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The metaphysics of representation poses questions such as: in virtue of what does a sen-
tence, picture, or mental state represent that the world is a certain way? In the first instance, I
have focused on the semantic properties of language: for example, what is it for a name such as
‘London’ to refer to something?
Interpretationism concerning what it is for linguistic expressions to have meaning, says
that constitutively, semantic facts are fixed by best semantic theory. As here developed, it
promises to give a reductive, universal and non-revisionary account of the nature of linguistic
representation.
Interpretationism in general, however, is threatened by severe internal tension, due to argu-
ments for radical inscrutability. These contend that, given the interpretationist setting, there
can be no fact of the matter what object an individual word refers to: for example, that there is
no fact of the matter as to whether “London” refers to London or to Sydney.
A series of challenges emerge, forming the basis for this thesis.
1. What sort of properties is the interpretationist trying to reduce, and what kind of reductive
story is she offering?
2. How are inscrutability theses best formulated? Are arguments for inscrutability effective
in their own terms? What kinds of inscrutability arise?
3. Is endorsing radical inscrutability a stable position?
4. Are there theoretical virtues—such as simplicity—that can be appealed to in discrediting
the rival (empirically equivalent) theories that underpin inscrutability arguments?
In addressing these questions, I concentrate on diagnosing the source of inscrutability, map-
ping the space of ways of resisting the arguments for radical inscrutability, and examining the
challenges faced in developing a principled account of linguistic content that avoids radical in-
scrutability. The effect is not to close down the original puzzles, but rather to sharpen them into
a set of new and deeper challenges.
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Anticipation
My theme is the inscrutability of reference: the idea that, in a range of cases, there may be no
fact of the matter about what it is our words refer to. The thesis is divided into four parts:
1. The framework;
2. Arguing for inscrutability;
3. Against radical inscrutability;
4. Avoiding radical inscrutability.
In this introduction, I shall sketch the contents of each part, and of the chapters within them.
Part I: The framework
Some think that arguments for the inscrutability of reference are perfectly general, or generaliz-
able.1 I do not think this is the case: I regard them rather as local issues arising within particular
philosophical treatments of the representational content of language. Part I describes and de-
velops “interpretationism” as a reductive account of linguistic content in which inscrutability
puzzles do arise.
Chapter 1 “The semantic project” describes the general landscape in which the thesis op-
erates, and lays out terminology. It contains three sections. First, I discuss the motivation
for attributing semantic properties to words. Second, I make the Quinean distinction between
the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, and locate versions of Davidsonian truth-
1Putnam’s notorious ‘just more theory’ argument attempts this. It is briefly discussed in Chapter 8, §8.1 below.
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theoretic and Montagovian intensional semantics within this. I discuss possible relations be-
tween semantics and an account of the cognitive significance of sentences.
Third, I characterize the metasemantic project: to give an account of the nature of the facts
apparently uncovered by a semantic theory of language. I accept Fodor and Field’s challenge to
reduce the intentional to the non-intentional. Finally, I explain how ‘interpretationist’ metase-
mantics can be seen as answering this challenge, and briefly describe three versions: Lewis’
convention-based approach, so-called ‘global descriptivism’, and Davidsonian radical interpre-
tation.2
Chapter 2 “Reductive Paraphrase” offers an account of interpretationism as a metaphysics
of meaning. It construes it as a reductive paraphrase—systematically pairing semantic vocab-
ulary (‘refers’ ‘is true’) with non-semantic surrogates. The main body of the chapter develops
the conception of paraphrase in play. I argue for a Quinean conception of the significance of
paraphrase, as constrained by the philosophical purposes at hand, rather than as uncovering the
semantic or pragmatic content of the problematic discourse. I set out a form of paraphrase com-
mon to a number of philosophical ‘fictionalisms’, and look in detail at a general problem for
such views: the puzzle of ‘incomplete fictions’.3
I outline how one can view interpretationist metasemantic theories as allowing a ‘theory-
shadowing’ (i.e. broadly fictionalist) paraphrase, reducing the semantic to non-semantic facts.
I defend the account in detail against charges that the apparatus induces circularity.
Part II: Arguing for inscrutability
I characterized inscrutability of reference as the thesis that there is ‘no fact of the matter’
about what our words refer to. The second part of the thesis examines what ‘no fact of the
matter’ comes to within the interpretationist framework, and develops several arguments for
disturbing—even untenable—forms of inscrutability within the interpretationist setting.
2See Davidson (1973), Lewis (1975) and Lewis (1984), respectively. Further references are given in the chapter.
3The puzzle is formulated, for the case of modal fictionalism, in Rosen (1990).
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The first section of Chapter 3, “Inscrutability theses”, describes how arguments for in-
scrutability can be based on the interpretationist metasemantic proposal. The constraints on
the ‘meaning-fixing’ semantic theory is just that it account for a set of data pairing sentences
with truth-values or propositions, so if a range of semantic theories all accomplish this, there is
prima facie no choosing between them. If there is no fact of the matter about which semantic
theory fixes meaning, there will be no fact of the matter which of the various (incompatible)
claims they make hold good.
The main question this chapter addresses is: how are we to formulate the claim that reference
is inscrutable, both as theorists, and as speakers of the language in question? Two proposals
are described and compared. The first is a version of ‘supervaluationism’; the second rests
entirely on the way of paraphrasing semantic facts put forward in Chapter 2. The proposals are
clearly distinct, but neither seems to have a clear advantage over the other. In this context, I
defend supervaluationism against the charge that it engenders departures from classical logic.4
In Appendix A I argue that even if we treat consequence ‘globally’, a proper and well-motivated
supervaluational framework will accord with classical logic in its entirety.
Chapter 4: “Gavagai again” focuses on Quine’s most famous argument for the inscrutability
of reference: the ‘argument from below’ from “Word and Object” (Quine, 1960). I distinguish
two types of inscrutability promoted by Quine’s discussion: inscrutability over the analysis of
predication (e.g. over cashing-out predication in terms of sets and set-membership, universals
and instantiation, mereological sums and part-whole, or simply by utilizing a primitive notion
of ‘application’) and inscrutability over the division of reference (e.g. whether ‘rabbit’ applies
to rabbits, instantaneous rabbit-stages, or undetached rabbit parts, for example). Prima facie
the two issues are orthogonal, and I focus on the latter.
I outline certain technical objections to the Quinean argument for ‘division inscrutability’.5
My response is to set out three systematic semantic theories of fragments of English, that divide
reference along the three lines that Quine suggests. These are drawn initially from the literature
4Alleged by Williamson (1994) among others.
5These are drawn from Evans (1975) and Fodor (1993).
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on persistence: worm theory, stage theory, and a generalization of the ‘counterpart theoretic’
ideas of Lewis (1968); Sider (1996a) to spatial extension.6 I then examine how the technical
objections play out. My conclusion is that, at least in the instantaneous rabbit-stage/perduring
rabbit dispute, the case for division inscrutability is strong. I end by suggesting that such in-
scrutability, against initial appearances, should not be disquieting.
The fifth chapter turns to inscrutability arguments that are prima facie extremely disquieting:
permutation-based and completeness-based arguments for radical inscrutability of reference.7
I set out the former in an extremely general setting: a double indexed general semantics in the
tradition of Montague and Lewis.8 I outline a small but significant extension of the inscrutabil-
ity argument. The conclusion would be indexical inscrutability—it being indeterminate from
one context to the next whether reference of a term remains the same. Finally, I outline two set-
tings where the permutation argument breaks down: a structured-propositions framework and a
Davidsonian truth-theory.9 These do not, however, resolve the problem of radical inscrutability:
but they relocate the issue in an interesting way.
Permutation arguments have one potentially serious defect: they characterize deviant inter-
pretations in a way parasitic on an ‘intended interpretation’. Arguments for radical inscrutabil-
ity based on completeness results are slightly less general, but may ultimately prove more robust
(as discussed in the final chapter of the thesis). I describe the way these work, and in Appendix
B I give the details of completeness and compactness for a first-order language, and sketch the
Henkin (1950) proof for completeness of an (extensional) type theory.
6The generalization is due to unpublished work by Wolfgang Schwarz.
7I reserve the term for this case where the putative inscrutability of reference is ‘total’, and do not apply it to
putative “Gavagai” style inscrutability.
The permutation argument can be found, in various forms, in Jeffrey (1964); Quine (1964); Field (1975); Wal-
lace (1977); Putnam (1978a); Davidson (1979); Putnam (1981). The completeness/compactness arguments are
mentioned by Putnam (1980).
8In the main text, I develop the permutation argument for a ‘pure categorial language’; in appendix C I extend
this to a version of a λ-categorial language. (For the distinction between these frameworks, see Cresswell (1973)).
9For the former, see Soames (1989); for the latter, Davidson (1967) and Larson and Segal (1995).
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Part III: Against Radical Inscrutability
Davidson (1977) recommends we regard radical inscrutability as a discovery: there really is no
fact of the matter about what our words refer to. Part three of the thesis considers reasons why
this view might be unstable. I begin by outlining a number of putative reasons for rejecting
radical inscrutability (first amongst them, the incredulous stare it generates). I then turn to
extended discussion of two objections.
In chapter 6 “Lexical semantic beliefs” I put forward what I take to be a more serious
concern: that radical inscrutability would be inconsistent with a ‘cognitive’ account of under-
standing. Drawing on work by Richard Heck, I outline a case for ascribing to speakers beliefs
about the truth-conditions of sentences. This rests on what we need to do in order to represent
speaker’s linguistic actions as rational. Pointing to cases of subsentential speech acts, I argue
that the same considerations implicate beliefs about reference in this picture of language use. I
finish by outlining one response: accepting the need for beliefs about reference, but claiming
that we can have (true) beliefs about the references of our words, due to a matching inscrutabil-
ity in the contents of our thoughts, construed as expressions in ‘mentalese’.10
Chapter 7 “Good inference and context” picks up indexical inscrutability result of chapter
five, and argues that it will imperil the link between implication (what follows from what)
and inference (what it is good to infer). I outline a puzzle for the Kaplanian treatment of
consequence for indexical languages, and show how a certain modest proposal can resolve it.
The modest proposal, however, involves the presupposition that the reference of an expressions
is constant over time. I respond to objections to my account, and offer my own objections to
alternative accounts.
Part IV: Avoiding Inscrutability
The arguments for radical inscrutability are based on the assumption that every semantic theory
that ‘fits’ a certain range of data about the truth-values or truth-conditions of sentences is equally
10As noted below, it may be that the beliefs are only ‘pseudo-semantic’—the relevant factor being that they can
discharge the required theoretical role of genuine beliefs about reference.
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good, by interpretationist lights. In the final section of the thesis, I explore what happens when
we add additional constraints to the selection of the meaning-fixing theory.
Chapter Eight “Eligibility” begins with methodological discussion of what sorts of supple-
mentations of the interpretationist picture are philosophically defensible. The most promising
principled response to inscrutability concerns I find in the literature is that offered by David
Lewis (1983a, 1984): the ‘Eligibility’ response. I show that Lewis’ ‘eligibility constraint’, and
in particular, some prima facie peculiar aspects of it, is motivated directly from Lewis’ inter-
pretationism, when combined with several theses to which he is independently committed. This
makes for an attractive package in the abstract, for it makes clear why the eligibility response is
not ad hoc, but rather flows naturally from the interpretationist framework.
The proposal faces severe limitations. I argue that, in the case of global descriptivism, a
‘revenge’ problem arises. Inscrutability may be dealt with, but there are non-sceptical scenarios
where the ‘intended’ interpretation is demonstrably less eligible than the kind of model we
can build out of the natural numbers using Henkin-style techniques. I offer a way out to the
Lewisian: if they accept Armstrongian Universals at a macroscopic level, the revenge problem
dissipates.11 To avoid inscrutability in the Lewisian fashion, then, we may have to forswear
microphysicalism.
11To equal effect, they could adopt what plays the role of ‘emergent’ sparse properties in alternative inegalitarian






This chapter has two aims. In the first section, I introduce and motivate what I call ‘the initial
semantic challenge’: to systematize the truth-conditions attaching to sentences. I give reasons
for moving to a systematic theory that attributes semantic properties to individual words, rather
than resting content with a mere listing of the truth-conditions.
I then turn to questions of the proper ambition of semantic project, and the nature of the
resources we are to exploit when addressing it. I use Quine’s distinction between theories of
reference and theories of meaning to focus this discussion. The conclusion is that, so far as the
initial semantic challenge is concerned, both in ambition and execution we can remain within
the theory of reference, so long as (contra Quine) modal resources form a legitimate part of this
domain. This leaves open the question of the relation between a semantic theory and an account
of the cognitive significance of language. I finish this section by outlining a number of ways in
which the two projects may be related.
I turn next to the topic that forms the theme for this thesis: the problem of intentionality,
conceived as the challenge to give a broadly reductive account of representation properties,
including mental content and semantic content. Metasemantic theories focus on the latter ele-
ment. I briefly describe how a familiar account—the causal theory of reference—fits into this
setting, and introduce some strategic issues facing any metasemantic account.
Our focus in this thesis is on a particular metasemantic approach: interpretationist theories.
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I introduce the ‘two-step’ form common to such theories, and sketch three versions: David
Lewis’ convention-based account; global descriptivism; and Donald Davidson’s radical inter-
pretation. I finish by emphasizing the flexibility of interpretationism: in particular, there is no
reason to suppose that it cannot be extended from natural languages to the language of thought;
and no reason to think that it is committed to any objectionable semantic holism.
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1.1 Semantic properties
The first half of this chapter discusses semantic properties. We start from the assumption that
sentences have semantic properties: that they are systematically true and false in various cir-
cumstances. Do we have any reason to attribute other semantic properties?
We first look at reasons for positing, and developing a theory of, the semantic properties of
individual words. What prompts the move from noting the distribution of truth-conditions to
discerning, for example, reference relations between words and objects?
The second part of this chapter looks at the relationship between the project thus motivated,
and the attempt to theorize about the fine-grained ‘meaning’ of words. I argue that the two
projects are at least in principle separable; and outline some of the ways in which they may
interact.
1.1.1 From truth-conditions to reference.
I take the following two principles as my starting point.
1. Given a sentence S, in one’s own language, or in the language of another, one can evaluate
whether what S says holds in various counterfactual situations. That is, sentences have
truth-conditions.
2. At least in part, these truth-conditions are systematically sensitive to the (syntactic) parts
of the sentence.
Though philosophers have questioned them, and there are certainly refinements and qualifica-
tions to be undertaken, to abandon them altogether would be a major revisionary project.1 In
1One such revisionary project would be a pure ‘disquotationalism’, where a truth predicate may be introduced
stipulatively through the laying down of the scheme:
‘S’ is true iff S
The resources thus introduced will be restricted in application to ascriptions of truth in one’s own language. A
pure disquotationism would insist that this was the only legitimate concept of truth. Consequently (1) would have
to be given up (cf Gupta and Martı´nez-Ferna´ndez, 2005). Moderate disquotationists introduce a “use-dependent”
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what follows, I assume that (1) and (2) are correct.2
What do (1) and (2) describe? Effectively, they tell us of a range of facts that display a
certain holistic interlocking character. Three instances of the kind of truth-conditional facts
mentioned in (1) are the following:
• ‘Billy runs’ is true in all and only actual or counterfactual situations where Billy runs
• ‘Susan runs’ is true in all and only actual or counterfactual situations where Susan runs
• ‘Billy walks’ is true in all and only actual or counterfactual situations where Billy walks
Such facts are not unrelated. When we substitute one name or predicate for another, there is
a predictable relationship between the truth-conditions of the initial and the resulting sentence.
The situations that make-true ‘Billy runs’ and those that make-true ‘Billy walks’ both feature
Billy doing something. The situations that make-true ‘Billy runs’ and those that make-true ‘Su-
san runs’ both feature someone running. Moreover, such connections support counterfactuals:
Were it the case that a given sentence S had some alternative truth-conditions, we expect knock-
on consequences for the truth-conditions of sentences other than S. For example, given the
syntactic properties of language, had the string ‘Billy runs’ been true exactly in those situations
where Maxwell runs, then ‘Billy walks’ would have been true exactly in those situations where
Maxwell walks.
So far, I have simply described a range of systematic and counterfactually robust connec-
tions between the truth-conditions of sentences. It would be a further step to account for these
connections by postulating an underlying level of semantic properties of individual words: for
example, names referring to objects, and there being conditions under which a predicate applies
to an object. Yet the move to this level is extremely natural. We want to say that ‘Billy runs’
notion of truth, exploiting translation into one’s own language; they can therefore accept (1). See essays 3-5 of
Field (2001b) and Field (2005); Loewer (2005); McGee (2005b). Such moderate disquotationalism is discussed
below, as one way of avoiding the morals that I draw from (1) and (2).
2One important refinement is that we should distinguish what it is for a sentence to be true when evaluated
at a situation w from its being true as uttered in that situation. This distinction is particularly important when
analyzing indexical sentences (Kaplan, 1989b; Stalnaker, 1978). For example “I am here now”, as uttered by me,
is false when evaluated with respect to a situation in which I have moved from the spot in which I currently stand
(that is what makes the sentence contingent). However, it is tempting to think that in all situations in which that
sentence type is uttered, it will be true. Which of these two (1) and (2) are concerned with depends on how we are
to understand the notion of ‘what is said’ by a sentence. See Stanley (2002).
CHAPTER 1. THE SEMANTIC PROJECT 12
and ‘Billy walks’ are each made-true by situations where Billy is doing something, because (A)
‘Billy’ refers to the individual Billy; and (B) generally, a sentence of the form ‘N walks’/‘N
runs’ will be true in those situations where the individual referred to by N is walking/running
respectively.
The challenge to give a theory of the semantic properties of words, from which we can
derive the truth-conditional properties of sentences, I call the initial semantic challenge. If the
challenge is accepted, nothing further needs to be said to motivate the project of semantics,
understood simply as addressing the initial semantic challenge.
Since much of this thesis is taken up in examining the problems and puzzles that arise
in giving a philosophical account of the facts invoked by this further level of theorizing, it is
worth asking why we are moved to theorize at this level. Why should we take this ‘further’ step?
Why not rest content with merely noting the systematic and counterfactually robust connections
between the truth-conditions of sentences?3 (For the time being, I assume that any ‘further’
theorizing here will take the form of ascribing referential semantic properties to words. There
are those, such as Dummett (1991) and Field (2001a) who would propose a different kind of
substantive theorizing, which I briefly discuss in a subsequent section).
The source of the challenge I: autonomous explanation
I have sympathy for the following description of the situation. Quite generally, we explain
observed patterns by postulating an underlying system from which the pattern can be derived.
The underlying system, if it were present, would allow a powerful explanation of the data. If
asked why we postulate any such system, rather than presenting a ‘theory’ which simply lists
3Foster (1976, p.2) argues that no substantive semantic project is motivated unless it has the ambition to account
for speakers’ competence in a language. Absent this, Foster suggests one might as well put forward a semantic
theory that consists of the infinitary schema: T (S)↔ p, where, in each case S is the object-language translation
of the metalinguistic p. I have nothing against the project of accounting for linguistic competence: we discuss
this below. The question here is whether Foster’s claim that only linguistic competence could motivate substantive
semantics. I argue that this is not the case.
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the data, the reply is that on grounds of simplicity, unification, predictive power and so on,
an underlying system provides better explanation than would a mere listing of the data. The
data supports the postulation of an underlying system by inference to the best explanation. In
the case at hand, the theory which ascribes referential properties to names and predicates—
semantic theory—is explanatory of the pattern of truth-conditions of sentences in a way that a
mere listing of the truth-conditions is not. Inference to the best explanation thus pressures us to
take the ‘further’ step to systematic semantic theorizing.
The idea that semantics is in this way autonomous is well expressed by Scott Soames:
. . . one should look to [semantics] for an explication of the representational char-
acter of language. The central semantic fact about language is that it is used to
represent the world. Sentences do this by systematically encoding information that
characterizes the world as being one way or another. Semantics is the study of this
information, and the principles by which it is encoded.
(Soames, 1989, p.591)
I hold that (1) and (2), together with inference to the best explanation, motivate the initial se-
mantic challenge and thus the project of semantic theorizing, in complete independence from
any role in broader explanatory projects. To defend this view, and in particular the appeal to
inference to the best explanation, would take us deep into issues of the nature of explanation,
its methodological and epistemological significance, and applicability in relatively a priori dis-
ciplines such as semantics. I do not undertake this task here.4
The source of the challenge II: wider explanatory projects
Even if the ‘minimal’ and autonomous motivation for semantic theorizing just canvassed is re-
jected, there are various other pressures to indulge in semantic theorizing. The most famous of
these is a putative connection between semantic theorizing and accounts of linguistic compe-
tence. Some indeed, see it as the only reason to engage in semantics (Foster, 1976). But even
4Notice, in particular, that accounts of inference to the best explanation that focus on causal explanation (cf.
Lewis (1986b), Lipton (1991, ch.3)) will be problematic in the current, relatively a priori context. But there are
other paradigms that look more promising: for example, the deductive-nomological model of explanation. See
Lipton (1991, passim) for much relevant discussion and criticism.
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while resisting this extreme view, we may still agree that linguistic competence provides one
reason to engage in semantics—much as an interest in fundamental physics may provide one
reason for researching pure mathematics.5
Foster starts with the view that linguistic competence with S can be identified with knowl-
edge of the truth-conditions of S. Since we are presumably competent with a potentially infinite
variety of sentences, this immediately gives rise to puzzles about how we could have learned
this infinite amount of information, and how we manage to store such information in our finite
heads. An influential thought in response, abstractly stated, is that knowledge of potentially
infinitely-many pieces of information is explicable, when we can identify a finite set of prin-
ciples which entail the whole infinitary range of information. All we need do then is to credit
agents with knowledge of this basic set (a finite learning/storage achievement) and the ability
to derive consequences from this stored data.6 One thing that semantic theory delivers is a way
of encapsulating an infinitary range of data about the truth-conditions of sentences, within a
finitely statable theory. Hence, one natural route to explaining how infinite linguistic compe-
tence is achieved by finite agents, is to credit the agents with knowledge of semantic theory.7
One need not buy into the ‘cognitive’ approach which identifies competence with knowledge
of truth-conditions to see the attractions of building semantic theory into one’s explanation of
linguistic competence. Psychologically and neurophysiologically, as well as philosophically,
it would be good to explain how an ability to understand potentially infinitely many novel
sentences could be grounded in finite minds. Hence the attraction of ‘mentalist’ assumptions
about semantics in linguistics (cf. Davis and Gillon, 2004, ch.5); of the conception of semantic
5Soames (op cit) takes a view diametrically opposed to Foster. As quoted above, he holds that semantics
is motivated autonomously as the study of the principles whereby linguistic representation is effected. But he
also holds that semantic theorizing is ill-suited to the project of explaining competence. I discuss the relationship
between the kind of semantic theories that Soames prefers and the project of accounting for ‘cognitive significance’
and linguistic competence later. See also Dowty (1979, ch.8.)
6See Chomsky on the analogous issue with syntactic knowledge.
7Foster and Davidson both state their aims a little more circumspectly: they want to explain linguistic compe-
tence by showing how it could be encapsulated by finite agents. They avoid saying that knowledge of semantic
theory is what actually underlies linguistic competence.
For other philosophers endorsing the argument from a cognitive conception of competence (understanding as
knowledge of meaning) to an interest in compositional semantic theories, see Dummett (1976), Evans (1981),
Heck (forthcoming) .
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theory as describing the information held in our ‘semantic module’ (Larson and Segal, 1995), as
well as of the claim within philosophy of language that understanding is knowledge of meaning.
In all cases, interest in explaining linguistic competence provides a reason to be interested in
semantic theory. Interest in any one of these projects would provide a motivation to take the
‘further step’ beyond noting relations between truth-conditions of whole sentences.
The source of the challenge III: counterfactually robust connections
The above discussion focuses on ‘interlocking’ truth-conditions of sentences. Our initial charac-
terization of the data noted another feature: the interlocking of the truth-conditions of sentences
is apparently counterfactually robust. Were ‘Billy walks’ to have truth-conditions other than
those it actually has, the truth-conditions of other sentences would alter accordingly. A standard
pattern for explaining counterfactual connections looks at the possible situations involving least
disruption to the actual ways things are, but which render the antecedent of the counterfactual
true; and then checks to see whether the consequent holds of the situation constructed.8 We can
fit the counterfactuals from p.11 into this pattern, by making appeal to the referential properties
of ‘Billy’. Given the way that reference and truth-conditions are compositionally related, letting
‘Billy’ refer to Maxwell, and holding all other lexical semantic facts fixed, we have a situation
giving rise to the truth-conditions mentioned in the antecedent of the counterfactual. Moreover,
this is plausibly the least disruptive way to accommodate the counterfactual supposition. But
also, that situation makes true the consequent of the counterfactual. The counterfactual is thus
straightforwardly vindicated.
If we were barred from appealing to the layer of lexical semantic facts, we would be left
with a situation where, counterfactually supposing one sentence to have some property, we find
knock-on effects for an (ex hypothesi) entirely unconnected property possessed by some other
sentence. Brute counterfactual connections are rightly regarded with suspicion. Avoiding brute
8See Lewis (1979b). The challenge, of course, is to spell out what ‘least disruption’ amounts to. Lewis’ account
appeals to laws of nature. I would generalize this to an account that would allow appeal to laws of any special or
fundamental science—including semantics.
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counterfactual connections, then, provides us with our final reason for moving to the level of
subsentential semantic theorizing.9
To summarize: the systematic and counterfactually robust connections between the truth-
conditional properties of sentences make pressing the initial semantic challenge in two ways.
First, the systematic connections themselves demand an underlying explanation. I have a
favoured view on what motivates the step from a mere listing of the truth-conditions of sen-
tences, to subsentential semantic theorizing. However, I need not be over-committal on this
point: a whole variety of explanatory projects, centrally those seeking to explain semantic com-
petence, will require us to take the ‘further’ step. I need only maintain here that there is some
well-motivated explanatory project of which subsentential semantic theory forms part. Second,
the counterfactual robustness of these connections is itself barely intelligible if those connec-
tions are taken to be brute, rather than resting on an underlying basis of subsentential meaning.
1.1.2 The theory of reference and the theory of meaning
We have just seen considerations pointing in favour of discerning semantic properties of words,
as well as of complete sentences. We now turn to the question of the relation between the project
thus motivated and another: that of accounting for the cognitive significance of words.
Quine’s distinction
Quine distinguishes two kinds of projects within semantics, broadly construed:
9One response would be to attempt a similar explanation without appeal to semantic properties of individual
words. For example, one might think there are causal-explanatory connections between words and parts of the
world, and the truth-conditions had by sentences. The closest world counterfactual supposition holds is one where
those relations differ; and this explains why the consequent holds.
The line of response is strategically good. However, the details look difficult. For example, the same kind of
robust variation in truth-condition would appear to occur in discourse where we are not plausibly in any straightfor-
ward causal relationship with the items in question—for example, in discourse about abstracta. Thanks to Carrie
Jenkins for pressing me on this point.
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When the cleavage between meaning and reference is properly heeded, the prob-
lems of what is loosely called semantics become separated into two provinces so
fundamentally distinct as not to deserve a joint appellation at all. They may be
called the theory of meaning and the theory of reference.. . . The main concepts
in the theory of meaning, apart from meaning itself, are synonymy (or sameness
of meaning), significance (or possession of meaning) and analyticity (or truth by
virtue of meaning).. . . The main concepts in the theory of reference are naming,
truth, denotation (or truth-of) and extension. Another is the notion of values of
variables.
(Quine, 1953, p.130-1)
The distinction between these two projects can be brought out by considering the famous
pair of sentences (Frege, 1892):
Phosphorus is Phosphorus
Hesperus is Phosphorus
The sentences have the same truth-value, and the words have the same reference. Indeed, or-
thodoxy has it that these two sentences agree in truth-conditions—since true identity statements
are necessary, every situation in which one is true is a situation in which the other is true.10 As
far as the theory of reference is concerned, we can treat ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ on a par,
assigning them each the self-same semantic value.
On the other hand, it seems that we can know that the first sentence is true purely on the
basis of our understanding of the terms involved; not so for the second. They are not ‘cogni-
tively’ or ‘analytically’ equivalent. It is hard to see, therefore, how one could give a theory of
understanding (semantic competence) that treated the two cases in the same way. Prima facie,
the theory of meaning, responsive to such demands, will have to be more fine-grained than the
theory of reference.
We want to know where to locate that project of semantic theorizing motivated by the initial
semantic challenge. There are really two questions here. First, what should our ambition be?
10See Kripke (1980) (originally published in 1972). For resistance to the orthodoxy, see Dummett (1973); Searle
(1983); Lewis (1984); Jackson (1997).
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Should it be to underpin a theory of cognitive significance, or should its goals be characterized
in terms drawn from the theory of reference? Second, what resources should we allow ourselves
in formulating truth-conditions and prosecuting our explanatory goal: should we use the kind
of rich vocabulary of the theory of meaning, or the more sparse equipment of the theory of
reference?
The initial semantic challenge gives us our handle on this issue. It sets out the relevant kind
of ambition: to systematize the truth-conditional properties of sentences. Our question then is
what kind of properties truth-conditions are; and whether they are of the family that includes
analyticity and synonymy (the theory of meaning) or whether they are more closely aligned to
concepts of the theory of reference—reference, satisfaction and so forth.
We shall illustrate this issue by examining how it plays out with respect to two ways of
formulating truth-conditions, corresponding to distinct frameworks for prosecuting the semantic
project: truth-theoretic semantics and intensional semantics.
Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics
Davidson’s original project illustrates the way in which a theory can have the ambition to ac-
count for rich semantic properties such as cognitive significance, yet use resources drawn from
the theory of reference. He recommends we formulate the truth-conditions of sentences in
biconditionals such as:
‘Schnee ist weiss’ is true iff snow is white.11
Davidson then adapts Tarksi’s theory of truth to show how axioms about the reference and
application conditions of subsentential expressions allow one to construct a theory where such
11I use ‘iff’ throughout as shorthand for ‘if and only if’. Throughout, I drop relativization to particular languages.
The reader should have no problems adding such relativizations if required. (In fact, I do this for principled reasons:
I thin that inter-linguistic homonyms should be treated as distinct words having relatively categorical semantic
properties; rather than there being a single word which has different semantic properties relative to its use in two
languages. For an account of word-individuation that cuts across orthographic or phonographic type, see Kaplan
(1990).
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‘T-sentences’ are derivable. Because derivability is at issue, there is potentially a distinction in
status between the following pair of truth-conditions:
(a) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true iff Hesperus is Phosphorus
(b) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true iff Phosphorus is Phosphorus
It would take an additional axiom of the theory (stating that Hesperus = Phosphorus) to let us
interderive these two sentences. Hence, distinctions of cognitive significance might be cap-
tured by means of this syntactic way of presenting truth-conditions; and this without utilizing
resources beyond those of the theory of reference.
Notice, however, that we are not required to exploit this fine-grainedness of the truth-
theoretic setting. If our conception of truth-conditions draws no distinction between (a) and
(b), then derivation of either would suffice to discharge the initial semantic challenge. Given
such a coarser-grained conception of truth-conditions, the truth-theoretic framework still gives
us a way of stating truth-conditions of sentences using resources purely from the theory of
reference.
In sum, then, there are more and less ambitious ways of implementing the truth-theoretic ac-
count, according to whether or not we take truth-conditions to coincide with cognitive significance—
this identification is allowed, but not mandated, by the Davidsonian framework. Whichever way
we go as regards the ambition of the project, the resources exploited do not go beyond the theory
of reference, strictly construed.
Intensional semantics and modality
The alternative way of formulating truth-conditions we discuss here is inherently modal. To
begin with, notice that it is natural to take the truth-conditions of a sentence as captured by
counterfactual conditionals (whether the sentence would be true if uttered in a given situa-
tion); or, more abstractly, as a matter of the sentence’s truth-values with respect to actual and
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counterfactual situations.12 From this perspective, we naturally think of truth-conditions as
‘world-conditions’—the set of conditions (i.e. possible worlds) where the sentence is true.13
A striking departure from the Davidsonian setting is the heavy use of modal machinery.
Even formulating the ambition involves modal notions.14 The natural way of implementing
the semantic project, with truth-conditions formulated in this way, is through possible world
or intensional semantics. Such a setting requires more than appeal to modal notions such as
necessity, possibility, and (arguably) counterfactuals: it requires quantification over possible
objects—talking donkeys, blue swans and merely possible situations.15
Two points are in order. First, that allowing quantification over possibilia allows one to
define modal notions, and formulate possible-world semantics, in a purely first order way.16
Second, that the increase in ontology must be defended; and if it is not construed literally,
some reductive or deflationary story must be offered.17 One concern is that this reductive or
deflationary project might lead us back around to notions drawn from the theory of meaning.
In fact, this is exactly how Quine conceived of notions of necessity—he held that a sentence
‘necessarily p’ should be understood as asserting the analyticity of the sentence ‘p’.18 It will be
simplest if we finesse these issues, and assume pro tem an account of modality and possibilia
that do not lead us back into the theory of meaning. I therefore take as a working hypothesis the
12The former understanding of ‘truth-conditions’ arguably would not capture the semantic content of the sen-
tence; it would rather capture the ‘diagonal content’ or ‘A-intension’. Either this notion or semantic content (‘hori-
zontal’ or ‘C-intension’) are standardly represented in terms of functions from possible worlds to truth-values; but
only the former is easily understood in couterfactual terms. For these distinctions, see Stalnaker (1978); Chalmers
(1996); Jackson (1998).
13See Stalnaker (1984) and Lewis (1986c) for defence of the general idea of identifying truth-conditions with
‘worlds-conditions’.
14One way of resiting this, though, would be to formulate truth-conditions counterfactually, rather than in terms
of functions from worlds to truth-values, and then argue that counterfactual conditionals are not themselves modal.
See Edgington (1995); Stalnaker (1984) for accounts of counterfactuals as projections of belief-revision policies.
15For recent discussion of the relation between modality and such possibilia, see Nolan (1997b); Sider (2002);
Fine (2003).
16That is, the semantics for a multiply intentional type theory can be given in first order set theory with possibilia
as urrelemente.
17Famously, David Lewis takes the existence of concrete cosmoi corresponding to all the ways the world could
be, at least in part in order to give a reduction of modal ideology to the non-modal (cf. Lewis, 1986c, §1.2).
18This is Quine’s ‘second grade of modal involvement’, alleged to involve use/mention confusion. Quine fa-
mously rejected even the notion of ‘analyticity’, so even the ‘first grade’ of modal involvement was too much for
him.
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modalist assumption that notions such as possibility and necessity can be taken as primitive, and
need no independent explication; and combine this with either the kind of reduction of possibilia
talk to talk of modality canvassed in Sider (2002); or the related ersatz-worlds proposal of Nolan
(1997b). I would argue that these accounts need not appeal to representational resources.19 If
so, then intensional semantics involves no resources beyond the theory of reference plus modal
primitives and abstracta.20
Given our assumptions, possible worlds semantics does not bring in the devices of theory of
meaning. Just as with Davidson’s project, one might deploy the semantic theory to account for
cognitive significance on the basis of independent resources—in this case, the material of the
theory of reference+primitive modality. As originally conceived, possible-worlds or intensional
semantics did have the ambition to account for the cognitive significance of sentences, aiming to
explicate Frege’s notion of sense. The contention was that paradigmatic examples of cognitively
significant identities such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ became false when evaluated at other
possible worlds. These claims were famously rejected by Kripke, who put forward a persuasive
case that such identities were necessary truths. Given the Kripkean orthodoxy, the original
ambition is not discharged.21
In the present context, the only impact of this observation is that the ambition of intensional
semantics should not be to account for cognitive significance, in the first instance, but to focus
on explaining truth-conditions. As it turns out, possible world semantics has proved hugely
successful in giving satisfying theories of the truth-conditional structure of complex parts of
language, for example modal discourse, counterfactuals and indicative conditionals, indexicals;
as well as less obviously modal parts of language.22 It is not obvious how to replicate these
19The reasons for this are the same as those presented in §2.3 below for similar ‘fictionalist’ proposals.
20Of course, it might turn out that best theory in the philosophy of modality recommends some alternative
account—perhaps even one that recalls the pre-Quinean link between conventionality and modality (cf. Sider,
2003).
21The recent trend towards two-dimensional semantics, in the hands of Jackson (1998) and Chalmers (1996),
might be thought to resurrect a version of this original ambition. See below.
22Two famous works within this tradition familiar to philosophers are Lewis (1973b) on counterfactuals and
Kaplan (1989b) on indexicals. Partee (1996) surveys the development and successes of Montague-style intensional
semantics. Thomason (1974a) collects the writings of Montague himself on these topics. Lewis (1970a), Cresswell
(1973) and Thomason (1974b) are clear introductions to the technical machinery. The introduction to Davis and
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successes in less rich settings.
Summary
I have characterized the initial semantic challenge, and given several reasons for regarding it
as pressing. I now distinguish two ambitions for a semantic theory: first, to account for the
properties characterizable by the theory of reference; second, to account for the rich notions of
the theory of meaning (centrally, the cognitive significance of sentences). Perhaps (as Davidson
and the originators of intensional semantics thought) the project of giving the truth-conditions of
sentences coincides with that of giving the cognitive significance of sentences. However, if this
connection is broken, the motivation provided by the initial semantic challenge requires only
that we pursue a systematic explanation of truth-conditions. The primary aim of the semantic
project is not to explain cognitive significance: it would be a happy accident if truth-conditions
and cognitive significance were to coincide.
The other question concerned the status of the resources used to formulate truth-conditions
and prosecute our project. On at least one of the ways of formulating truth-conditions, they
are formulated in modal or possibilist terms. Some (such as Quine) have claimed that modal
notions should be analyzed via the theory of meaning. We have assumed pro tem that this is
not the case, and under our supposition the initial semantic challenge and the framework for
addressing it can be formulated in terms drawn from the theory of reference, supplemented
with primitive modality.
Granting all this, we can still see the project of accounting for cognitive significance as
interesting and important; and one that is intimately connected to theories of linguistic compe-
tence. We now turn to the relationship between semantic theory, motivated in the way described
above, and ‘meaning’ richly construed.
Gillon (2004) surveys some different settings and extensions to the framework, and discuss rival approaches.
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1.1.3 The relation to meaning
Suppose that the oracle gave you the ultimate theory of the truth-conditions—every system-
atic variation is captured in an elegant way. Perhaps the truth-conditions the theory assigns to
sentences match intuitive differences between the meanings of different words, as Davidson
(1967) and others hope. But what if it doesn’t? What if the truth-conditions assigned to “Hes-
perus is Phosphorus” and “Hesperus is Hesperus” are the same? Surely there’s some interesting
difference between the two cases. What can be done?
There are numerous approaches to this issue; some are listed below:
• Reduce. Look within the semantic theory that the oracle gave you, and see whether it
contains the resources to account for the different standing of the two sentences. Even if
what corresponds to truth-conditions within the theory does not track ‘cognitive signifi-
cance’, some other semantic property of sentences might do so. First, if one is using an
intensional semantics, semantic values of sentences are usually identified with something
coarse-grained, such as a set of possible situations. But ‘fine grained propositions’ can
be defined, by labelling the nodes of a syntactic tree for the sentence with the semantic
values of the respective parts.23 Second, are there semantic resources beyond semantic
content (or ‘C-intensions’). Many theories include a notion of character—or systematic
variation in content in different circumstances. Several would claim that there is a dif-
ference in the character (and the related “A-intension”) of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” and
“Hesperus is Hesperus”. 24
• Bring in the cavalry. If the semantic theory alone does not provide all the resources one
needs to make discriminations between sentences with intuitively distinct meanings, then
one can look to other independently motivated theories for help. Two examples are given
23See Lewis (1970a). Compare the ‘interpreted logical forms’ of Larson and Ludlow (1993).
24C-intensions and A-intensions are two constructions within ‘two-dimensional’ intensional semantics. The two-
dimensional framework is motivated to handle the behaviour of indexical expressions: see (Kaplan, 1989b; Perry,
1977). For the extension of this from paradigmatic indexicals to language in general see Lewis (1980); Jackson
(1998); Chalmers (1996). For scepticism of this deployment of the two-dimensional framework, see Stalnaker
(2001).
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below: they are each highly controversial, but give a flavour of the way that non-semantic
theories might help to ease the theoretical burden on semantic theory proper.
The first example is Robert Stalnaker’s project, as set out in the essays collected in (Stal-
naker, 1999a). There it is argued that a proper theory of communication can show how as-
serting sentences with the same semantic content can have interestingly different conver-
sational effects—in particular, statements that are semantically trivial might nevertheless
be informatively uttered. For Stalnaker, the idea that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ differ
in semantic content is merely an illusion generated by the typically distinct pragmatic
effects of sentences containing those names.25 Here we have a recipe (albeit controver-
sial) for relocating cognitive significance away from semantic theory and into a combined
theory of semantics and pragmatics.
Our second example is Fodor’s appeal to non-intentionally individuated “modes of pre-
sentation”. Fodor (1993) identifies these with words in a ‘language of thought’, which are
individuated by computational role. The cognitive difference between ‘Hesperus shines’
and ‘Phosphorus shines’ is then located in the fact that the vehicle of the semantic content
is distinct in the two cases. Again, given a distinctive and controversial background the-
ory, differential cognitive significance no longer requires differences in semantic content.
• Check your motivations. What is the need for the differences in meaning? What theo-
retical function does making such distinctions serve? Is it possible to simply write off
distinctions not capturable by one of the tactics above? Can we, that is, eliminate appeal
to meanings from our best theory of the world, replacing any role they play by theoreti-
cally more tractable concepts?26
25For example, the differing informational content of speech acts differing only in substitution of co-referential
names is discussed in Stalnaker (1978, 1984); the use of empty names is discussed in Stalnaker (1978); belief
reports are discussed in Stalnaker (1987, 1988). The ‘problem of deduction’ is the main obstacle that Stalnaker
sees (1984; 1991; 1999b). Lewis (1979a, 1970a, 1986c) outline further resources that, though rejected by Stalnaker
himself, might be used within Stalnakerian project: centred worlds and fine-grained propositions.
26The famous eliminativist proposal is Quine’s, who notoriously gives up the ‘theory of meaning’ as a bad
job. Given his strict views on what counts as part of the theory of reference (the only remaining legitimate part
of semantics)—and in particular, his association of modal notions with the supposedly discredited concepts of
analyticity, Quine’s eliminativism is far more radical than that canvassed here.
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• Supplement. If one is dissatisfied by progress made through reduction and appeal to in-
dependent theories, and one holds that there are reasons for not eliminating the residual
phenomena, then one may need to supplement the theory with something else—a distinc-
tive meaning theory to complement the theory of truth-conditions. This need not embed
the theory of truth-conditions, but it had better be consistent with it.27 The classic ex-
ample of this move is, of course, Frege (1892), arguing for a theory of Sinn (sense) to
supplement his theory of Bedeutung (reference). Field (1977) recommends that we sup-
plement truth-theoretic semantics with an account of “conceptual role”, which he goes on
to characterize in a precise way.28
We have distinguished three motivations for undertaking the project of semantics: first,
to give a unified account of the pattern of truth-conditions of sentences (the initial semantic
challenge); second, to give an account of speaker’s semantic competence; third, to give a de-
scription of the facts underpinning robust counterfactual truth-conditional connections between
sentences.
I have urged that, at least if we do not share Quine’s hostility to modal concepts, the initial
semantic challenge can be formulated without appeal to terms drawn from the theory of mean-
ing. Two approaches were then identified: Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics; and model
theoretic/possible-worlds semantics. The methodological stance of limiting one’s ambitions to
accounting for truth-conditions of sentences does not foreclose a more ambitious project of
accounting for cognitive significance: we have just seen several ways in which the two may
27See the theories of meaning within linguistics described by Davis and Gillon (2004).
28The account of sameness of conceptual role, or equipollence, there characterized, is not easily extended beyond
an analysis of intralinguistic synonymy. This contrasts sharply with Frege, who placed great importance on the
shareability of sense; and those (such as Stalnaker) whose basic interest is in the study of communication, rather
than narrow psychological role. There is room in principle, therefore, for a three-way distinction: between truth-
conditional semantics, meaning in the psychological sense; and meaning in the communicative sense. As I hope
has become obvious, the relationship between these three projects is going to be a highly complex and controversial
matter.
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relate.
The ultimate semantic theory an oracle might give us would seemingly describe semantic
facts—that words refer to particular bits of the world; that sentences represent that the world is
thus-and-such a state. For the remainder of this chapter we will be looking at the philosophical
puzzles that emerge in accounting for such properties and outlining the kind of foundational
account that will be principal focus of this thesis.
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1.2 The problem of intentionality
Semantics itself is a research project that (in the first instance and with distinguished exceptions)
is prosecuted by linguists rather than philosophers. Nevertheless, given a semantic theory of the
Davidsonian or possible-worlds sort mentioned above, a distinctively philosophical question
can be asked: what is the nature of the facts that it describes?
The general issue concerns the metaphysics of representational properties. Philosophers
are interested in questions such as: in virtue of what does a sentence, picture, or mental state
represent that the world is a certain way? This is the problem of intentionality.
One approach is to simply be brutally non-reductionist about the intentional, to maintain that
there are emergent representational properties that cannot be explicated in other terms. Many
are dissatisfied with such an approach. For example, Fodor writes:
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they’ve
been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they
do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But
aboutness surely won’t; intentionality simply doesn’t go that deep. It’s hard to
see, in the face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality
without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the
intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or
supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic.
If aboutness is real, it must be really something else.
(Fodor, 1987, p.97)
and Field:
This doctrine, [which] might be called ‘semanticalism’, is the doctrine that there are
irreducibly semantic facts. The semanticalist claims, in other words, that semantic
phenomena (such as the fact that ‘Schnee’ refers to snow) must be accepted as
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primitive, in precisely the way that electromagnetic phenomena are accepted as
primitive (by those who accept Maxwell’s equations and reject the ether); and in
precisely the way that biological and mental phenomena are accepted as primitive
by vitalists and Cartesians. Semanticalism, like Cartesianism and vitalism, posits
nonphysical primitives, and as a physicalist I believe that all three doctrines must
be rejected.
(Field, 1972, p.12)
One might reasonably wonder whether the dichotomy these authors present is genuine.29 I
want to outline an account that accepts the challenge as presented: the overall goal is a reductive
account of the intentional. The specific project that concerns us here is a subproblem of the
problem of intentionality focused on the semantic properties of language. What is it for a name
such as ‘London’ to refer to something, or a predicate such as ‘is large’ to apply to some object?
Such questions naturally arise if we think that there are semantic facts such as that the French
word ‘Londres’ refers to London. Prima facie, if we are to take the kind of theories described
above seriously, and regard them as true, it seems we are committed to take such facts seriously.
We can draw analogies to other areas of philosophy. If we take seriously the claims of
ethics—that kicking puppies is wrong, or that ceteris paribus it is good if human welfare
increases—then we need to explain what about the world, or about us, makes it the case that
kicking puppies is wrong, or that human welfare is good. We need to explain the constitution of
these ethical facts, and their relation to the physical. This leads to an interest in the field of meta-
ethics, which addresses such questions. By analogy with the terminology in the ethical case, we
can call the analogous foundational project, in the case of semantics, ‘meta-semantics’.30
29Fodor himself famously defends non-reductive physicalism about special sciences, so his appeal to the prop-
erties physicists list seems odd. McDowell (1978) discusses whether intentionality is a special case where a phys-
icalistic worldview can be held compatibly with non-reductionism.
30I take this term from Stalnaker (1984, 1999a). There seems to be no universally accepted terminology in this
area. ‘Semantics’ ‘Pragmatics’ and ‘theory of meaning’ have all been used to name the questions intended here;
but such terms have all got other, more precise roles to play. I hope that the regimentation of terminology I use is
not artificial.
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Of course, a metasemantical theory does not have to be a reductive one. Just as one might
postulate irreducible ‘non-natural’ ethical properties, one might postulate irreducible represen-
tational properties. This is the position taken by Field’s ‘semanticalist’. Moreover, reduction-
ism need not take the form of reductive identification of semantic facts with other (e.g. causally
constituted) facts. Within the ambit of reductive accounts, I include fictionalist and anti-realist
accounts that would give a substantive theory of how the apparently semantic emerges from the
non-semantic. My focus will be on a certain class of reductive metasemantic theories (‘inter-
pretationist’ theories). Before outlining the characteristics of this approach, I shall cover two
more general issues: first, various ways of avoiding or relocating the challenge; second, the
strategies available when constructing a reductive account of intentionality.
Who faces the challenge?
Metasemantics asks the question: What is the nature of the facts that semantic theories describe?
What constitutes reference, satisfaction and the other relations that feature in classical semantic
theorizing?
Who can avoid the specific foundational questions described above? Three kinds of theorist
would appear to do so. Firstly, there are those, mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, who are
eliminativists about the semantic—those who do not feel the pressure to engage in systematic
explanatory theorizing about subsentential semantics, but rest content with a mere description
of the differing truth-conditions of sentences; or more radically still, who do not think that there
are systematically statable truth-conditions for sentences at all.31 For reasons set out earlier, I
reject this approach, and will not consider it further.
Second, there are those who, like the deflationists, deny that commitment to semantic talk
about ‘reference’ and ‘truth’ commits one to semantic facts—who deny that there is a coherent
project of substantive semantic theorizing.32 This Quinean position has its own obligations and
31This is not the Quinean eliminativism about analyticity and meaning more generally. For, as discussed above,
the more hygienic theoretical enterprise of the theory of reference (generously construed to include modality)
allows the foundational questions can be posed.
32Typically, they think that the needed notions can be characterized intra-linguistically through the so-called T -
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challenges. For example, as Field in his later work (1994; 2001a) develops it, a ‘disquotational’
(non-substantive) intralinguistic theory of truth and reference needs supplementation with a
theory of translation, to account for how others who do not speak my idiolect can nevertheless
be ‘saying the same things’ as me. We then need an account of what counts as a good translation,
and the story here appeals to the kind of materials that might, in another setting, to give a
metasemantic theory (Field says that S′ will be a good translation of S if S and S′ stand in
approximately the same indication relations, and if the terms in S and S′ have approximately the
same inferential role.33)
The other sort of theorist not to face the challenge in the form set out above is one who is
revisionist about the form a semantic theory should take. For example, Michael Dummett, in
(1991) and other writings, has argued that we should reject the ‘classical’ framework of refer-
ence and truth in favour of a constructivist alternative. Clearly, such a theorist is committed to
the possibility of a constructivist account of comparable detail and success as the more familiar
classical alternative. Once such a theory has been developed, foundational questions can be put
which bear comparison to those detailed above.
The two approaches just mentioned do not eliminate the metasemantic questions, but simply
transform them. What makes one translation better than another? What story can one give
about the foundations of new non-classical semantic theories? Though they avoid “straight”
metasemantic questions, they face “relocated” ones. That is not to say that no progress can be
made by such projects: in principle, the relocated questions may be more tractable than the
original.
I mention such views only to set them aside. The challenge to be considered in this thesis
accepts “straight” semantic theory, construed as describing robust word-world representational
relations.
and R-schemata. See, for example, Horwich (1990).
33See Field (2005); Loewer (2005) for synopses of the view. The original Quinean version had translation
constrained by similarity of patterns of assent and dissent. See Quine (1960, ch.2.).
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Head-first and word-first strategies.
In the work cited, Field and Fodor endorse a causal account of the reference of terms, at least
for basic parts of language.34
One interesting thing about these authors is that they adopt a word-first strategy in their
overall reductive account of intentionality. The foundational theory they demand for language
will not make appeal to any intentional mental states. They can then supplement this story by a
reduction of mental content to linguistic content, by supposing that the vehicle of mental content
is itself a language—the language of thought. (See Field (1978), Fodor (1987, passim).) In this
way a reductive account of linguistic content may be turned into an overall reductive account of
the intentional.
The strategy contrasts with that adopted by other causal theorists. Kripke (1980) notes ex-
plicitly that his ‘causal theory of reference’ makes appeal to certain intentions. Such a causal
theory, if put forward in the service of an overall reductive account of the intentional, presup-
poses some independent foundational story of mental content. Stalnaker (1984, 1997), develop-
ing the Kripkean causal theory, explicitly puts forward a head-first account: giving a reductive
account of mental content, and then appealing to mental content when giving foundations for
the content of language.
Alongside word-first and head-first strategies of Field and Stalnaker respectively, there are
also ‘no-priority’ strategies, which hold that neither mental nor linguistic content can be fixed
independently of the other. This was Davidson’s preferred approach (Davidson, 1974).
A second strategic choice faces the metasemantic theorist, within their account of linguis-
tic content. Do they, with Field (1972) and the other causal theorists mentioned earlier, see
the semantic properties of sentences as built out of, and reducible to, the semantic properties
of individual words (What Davidson (1977) calls the ‘building-block’ view). Or is some ac-
count in view that assigns content to sentences and then derivatively characterizes the content
34See Field (2005) for discussion of his views on explicating ‘primitive denotation’, including non-causal el-
ements. Fodor (1993) discusses how to give a foundational story beyond the paradigmatic cases where a causal
theory seems appropriate.
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of words, as urged by Davidson (1973); McDowell (1978)? Or should we favour a holistic
treatment whereby the semantic properties of individual words and whole sentences are fixed
simultaneously?35
This disagreement over broad reductive strategy (head-first vs. word-first) cuts across dis-
agreements over the ‘direction of explanation’ within the account of linguistic content. For
example, Lewis (1994b), like Stalnaker, favours a head-first strategy; but his account of linguis-
tic content (described below) is not of the building-block kind favoured by Stalnaker.36
The choice of reductive strategy is of enormous importance for the overall project of ad-
dressing the problem of the intentionality. Word-first theories are hugely ambitious, taking on
the problem directly; whereas head-first theories allow only a partial reduction of linguistic con-
tent, and some independent story about mental content would be offered if the intentional is to
be reduced to the non-intentional facts. When we discuss specific metasemantic theories below,
the kind of strategy that they allow will be of special interest.
Those who take semantic facts seriously face metasemantic questions, about the nature of
such facts. This is a subquestion of the general problem of intentionality—the metaphysical
standing of representational properties. A dualism, that simply takes such facts as primitive,
is a prima facie coherent view, but not a very attractive one. One can relocate the problem in
various ways, but avoiding it altogether seems unlikely.
My project in the thesis is to examine a “straight” broadly reductive account, describing
what underlies best semantic theory. We have outlined some of the strategic choices that face the
theorist over how the reductive account of semantic facts fits into an overall reductive account
of the intentional.
In the remainder of this chapter, we describe interpretationist metasemantic theories. These
35As will be seen below, I believe the latter to be the most promising way of developing the ‘top down’ David-
sonian picture.
36Their account of mental content is reasonably similar, giving a central role to decision theoretic machinery.
However, Stalnaker (1984) appeals to causal connections to get an independent fix on the content of belief, whereas
Lewis adopts a more holistic strategy.
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will come in both head-first and word-first varieties; but quite generally reject building-block
approaches to reducing linguistic content. The alternative picture is escribed in the following
section, and examined in detail in Chapter 2 .37
37I will not engage in criticism of building-block approaches here. But I cannot resist expressing puzzlement
over one feature. Let us suppose that the semantic content of all lexical items can be fixed in some fashion. In
order to extract an account of the semantic content of sentences, one needs to appeal to compositional axioms.
The semantic significance of composition prima facie cannot be taken for granted within a foundational theory.
In general, semantic projection rules vary from one semantic setting to another. It is hard to see how we could
be entitled to ignore such features within a metasemantic theory, and obscure to see how a building-block theory
could handle them.
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1.3 Interpretationism
Interpretationism is an approach to the metasemantic challenge under which a variety of ac-
counts fall. As I shall develop the approach, it engages squarely with the Fodor-Field reductive
challenge: to explain how representational properties can exist in a world that can be character-
ized exhaustively in non-representational terms.38 However, it does not attempt to do this in the
‘building-block’ style characterized above. Rather, one first characterizes holistically what it is
for a semantic theory to be in force, and then ascribes reference to terms and truth-conditions to
sentences on the basis of what the semantic theory entails. In the next chapter, we shall discuss
what metaphysical view of semantic properties such a ‘theory shadowing’ account suggests.
Once we have chosen a semantic theory, then we can say what it is for e to have semantic
property P, in terms of what follows from the ‘selected’ semantic theory. The fundamental
question facing such an account, therefore, is how this meaning-fixing theory is selected. It
is here that we find the substance of interpretationist proposals. They characteristically adopt
a certain two-step strategy: first, identifying a range of data correlating sentences with states
of the world; second, saying that for a semantic theory to be in force in the population (to be
selected) is for it to be the best theoretical account of the data.
Let us illustrate this with a toy case. Suppose that Billy and Jane speak a simple language.
Intuitively, they have names for one another “B” and “J”, and predicates for “wearing red”,
“wearing yellow” and “wearing green”: “R”, “Y” and “G”. For the sake of our toy example,
suppose they are invariably successful detectors of each other’s clothing, and always speak their
minds.
Now, causal theorists would look for causal links between the individual lexical items—say
“B” and “J”—with items in the world. By contrast, the interpretationist first gathers the data:
“J R” is uttered when and only when Jane wears red
“J G” is uttered when and only when Jane wears green
38I rule that the ‘dual aspect’ position suggested by McDowell (1978) are incompatible with this ambition.
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“J Y” is uttered when and only when Jane wears yellow
“B R” is uttered when and only when Billy wears red
“B G” is uttered when and only when Billy wears green
“B Y” is uttered when and only when Billy wears yellow
Now given a toy semantic theory correlating “J” with Jane, “R” with wearing red and so
forth, we can derive statements such as:
“J R” is true iff Jane wears red
and indeed, appealing to such axioms, we can derive a theorem corresponding to each data
point.
If we suppose that Jane and Billy have competence with the semantic theory, and that they
try to utter something just when it is true, then the little semantic theory we have constructed
will account for this data. Our hypothesis, then, is that the designated theory will be the one that
best discharges this role, accounting for the data about sentence utterances. A natural language
contains far more complexity, and elements of the scenario described are implausible (they utter
the sentences whenever the condition is met?). However, the principles will be the same. Write
down correlations (identified in non-semantic terms) and then select that theory that (modulo
pragmatic hypotheses) best explains this data.
(To avoid possible confusion. I am not here thinking of an epistemological project, where
certain theorists have some data and we ask what theory they would ideally choose. Rather the
‘data’ are simply all the facts of some characteristic sort, which no theorist need have access
to. Compare the ‘Humean’ accounts of laws of nature, and in particular Lewis (1994a), where
a similar non-epistemological relationship between ‘data’ and ‘best system’ is appealed to.39)
39The relationship between interpretationism and Humean accounts of laws is discussed in Chapter 8.
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Within this broad framework, there are many loci for variation. How shall we characterize
the data? What form should it be presented in? What kind of semantic theory should we look
for? What kind of pragmatic considerations are appropriate to appeal to? Are we allowed
to appeal to intentional properties in the process (appealing to a ‘head-first’ approach to the
problem of intentionality) or are more severe constraints in place? It is in answering these
questions that the various forms of interpretationism get their distinctive character.
I shall briefly sketch three ways in which interpretationism can be developed. Each no doubt
deserves an extensive discussion. We are concerned, however, with issues common to all such
approaches. In chapter 2, we shall be looking at what metaphysical picture of facts about content
they offer; and the much of the rest of the thesis is concerned with examining “inscrutability
puzzles” that prima facie, arise for the same reasons in each one of these approaches. It is
therefore appropriate to introduce the theories here succinctly, and to note differences as they
become relevant in the course of our later discussions.
Lewis’ convention-based interpretationism
Lewis’ head-first reductive account of intentionality incorporates an interpretationism about
semantic properties.40 The first step is to identify linguistic conventions that govern utterances
of sentences: these will provide the pairings of sentences with states of the world. A convention
in Lewis’ sense is a certain kind of regularity in action; one characterized by mutual expectations
and preferences sustaining the regularity. Paradigm examples include the convention to drive
on the left hand side of the road when in the UK, and the convention to meet with friends for
lunch in a particular venue. There is nothing intrinsically superior about driving on the left
rather than the right; there is nothing, we can suppose, favouring one venue over another; but
the participants have an interest in co-ordinating their actions: they prefer to drive on the left
given that everyone else does, or meet in the venue if that’s where other people will be. In
40For the overall project see Lewis (1974a, 1994b). For the specifically interpretationist component see Lewis
(1969, 1975, 1992). For the head-first account of mental content see Lewis (1974a, 1994b), Lewis (1986c, §1.4).
Lewis frames his views with a possible-worlds semantics, which dovetails neatly with his favoured way of
describing mental content; but it seems that his account is largely independent of this assumption.
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the jargon of game theory, they face a co-ordination problem. Lewis (1969) is a book-length
treatment of the general notion of a convention based on this idea.
Informally, we have the idea that R is a convention iff the following three conditions are
met:
1. REGULARITY: Everyone conforms to R
2. EXPECTED CONFORMITY: Everyone believes that everyone conforms to R
3. SUSTAINMENT: R is the solution of a (repeated) co-ordination problem.
The last condition can be broken down into (at least) three components:
(3) (a) COOPERATION: coincidence of interest dominates;
(b) EQUILIBRIUM: all would prefer that they themselves conform, on the supposition
that the others conform;
(c) ALTERNATIVE: there is some possible regularity R′ uniformly incompatible with
R, which, were it to obtain, would meet the above conditions. (so we have here a
co-ordination problem).
Lewis then refines and liberalizes the basic idea expressed above to arrive at his final analy-
sis. But the essential features are already present: conventions, not as explicit agreements, but
as regularities sustained by characteristic attitudes within a population.
Linguistic conventions are then an application of this analysis. The basic resources are
conventions of truthfulness, cashed-out in the Lewisian way:
The regularity of uttering S only if one believes p in the behaviour of members of the
population P in a serious communication setting41 is a convention of truthfulness iff
it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in any serious communication
setting:
41This is one of the alternatives Lewis (1975, p.183) suggests in response to issues about non-literal use of
language. A serious communication setting with respect to a sentence S and proposition p obtains whenever:
it is true, and common knowledge between a speaker and hearer that
1. The speaker does, and the hearer does not, know whether p;
2. the hearer wants to know;
3. neither the speaker nor the hearer has other (comparably strong) desires as to whether or not the speaker
utters S
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1. Everyone utters S only if they believe p;
2. Everyone expects everyone else to utter S only if they believe p;
3. Everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all (relevant)
possible combinations of actions;
4. Everyone prefers that everyone utter S only if they believe p, on condition that
at least all but one utters S only if p;
5. Everyone would prefer that everyone utter S only if q, on condition that at
least all but one utter S only if q,
where q is some proposition distinct from p.42
The pairing of sentences with states of the world that interpretationism requires is thus provided
for: S is paired with the proposition p iff there is a convention to only utter S if one believes
that p. Clearly, this requires a ‘head-first’ approach to the problem of intentionality, given that
it involves appeal to beliefs and desires. Indeed, Lewis explicitly adopts such an approach, in a
form relatively close to Stalnaker’s.
Lewis (1975) exploits linguistic conventions to develop an interpretationist metasemantic
account. Whether or not a semantic theory (what he calls a ‘grammar’) is “used by” a given
population, turns on which assignment of propositions to sentences (what he calls a ‘language’)
is “used by” that population. This in turn is fixed by the linguistic conventions that prevail:
I would say that a grammar Γ is used by P if and only if Γ is a best grammar for
a language L that is used by P in virtue of a convention in P of truthfulness and trust
in L; and I would define the meaning in P of a constituent or phrase. . . accordingly.
(Lewis, 1975, p.177)43
42This formulation is based on those found in (Lewis, 1969). In (1975), Lewis complicates the account by adding
‘conventions of trust’: the conventional regularity of forming the belief that p in response to hearing someone utter
S.
Further, more complex, approaches to specifying appropriate linguistic conventions are possible. Griceans, for
example, might wish to adopt interpretationism about semantic meaning by means of conventions of individuals to
speaker-mean p when uttering S (cf. Schiffer, 1972). Avramides (1997) endorses this kind of proposal. Not only
does it extract a notion of the ‘timeless meaning’ of sentences from the representational properties of sentence-
tokens the Gricean has available, but it will underpin ascriptions of subsentential meaning, which otherwise have
no obvious place in the Gricean framework.
43Page references are to the version collected in Lewis (1983b).
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Here Lewis’ notion of a semantic theory ‘used by’ a population corresponds to my notion of a
‘selected’ semantic theory.
In Lewis’ account of what makes a ‘language’ correct, characterized in terms of conven-
tions, we find the characteristic first step of an interpretationist metasemantics—identification
of sentential data. In his account of the correctness of a ‘grammar’ (semantic theory) we find
the second component—lexical meaning-facts fixed by the best theory of this data.
Global Descriptivism
Lewis (1984), drawing on Putnam (1980, 1981), describes an alternative to his convention-based
approach—global descriptivism. First, one must construct, for language as a whole, a ‘term-
introducing theory’. Lewis says that this will be “total theory”: the set of all the sentences that
normal (or perhaps ideal) agents would endorse.
Lewis is extremely unspecific about exactly how “total theory” is to be identified; but then,
he is perhaps not himself endorsing the theory, but rather offering it as a reconstruction of the
view described as ‘standard’ by Putnam (1980). Global descriptivism therefore delimits a class
of views. One in particular is often associated with Lewis. This sees it as a generalization of
the so-called ‘Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis’ treatment of theoretical terms (Lewis, 1970b). Here, the
first step is to identify a ‘folk theory’ of some phenomenon (say, heat, or mental phenomena,
or inheritance). These are supposed to be platitudes with which no-one should disagree. In
the case of mind, this might include principles such as: “If someone hits you hard, and you are
paying attention, you will feel pain”; and “If you are feeling pain, then unless distracted you will
tend to wince and groan”. The introduction of theoretical terms is supposed to be accomplished
by collecting such platitudes, formulating them efficiently and then transforming the resulting
folk theory into a definition, say, of mental vocabulary, by the technique of ‘Ramsification’.44
Suppose that we collect all the platitudes from every walk of life, and formulate them into a
global ‘folk theory’. Then we have exactly the sort of “total theory” that we need to introduce
44For an account of this, see Lewis (op cit).
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global descriptivism. On this implementation, the interpretationist’s data is the uninterpreted
global folk theory.
Where does this version of global descriptivism stand strategically? Lewis does not say;
if platitudes can be identified in a non-intentional way, it can be a word-first view. Easier,
of course, would be to identify platitudes given prior information about which sentences are
believed to be trivial; but this surely would only make sense within a head-first view.45
Next:
The intended interpretation will be the one, if such there be, that makes the term-
introducing theory come out true.
(Lewis, 1984, p.60)46
Again we find a two-step strategy. The first interpretationist step is to identify an appropriate
set of sentences—the global ‘total theory’ to which Lewis refers—perhaps global folk theory.
The second interpretationist step is to find a semantic theory that renders all (or enough) of these
sentences true.
The semantic framework that Lewis has in mind seems to be model-theoretic in character.
Beyond this, presumably the only constraints depend on what resources are required to get
a sensible theory making total theory come out true; with purely first-order vocabulary, we
might get away with a first order language; whereas with modal vocabulary involved, a Kripke-
semantics may be required.47
Davidsonian radical interpretation
In a series of papers in the 1970’s, Davidson developed the kind of interpretationist approach
we are examining.48 The interpretation of Davidson’s views that I favour is far from uncontro-
45Lewis, as already mentioned, favours a head-first approach; but in presenting global descriptivism he may well
wish to describe an approach that is non-committal on this point. Indeed, he indicates at points in Lewis (1983a)
that he regards it as a word-first approach, and objectionable on that count.
46Page references are to the version collected in Lewis (1999).
47Contrast with the convention based approach above, where the pairing of sentences with propositions (sets of
possible worlds) forces one into a possible-worlds semantics setting from the beginning.
48See the papers collected in Davidson (1984). Davidson (1980) marks an important development in Davidson’s
account.
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versial, for I will look on him as putting forward a purelymetaphysical ormetasemantic project;
whereas it is often thought that the key element of Davidson’s radical interpretation is an epis-
temological story about how one interprets others in everyday situations.49 Having noted these
reservations, I will for convenience set exegetical issues aside and speak as if Davidson’s view
were straightforwardly metasemantic in ambition.
Davidson takes as his starting point descriptions of situations described in non-intentional
terms. Individuals behave in various ways, utter strings of sounds in certain circumstances,
and the rest. Davidson supposes that, on this basis, we can identify which sentences a subject
“holds-true”; or which she “prefers-true” to others.50 Davidson is more radical than Lewis, in
that his ambition to reduce both facts about the content of attitudinal states, and semantic facts,
to the spartan basis of the pattern of sentences held- or preferred-true. His strategy is neither
head-first nor word-first: he aims to get both linguistic and mental content simultaneously.
In its original version, radical interpretation proceeds by finding generalizations about the
circumstances in which sentences come to be held-true. For our toy language above, for exam-
ple, the generalization might be that one holds-true “J G” whenever Jane is wearing green in the
vicinity. Taking this as one’s starting point, one can start to compile a list of initial hypotheses
linking sentences with truth-conditions.
“J G” is true if and only if Jane is wearing green
The ambition is to get a workable set of ‘T-sentences’ that will transform information about
sentences held-true, to information about the beliefs an agent holds; and which in addition form
49Heck (2005b) defends the kind of view I take of the ambition of Davidson’s project. Lepore and Ludwig
(2005) examine in great detail Davidson’s writings, favouring a more epistemological reading. I find Davidson’s
own writings obscure on this point.
50This is often held to be an encroachment of the intentional into the basis of Davidson’s radical interpretation.
See Heal (1997). I am less sure of this. It seems to me that it is plausible that one can identify attitude kinds
independently of the content of attitudes. See Fodor (1987, ch.2.) for the importance of this distinction.
Believing-true is plausibly a kind of attitude (a sub-kind of belief), so it may be that we can use the above to get
a grip on which sentences are held-true. Fodor’s setup allows a straightforward characterization those sentences
in the language of thought which are ‘held true’ (or, as he might put it, those sentences that ‘are in the belief
box’). Since Davidson is interested in natural language, he will have to appeal to the manifestation of attitudes
in utterance, and it is not clear how the story will go. In any case, it seems clear to me that the challenge is
qualitatively different from that of identifying the content of ordinary beliefs.
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the target theorems for a semantic theory to generate.
There is a complex story about how the initial set of generalizations is to be revised and im-
proved until an acceptable final set is reached. The process is regulated by so-called principles
of ‘charity’ or ‘humanity’, which admonish the interpreter to maximise the rationality and truth
found in the subject’s behaviour and beliefs; the eventual semantic theory and assignment of
beliefs is one that optimises such virtues.51
Davidson (1980) extends the procedure in an innovative way. By focusing on data about
preferences-true, and exploiting the decision theoretic determination of cardinal attitudes from
ordinal attitudes, he is able: (1) to describe how (in an idealized setting) to identify truth-
functional connectives within a language; (2) to describe how to identify degrees of holding-true
and preferring-true, using the methods of Jeffrey (1965). This richer basis is then used to give
a fuller account of how radical interpretation of a full language (beyond the core of ‘occasion’
sentences) might proceed.52 (The new ideas introduced in this article can be elaborated in
non-Davidsonian ways, too.53)
However the details work out, we have the characteristic patter: primitive semantic data is
given (the finalized set of T-sentences); and the correct semantic theory is picked out as one
that generates the data. The choice of T-sentences as data is, of course, not accidental: for this
is the characteristic output of Davidson’s favoured form for a semantic theory—truth theoretic
semantics.54
51Lewis (1974a) and Lepore and Ludwig (2005, pt II) contain extensive discussion of the details of Davidson’s
project.
52See Lepore and Ludwig (2005, ch.16) for discussion.
53One simple non-Davidsonian proposal would be to use the detailed data about sentential attitudes to evaluate
the success of pairings of sentences with propositions: one would attempt to optimize the rationality of the agent’s
non-linguistic actions, along the lines suggested by Lewis (1994b). The optimal pairing would then serve to
identify the agent’s attitudes, and further to provide the target data for a semantic theory.
54For a contemporary introduction from a linguistics perspective, see Larson and Segal (1995). Lepore and
Ludwig (2005) discuss Davidson’s version.
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Flexibility
Particular implementations of interpretationism are committal. For example: Lewis’ convention-
based approach is appropriate to natural languages rather than languages of thought; and to
communal language, rather than individual idiolects. Davidson similarly focuses on natural
languages; though his approach is more sympathetic to idiolects than is Lewis’. Different au-
thors construct their theories with different semantic frameworks in mind.
Some of the characteristics mentioned above are inessential to the overall strategy; and of
course interpretationism as an overall strategy is compatible with a wide range of starting points,
simply because of the varying nature of the views.
There are two points, however, that might be thought to be theoretical commitments of
any interpretational theory. These are a focus on natural languages, rather than languages of
thought; and a commitment to a form of ‘meaning holism’ that some find objectionable.
It is, of course, extremely controversial whether there is a ‘language of thought’—a syn-
tactical structure with recognizable names, predicates and logical connectives, which underlies
mental computation. It would be a bad thing for an approach to reducing the intentional if it
were incompatible with this hypothesis, or could offer no story to support it.55
However, there seems no real obstacle to constructing an interpretationism that works in that
setting. Consider, for example, the ‘head-first’ strategy endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis and oth-
ers. The head-first approach uses causal indication relations, decision theoretic constraints, and
similar factors, to determine the overall content of an agent’s belief and desire states. Surely,
there must be some neurological vehicle for this content—some information-storage mecha-
nism. Though Stalnaker and Lewis proclaim their neutrality on this score, they do not reject the
hypothesis that the information is stored in sentence-like structures.56
On this view, sentences in the language of thought within a subject’s ‘belief box’ would
collectively represent the world being a certain way. The challenge for an interpretationist is
55Of course, one might agree with a language of thought as a hypothesis about cognitive functioning, but not
think of the ‘language’ as having a compositional semantics—this would be directly compatible with the Stalnaker-
Lewis holistic mental content. This would not satisfy Fodor (1993), however.
56Lewis (1994b). See the general discussion in Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996).
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then to assign content to the individual sentences, and to the lexical elements of those sentences.
One option is to appeal to a variant of global descriptivism to accomplish this: one would
identify ‘total theory’ with the sentences that the subject is disposed to put in the belief box.
(Alternatives are possible: it seems to me, for example, that ideas from Davidson (1980) do
extremely well when adapted to this setting. The key observation here is that Davidson’s basic
notion of a sentence being held true can be cashed-out, within a Fodorian setting, in terms of S
being tokened in ‘the belief box’.) On the other hand, it is hard to see how to apply the Lewisian
convention-based approach to this setting. There is little sense in which we have preferences
about one another’s tokening of mentalese sentences, as we do about each others utterances in
a communal language. I hope that even this quick sketch will show that there is nothing in
interpretationism incompatible with a metasemantics for the language of thought.
To what extent is the interpretationist committed to holism? Well, it is undoubtedly the case
that metaphysically, it pictures semantic facts as determined by the best theory of all language
use. Moreover, since content is assigned to expressions via a semantic theory for a language as
a whole, semantic properties such as ‘having reference’ will be ‘anatomic’ in the sense of Fodor
and Lepore (1992): necessarily, if one word refers, many others do too. However, it is the kind
of holism or anatomism that these authors call ‘weak’ rather than ‘strong’—for a word to have
reference, we need only that there be other words with references. Strong holism would require
that there be words meaning such-and-such (in English, say), such that if ‘London’ is mean the
same in L as it does in English, the same must go for those words. But, on the contrary, on the
interpretationist proposal there is every reason to think that words in languages with only small
areas of overlap can share content. For, according to the interpretationist, the content that a term
has is that assigned to it by the relevant theory. If the best semantics for British-English declares
that ‘London’ refers to London; and the best semantics for Martian declares that ‘ZXQU’ refers
to London; then the two words have the same content.57
57Given that Fodor and Lepore (1992) are concerned to argue that holism does not follow from a variety of
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theories (including Davidson’s and Lewis’, which we have briefly mentioned above) there need to be no dispute
between us. It is significant that a clearly ‘holist’ approach to meaning-fixation does not motivate the strong holist
theses that interest Fodor and Lepore. Indeed, their ‘strong holism’ seems so strong it puts into doubt their claim
that “almost everyone is a holist” (p.32). Certainly Lewis, as I read him, is committed to no such claim.
In fact, some local versions of ‘strong anatomism’ seem uncontroversial. If ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ means what it
does, then, one might reasonably think, ‘Caesar killed Brutus’ must also mean what it does. This certainly follows
from the kind of proposal which I am interested in, but it is far from the meaning holism (or indeed ‘molecularism’)
in the sense that Fodor and Lepore wish to engage.
Chapter 2
Reductive paraphrase
We are challenged to give a foundational story about semantic notions such as reference. As
prefigured in the previous chapter, the metasemantic project that we are interested in is an inter-
pretationist one: and we have seen several shapes that such a project might take. What kind of
proposal is this? I shall outline the enterprise as one of providing a reductive paraphrase for dis-
course about the semantic. This paraphrase will pair sentences containing semantic terminology
such as ‘says’ ‘refers’ ‘has truth-conditions’, with sentences that are free of such terminology.
Comparable projects focus on paraphrases that reduce ontology: the elimination of appeal to
possible worlds, abstracta, composite objects etc. We are here interested in reducing a certain
kind of ideology: i.e. showing that certain distinctive vocabulary doesn’t have to be taken as
primitive. The basic goal of the current chapter is to delimit the form and detail of the reductive
paraphrase associated with interpretationist metasemantic theories. I will also show how the
proposal can escape various charges of circularity.
Confusion may reign if we do not first get clear on the nature of the project being undertaken.
What are the aims of reductive paraphrase? What are the constraints on its success? Do we need
to offer some kind of analysis of what the discourse in question means (a kind of conceptual or
semantic analysis of the discourse in question)? If not, what are we up to?
46
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2.1 The framework: theory-shadowing paraphrase
A common tactic when trying to avoid metaphysical commitments is to offer a paraphrase
of apparently committal discourse. The paraphrase will pair sentences with non-committal
surrogates. (Of course, the surrogate sentences may have commitments of their own: reductive
paraphrase may take the form of a trade-off. Thus Lewis (1968) offers a paraphrase of modal
claims into a combination of possibilist quantification, and the invocation of certain similarity
relations among possibilia.)
There is a certain picture of the goal of reductive paraphrase that I want to resist. This
has paraphrase ‘uncovering’ what was really meant all along. Manifestations of this picture
include the thought that sentences paired by a reductive paraphrase should have the same mean-
ing, or that paraphrase should take the form of semantic analysis of the discourse in question.1
I think this picture is problematic in a number of ways. It lies at the heart of famous ‘symme-
try’ objections to the paraphrase project: since synonymy is symmetrical, why should we take
a paraphrase to deflate the ontological pretensions of the original (apparently committal) dis-
course, rather than uncovering previously hidden ontological costs of the surrogate (apparently
non-committal) discourse? Moreover, the picture seems to burden us with a range of objections
from sources that should be irrelevant. For example, suppose that one were able to give a para-
phrase of arithmetical talk into terms that (a) had no apparent commitment to abstracta (b) were
such that the surrogate could discharge the theoretical role of arithmetic, e.g. within science.
The result would seem extremely philosophically important: exactly the sort of thing to make
nominalists rejoice. However, it may not be plausible as semantic analysis, for sociological
reasons. We can imagine a community who insist that their words be taken at face-value: the
Society for Real Arithmetic insists that when they say ‘there is an even prime’ they mean that
there is really, out there an even prime. I take it that members of such a community are speak-
ing falsely, if it turns out that mathematical entities such as numbers do not exist. But despite
1Paraphrase as semantic analysis can be understood within a model-theoretic approach to semantics in the way
described by Lewis (1970a, p.205)
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this, the philosophical significance of the paraphrase for members of the population seems un-
changed. The key point is this: whether or not a paraphrase captures the semantic content of
language depends on all sorts of psychological and sociological contingencies that are simply
irrelevant to the philosophical enterprise at hand.
(Two weakening moves might be attempted. First, to say that it is not semantic content
that is at issue, but pragmatic content or questions of what norms assertion. However, I think
that it is equally implausible to take the words of the Society for Real Mathematics to be non-
committal at the level of pragmatic content or norms. Second, one might say the goal is not
to describe linguistic practice as it is (the hermeneutic project), but to describe how it should
be (the revolutionary project).2 But now different irrelevancies come into view. The surrogate
discourse may suffer from all sorts of practical deficiencies, when compared to the original. This
fact is surely irrelevant to the philosophical interest of the paraphrase, but it does undermine a
straightforward understanding of the paraphrase as giving a picture of how the discourse should
be revised.3)
My view of the goal of paraphrase is close to Quine’s:
likeness of meaning is not my aim.. . . One can still hold that [the surrogate] serves
any purpose of [the original] that are worth serving.
Quine (1960, p.214)
Unlike Quine, a scepticism about objective semantic analysis or synonymy in general forms
no part of my motivation; but with Quine, I hold for the reasons sketched above that semantic
analysis is irrelevant to the purposes of a metaphysical assay. If we label the earlier picture
paraphrase as semantic analysis, we can call the Quinean view paraphrase as regimentation
2The terminology is from Burgess and Rosen (1997). Compare Stanley (2001).
3Compare Melia (1995). There may be other non-revisionary readings of the ‘ought’ involved here with which
I have no problem. Suppose, for example, it is glossed at what one with philosophical qualms ought to take from
an assertion i.e. how the discourse ‘ought to be understood’ (compare Nolan (2002, §1.3), who uses both this gloss
and the one I object to above). I expect that cashing out the force of this ‘ought’ will take us into issues of ‘facts
underlying the discourse’ very much like those discussed below.
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What constrains reductive paraphrase, if not semantic equivalence? The basic idea is that
the paraphrase reveals what the facts underlying the discourse in question are. This might strike
some as more metaphor than substance. However, I think substance is introduced by the kind
of consideration adduced a number of times above: we are looking for the facts that play the
central theoretical role that the discourse is meant to play. Thus, if nominalistic paraphrases can
do all the work that Platonistic arithmetical facts were supposed to, then (absent such Platon-
istic facts) we are justified in saying that what was really going on, what underlay Platonistic
talk, what Platonistic mathematics latched onto or was tracking were facts expressed by the
nominalist paraphrases.4
We can see why paraphrase that captures the ‘facts underlying’ a discourse in this particular
sense will be philosophically interesting. One canonical mode of argument for believing in
abstracta, possibilia or other problematic metaphysics, is to point to a certain role that they
play (say the use of abstracta within physical science,5 or the use of possible worlds within
philosophy, linguistics, probability theory and so on6). If (1) the theoretical role cannot be
achieved by other means, and we know that (2) it must be achieved somehow, then we have an
argument for their existence. A reductive paraphrase in our sense debunks this argument, by
undermining (1).7
4I take it that the link between these metaphors and the discharging of a given theoretical role is relative to the
philosophical purposes at hand. In other contexts, we might think of the facts that play a distinctive causal role in
the genesis of opinions expressed in the discourse, as what ‘underlies’. Consider, for example, the relation between
physical properties of objects and opinions about what colour objects are, for the error-theorist of colours (Mackie,
1976). Quine (1960, §33) also emphasizes the context-relativity of successful regimentation/paraphrase.
5See Field (1980) and Colyvan (2003), and the references therein.
6See Lewis (1986c, §§1.2-1.5).
7I think that this conception of the utility of a fictionalist paraphrase can be found in Nolan and O’Leary-
Hawthorne (1996, p.28):
. . . [mathematical fictionalist proposals] are a way of introducing a loose way of using talk about
numbers that is not ontologically committing. [They] can say ‘When I am speaking loosely, were I
to say “The number of moons of Mars is identical to Two”, take that as equivalent to “According to
the fiction, the number of moons of Mars is identical to Two”. . .
So long as the . . . rules give talk about numbers a useful role to play, they will serve their purpose
(my emphasis.) Nolan and Hawthorne’s notion of truth ‘loosely speaking’ is explicitly not to be read as a semantic
proposal. It looks very close to my notion of ‘supported by the underlying facts’.
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Theory-shadowing paraphrases
Consider philosophical fictionalisms. Some paradigmatic examples include:
• Field (1980) on mathematics
• van Fraassen (1989b) on unobservables
• Rosen (1990) on modality
• Dorr (2002) on mereology
There is a certain core to these fictionalist proposals: a distinctive form of paraphrase. For
example, for Field, the claim that there is an even prime corresponds to: it is a consequence of
standard arithmetic that there are even primes. For Van Fraassan, what underlies atoms contain
protons will be the fact that: according to empirically adequate scientific theory, atoms contain
protons. For Rosen, a modal claim that possibly, there are blue swans means no more than:
according to the fiction of the plurality of worlds, there is a world containing blue swans. Dorr
holds that if I say that there is a chair in front of me, what I communicate is that: Were there to
be composite objects, there would be a chair in front of me. The form of all these paraphrases
is roughly as follows:
pp q pAccording to theory T , pq
Different fictionalisms then take different views about how to understanding ‘according to’,
how to pick out the appropriate theory, and so forth.8
Beyond this core, fictionalisms are also characterized by (some or all) of a cluster of addi-
tional theses:
1. Statements in question are (often, and unexpectedly) strictly and literally speaking, false.9
8The views whereby p is a ‘loose way of talking’ about it’s fictionalist paraphrase is called by Yablo (2001)
a ‘metafictional’ fictionalism. I discuss the relation between metafictional fictionalism and Yablo’s object-
fictionalisms (when divorced from the semantic concerns that form a large part of Yablo’s discussion) briefly
in the conclusion to this chapter .
9In some versions, we replace the requirement that they be false when taken at face value, with the contention
that language-users are in no position to know whether or not they are false. Thus the agnosticism of van Fraassen
(1989b).
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2. Attitudes towards the contents in the area are not straightforward belief, but rather ‘pre-
tended belief’
3. Fictionalist surrogates specify the semantic/pragmatic content of statements in the dis-
course.10
For our purposes, it is best to divorce the core paraphrase proposal from any accompanying
theses: this fits with our earlier discussion to concentrate on paraphrases that ‘regiment away’
metaphysical commitments, rather than getting involved in the contingencies of the fine charac-
ter of the discourse in question. To avoid terminological disputes, however, we shall reserve the
term ‘fictionalism’ for those more ambitious theories that aim to satisfy the cluster (1-3). Let
us call regimenting paraphrases of the distinctive form “theory shadowing paraphrases”. The-
ory shadowing paraphrases that are offered without commitment to the kind of semantic theses
associated with fictionalism we call quasi-fictionalist accounts.
A number of theories that are not comfortably described as fictionalisms are quasi-fictionalisms
in this sense. Some examples, along with their respective paraphrase proposals, include:
• Sider (2002) on possibilia
pp q p‘p’ is entailed by every pluriverse sentence11q
• Eliminative structuralism (if-thenism) concerning arithmetic (Parsons, 1990)
pp q p∀X¯(PA(X¯)→ p(X¯))12q
• Hellman (1989) on modal structuralism
pp q p∀X¯(PA(X¯)→ p(X¯))13q
10We can make further distinctions: we can contrast ‘semantic’ fictionalisms that aim to specify the semantic
content of our talk (compare Nolan’s ‘strong fictionalisms’ (Nolan, 1997a)), with ‘error-theoretic fictionalisms’
where the problematic committal statements are literally false, but where the fictionalist paraphrase specifies some
underlying pragmatic content to the speech acts in question. What Nolan (1997a) (following Rosen (1990)) calls
‘timid’ fictionalisms I do not think are fictionalist proposals at all in the sense at issue here.
How is semantic fictionalism compatible with (1) above? In such a case, we should read ‘strictly and literally
speaking’ as an operator that undoes the work of the fictionalist’s ‘according to the fiction’ operator. I.e. ‘read
at face value’ they are false, but according to the present value, the semantic content is not given by a face-value
reading. For discussion of this, and a possible relation between semantic and error-theoretic fictionalism, see Dorr
(2002).
Yablo (2001) contains a nuanced discussion of possible semantic views a fictionalist might adopt.
11A pluriverse sentence is a certain kind of maximal description of the modal realm, which Sider proposes to
analyze using de dicto modal resources.
12where PA is a second order formulation of the Peano axioms, wherein both PA and p all non-logical symbols
replaced by variables.
13where PA is a second order formulation of the Peano axioms, wherein both PA and p all non-logical symbols
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Summary
Fictionalist views have a variety of characteristics. Fictionalisms are often associated with
the view that, strictly construed, statements in the problematic area are often false, even if
correctly assertible; and that the appropriate attitude to take to them is not belief, but rather a
non-committal kind of acceptance. They assign a central role to a certain kind of paraphrase:
associating a ‘problematic’ sentence S with the fictional paraphrase ‘According to the fiction F ,
S’. Quasi-fictionalism, as I have introduced the term, drops commitment to everything but the
central role for fictionalist paraphrase.
Quasi-fictionalism seems a fall-back position for any fictionalism. In the kind of example
given above, where Platonist mathematicians demand that their words be taken at face-value,
what might be put forward as a hermeneutic fictionalism for a less opinionated population
becomes a reductive quasi-fictionalism. From the metaphysical point of view, the additional
trappings that make a quasi-fictionalism into a fictionalism, are irrelevant in such cases. The
significant feature is that the facts underlying the discourse in question (i.e. discharging the
function that was the point of the discourse in the first place) can be outlined in metaphysically
less committal terms.
are replaced by variables.  is supposed to be ‘logical necessity’—but clearly variant doctrines can be derived by
interpreting this as epistemological, metaphysical or some other kind of necessity.
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2.2 Incomplete fictions and theories
There are certain issues that impact all theory-shadowing paraphrases just in virtue of their
distinctive form. One cluster of issues are technical questions about how the machinery of the
paraphrase is to be understood . In the examples just used, we have seen a variety of ways of
cashing-out ‘according to’ or ‘follows from’: as logical consequence relations, as universalized
conditionals, as necessitated universalized conditionals, as counterfactual conditionals, or as
operators drawn from an independently motivated analysis of locutions such as ‘According
to the Sherlock Holmes stories . . . ’. Clearly, how this notion is cashed is of key strategic
significance for a reductive project.
There are also issues about the extent and tenability of the projects. Two of the most impor-
tant are the following:
1. The issue of Reflexive application: what happens when we try to apply the paraphrase to
sentences involving the problematic notions themselves. For example, what do we get if
we ask about the modal status of claims about possible worlds, or about the number of
numbers.
2. The issue of Incomplete Fictions: what happens when the theory involved is silent about
some salient matter?
The latter, in particular, will be relevant to us when we come to consider how the interpre-
tationist should understand inscrutability arguments, and so it is this that we discuss here.14
The puzzle of incomplete fictions
The puzzle of incomplete fictions is instructive, in that it illustrates how our conception of the
paraphrase project can give a motivated resolution of a tricky issue. It will also be of strategic
significance, since, on the view that I will be urging, inscrutability of reference may turn out to
be a particular instance of this kind of puzzle.
14Problems for modal fictionalism arising from reflexive application are discussed in Brock (1993); Rosen
(1993). For the generalization and discussion of the case of arithmetic, see Nolan and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1996).
The line of thought suggested by Nolan and Hawthorne in that paper has much in common with the response to
the incompleteness problem suggested below: they claim that the reflexivity problems can be avoided if we do
not buy into fictionalism as a semantic analysis of the discourse in question. For a direct response to Nolan and
Hawthorne, see Yablo (2001).
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The puzzle with which we are concerned arises when the fiction/theory on which our fic-
tionalist paraphrase is based is incomplete in certain respects. The puzzle is tightest when we
consider a fictionalism with semantic pretensions: the paraphrase aims to uncover what ‘was
really being said’ all along. Consider a simple ‘hermeneutic’ fictionalism concerning set theory.
This has it that claims such as ‘there is a null set’ corresponds to the claim that ‘According to set
theory there exists a null set’. Writing S for a formulation of set theory, the semantic pretensions
of the view being considered lead us to endorse a ‘fictionalist biconditional’:
p↔ According to S, p
Now it is well-known that there are sentences that are not only unsettled by the current axioms
of set theory, but which look like in principle they cannot be settled. One such is the generalized
continuum hypothesis which we write σ. If, as seems plausible, the set theoretic story is silent
about this claim, we get the following pair of claims:
SET THEORETICAL INCOMPLETENESS
• ¬According to S, σ
• ¬According to S, ¬σ
We can now derive both ¬σ and ¬¬σ, in each case by a single application of modus tollens
on the fictionalist biconditional.15
The problem is clearly a general one, arising from (a) the endorsal of the fictionalist bicon-
ditional; and (b) an incomplete fiction/theory within the fictionalist paraphrase, leading to the
pair of denials of the form given above.16
15Two caveats: first, it takes an extra move to obtain an explicit contradiction from this, i.e. to get the conjunction
¬σ∧¬¬σ. This move may not be as trivial as it first looks, as the setting has formal analogies to the subvaluationist
settings where exactly this kind of move is denied, and a paraconsistent situation arises. Second, one might wonder
whether the pair of statement really contradict each other: that is, do they express contradictory contents? The
thought would be that, since their contents are given by the fictionalist paraphrases, which do not contradict each
other, we have merely the superficial appearance of contradiction, not a genuine paradox.
16Note the parallel with well-known arguments for contradiction from denials of bivalence. See, for example,
Williamson (1994, ch.5.). We have a contradiction where we have a ‘disappearing’ operator O(p)↔ p together
with a denial of exhaustiveness ¬O(q), ¬O(¬q). With O as truth, we get an argument against denials of bivalence.
With O read as ‘According to F’ we get the problem of incomplete fictions.
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The point has received occasional discussion in the context ofmodal fictionalism (cf. Rosen,
1990). There, an incompleteness within the ‘hypothesis of the plurality of worlds’ is used to
cause trouble for the fictionalist biconditional:
p↔ According to PW, p∗
where PW is a story about the plurality of worlds as described by Lewis (1986c), p is a modal
sentence, and p∗ is a paraphrase of p into possibilist language (following Lewis (1968)).17
Rosen’s suggestion in the modal case is to reject the analogue of SET THEORETICAL INCOM-
PLETENESS. He recommends that we should formulate the fictionalist biconditional using an
operator ‘According to PW, p’ which is neither true nor false (i.e., is indeterminate) wherever
p is a sentence about which PW is silent. Now, many find this implausible if presented as a
general account of locutions such as ‘according to the fiction’; so the suggestion is often taken
to be that we are to treat ‘According to PW’ as a sui generis primitive of the account.
One problem with this kind of tactic is the sheer implausibility of treating ‘According to
PW’ as having no internal structure. Another concerns the costs of having to postulate a new
sui generis piece of ideology; after all, it was reduction of ideology (e.g. ‘Necessarily’) that
we were after in the first place. The primitivist strategy looks even less attractive from the
wider perspective. If we were to adopt Rosen’s response for each fictionalism threatened by the
problem of incomplete fictions, then we would have in each case a new sui generis ‘According
to F’ primitive. At the least, we want to discern structure within the operators and to give
an independent account of their common core, ‘According to F’. Multiplication of duplicate
primitives is a sure sign we have gone wrong. I take it that since the puzzle of incomplete
fictions is a general issue for fictionalisms, we should be looking for a generally applicable
answer: and this is not what Rosen offers us.
(I think, in fact, that in the particular case he is interested in, Rosen can do better to defend
17The specific incompleteness appealed to concerns the maximum cardinality of non-overlapping objects there
could be.
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his ‘indeterminacy’-strategy. I see two lines of defence. First, Rosen’s fictionalist could main-
tain that ‘According to’ is a general fictional operator. The burden would then be to explain
away intuitions concerning, for example:
it’s not the case that according to the Sherlock Holmes story, Holmes’ mother was
born on a Tuesday.
In light of Conan Doyle’s silence on such matters, this statement certainly seems to express
a truth. However, generally constructions involving ‘it is not the case that’ attached to a less
controversially indeterminate sentence can seem true. Certainly if Alfie is borderline bald,
accepting ‘it is not the case that Alfie is bald’ seems tempting.
The second tactic is to find some non-fictional model for the operator. Consider, for ex-
ample, counterfactuals as understood by Stalnaker (1984). When the antecedent A of a coun-
terfactual is compatible with either of two situations, neither of which has a better claim to be
‘selected’ than the other, on Stalnaker’s analysis it is indeterminate which of these is selected,
and if the scenarios disagree over whether B, it will turn out indeterminate whether A > B is
true. The suggestion would then be to read the fictionalist paraphrase as ‘Were the hypothesis
of the plurality of worlds to obtain, then p’. Where PW is not explicit over whether B, either
B situations are nevertheless determinately selected (in which case PW is not in the relevant
sense silent over whether B) or else B- and ¬B-situations are equal candidates to be ‘selected’,
and (by Stalnaker’s lights) the counterfactual will be indeterminate, just as Rosen proposes.
(I make no claim that Rosen’s fictionalist will want to buy into this counterfactual analysis of
her operator, just that in doing so she would have a natural backup for Rosen’s response to the
incompleteness worry.))
There is a more detailed reason why the general strategy that Rosen likes is unlikely to
generalize to the set-theoretic case we started out with, and the other fictionalist paraphrases in
which we are interested. Consider again the simple set-theoretic version fictionalism outlined
above. The theorist putting this forward will typically be opinionated about the way she would
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understand the operator ‘According to S’.18 Within the philosophy of mathematics, for example,
one is likely to find it cashed-out (a) in terms of logical consequence (either taken as primitive,
or analyzed model-theoretically); or (b) in terms of the truth of a universally conditionalized
statement; or (b) in terms of the truth of necessitated universally conditionalized statement.19
Suppose, for example, we adopted the first view. We would have a biconditional of the form:
p↔ S  ppq
The following seems then to be a metatheorem of set theory:20
18One could always declare this to be a mistake. For example, we might think that fictionalisms should always be
cashed-out in terms of counterfactuals (and exploit the Stalnakerian treatment to deal with the puzzle of incomplete
fictions, as described above). For defence of such counterfactual imperialism, see (Dorr, 2005)
19See, respectively, ‘if-thenist’ formalism, Parsons (1990) on eliminativist structuralism, and Hellman (1989).
A little more care needs to be taken in formulating incompleteness in such cases. For example, in the case of
eliminativist structuralism, the corresponding case is one where neither ∀XΩ(X)→ p(X)) nor ∀XΩ(X)→¬p(X))
is true. If Ω was a second-order formulation of ZFC, then GCH is a good candidate for such an incompleteness, as
are large cardinal axioms.
20If the consequence relation involved is spelled out in the standard way, this will indeed be a metatheorem
(Go¨del, 1938; Cohen, 1963, 1964) . There are worries over the standard exposition, however. (A) the model-
theoretic consequence relation is normally cashed out in terms of set-theoretical constructions. By Cantor’s para-
dox, there is no set of all sets, and hence there is no set-theoretical model whose domain contains all sets. Hence, it
seems, no such construction can capture an ‘intended’ interpretation of set-theory, with a domain consisting of all
the sets there are. (There are, however, results that give us reassurance that the standard treatment of consequence
will not mislead. See Kreisel (1967). Moreover, there are those who reject the picture of a single ‘intended’ in-
terpretation of set theory. See Zermelo (1930) and Parsons (1974).). (B) in the context of a fictionalism over set
theory, a set theoretical explication of the key notion in the paraphrase is odd. One way out of this is to use a for-
mulation within type theory of the kind suggested by Shapiro (1991) and defended by Rayo and Uzquiano (1999)
under a plural interpretation of the style promoted by Boolos (1984). Another is, with Field (1989), to take the
notion of consequence as primitive. (C) The focus on consequence, as opposed to conditionals, allows us to avoid
some of the issues concerning the finite expressibility of theories. In the variants where conditionals are appealed
to, a higher-order setting becomes attractive, enabling, for example, a finitely axiomatization of Peano Arithmetic.
But a higher-order setting makes controversial the kind of incompleteness claims to which we are appealing.
There is a question whether incompleteness results go through under these interpretations. For in general, a more
powerful notion of consequence (in connection, for example, with a higher-order formulation of the theory at hand)
may mean that many more sentences are semantic consequences of the theory than a first-order understanding of
consequence would allow. Our choice of example—the generalized continuum hypothesis—is fairly robust. For
a second-order formulation of set theory is only quasi-categorical—it leaves unsettled ‘how tall’ the hierarchy of
sets might be. Whether or not the generalized continuum hypothesis holds might well depend on the height.
In general, I am inclined to think that the puzzle arises in other cases, even if we move higher-order, for I think
that the natural way to understand higher-order consequence is through Henkin-semantics, which do not allow us
to establish the categoricity results that would undermine completeness claims (see the second section of Appendix
B). This is a matter for another occasion.
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SET THEORETICAL INCOMPLETENESS 2
• it is not the case that S  pσq
• it is not the case that S  p¬σq
With set-theoretic fictionalism cashed out in this way, there is no room for flexibility on
incompleteness: we must look elsewhere to resolve our puzzle. The general methodological
point is that questioning the incompleteness premisses of the puzzle of incomplete fictions will
only be applicable where the operator in terms of which the fictionalism is phrased has the
(prima facie odd) features which Rosen postulates in the modal case. In many cases, then,
Rosen-style responses will be simply inapplicable. Thus, we are motivated to look for a different
resolution.
Incomplete paraphrases
I think that the key to defusing the puzzle above lies in the conception of paraphrase we dis-
cussed above. There, it was argued that reductive paraphrase is first and foremost a project
of describing the facts underlying a discourse. Philosophical significance is not carried by the
contingencies of what our expressions actually mean or commit us to, but what commitments
we have to undertaken in order to discharge a certain theoretical role. This view enjoins a neu-
trality about the semantics of the discourse in question. It is compatible with an error-theoretic
approach, whereby the absence of ontology renders the committal claims of the discourse false.
It is also compatible with the view that the semantics of the given domain is interestingly related
to the paraphrases in question.
Now, if we drop the claimed semantic equivalence of original statements and fictionalist
paraphrase, we lose our motivation for the fictionalist biconditional. This by itself is enough to
block the derivation of paradox. However, it is not so easy to escape the puzzle. To begin with, it
resurfaces, albeit in a watered down form. We have a pair of contradictory sentences, σ and ¬σ,
that are each paraphrased to something false. That still looks uncomfortable. Secondly, if we are
to maintain neutrality over semantic standing of the discourse, we need to block the derivation
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of conditional under the assumption that the paraphrase discloses the semantic content of the
original discourse. Without something further to say, it looks like we have an argument for an
error-theoretic approach.
Biting those bullets, and buying into an error theory, might in the end be the appropriate
response. I think we can do something better, however. Consider again the conception of
reductive paraphrase outlined previously. The basic idea of theory-shadowing paraphrase is
that the facts underlying a discourse D are facts about what follows from a certain fiction or
theory F . The key constraint on the paraphrase is that the surrogate sentences discharge the
theoretical role appropriate to the original discourse.
Why then do we assume that a paraphrase must be total, that it pair each sentence of the
original domain with a surrogate? If some of those sentences do no work (i.e. if we never, in
discharging the theoretical roles appropriate to the discourse, appeal to them) then we have no
need for a paraphrase. Nor does the theory-shadowing conception motivate any paraphrase in
cases where F is silent: it is facts about what does follow from the fiction that are supposed to
underlie the original discourse, not facts about what does not follow. My suggestion, therefore,
is that we take the reductive paraphrase to be partial, to take the form:
ppq pAccording to F, pq
for exactly those cases where the disjunction ‘(According to F , p) or (According to F , ¬p)’
holds. This is all that is motivated by the theory-shadowing conception, and all that is needed
for it to discharge its functions.21
Since the paraphrase is partial, we eliminate any analogue of the incomplete fictions puzzle.
What we get instead is the general statement that neither p nor ¬p is paired with any ‘underly-
ing facts’. That gives content to the claim that there is no fact of the matter over such p. We
can give a formal elucidation of this notion. For the general case of a theory-shadowing para-
21Of course, it would be a good objection to this view if it could be shown that some p over which the theory
is silent does do some important work. This would be a problem for any theory-shadowing proposal based on that
theory, not a problem specific to the case at hand.
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phrase based on ‘fiction’ F , let us introduce a new operator FACT, defined through the following
biconditional:22
FACT[p] iff According to F, p∗
We can now, in a neutral way, state the situation at hand. Where σ is the generalized contin-
uum hypothesis, we have:
¬FACT[σ]∧¬FACT[¬σ]
Notice that the disjunction FACT[σ∨¬σ] does hold: in the jargon, the facts are ‘non-prime’.
We noted above that our conception of paraphrase motivated neutrality on the standing of
the biconditional, not its rejection. What we now show is how a semantic hypothesis could be
maintained in the setting just described. Imagine that we supplement the core theory-shadowing
paraphrase, outlined earlier, by the additional view that, the fictionalist paraphrase gives the
content of our set-theoretical talk. We regard the apparently committal talk as a ‘manner of
speaking’, perhaps convenient for practical purposes, when what’s really being expressed is
given in the fictionalist paraphrase. Given this additional principle, we now get the biconditional
back. Where ‘p’ is reductively paraphrased to ‘According to F, p’, we have:
p↔ According to F, p∗
But notice that there is an absolutely natural restriction on this scheme: it holds only where
the paraphrase relation obtains. According to the view given above, it will not hold in cases
where the modal fiction falls silent. Thus, we derive the result that Nolan (2002) urges: rather
than fiddle with the behaviour of ‘According to’ to deny INCOMPLETENESS, we restrict the
biconditional.
Nolan further claims that modal claims not covered by this should be taken as indeterminate,
thus getting behaviour matching Rosen’s original hypothesis. Can we derive this claim also?
Not directly, I think. As we imagine the case, we have a community who explicitly decide to let
22Compare Fine (2003).
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their set-theoretic or modal talk be in effect a round-about way of talking about the fictionalist
paraphrases. At the points where the paraphrase is silent, we simply do not express anything,
however round-aboutly: their convention does not cover the case. It might be that one takes
situations where linguistic conventions lapse, to be ones where the relevant sentences have an
indeterminate status: neither true nor false. If so, then one has indeed derived the second aspect
of Nolan’s suggestion. 23
23The current proposal, though compatible with Nolan’s, differs in two respects. First, it gives a non-ad hoc
motivation for the obtaining of the biconditional, as the joint upshot of (a) the project of paraphrase; (b) a linguistic
convention to let one’s modal discourse express their fictionalist paraphrases. Second, it is a response that gives
a general recipe for treating incomplete fictions. Dropping (b) leaves the fundamental diagnosis of the situation
untouched: thus we can apply our result theorists in an error theoretic treatment of modal discourse, underpinned
by the possibility of fictionalist paraphrase.
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2.3 Interpretationism as a quasi-fiction
Recall that the puzzle was to see what the metaphysical view associated with interpretationism
was. I will here draw on the resources examined above to give one gloss on the enterprise. My
suggestion is that interpretationism is a theory-shadowing paraphrase put forward in furtherance
of the project of reducing intentional idioms to non-intentional ones. That it shares this general
shape is suggested by the gloss given earlier ‘for an expression to have a semantic property is
for that property to be assigned to it by the best semantic theory’. (Clearly, such a principle is
most comfortably read in furtherance of a reductive rather than semantic project—our aim is to
found semantic properties, not to give the semantics for talk about semantic properties.)
The rough characterization of the position, then, can be given by the following scheme:
pp q
pAccording to best semantic theory pq
There will be immediate concerns about how this can really work as an ideological reduction
of the semantic. If “Londres’ refers to London’ is to be replaced with ‘According to best theory,
‘Londres’ refers to London’, we seem to use the ideology we were meant to eliminate (‘refers’)
within the surrogate. Moreover, one might be concerned whether ‘According to best theory’ is
to be understood: it sounds very like the frankly semantic ‘Best theory says. . . ’. (This concern
is the analogue of the worries expressed by Nolan (2002, §4.2) concerning ‘strong’ modal fic-
tionalisms: that it appears that they will make circular appeal to a modal notion of entailment.)
The concerns are addressed by further details about how the machinery of the theory shad-
owing paraphrase is to be cashed-out in this particular case. We avoid using ‘refers’ in the
surrogate sentence, by mentioning it instead. The paraphrase really pairs “Londres’ refers to
London’ with ‘p‘Londres’ refers to Londonq follows from best theory’. The concern about
possible circularity induced by appeal to “according to” or “following from” are outlined below
and answered in the following section: essentially, the key is to analyze ‘follows from’ in terms
of (something like) logical consequence, and argue that no residual circularity remains.
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A second immediate objection rests on the observation that semantic theory, per se, will not
entail categorical semantic truths such as
‘London is a large city’ is true.
At best, we get:
‘London is a large city’ is true if and only if London is a large city.24
Appeal to non-semantic facts—facts about the size of cities—is required to discharge the right-
hand side and allow us to derive the canonical formulation. Recall that the biconditional is not
the underlying story—it may not even be true. What is really going on is:
According to best theory, [‘London is a large city’ is true if and only if London is a
large city].
and we can’t derive the categorical statement from this together with London is a large city.
This is a general issue with theory-shadowing paraphrases. In the case of modal fiction-
alism, it is mentioned by Rosen (1990) (see also the discussion in Sider (2002)).25 I take the
appropriate response here to be the same as in that case. Really, the paraphrase should not be to
‘According to best semantic theory, p’, but to ‘According to best theory together with the non-
semantic facts, p’. By incorporating an ‘encyclopedia’ of non-semantic facts into the theory
that our paraphrases shadow, we can allow categorical statements such as that cited above to be
derived.
Our paraphrase, then, will quantify over two kinds of theories. First, there will be the
selected semantic theory: in Lewis’ terminology, that grammar which is used by the community
in question. It is the substantive work of interpretationist metasemantic theory to say what
24Or, in the possible-worlds setting: ‘London is a large city’ is true relative to all and only worlds where London
is a large city.
25Rosen’s fictionalism wants to earn the right to assert a categorical modal claim such as “Possibly, there is a
swan.” The basic fictionalist proposal pairs this with ‘According to the modal fiction, there is a possible world
where there is a swan’. All that follows from ‘the hypothesis of the plurality of worlds’ per se is the conditional
that if swans exist in the actual world, then there is a possible world where swans exist. We need again to appeal
to facts about the actual world to discharge the antecedent. Rosen therefore adds an appeal to an ‘encyclopedia’ of
actual facts, just as we are about to.
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this is. Second, there will be the encyclopedia—a theory encapsulating all the non-semantic
facts. Putting together these last remarks with the earlier ones about the use of quotation and
model theoretic consequence, we get a more precise (though still schematic) statement of the
interpretationist paraphrase:
pp q p∀x,y(SELECTED(x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪ y  ‘p’)q26
This, then, is the form of the proposal. The fundamental question now is whether all the
machinery here invoked—the predicates SELECTED and ENCYCLOPEDIA, the consequence re-
lation , and the use of quotation—can each be explicated without appeal to semantic facts. We
shall outline four areas of concern.
Selected theory
Recall the characteristic two-step approach to identifying the semantic theory appropriate
to a population—we first pick out data (e.g. conventions of truthfulness, or T-sentences)
and then let the correct semantic theory be the best one that explains the data. We can
regard such stories as implicitly constructing the required predicate ‘SELECTED’. For we
can say that a theory is selected iff it is best at explaining relevant data, where this data
takes the form (for example) of conventions of truthfulness in population P. Semantic
ideology, then, is reduced to whatever ideology is used in explicating SELECTED. Atten-
tion to the details of the interpretationist metasemantic account thus allows us to assess
its success as part of a reductive paraphrase. Characteristically the interpretationist para-
phrase will feature a predicate DATA—holding of the data the interpretationist identifies,
and a relation BEST, holding between this data and the semantic theory that best accounts
for it.
pp q p∀z,x,y(DATA(z)∧ BEST(z,x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪ y  ‘p’)q
26In fact, as explored below, the use of quotation marks hides some complexity: really, we should use an explicit
“quotation function” *p*.
Note the universal quantification used in this formulation. An alternative would be to use existential quantifica-
tion. The two are equivalent so long as on e and only one theory is selected—see Chapter 3.
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Here different interpretationisms diverge. Appeal to mental representation will be made
explicit in the way the Lewisian unpacks DATA; whereas the characteristic Davidsonian
appeal to ‘holding true’ will feature in the Davidsonian’s explication of the same relation.
The other component to picking out the selected semantic theory is equally vital: What
is it that makes a semantic theory the ‘best’ account of this data? Again, if appeal to
intentional or semantic notions must be made in spelling out this notion, that impacts
on the reductive ambition that can be sustained by a given interpretationism. In fact,
particular proposals for unpacking this notion will be the focus of later parts of this thesis.
Our methodology shall be to start with a ‘null’ hypothesis: an explication of ‘best theory
for data-set z’ (‘BEST’) that minimizes appeal to contentious resources.
The null hypothesis I have in mind I call BEST=FIT. This identifies the relevant sense of
best theory of a certain set of data, with a theory that fits the data, in the sense that, ideally,
it (1) entails the data and (2) entails nothing incompatible with the data.27 (This will
require modification if we are to deal with situations data are less than totally coherent,
and so, intuitively, no theory ‘fits the data’ perfectly.28)
Taking the second component of an interpretationist proposal to be fit with the data has
a distinguished history—it is (explicitly or implicitly) endorsed by Davidson, Lewis and
Putnam at various points.29 BEST=FIT is a crucial premiss in the inscrutability puzzles
which are the focus for much of this thesis. It is important, then, to note that we have
offered no positive reason for endorsing it. On the other hand, any more constraining
hypothesis will have the burden of showing that it is not appealing to any problematically
semantic resources.
27I ignore, for the time being, complications arising from the need to introduce pragmatic factors mediating
between best semantic theory and the data.
28Progress towards gradable notions of ‘fit’ are developed in Braddon-Mitchell (2001), who appeals to work on
lossy algorithms, Rothschild and Leuenberger (2005) who focus on accounts of ‘truth-likeness’ in the philosophy
of science, and Elga (2004), who in the case of probabilistic theories develops a notion of the relative ‘typicality’
of data-sets.
29See, for example, Davidson (1977, 1979); Lewis (1975); Putnam (1980, 1981).
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With the other three worries, I will list the problems here, and then develop the framework
that resolves them in the following section.
The Encyclopedia
There are two concerns with the analysis of the predicate ‘encyclopedia’. One is whether
we can really have a theory which has the intended effect. What reason have we to think
that any language has the expressive resources to capture all the facts about the world?
The other is how we should analyze this predicate. The natural way to go to describe
a theory containing all the non-semantic facts would be talk about a true theory whose
content is wholly non-semantic. Neither notion, of course, can legitimately be appealed
to at this stage.
Consequence
In order to eliminate suspicion that semantic resources are smuggled into the notion of be-
ing true ‘according to’ some theory, we will appeal to the relation of logical consequence.
This stands a chance of being characterized without appeal to the semantic.
What is this notion? One option is to understand it model-theoretically. The rough char-
acterization is as follows: that φ is a model-theoretical consequence of Γ iff no matter
what the language means we never get all of Γ being true (on that interpretation) but φ
false. Despite the talk of ‘truth’ and ‘interpretation’, there is no blatant circularity. For
given a syntactical characterization of the language, we can define what it is for a math-
ematical function to be an ‘interpretation’ of the language in a formal sense (i.e. just a
mapping from names to objects, predicates to sets of objects, etc.) Further, we can then
explicitly define the property of truth-on-interpretation- f (e.g. PN has this property if
f (N) is a member of f (P)). So far, so good.
One might worry about a more subtle circularity. In explicating consequence model-
theoretically, it is no good letting every syntactically appropriate interpretation function
be ranged over. We want ‘A’ to be a consequence of ‘A∧B’ in the relevant sense. How-
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ever, if we allow ourselves to re-interpret ‘∧’ as disjunction, this will not be a case. Ac-
cordingly, the standard Tarskian analysis requires we hold fixed the actual interpretation
of a certain range of expressions: the logical constants.30 It appears, then, that model-
theoretic consequence makes essential appeal to the identification and interpretation of
logical constants within the object language. Prima facie, semantic notions are being
invoked.
Quotation
The appeal to quotation, in the course of giving the interpretationist’s paraphrase, may
give pause. For our aim is to get to facts relating quoted and unquoted words: indeed,
it might seem that quotation is exactly the inverse of the reference relation, so that given
the former we could explicitly define the latter. To get a grip on the concern, suppose that
we write the quotation function ∗∗. Then it looks as though we could define ‘reference’
by means of the following: w refers to o iff w =*o*. We need to address the worry,
therefore, that in using quotation we are tacitly assuming object-language/meta-language
connections that are semantic in nature.
The key thought in addressing all three questions is to distinguish carefully genuine appeal
to notions of reference and truth, from appeal to ‘reference-on-I’ and ‘truth-on-I’ where we can
give an explicit characterization of these ‘parochial’ relations. Whereas what ‘Billy’ refers to is
a semantic issue, what ‘Billy’ stands in the R relation to, where we explicitly stipulate what the
extension of the R relation is to be, involves no appeal to anything representational. As we shall
see in the following section, appeal to such explicitly defined relations allows us to develop a
‘parochial’ notion of consequence, quotation, etc. which will serve our purposes.
30We get a range of notions of model-theoretic consequence if we hold other aspects of interpretation fixed. I
ignore this for now.
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2.4 Parochial consequence and paraphrase
Consider again the reductive paraphrase of semantic discourse that has been offered.
pp q p∀x,y(SELECTED(x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪ y  *p*)q
Notice that we are now mentioning a language within the paraphrase. As already high-
lighted, it is important to be able to appeal to some prima facie semantic properties of this
language (e.g. to pick out its logical constants, and say what their intended interpretation is.)
The challenge is to say how we do we do this without compromising the reductive ambition.
This section will:
(A) state exactly what is involved in the above paraphrase;
(B) describe a ‘parochial’ interpretation of a language, and show that such resources are le-
gitimate within a reductive project;
(C) describe how such resources allow us to explicate the quotation function p* *q, and to
construct a notion of parochial consequence pq;
(D) show how a specific ‘meaning building’ language can be developed within the base lan-
guage over which the quantifiers within the paraphrase range and which can be taken to
be the language for which the parochial consequence relation is defined. This will allow
us also to define explicitly the predicate ENCYCLOPEDIA.
(A) The paraphrase
The general schematic formulation of the paraphrase has as instances statements such as:
p‘London’ refers to London q p∀x,y(SELECTED(x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪
y  “‘London’ refers to London”)q
The paraphrase is given in the theorist’s (meta)language but there are several other languages
in play. Let us give them names:
• Call the language used in the left-hand side of the paraphrase the problem language.
• Call the language mentioned in the left hand side of the paraphrase the target language.
• Call the language used in the right-hand side of the paraphrase the base language
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• Call the language mentioned by the base language the meaning-building language.
Typically, in giving a paraphrase we are trying to show how the work done by a problem
language (in giving the semantic properties of the target language) can be done by a base lan-
guage that makes no mention of semantic resources. Here, our base language itself contains
‘higher-order’ resources—the ability to talk about the meaning-building language.
In the case just given, all the languages were (fragments of) English, albeit supplemented
with some formal vocabulary. The problem language is the semantic fragment of English,
which mentions English expressions. The base language is a non-semantic fragment of English,
with special predicates and the resources to specify syntactically the sentences of the semantic
fragment of English—so English is the meaning building language too.
The free use of quotation and other devices cannot be supposed to be in goodstanding. To
bring this out suppose that the meaning building language is French. Then our ‘quotation marks’
need to take an English expression ‘dog’ to the French quoted expression ‘〈〈chien〉〉’. Clearly,
here some sort of translation is being implicitly appealed to: something that is obscured by the
all-English version.
As anticipated above, this will turn out to be unproblematic. For the purpose of clarifying
our commitments we shall assume that the meaning-building language is a formal language,
rather than ordinary English. This will mean that we are obligated explicitly to define the
quotation function **. That we can do this without the use of representational notions will
vindicate the somewhat sloppy formulation where we use English and ordinary quotation.
(B) Parochial interpretations
The key idea is to use predicates of the base language to specify aspects of an ‘intended’ val-
uation of the meaning-building language. Suppose, for example, that our meaning building
language is an initially uninterpreted first-order language, containing the non-logical predicate
‘Q’. Then we can stipulate that this symbol will have the valuation {x : x is a quark}. Or bet-
ter: we stipulatively define a notion ‘refers-in-the-meaning-building-language’ which relates
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the symbol ‘Q’ to the set {x : x is a quark}. We incur ideological commitment to quarkhood,
ontological commitment to sets, but no commitment to genuine representational properties for
the meaning-building language.
Now the notion ‘refers-in-the-meaning-building-language’ has been explicitly defined. This
is not to explicate a general notion of reference—the relation that we have introduced is simply
undefined beyond the narrow range of predicates for which we introduce it. Call it, therefore, a
parochial interpretation.
A base language can therefore construct a meaning building language as a purely mathemat-
ical entity. and specify a parochial valuation by using base-language predicates as appropriate.
This is no more problematic than any other use of predicates within a mathematical construc-
tion. There are no hidden semantic notions here.31
(C) Applications: ** and consequence
We are not assuming that the meaning building language is identical to the problematic lan-
guage. The quotation involved in the paraphrase is not a purely syntactic device—it needs to
correlate a given sentence of the problematic language with an appropriate expression in the
meaning building language which is then quoted.
The required translation is as follows. First, the vocabulary to be reduced (e.g. ‘refers’)
is mapped to a special symbol of the meaning-building language, ‘VAL’, say. Otherwise, an
expression ‘London’ is translated within the meaning building language with some symbol L
which refers-in-the-meaning-building-language to London. Therefore, the translation can be
set up simply by using (1) resources shared by the problematic language and the base language;
(2) parochial interpretations of the meaning building language.
The other resource that we promised to explain is that of consequence. I favour a model-
theoretic analysis of consequence—but the standard model-theoretic definition requires we
identify logical vocabulary, to tell us what interpretations are and which aren’t admissible. How,
31If the base language contains a quotation device, then it can treat itself as a meaning building language. The
required relations are then ‘disquotationally’ specified.
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when reducing semantic properties, can we appeal to this? The solution is not to appeal to it.
We define a parochial notion of consequence for the meaning building language.
As before, we can pick out symbols within the meaning-building language e.g. p∧q and use
the base language to specify a parochial interpretation for them. We then can define a notion
of ‘admissible valuation’ by restricting the range of valuations to just those that agree with our
parochial interpretations on the assignment to the range of expressions picked out. We therefore
have a definition of ‘’, given just mathematics, the syntax of the meaning-building language
and again the use of various base language logical notions. Notice that because we have not
said what it is for an arbitrary symbol to be logical, this is not adequate as a characterization
of logical consequence—but the model theoretic notion just characterized will serve our pur-
poses.32
(D) Lagadonian languages
It is clear from the above discussion that any meaning-building language could serve our needs—
English is used for ease of presentation, but to legitimize its use, we need to define a parochial
interpretation, so we could as well have used a purely formal language. In fact, for some pur-
poses, a formal language has advantages over English. Recall, for example, the need for an
encyclopedia that contains all facts about the world. What guarantee do we have that any natu-
ral language could be expressively adequate for this?
To allay such concerns, we can take our meaning-building language to be Lagadonian lan-
guage (Lewis, 1986c, pp.145-6). This (purely formal) language has some distinctive features:
• The formal syntax of a categorial grammar.33
• It has as constants all objects.
32Even if we were to take logical consequence as a primitive, following Field (1989), we can make a similar
case. Presumably something is a consequence of a set of sentences only relative to some interpretation of the
logical constants involved (sentences, after all, do not have their consequences essentially). We can equally define
a parochial notion of logical consequence as what the logical consequences of the formulae would be were the
symbols to receive such-and-such an interpretation (explicitly specified).
33See Ajdukiewicz (1935); Lewis (1970a); Cresswell (1973). See also discussion in §5.1, below.
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• It has as predicates all sets (pure or impure).34
• There is a special uninterpreted relation-symbol VAL (for ‘semantic value’).35
The Lagadonian language so constructed is a mathematical entity (a proper class of sets).
What makes it useful is the ease with which we can introduce a parochial interpretation for it.
We can reductively analyze ‘refers-in-Lagadonian’:
x refers to y iff x= y.36
We can therefore take this as a canonical framework in which to apply the treatment of quotation
and consequence given above. Since we can now easily formulate a parochial notion of true-in-
Lagadonian,37 we can reductively define the encyclopedia predicate:
ENCYCLOPEDIA(x) iff ∀y(y is true-in-Lagadonian→ y ∈ x)38
34Hence, some predicates will also be constants. These will be distinguished by syntactic position. If one likes,
one can take a predicate to be the pair 〈M,S〉, where the first element is a name for the appropriate syntactic
category (e.g. S/N) and the second element is a set of objects.
35We can introduce a special syntactic marker which will distinguish VAL from other relation symbols.
36This will not cover VAL, of course.
37Compare the definition of truth for structured propositions in Soames (1989). His ‘structured propositions’ (or
‘structured intensions’) are exactly Lagadonian sentences, from the present perspective, and the definition of truth
for them is a parochial interpretation. Propositions, so characterized, are not intrinsically representational (compare
Lewis, 1986c, p.146)(it is not clear why they are especially appropriate as truth-bearers, therefore, though clearly
they are technically elegant).
38Notice that the base languages quantifiers have here to range over a proper class of entities. I shall assume that
this raises no new problems.
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2.5 Conclusion
The basic idea that meaning facts are ‘fixed by best theory’ connects interpretationism with a
range of deflationary metaphysical accounts: on modality, mathematics, composite objects and
in many other areas. The full ‘fictionalist’ package—including, maybe, an error theory about
the semantic content of such claims, a ‘pretence’ account of attitude to such statements; or alter-
natively claims of semantic equivalence between original and surrogate statements—contains
much about which we can and should remain neutral. The key idea that interpretationism takes
from fictionalism is that of giving a ‘theory-shadowing paraphrase’ of the target discourse. In
accordance with the general project of reductive paraphrase, this is intended to say what the
facts underlying the discourse are, and is neutral on the question of the truth or falsity within
the discourse itself.
In fact, there is more than one way in which we can specify the ‘facts underlying the dis-
course’ by exploiting the fictionalist paraphrase. Given a substantive account of how best se-
mantic theory is selected, we can look at the set of situations where all selected semantic the-
ories entail S. This is the recipe for constructing what Yablo (2001) (in analogous cases) calls
the ‘real content’ of such sentences.39 Given an interpretationist story about theory selection,
the real content of a semantic claim in this sense would comprise worlds where (roughly) the
patterns of assent and dissent are such as to select a semantic theory entailing the claim. In
this way, we can ‘unwind’ our theory-shadowing paraphrase to associate a proposition (set of
worlds) with a semantic statement. But thinking of Yablo’s ‘real content’ as the facts under-
lying semantic talk is not in competition with my claim that the theory-shadowing paraphrase
gives these facts (individuated in a coarse-grained way, and supposing that words quoted exist
necessarily): for the Yablo-real content holds in exactly the worlds where the theory-shadowing
paraphrase ∀x,y(SELECTED(x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪ y  *p*) is true. Hence, the Yablo-
39See §5 of Yablo (2001): “The real content is the circumstance K that makes S fictional” Yablo’s setting is
slightly different frommine, as he is assuming a particular fiction is fixed, relative to which sentences are ‘fictional’
or not depending on how the world is. But since our theory-shadowing paraphrase quantifies over fictionalisms,
we need to factor in this variation into the characterization of the real content: hence the version given above.
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real content and the fictionalist paraphrase are just ways of presenting the same underlying
(coarse-grained) facts.
The distinctive interpretationist contribution to the theory-shadowing paraphrase of seman-
tic facts is a particular style of account of what it is for a semantic theory to be selected. A
semantic theory is selected if it is the best theory of the sentential data that the interpretationist
identifies.
What happens if more than one semantic theory meets the conditions that the interpretation-
ist sets down? That is, what if the constraints that the interpretationist sets down underdetermine
best theory? There is here a tension within the account. The more constraints packed into the
interpretationist’s account of what makes a semantic theory ‘best’, the more likely it is that
resources used vitiate reductive ambitions. Conversely, the thinner that we make the notion of
‘best theory’, the greater the chances of underdetermination occurring. Does underdetermina-





Introduction to Part II
Discussion of inscrutability of reference will occupy the next three chapters. Within an inter-
pretationist setting, inscrutability arises when there are multiple theories, each with equal claim
to be the ‘meaning-fixing semantic theory’. Chapter 3 will be concerned with the content of
inscrutability theses: how to handle situations where we have a range of ‘successful’ theories
by interpretationist lights, and what the content of claimed inscrutability is.
Chapters 4 and 5 present arguments for two types of inscrutability. The first concerns how
reference of general terms such as “Rabbit” is divided: i.e. which objects fall under that predi-
cate. The source here is Quine’s famous “argument from below” (Quine, 1960).
The second type of inscrutability in which I will be interested is radical inscrutability of
reference. This is the claim that there is no fact of the matter at all concerning which objects
singular terms pick out (and indeed, which objects are in the extension of predicates).
In each case, I am interested in the first instance with how the interpretationist should view
these arguments. I argue that we can treat these arguments as showing the costs of various forms
of interpretationism—particularly of forms that endorse the attractively simple BEST=FIT hy-
pothesis. Therefore, the issue to be discussed here is whether the semantic theories embedding
strange ways of dividing reference, or radically permuted reference schemes, can fit with what-
ever data is thrown at them at the level of pairings of sentences with truth-values or propositions.
It may well be that a different setting (e.g. causal theories of reference) would avoid the diffi-
culties here sketched. That is not at issue for now.1
1Such theories have their own problems to deal with. Some of these problems may impact on how they would
respond to the ideas here presented, though: in particular, it looks like an account of what privileges a semantic
theory dividing reference over Rabbit-slices rather than over Rabbit-worms would have to appeal to a solution to
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The two chapters present rather different cases for this, however. In the case of radical
inscrutability of reference, we can produce formal theorems making out our results: we can
prove theorems that appropriate settings will “overgenerate” semantic theories that are success-
ful by interpretationist lights. In the division-inscrutability case, however, I will not be arguing
for such a general result (indeed, I will be adducing counterexamples: instances of sentences
which are true on one reading but not on another). My methodology will therefore be to present
a semantic theory for a fragment of English, and show how in a range of central cases, the
truth-conditions generated by rival ways of dividing reference are in each case “good enough”.
If we manage, in either the division- or the radical-inscrutability case, to show that the
relevant semantic theories match each other over the relevant data about the usage of whole
sentences, interpretationists are then faced with a dilemma. Should they complicate their story
about the foundations of semantics, denying BEST=FIT, for example, by putting further con-
straints on ‘best theory’? Or should they instead learn to live with the inscrutability? I shall
suggest that the division-inscrutability should not be too unpleasant. Radical inscrutability is
another matter: and in the final chapters of the thesis we shall measure the costs of accepting it,
and the burdens that would need to be undertaken in avoiding it.
the “qua” problem (For a presentation of the qua problem, see Sterelny (1990, ch 6.)).
Chapter 3
Inscrutability theses
Our focus now is on the alleged phenomenon of inscrutability of reference. Such theses take
the form of claims such as:
There is no fact of the matter whether ‘Rabbit’ applies to instantaneously existing
entities (rabbit-slices), or to perduring objects (rabbit-worms).1
There is no fact of the matter about whether “Londres” refers to London, or whether
it refers to New York.2
There is no fact of the matter whether ‘mass’ denotes relativistic mass, or whether
it denotes rest mass.3
We shall see in due course arguments for particular claims of this sort, and shall assess their ef-
fectiveness and tenability. Within interpretationism, we can expect arguments for inscrutability
to take a particular form. What underlies the semantic, on this view, are truths of roughly the
form ‘It follows from the best semantic theory that p’. This raises the question: what if there
is no unique best theory? What if there are a number of theories—even infinitely many—tied
for ‘first place’? Generally speaking, inscrutability results will threaten if we can make the case
that semantic theories entailing the contradictory results fit the interpretationist’s data equally
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well. 4 (For the moment, we will suppose that the only theories in the race to be ‘best’ are
classical semantic theories.)
The task of this chapter is to gain a rigorous understanding about what it means to say that
‘there is no fact of the matter. . . ’ over whether or not p. To this end we present two differ-
ent ways of handling such locutions. The first is to construct from the multiple best theories
an ‘overall’ meaning-fixing theory that encapsulates all of them. The second is to stick with
the simple identification of selected theories with best theories, and allow there to be multiple
selected theories. We discuss each of these in turn.
4Note that we hold the metasemantic theory fixed while considering whether inscrutability emerges. Thus we
are here concerned with “genuine” inscrutability and not merely “conventionality of claims about reference” in the
sense of Field (1975). However, see the discussion of ‘innocuous’ vs. ‘illuminating’ and ‘surprising’ inscrutability
at 101, below.
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3.1 A supervaluational treatment of inscrutability
Cashing out inscrutability of reference in terms of there being ‘no fact of the matter’ about
which of a range of things a given term refers to, brings to mind other areas of the philosophy of
language where such glosses have been offered. Vague language—paradigmatically predicates
such as ‘is a heap’, ‘is bald’ and‘is red’—lends itself to such elucidations. Faced with a series of
men with receding hairlines, it is tempting to say that there is no fact of the matter about where
the boundary between bald and non-bald men lies. Consider also counterfactual conditionals:
in particular, the claim ‘If I had flipped that (fair) coin, it would have come down heads’. Some
maintain that given the chancy nature of the situation there is no fact of the matter whether this
claim is true.
My ambition here is not to say anything novel about these claims (though the relationship
between vagueness and inscrutability, in particular, is extremely interesting.5) What I intend to
do in this section is to describe and elaborate one of the pieces of formal machinery that has been
at the heart of debates about vagueness, and outline a possible analysis of inscrutability in terms
of it. The machinery is commonly associated with supervaluational theories of vagueness.
Classic papers on this include Lewis (1970a); Dummett (1975); Fine (1975); Kamp (1975). A
similar setting is deployed by Field (1973, 1974) specifically in application to inscrutability. I
will not trace the history of the notion here, but rather develop a version from scratch.6
In the following sections, I outline the basic idea of multiply intensional semantics by out-
lining two paradigmatic examples: relativization to possible worlds and to variable assignments.
We see two illustrative ‘derelativization’ strategies: the picking out of a privileged index (e.g.
the actual world); or quantification over all indices (in the case of variable assignments), and
characterize local and global consequence in that general setting. Introducing a new parameter
of ‘delineations’ gives the basic framework for a supervaluational treatment. (In Appendix A, I
argue contraWilliamson (1994, ch.5) and Keefe (2000, ch.8) that no matter whether we charac-
5See in particular current work by Eklund (2005); Rayo (2004) on aspects of this relationship.
6Those interested in its development, and particularly on the current debate about its role within an account of
vague language, should consult Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000).
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terize consequence globally or locally in the context of supervaluational semantics, no revision
of classical logic is induced.) I finish by defining various de-parameterized semantic notions
that allow us to express inscrutability of reference within a supervaluationist treatment, and
showing in each case how an object-language operator can be constructed to allow expression
of inscrutability within the object-language.
Multiply indexed semantics
Following Lewis (1970a), we will treat indeterminacy within a model-theoretic semantics for
a language. The model theory used, in general, will be multiply intensional, in the sense that
expressions will be assigned extensions relative to a string of indices. Two familiar cases are as
follows:
(A) One of the indices is a possible world. Thus ‘Britain is in the Arctic’ will be assigned
a function that will map to True situations where Britain occupies that more northerly
position; other situations (such as the actual one) will be mapped to False. We can then
treat modal operators such as ‘Necessarily’ through clauses exploiting this parameter:
‘Necessarily, Britain is in the arctic’ is true at a world iff ‘Britain is in the arctic’ is true
at every world.
(B) Another of the indices is a variable assignment. For example ‘x is male’ is assigned
a function that maps variable assignments pairing George Bush with ‘x’ to True; and
mapping variable assignments pairing Hilary Clinton with ‘x’ to False. Exploiting this
parameter, we can characterize quantification: ‘For all x, x is male’ will be true at a
variable assignment iff ‘x is male’ is true with respect to every variable assignment.
More sophisticated intensional operators can be introduced using accessibility relations on
the class of possible worlds, or of variable assignments. Let a world w P-access u iff the laws
of nature of w are not violated in u. Then we can set up the notion of Physical Necessity, PN,
with the effect: ‘PN, Britain is in the Arctic’ is true at w iff ‘Britain is in the Arctic’ is true at u
for all u that w P-accesses.
Encapsulating all this, amodel for a language containing these two kinds of indices will take
the form:
〈D,W,V,R,F,a〉
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where D is a set (understood as the domain of all objects) W is a set (understood as the set
of all possible worlds and a a point within that set (understood as the actual world, V is a set
(understood as the set of all variable assignments), R contains a string of accessibility relations
and F is the interpretation function that assigns to expressions of the language appropriate
intensions—that is, functions from pairs of elements drawn fromW and V to extensions based
on D.7 (We shall use the notation (m)D to pick out the domain of m, (m)W to pick out the set of
worlds in m, etc.) Call the space of all such models semantic space.
With this in place, we can define the unrelativized notion of TRUTH on the basis of the
parameterized truth under interpretation F at world w on variable assignment v. First, we
define ‘S is true on model m’. The model will provide us with the ‘designated interpretation’ of
the language and an ‘actual world’, but what of the variable assignments? It makes no obvious
sense to think of picking out a ‘privileged’ variable assignment; so instead we de-parameterize
by generalizing. The result:
S is true on modelm iff for all variable assignments v based on (m)D, S is true under
(m)F at (m)a and v.
S is false on model m iff for all variable assignments v based on (m)D, S is not true
under (m)F at (m)a and v.
We get truth simpliciter by picking out a ‘designated’ model: the one where the (m)a is truly the
actual world, where (m)F is the correct interpretation of the language, etc. The job of metase-
mantics is exactly to help us pick out this designated model. Given this, we can characterize
truth and falsity simpliciter in the obvious way:
S is TRUE iff S is true on m, where m is the designated model.
S is FALSE iff S is false on m, where m is the designated model.
7This is a ‘Carnapian’ model in the sense of Chapter 5. See also the discussion in Appendix C.
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To get a model-theoretic characterization of logical consequence, we start with the intuitive
idea that φ is a logical consequence of φ if no matter what, if Γ is true then so is φ. Actually, this
won’t quite do: consequence will be vacuous if we are allowed, say, to re-interpret ‘and’ as or
(for then we can create counterinstances even to the move from ‘A and B’ to ‘A’). Therefore, we
pick out a subspace Λ of semantic space: the logically admissible models. These are those that
agree with the designated model on the interpretation of a certain special range of expressions:
for example, on the interpretation of logical constants such as ‘and’, ‘or’ and quantifiers such
as ‘exists’ and ‘for all’.
Thinking of consequence as truth-preservation under logically admissible models in this
way, the following ‘global’ characterization of consequence is natural (Williamson, 1994, ch.5):
φ is a GLOBAL LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE of Γ iff For all models m within Λ, when-
ever each element of Γ is true on m we have φ true on m.
An alternative characterization works with the original parameterized semantic properties:
φ is a LOCAL LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE of Γ iff For all models m within Λ, for
all worlds w in (m)W and variable assignments v drawn from (m)D, whenever each
element of Γ is true under (m)F at w and v we have φ true under (m)F at w and v.8
On both these setups, we will have ‘failures of bivalence’ in a certain sense. In the actual
world and on the intended interpretation, ‘x is male’ is true on some variable assignments and
false on others. It is thus not TRUE, but it is not FALSE either.
Delineations
The above discussion illustrates general tactics which we can apply in many cases. The su-
pervaluationist’s thought concerning indeterminacy is one implementation of these ideas. To
motivate the extension, consider the following pair of operators:
Definitely, a person with no hairs is bald.
8As explained in Appendix A, global and local consequence as currently characterized come apart when we
consider argument forms involving free variables.
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In some sense, Alfie is bald.
The two operators ‘in some sense’ and ‘Definitely’ have formal analogies to intensional
operators such as ‘necessarily’, discussed above. Lewis suggests we treat them as such, intro-
ducing a new parameter—that of a ‘delineation’—to accommodate them. In what follows, a
delineation may be thought of as a ‘way of drawing boundaries’, where (one would think) the
meaning-fixing facts do not fix such things.9 ‘Definitely S’ will now be treated as requiring S
to be truth at all delineations. (Now this might make it look as if we only need delineations
which are (intuitively) ‘ways of making precise’ our language as is stands: ones which draw the
boundaries for predicates compatibly with the meaning-fixing facts. In fact, I think we need to
revise the setup a little: I discuss this in Appendix A. For the moment, let’s assume the contrary:
the designated model will include a set of delineations ∆ corresponding to all and only the ways
of ‘sharpening’ the meanings of our language compatibly with the meaning-fixing facts.)
Now, just as with variable assignments, it seems that we have no way to pick out a ‘privi-
leged’ delineation. The natural tactic is to generalize, just as in the earlier case:
S is true on m iff For all delineations d in (m)∆ and for all variable assignments v
drawn from (m)D, S is true under (m)F relative to (m)a, at d and v.
TRUTH simpliciter is once more truth at the designated model.
Now consider an intuitively borderline case of a bald man—Alfie, say. By our understanding
of what a delineation is, on the designated model there will be delineations relative to which he
is bald, and delineations relative to which he is not. By our characterization of TRUTH, ‘Alfie is
bald’ is not TRUE. Similarly, this is not FALSE. We have it that ‘Alfie is bald’ is not TRUE nor
FALSE. Formally, this ‘failure of bivalence’ is exactly like the one we observed occurring in the
9Formally, we can take delineations to be structureless points: the idea of them as a ‘way of drawing boundaries’
comes form their interaction with the interpretation function. Intuitively, the extensions assigned to a predicate P
by f relative to a delineation d, will have a certain boundary; and if we substitute d′ for d we get an extension with
slightly different boundaries. I shall continue to use ‘delineation’ in a way that confuses delineations proper with
the image of the delineations under the mapping given by the interpretation function.
Lewis (1970a) attributes to delineations much richer structure. This does not seem to be exploited in his formal
treatments, and Keefe (2000) argues, to my mind convincingly, that there will be no principled extension of this
kind of structure to vague predicates such as ‘nice’.
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case of the free-variable sentence ‘x is male’. It has the same root cause: de-parameterizing via
a generalization, rather than by picking out a privileged point.
Semantic properties
Let us review the unrelativized semantic properties that the supervaluational framework allows
us to attach to words and sentences.
First, at the level of sentences, we have the notion of TRUTH that results from generaliz-
ing across all delineations: a property often called supertruth. Equally we have FALSITY, or
superfalsity. We can also define INDETERMINACY as a third status: S will be INDETERMI-
NATE iff it is neither TRUE nor FALSE. We have already seen two examples of sentences that
arguably are INDETERMINATE in this sense: the free-variable formula ‘x is male’, and the case
of borderline-bald Alfie: ‘Alfie is bald’.
But the central focus of the inscrutability we are looking for is at the level of word-reference,
rather than the truth-status of sentences. Here we can define three analogous statuses for other
semantic notions, again in two steps:
N refers to O on m iff For all delineations in (m)∆, and all variable assignments v
drawn from (m)D, N refers to O under (m)F at (m)a and v and d.
N fails to refer to O on m iff For all delineations in (m)∆, and all variable assign-
ments v drawn from (m)D, it is not the case that N refers to O under (m)F at (m)a
and v and d.
To get de-parameterized notions, we have:
N REFERS TO O iff N refers to O on m where m is the designated model
N FAILS TO REFER TO O iff N fails to refer to O on m where m is designated.
Again, there will be a third status: We say that N PARTIALLY REFERS TO O iff it neither REFERS
nor FAILS TO REFER to O.10
10For the notion of partial reference, see Field (1974). Notice that, just as free variables allow us to construct
INDETERMINATE sentences, variables themselves PARTIALLY REFER to every object.
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Inscrutability within supervaluationism
Inscrutability arises when there is no choosing between a range of interpretations of a language.
Taking these to each attribute classical extensions or intensions to expressions, we can encap-
sulate this whole range within a supervaluational setting by pairing each interpretation in the
range with a delineation—the semantic value assigned to e according to the interpretation I is
now assigned to e by the supervaluational semantics relative to the delineation dI . Thus, where
inscrutability arises, we have a canonical method for constructing a supervaluational seman-
tics.11
Inscrutability of reference occurs when the range of ‘intended’ interpretations conflict over
the semantic value assigned to a given expression. A singular term N, for example, might be
assigned O by one interpretation, and O′ by another. Within the overall theory, the term denotes
O relative to one delineation, and O′ relative to another. According to the definitions above, this
is a case where a term t does not REFER at all. Rather, it PARTIALLY REFERS to both the objects
O and to O′.
The supervaluationist framework thus gives us a way of handling inscrutability, and relat-
ing it to semantic properties of expressions. In this way we can describe the effect of Quinean
‘gavagai’ arguments (to be discussed in Chapter 4): they try to show that ‘Peter’ PARTIALLY
REFERS to a rabbit-stages, and to rabbit-parts, and to various other rabbit-related entities. Rad-
ical inscrutability of reference (to be discussed in Chapter 5) is the thesis that any singular term
N PARTIALLY REFERS to every object whatsoever.12
11The idea of handling inscrutability within a supervaluational setting originates in Field (1973, 1974).
12Some ‘supervaluationist’ settings involve machinery far richer than that described here, and will not naturally
generalize to the case of inscrutability. The use of partial models in Fine (1975) and Kamp (1975) is an instance
of this.
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3.2 A theory-shadowing treatment of inscrutability
When we formulated interpretationism in terms of theory shadowing paraphrases in Chapter 2,
we did not consider what would happen if more than one theory was ‘selected’. Our implicit
assumption was that we would find a single selected meaning-fixing theory; this encourages the
supervaluationist treatment of inscrutability just described, for there we show how to construct
a single overall meaning-fixing theory.
However, our original formulation identified meaning fixing theories with the best theory
of the relevant data. If we simple-mindedly carry over this identification, we will end up with
multiple selected theories in cases of inscrutability. The present section examines what happens
if we allow this to happen.
The theory-shadowing paraphrase rendered ‘p’ as ‘According to best semantic theory, p’,
where this in turn was explicated as follows:
pp q p∀x,y(SELECTED(x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪ y  *p*)q
Notice that in order to receive a true paraphrase, a semantic statement must follow from
each selected semantic theories. Inscrutability of reference occurs where the selected theories
disagree among themselves. If p is a semantic claim over which the selected theories disagree,
then we have the formalized versions of the following:
¬According to best semantic theory p
¬ According to best semantic theory ¬p.
That is, in such cases we will have an ‘incompleteness’ within a theory-shadowing account,
analogous to those we have seen previously, within a quasi-fictionalism about set theory and
within Rosen’s fictionalist account of modality.13
13An even closer analogy is with if-thenist accounts of mathematics, where the paraphrase is to a universalized
conditional ∀X(PA(X)→ p(X)) if PA is not categorical (e.g. on a second order framework with Henkin semantics)
then we find the same issues.
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If all optimal candidate semantic theories fall under ‘selected’, inscrutability is manifested
in incompleteness within the theory-shadowing paraphrase. This suggests that we may be able
to describe the phenomena using the kind of machinery we introduced to handle incompleteness
puzzles quite generally.
To fix ideas, let us make up a word “Lonis”, and suppose there is no choosing between
candidate theories that assign London to “Lonis”, and those that assign Paris to it. Let us
suppose further that a pair of theories embedding the respective reference schemes are the only
two ‘successful’ theories by interpretationist lights. Call the former θ1 and the latter θ2.
To get a grip on which of the paraphrased sentences hold and which do not, we can exploit
the following equivalence:14
θ1∨θ2  p⇐⇒ (θ1  p)∧ (θ2  p)
Quite generally then, p will be paraphrased to something true, iff it follows from disjunctive
theory; and incompleteness within the former theory correspond with incompleteness within
the disjunctive theory.
Some categorical statements about reference can follow from the theory. For example, if
both theories agree that ‘Madrid’ REFERS TO Madrid, then clearly or-elimination will let us
derive the categorical statement:
‘Madrid’ REFERS TO Madrid.
But the disjunctive theory does not, in general, deliver categorical statements about reference.
Rather, we get disjunctive principles such as:
‘Lonis’ REFERS TO London ∨ ‘Lonis’ REFERS TO Paris
in this case, the lack of resolution impacts on the sentential level; we find:
14The left-to-right direction holds since θ1  θ1∨θ2, and  is transitive. The right-to-left direction follows from
or-elimination. Given θ1∨θ2, from each disjunct p follows, so p follows from the disjunction.
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(‘Lonis is in England’ is TRUE iff London is in England)∨
(‘Lonis is in England’ is TRUE iff Paris is in England.)
Since one of the right-hand sides here is true and the other is false, we cannot conclude anything
categorical about the truth-value of the sentence: the disjunctive theory (and hence our theory
shadowing paraphrase) is incomplete at this point. Now consider a case where the right-hand
sides of both biconditionals are true:
(‘Lonis is in Europe’ is TRUE iff London is in Europe) ∨
( ‘Lonis is in Europe’ is TRUE iff Paris is in Europe)
Since both right-hand sides are true, or-elimination gives that, unconditionally, ‘Lonis is in
Europe’ is TRUE.
Fact
Within supervaluational treatment the idea that there is ‘no fact of the matter’ about what a
term refers to was explicated by attributing to the term a definite semantic relation to the ob-
jects in question: PARTIAL REFERENCE. The theory-shadowing account does no such thing:
rather, cases where there is intuitively ‘no fact of the matter’ about reference correspond to
incompleteness within the theory-shadowing paraphrase. This allows us to bring in the kind
of machinery we have already found useful in describing incompleteness puzzles within the
general fictionalist and quasi-fictionalist setting.
Recall the operator FACT which was introduced in §2.2. Recall that, when we have an
incomplete fiction, we get sentences p such that
¬FACT[p]∧¬FACT[¬p]
(For example, in the case of a mathematical fictionalism, the generalized continuum hypothesis
might be such an S). In the current context, we can introduce the relevant operator by the
following biconditional:
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FACT[p]⇔∀x,y(SELECTED(x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪ y  ∗p∗)
In cases where the theory falls silent or multiple selected theories disagree (e.g. over whether
‘Lonis is in England’ is true) we will have
¬ FACT[ ‘Lonis is in England’ is TRUE] ∧
¬ FACT[‘Lonis is in England’ is not TRUE]
Indeed, we can formulate this directly at the level of reference:
¬ FACT[ ‘Lonis’ REFERS TO London] ∧
¬ FACT[¬ ‘Lonis’ REFERS TO London]
As noted previously, in the presence of incompleteness we cannot move from FACT[p∨ q]
to FACT[p]∨ FACT[q]. A striking illustration of this feature, in the case at hand, is that even
though there’s no fact of the matter over whether ‘Lonis is in England’ is TRUE or FALSE, and
so we do not have:
FACT[‘Lonis is in England’ is TRUE] ∨ FACT[‘Lonis is in England’ is FALSE]
we still have the following:
FACT[ (‘Lonis is in England’ is TRUE) ∨ ( ‘Lonis is in England’ is FALSE) ]
Indeed, given that the candidate semantic theories are classical, every instance of bivalence for
closed sentences has a true paraphrase; and more generally, the theory shadowing account will
conserve all the formal features of the semantic properties of the candidate semantic theories (of
which bivalence is an instance, if the candidate theories are all classical). For if these properties
hold with respect to any semantics of the candidate kind, then they hold in particular in each of
the selected theories; whereby we can derive them by or-elimination from the overall theory.15
15McGee and McLaughlin (1994) describe a non-classical semantic treatment of a vague language that supports
bivalence. However, their setting differs substantially from that in view here. They draw a sharp distinction
between ‘correspondence truth’ for which bivalence fails; and ‘disquotational truth’ or ‘pluth’ for which bivalence
holds. On the latter notion, they write that it is “a way of using the word ‘true’ whose fundamental governing
postulate is the disquotation principle” (p. 217). By contrast, the treatment here need not support disquotation at
all, since the metalanguage can in general be perfectly precise.
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Formulating inscrutability of reference
We can use the ‘FACT’ operator to unpack our original characterization of inscrutability as a
case where there ‘is no fact of the matter’ about what a given term refers to. One who follows
Quine on ‘gavagai’ might maintain:
¬ FACT[ “Peter” REFERS TO a temporal slice of a rabbit] ∧
¬ FACT[¬ “Peter” REFERS TO a temporal slice of a rabbit]
To formulate the idea of radical inscrutability of reference, we really want to be able to
quantify into FACT contexts. We want to say that there is no object O such that it is a fact that
N fails to refer to it. That is, we want to formulate the claim as follows:
¬∃xFACT[¬N refers to x]
However, we have as yet no machinery to understand what quantifying into such contexts
amounts to. Because of one of the idiosyncracies of the setup outlined in §2.4, however, we can
give an account of such a notion. In the context of a Lagadonian meaning-building language,
the boundaries between substitutional and objectual quantification get blurry (as each object has
a unique name—itself), and we exploit this in the following:
FACT[φ] holds of the objects o¯
⇔
∀x,y(SELECTED(x)∧ ENCYCLOPEDIA(y)∧ x∪ y  p*φ(o¯)*q)
That is, the open sentence FACT[φ(x¯)] holds of a sequence of objects (assigned to the variables)
iff, translating the matrix into Lagadonian, and then filling the places of the variables with those
objects, we get something that follows from best theory.
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We have seen two ways of handling inscrutability of reference within a broadly interpreta-
tionist setting. Supervaluationism allows us to construct a single overall meaning-fixing theory
out of a range of optimal classical semantics. Or, simply letting each of the optimal theories be
selected, we can allow the theory-shadowing paraphrase to stand as it is. On this latter approach,
inscrutability of reference is identified as arising from the kind of incompleteness familiar from
other theory-shadowing accounts.16
16What happens if we formulate the theory-shadowing paraphrase in terms of an existential quantification over
selected theories on the liberal understanding of ‘selected’? The result will be the analogue of dual of supervalua-
tionism, known as subvaluationism. Characteristic features are that some sentences will be true, and will also be
false; but that no sentence is simultaneously true-and-false. See Hyde (1997) for details.
The universal treatment corresponds to a disjunctive theory, as we have seen; does a similar correspondence
hold for the existential treatment? A conjunctive theory θ1 ∧ θ2 where the theories give competing assignments
of truth-values will not do; for unlike the existential treatment, this represents certain sentences as both true and
false. What is needed is a logic which fails to satisfy certain classically valid multi-premiss reasoning; in particular,
p,q  p∧ q. Given this, we can have {θ1, . . . ,θn} can be our theory. The failure of multi-premiss arguments is
a well-known feature of the logic sustained by subvaluational semantics, and is paralleled in the supervaluational
case by a failure to sustain classically valid patterns in a logic allowing multi-premiss conclusions.
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3.3 Object-language expressions of inscrutability
We have seen that the supervaluational and incompleteness proposals for handling inscrutability
allow formulation of inscrutability from the perspective of the theorist, using metalinguistic
notions such as PARTIAL REFERENCE and FACT. Do they allow inscrutability to be stated from
within a language that is itself inscrutable? If the inscrutability of a language could not be
formulated within it, all sorts of tricky issues arise. Fortunately, they can be avoided, for both
the above treatments allow us to characterize object-language operators that suffice to express
inscrutability.
A famous feature of the supervaluationist setting is its ability to characterize an object-
language operator DEF, which is the object-language equivalent of the supervaluationist’s met-
alinguistic TRUTH (supertruth). The characterization is simple:
‘DEF [Fx¯ ]’ is true relative to variable assignment v and delineation d iff ‘Fx¯’ is
true relative to variable assignment v on all delineations.
The upshot is that inscrutability can now be expressed in purely object-language in terms. The
radical inscrutability claim, that a name such as “Londres” PARTIALLY REFERS to everything,
now finds expression in the claim that “Nothing is definitely not identical to London”:
¬∃x DEF [x 6= Londres]
It will help to modify one aspect of the framework. (I give considerations in favour of the
following in Appendix A). I recommend we replace the assumption that the optimal candi-
date interpretations are in one-to-one correspondence with the delineations within the intended
model. Rather, I hold that we should have delineations giving ‘extreme’ and unintended ex-
tensions and intensions to expressions. We then add to our models an extra element: the set
of sharpenings, which are the subset of the delineations that correspond to some one optimal
candidate interpretation. The supervaluationist’s definitions of TRUE should be modified ac-
cordingly: in characterizing what it is for a sentence to be true in a model, we now generalize,
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not over all delineations, but just over the sharpenings. We also need to modify the characteriza-
tion of DEF. To this end we introduce a matching accessibility relation, S, which is (a) reflexive
(b) such that every sharpening accesses every other. The characterization of ‘Definitely’ then
becomes:
‘DEF [Fx¯ ]’ is true relative to variable assignment v and delineation d iff ‘Fx¯’ is
true relative to variable assignment v on all delineations which are S-accessed by d.
At first glance the theory-shadowing account only has a way of expressing the claim in the
theorist’s metalanguage, via claims such as ¬∃xFACT[¬N REFERS TO x]. Even this relied on
some idiosyncratic features of the setup—without a Lagadonian meaning-building language,
we would have to rely on disjunctions and explicitly substitutional quantification to express the
claim.
The aim here is to show that the theory-shadowing account can allow a language to express
its own inscrutability. The first thing to do is to bring across much of the framework of super-
valuational semantics, in the modified form given above. We have delineations corresponding
to all sorts of crazy ways of assigning intensions and extensions. However, whereas supervalu-
ationist models of the language contained a privileged set of delineations, the sharpenings, each
optimal candidate theory will now pick out a single privileged delineation.
The claimed inscrutability would mean that we won’t know which of the various semantic
theories (i.e. a designated model picking out a single privileged delineation) is the right one to
choose. Inscrutability will be a case where there are multiple ‘best models’, differing only over
which delineation is actualized. Suppose that these are S1, . . . ,Sn. Each comes with a privileged
delineation it thinks is actualized; write these δ1, . . . ,δn respectively. Then we can add to each
of these theories an accessibility relation M-accesses, characterized by:
d M-accesses d′ iff d and d′ are each one of the δi’s, or d = d′
Call the supplemented semantic theories S∗1, . . . ,S
∗
n. We can use the M-access relation to define
a type of DEFM operator which will enable us to express inscrutability:
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‘DEFM [Fx¯]’ is true relative to variable assignment v and delineation d iff ‘Fx¯’ is
true relative to variable assignment v on all delineations which are M-accessed by
d.
Since the set of sharpenings on the supervaluationist account are exactly the set of δi above, the
two relations S-access and M-access coincide exactly, and so allow the same expressive power.
We can parallel exactly the moves which the supervaluational treatment makes using their DEF
operator based on the S-accessibility relation. In particular, given radical inscrutability, it will
be TRUE on each S∗i that:
¬∃x DEFM [x 6= Londres]
This shows us that we can construct a semantic theory for a linguistic community with the
resources to express the inscrutability prevailing in their language. It also allows us to give a
general characterization of when a DEFM operator is tracking inscrutability: when its defining
accessibility relation coincides with the characterization of M-accessibility given above.17
17Notice that this (model-theoretic) approach seems inapplicable within a Davidsonian truth-theoretic setting. I
do not see any straightforward way of introducing the ‘Def’ operator into the object-language in such a setting. (For
example, we might look at defining a provability predicate for a (disjunctive) truth theory in order to formulate
suitable axioms. For reasons given earlier, we need to add an ‘encyclopedia’ to the semantic theory to get the
desired results. It is far from clear that the encyclopedia will be axiomatizable in the way needed.
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3.4 Comparing the two accounts
How does the more idiosyncratic treatment of inscrutability suggested by the theory-shadowing
analysis of semantic facts compare to the familiar supervaluational treatment of indeterminacy?
Let us review their basic features.
Interpretationism delivers a range of “successful” semantic theories. Each semantic theory
contains a certain assignment of extensions or intensions to expressions. We can either embed
this information within a supervaluational treatment, or exploit the classical theories within the
theory-shadowing paraphrase directly, treating inscrutability as a form of incompleteness.
In the former case, we assign statuses to the agent’s sentences: as TRUE, FALSE, or IN-
DETERMINATE; and relations that her words bear to objects: REFERENCE, NON-REFERENCE
and PARTIAL REFERENCE. In the latter case, each classical semantic theory embeds a proposal
about the application of the theorist’s TRUE. As previously noted, we can get a handle on the
theory-shadowing paraphrase by considering the theory that disjoins all the successful candi-
date theory. The disjunctive theory either entails ‘S’ is TRUE; or entails ‘S’ is FALSE; or remains
silent. The silences correspond to incompleteness within the theory, and can be expressed, by
the theorist, using the FACT operator. In general, the incompleteness account’s
FACT[S is TRUE]
can be matched with the supervaluationist’s
S is TRUE
Where the incompleteness account says there are no FACTS about TRUTH or FALSITY, the
supervaluationist says that, on the contrary, the sentence is INDETERMINATE—neither TRUE
nor FALSE.
The differences are marked. Given a classical backdrop, bivalence holds for the disjunctive-
style theory but not the supervaluational one. Clearly, then, these two proposals are distinct,
since they give rise to extensionally diverging overall analyses of semantic properties.
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Given that the two kinds of approach are distinct, what are their relative merits? We first
outline the areas of contention, and briefly assess the costs and benefits.
1. Bivalence vs. failures of bivalence
We have noted that the theory-shadowing proposal is typically conservative. The in-
completeness account’s truth predicate retains all the formal features of the background
theory: including (given a classical backdrop) all instances of bivalence. At the heart
of the supervaluationist picture, on the other hand, is the thought that INDETERMINACY
(/PARTIAL REFERENCE) is a state incompatible with TRUTH and FALSITY (/REFERENCE
and FAILURE TO REFER).
2. Logical revisionism?
Unlike the supervaluationist treatment, the incompleteness account of inscrutability is
entirely classical in its assumptions. Since the semantic theory it selects between are
classical, when we come to define consequence, we find no threat of departure from
classical logic. Formally, we find the setup analogous to a standard classical modal logic.
On the other hand, the supervaluationist treatment uses the non-classical explications via
a generalization over a set of points—the sharpenings. It has been alleged (Williamson,
1994; Keefe, 2000) that, when combined with GLOBAL LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE, devi-
ations from classical logic arise. A complex debate then arises over the acceptability or
otherwise of such revisionism.
In Appendix A, I argue that even if we interpret consequence within the supervaluation-
ist setting in a global way, as do Williamson and Keefe, we do not get any departures
from classical logic. Moreover, even if we did get the kind of features that Williamson
and Keefe allege, these may not count as a revision. The rules for which we find coun-
terexamples already have counterexamples involving open sentences, given the global
characterization of consequence. If this is right, there is nothing to choose between the
two accounts on grounds of conserving classical consequence.
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3. Expressing Inscrutability in the object language.
The construction of the operator ‘Definitely’ is a distinctive feature of the supervaluation-
ist setting—and allows us to formulate sentences that characterize the inscrutability of a
language within that language, and without using any semantic vocabulary.
We have just seen, however, that we can ape this construction within the theory-shadowing
setting. Again we have no grounds for discriminating between the setups.
4. Generality
Supervaluationism is flexible, in that it embodies a standard technique for generating a
new kind of semantics out of a given range of many-valued logics.18 Clearly, the in-
completeness account also generalizes in this way. Further, the latter can be extended
to cases where the supervaluational account is inappropriate. For example, Davidsonian
truth theoretic semantics are often formulated in terms of a restricted syntactic conse-
quence relation—canonical derivability. In the absence of a model theoretic correlate of
this notion, the supervaluationist cannot extract ‘valuation functions’ from a given suc-
cessful semantic theory. On the other hand, the incompleteness approach will extend to
this case.19
5. Unity
There is a major question whether everything that could be thought of as a case of ‘in-
scrutability’ can be captured by the supervaluationist approach. We shall shortly review
a variety of cases of inscrutability: the incompleteness approach looks better placed to
handle this than the supervaluationist.
6. Interaction with vagueness
One common deployment of supervaluationism is in a supervaluational semantics for
18Beall and van Fraassen (2003)
19We would need to take care, however, in how we handle the encyclopedia. If the encyclopedia was originally
thought to be a set of principles which entailed all non-semantic facts about the world, we can simply replace this
by its (classical) logical closure.
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vague language. Our focus on classical semantic theories for natural language is at
the moment justified only on methodological grounds. One might hold that from the
beginning we should compare the relative merits of semantic theories tailored specifi-
cally for vague languages—and supervaluational theories (perhaps cashed-out as in Kamp
(1975); Fine (1975)) would be a strong contender for providing that framework. If so,
then inscrutability will correspond to multiple successful supervaluational semantic the-
ories. Now, on the theory-shadowing approach, inscrutability and (semantic) vagueness
are cleanly separated. Semantic vagueness is given a semantic treatment; whereas in-
scrutability is handled metasemantically.
If, however, we adopt the supervaluational approach, we shall have to say something
about how vagueness-related models and inscrutability-related ones interact. One option
is simply to expand the number of sharpenings to include both those ‘admissible’ due to
inscrutability and those due to vagueness (that is, given theories θ1, θ2 with respective
sets of sharpenings S1, S2, we let the sharpenings of the combined theory Θ be S1 ∪ S2).
For example, it might be that various chunks of land corresponding to ways of drawing
precise boundaries around London or Paris will be assigned as referent to ‘Lonis’ on
different sharpenings. It would be much more satisfying to find a formal setting in which
such potentially damaging interactions did not arise, but I have no space to investigate
this here.20
(One reason for wanting such a nuanced technique is the risk of damaging interactions
between inscrutability and the theoretical resources of a semantic account of vagueness.
One potential area is in the kind of de re use of ‘Definitely’ that is commonly felt to
have a significance in diagnosing the seductiveness of sorites-style reasoning.21 But in
20Elia Zardini has suggested to me that a direction of progress would be to exploit the machinery that has
been developed to handle higher-order vagueness (for present purposes, thought of as indeterminacy over what is
determinate) within supervaluational theories of vagueness: in particular, that discussed in Fine (1975).
21For discussion of such distinctions, and their theoretical significance both in general and in the context of
supervaluational theories of vagueness, see Fine (1975); Keefe (2000); Greenough (2003); Edgington (1997);
Weatherson (2002). See also the brief discussion on page 192, below.
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the context of inscrutability of reference, the distinction will collapse.)22
We have not yet seen any decisive reason to prefer one account over the other. On grounds
of the availability of a construction of ‘Definitely’, and of conserving classical consequence,
they are equally matched. The incompleteness account has a claim to be conservative on other
matters: for example, in preserving bivalence. However, once it is appreciated that ‘failures
of bivalence’ are formally analogous to those that occur with respect to free-variable sentences
such as ‘x is male’, it becomes unclear in what sense this constitutes a revision.23
Generality and Uniformity, on the other hand, potentially count in favour of the incom-
pleteness account, as does the fact that the supervaluationist has the burden of showing that
her treatment of inscrutability will not damagingly interact with her account of vagueness (of
course, if she is, for example, an epistemicist about vagueness, she will feel no pressure here).
The incompleteness account has the advantage of neutrality here.
A marginal case can be made, therefore, for favouring the purely theory-shadowing account
as the better of the two options.
3.5 Concluding remarks
That some limited form of inscrutability infects our language should not come as a surprise.
There are all sorts of features of semantic theories as they are usually presented which we would
not wish to regard as reflecting, or taking a stand on, the underlying semantic facts. In these
final remarks I sketch one case of this. If the possibility of this kind of innocuous inscrutability
is admitted, then a key question for inscrutability arguments to come later in the thesis will be:
can the resulting inscrutability be regarded as of the innocuous kind? Or is something more
worrying being claimed?
22Though, it is in fact quite tricky to maintain the distinction within a standard supervaluational framework. In
Williams (2006a) I use this to argue for the “many” treatment sketched in Lewis (1993). The troubles may suggest
that we find a substitute for the theoretical role being played by ‘Definitely’. This is an area I hope to explore in
future work.
23It is a nice question how we should think of arguments purporting to establish a contradiction from the denial
of bivalence in application to the free-variable case.
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My example of innocuous inscrutability of reference focuses on the reference of predicates.
Classical semantic theories assign sets of n-tuples as the referent of an n-adic predicates. For
example, ‘is father of’ might be assigned the set of pairs:
{〈Ozzy, Kelly〉,〈Charles, William〉,〈George, George W.〉 . . .}
A familiar fact about the set-theoretic representation of ordered pairs is that they can be con-
structed in a variety of ways. The most usual set-theoretic reduction of ordered pairs to un-
ordered pairs is from Kuratowski (1921)
〈a,b〉 := {{a},{a,b}}
Clearly, there is nothing ‘uniquely special’ about this particular reduction. Equally good would
be the following
〈a,b〉 := {{b},{a,b}}
or the version suggested by Wiener (1914):
〈a,b〉 := {{a,ø}{a,b}}
If, as is often supposed, the semantic values of expressions are set-theoretic constructs, then
there seems an irreducible element of arbitrariness in exactly which semantic values we pick.24
24Compare Benacerraf (1965). One way of responding to this puzzle, paralleling Wetzel’s (1989) response to
Benacerraf, is to posit sui generis semantic values—abundant relations for each predicate. We would then say
that the arbitrariness issue identified here is a problem of set theoretic representation only. Some concerns: (1)
postulating sui generis ontology is generally unattractive; (2) Unlike the mathematical case, we need not only the
ontology, but also the additional ideology of an ‘instantiation’ primitive—in fact, we either need infinitely many
such primitives, corresponding to each adicity of predicate, or else a multigrade primitive. (3) We would then have
to face metaphysical concerns that the non-symmetric primitive of instantiation required is incoherent. See Dorr
(2004).
In the general case, an n-tuple can be identified with a function from the first n natural numbers to extensions,
so that
〈a1, . . . ,an〉 := f : i 7→ ai
The value of a n-adic relation will then be a set of such functions. Notice that in the standard set-theoretic case, the
functions themselves will be sets of ordered pairs, so the arbitrariness in pair-construction will still be present. In a
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Thinking that one of these constructions is a ‘reference magnet’ is surely too much of a bullet
to bite; more attractive is to say that there is no fact of the matter in such cases.25 This certainly
fits our intuitive characterization of the inscrutability of reference—and the incompleteness
account, at least, has the resources to depict it as such.26 This kind of inscrutability of the
semantic framework is, I claim innocuous: it would be worrying if it did not hold.
In addition to framework inscrutability of this kind, there are arguably various illuminating
kinds of inscrutability. In these cases the inscrutability, rather than being disturbing, helps
one to understand otherwise puzzling phenomenon. One possible example is that of Newton’s
concept of ‘mass’. Field (1973) argues that detecting inscrutability in the term ‘mass’ (between
the candidate referents rest mass and relativistic mass) can help us to rebut the charge that
consideration of scientific revolutions render a referential semantic theory implausible. Unger’s
problem of the many, and vague language in general, may be cases where inscrutability of
reference illuminates puzzling features of language.27
These two paradigms—innocuous inscrutability, and illuminating inscrutability—may not
exhaust the kinds of inscrutability of reference we find. Our focus in the next few chapters will
be on arguments for surprising instances of inscrutability, that neither have the innocuous feel
theory taking functions as primitive, this may be finessed; but alternative representations may still be constructed,
for example, by permuting the order in which the terms are given. Note that postulating sui generis functions will
be susceptible to some of the criticisms given above: functional application would be a non-symmetric primitive
notion.
25Cf. Hodes (1984) on reference magnetism. Williamson (1994) notoriously defends the idea that there can be
facts about which precise extensions vague terms pick out. This to most people seems wildly implausible. To adopt
such a view in the case at hand seems another level of implausibility beyond even Williamson’s position—for it
seems that there is in principle no way for one construction rather than another to be favoured. I think, therefore,
that even epistemicists should be interested in an analysis of inscrutability of the kind I will offer. In discussion,
Williamson has said that, if convinced by the arguments for radical inscrutability, he would extend his epistemicism
to such cases also. He may therefore be willing to bite the bullet even on the ‘innocuous’ kinds of inscrutability
just mentioned.
26This is one point at which the incompleteness account may gain in generality by comparison with the super-
valuational treatment. For clearly the theory-shadowing treatment can regard theories exploiting different con-
structions of semantic values for relations as rival semantic theories, and presumably the set of optimal semantic
theories will be closed under at least some of the ways of varying this. On the other hand, one would have to
work hard to get this into the supervaluational framework, for the overall model will have to provide once-and-for-
all criteria of admissibility for interpretation functions, or recipes for extracting truth-on-f from an interpretation
function f which assigns semantic values to the atomic parts of language.
27See Unger (1980) and Weatherson (2004). McGee (2005a) explicitly presents the problem of the many as a
form of inscrutability.
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This chapter presents arguments that interpretationism (at least as currently formulated) is com-
mitted to what I call division inscrutability: inscrutability concerning what kind of entities
general terms such as ‘Rabbit’ divide their reference over.
My discussion falls into two parts. In the first part, I discuss the form of arguments for
division-inscrutability, some of the general metaphysical and methodological issues involved,
and some important considerations that surface in commentaries on Quine’s “argument from
below”. In the second part, I turn to a detailed presentation of three semantic theories corre-
sponding to different ways of dividing reference, drawn from the literature on persistence in
the philosophy of time, and analogous systems for analyzing extension in space. I then address
objections that have been made in the debate on persistence that are relevant to our setting; and
discuss how the objections made to Quine can be handled within the framework here developed.
Though our discussion is focused on potential inscrutability, much of the material here could
be presented as engaging in the literature on persistence. Our considerations naturally raise the
meta-philosophical question of what the subject-matter the debate on persistence (in particular,
the worm theory/stage theory debate) is supposed to be: is it purely a matter of the appropriate
semantics for English, as is sometimes implied?1 If not, what kind of debate is it? If it is
a debate about semantics, should not the kind of indeterminacy or inscrutability thesis here
1Sider (1996a).
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advocated be seriously considered by interested parties?
4.1 Quine on ‘gavagai’
The second chapter of Quine’s “Word and Object” (1960) contains his famous “argument from
below”. Quine presents his ideas in the context of radical translation. He considers the chal-
lenge to translate from scratch an unknown tongue: in particular, to translate the expression
‘gavagai’ that native speakers use. The scenario he describes is one where the expression is
used (as we might say) to register the presence of rabbits—the kind of usage we find when a
child exclaims Rabbit! as a rabbit runs past.
If one focused exclusively on such ‘occasion sentences’, presumably all one could do to
elucidate their representational properties is to describe the states of affairs in which they are
appropriately asserted (the states of the world which make the sentences ‘true’). However,
to describe the representational function of ‘gavagai’ as a general term, we need something
more. We need something analogous to the assignment of an extension to ‘is a rabbit’: {Flopsy,
Mopsy, Cottontail, Peter. . . }. It is here that Quine detects indeterminacy:
Who knows but what the objects to which this term [‘gavagai’] applies are not
rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal segments, of rabbits? In each
case the situations that prompt assent to ‘gavagai’ would be the same as for ‘rabbit’.
Or perhaps the objects to which ‘gavagai’ applies are all and sundry undetached
parts of rabbits, again the same stimulus meaning would register no difference. . .
A further alternative likewise compatible with the same old stimulus meaning
is to take ‘gavagai’ as a singular term naming the fusion, in Goodman’s sense, of all
rabbits: that single though discontinuous portion of the spatiotemporal world that
consists of rabbits. . . . And a still further alternative in the case of ‘gavagai’ is to
take it as a singular term naming a recurring universal, rabbithood.
(Quine, 1960, pp.51-52).
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Quine argues that these kinds of translation-hypotheses are equally adept at explaining the
subjects’ speech behaviour. For him, this leads to the ‘indeterminacy of translation’. I follow
Field (1974) and Evans (1975) in reformulating the Quinean argument within the framework of
semantic interpretation, rather than that of translation. In this setting, we present the Quinean
case as follows. First, one can interpret ‘gavagai’ in one of the ways above: either as a predicate
dividing its reference over rabbits, or over rabbit stages, or over undetached parts of rabbits; or
as a singular term picking out the fusion of rabbits, or the universal Rabbithood. Second, that
at the level of sentences (and thus in the predicated pattern of assent and dissent to sentences)
there is nothing to choose between these rival interpretations.
When asking about the proper interpretation of a predicate, there are two distinct types of
question one might ask. The first considers the ‘logical form’ of predication, or its proper
semantic analysis. For example, one might think that in general one should regard a predication
‘A is F’ as being underlain by one of the following:
• ‘x is F’ is satisfied by the referent of ‘A’
• the referent of ‘A’ is a member of the set which is the extension of ‘F’.
• the referent of ‘A’ instantiates the property expressed by ‘F’
In each case, one finds a different idea about how predication should be framed: in the first
case the “satisfaction” relation is taken as primitive. In the second case, predicates designate
sets, and set-membership is taken as primitive. In the third case, properties are assigned to
predicates, and property instantiation is taken as primitive. The general question, then, concerns
the ontological and ideological commitments that surface in an analysis of predication, and the
project is to determine which are to be built into the framework of a semantic theory. The
semantic theories that we mentioned earlier take different stances on this: the Davidsonian
treatment took satisfaction as primitive, whereas the model-theoretic semantics is framed set-
theoretically.2
2There are alternatives: see Larson and Segal (1995, passim) for a number of formulations of a Davidsonian
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The second question to ask about predication is not a general ‘framework’ question at all:
it is a question about to which objects a particular predicate applies. If we say that a predicate
‘divides’ its reference over those objects it applies to, we can ask, for example, what kind
of objects ‘Rabbit’ or ‘Gavagai’ divide their reference over. Note that however one analyzes
predicate-application, the question of reference-division can be posed: we can ask respectively
what kind of objects satisfy ‘x is a rabbit’; what kind of objects are members of the set that is
the semantic value of ‘rabbit’; what kind of objects are instantiated by the property designated
by ‘rabbit’.
Seen in this light, the ‘argument from below’ if successful would establish two different
inscrutability results: inscrutability of analysis of predication, and division-inscrutability. The
former says that there is no fact of the matter whether falling under ‘gavagai’ consists in be-
ing a member of the (set-theoretic) extension of ‘gavagai’; or rather instantiating the universal
Rabbithood denoted by ‘gavagai’.3 I think that we should include the ‘rabbit-fusion’ proposal
within this class: the corresponding analysis of ‘A is F’ would be: the referent of A is part of
the referent of ‘F’.4
Inscrutability of reference division, on the other hand, maintains that there is no fact of the
matter whether the objects falling under the predicate (however that is to be understood) are
rabbits, or instantaneous stages of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits.
theory, for example, in terms of a property/instantion framework. The model theoretic framework too, could be
implemented in a variety of ways: for example, in terms of a theory of functions rather than of sets.
3One can look at the literature on property-ontology to find more alternatives: for example, a theorist who
viewed objects as bundles of tropes might analyze ‘x is a rabbit’ as A rabbit-trope is part of A. See Armstrong
(1989) for discussion of these issues.
4The natural objection to this is that any parts of an object that falls under F will now also fall under F . What
I take this to show is that in this particular case we cannot be neutral over issues over how reference is divided: in
particular, we have to combine this framework with the undetached parts proposal, whereby ‘Gavagai’ applies to
every undetached part of a rabbit.
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4.2 Metaphysics and methodology
The ontological and ideological commitments of a theory may depend to a considerable extent
on which of the various options just mentioned is sustained.5 On the logical-form side, we
find commitment variously to: properties and instantiation; sets and set-membership; primitive
satisfaction; mereological fusions and the part-whole relation; and so forth. On the reference-
division side, we find commitment to persisting objects, or merely to instantaneous stages, or
even just to mereological atoms.6 The former are putative commitments of predication; the
latter are putative ‘Quinean’ commitments: what kinds of object lie within the range of the first
order variables.
The ontological commitments of our theories (in any area) thus depend in part on which,
if any, of the various hypotheses hold. The claimed Quinean inscrutability will lead to it be-
ing inscrutable what the commitments of our theories are. Since the various alternatives have
different commitments, it is hard to see how we could establish inscrutability without an assur-
ance that the world contains the properties, sets, and various types of object called on by the
respective proposals. If one way of glossing predication, for example, has it that a sentence is
true iff the object A instantiates a particular property P, and in reality there are no properties,
then the upshot would be that the sentence is false. A more nominalistic gloss on predication
might render the sentence true. Whether such a situation arises is clearly relevant to judging the
merits of the two semantic proposals.
Some accounts of the relationship between linguistic analysis and metaphysics might blur
this natural thought. But it is only the most radical theses of constitutive dependence of ontol-
5I will not be following the Quinean understanding of these notions, since I will be taking predication to incur
ontological commitments to whatever kind of thing is involved in a proper analysis of predication, be that sets or
universals. This is something urged by Armstrong (1978a,b), but is resisted by Quineans. See Rayo and Yablo
(2001). (Notice that one way of resisting any ontological commitments from predication, compatibly with the
Armstrongian view taken here, is to adopt a framework whereby ‘satisfaction’ or ‘application’ as a primitive.
More radically, one could take the distribution of particular predicates as primitive: one could analyze ‘A is F’ as
the referent of ‘A’ is F : there would be no general schema available. This corresponds to the view of the ‘Ostrich
nominalists’.)
6If we read ‘atomic undetached rabbit parts’ for ‘undetached rabbit parts’ we would have the latter scenario.
This is the form in which I will be discussing it.
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ogy on ‘conceptual scheme’ or the like, that would deny the possibility of the kind of scenario
outlined above. I will assume in what follows that we can bring independently grounded meta-
physics to bear on the current debate.
Considerations from property-ontology can be brought to the alleged inscrutability of logical
form. If, for example, one rejects the existence of abstracta such as sets, viewing predication as
committed to sets looks unattractive. At the least, it will commit one to a universal error-theory,
since there will be no set picked out by ‘F’ of which the referent of ‘A’ can be a member.
Likewise, one might reject ‘abundant’ universals (e.g. universals other than the framework
notions of microphysics and perhaps other physical sciences) that would be needed to make
work the general analysis of predication in terms of Universals (cf. Armstrong (1978b)). One’s
general metaphysical view is unlikely to contain over-many candidate-types for the general
analysis of predication.7 Because of this, I will not focus in what follows on potential Quinean
inscrutability of logical-form.
Turning to alleged division inscrutability, issues in particular-ontology may constrain our
arguments. To have a chance of establishing Quinean inscrutability, we would need to find
a metaphysical picture which included rabbits, rabbit-stages, and undetached rabbit parts. A
preliminary question concerns the nature of rabbits, and how these entities relate to the other
categories. Elsewhere in his writings, Quine describes his “conception of a material object”:
. . . the material content of any portion of space-time, however scattered and discon-
tinuous. Equivalently: any sum or aggregate of point-events. The world’s water is
for me a physical object, comprising all the molecules of H2O anywhere ever. There
is a physical object part of which is a momentary stage of a silver dollar now in my
pocket and the rest of which is a temporal segment of the Eiffel Tower through
its third decade.. . . Among the myriad ways, mostly uninteresting, of stacking up
momentary objects to make time-extended objects, there is one popular favourite:
7An interesting residual question has already been raised concerning the ontological and ideological commit-
ments of other ways of cashing out non-symmetric relational predication: see Dorr (2004) for some of the issues
arising, and compare p.101 above for brief discussion.
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the corporeal. Momentary objects are declared to be stages of the same body by
considerations of continuity of displacement, continuity of deformation, continuity
of chemical change.
(Quine, 1976b, pp.124-125)8
I think this makes it plain what Quine would take to be rabbits to be: space-time worms that
are fusions of all the instantaneous rabbit stages of a single rabbit-life-history, and equally of all
the undetached parts caught up in that life-history. I shall call such entities rabbit worms.
The interesting thing about the picture Quine here sketches is that it seems to deliver all the
various candidates: Quinean ‘rabbits’ (i.e. rabbit-worms), rabbit-stages, and undetached rabbit
parts (URPs). Such a view is taken seriously in contemporary debate: for example, in the “four-
dimensional” view of particular-ontology that Sider (2001), for one, describes and advocates.
According to this view, the past and future are as real as the present (i.e. it stands opposed
to presentism), and the layout of reality contains no ‘tensed’ features. Furthermore, for any
plurality of objects there is a ‘fusion’ that has those objects as parts (unrestricted fusion). For
any space-time region ‘filled’ with an object, there is a part of that object existing exactly at that
space-time region (the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts). The notions of fusions, parts
and wholes within this world-view are characterized by a classical extensional mereology.9
Within this picture, the rabbit-worms that Quine thinks of as the natural candidates to be
rabbits, are to be found. Since such entities are four-dimensional objects, they fill spatial regions
at many times. By the doctrine of undetached parts, there are objects (‘temporal slices’) that
exist exactly at those times and nowhere else. Equally, the worms and slices fill smaller spatial
regions: indeed, if space is pointy they ‘fill’ points. By appeal to the same principle, we have
objects existing exactly at those regions and parts: undetached rabbit parts. (We could of course
work this the other way: starting with the mereological atoms existing at a single space-time
point, we can appeal to unrestricted fusion to ‘build up’ rabbit stages and rabbit worms).
8Page references are to the version collected in Quine (1981).
9For the mereological notions see Simons (1987); for formulations of four-dimensionalism see Sider (2001).
For further discussion concentrating on the interaction of mereology and location see Parsons (2005b).
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Clearly the four-dimensional setting is extremely controversial, and many reject some or
all of its theses. Some reject the framework assumptions: its eternalist and de-temporalizing
presuppositions. Some accept the framework but reject either unrestricted fusion or arbitrary
undetached parts. Those who deny the former principle include both moderates and radicals.
The former accept that fusion occurs in the case of rabbits, chairs and planets, for example, but
not in the case of arbitrary scattered collections of objects. Radicals—for example, the various
near-nihilist and total-nihilist positions of van Inwagen (1990) and Dorr (2002) respectively—
deny that there are any non-living composite objects, or any composite objects at all. Those who
deny the latter principle (of ‘arbitrary undetached parts’) include ‘endurantists’ and believers in
spatially extended simples.10
Particular stances here may provide a metaphysical resolution to the alleged division in-
scrutability. For nihilists, only certain (mereologically simple) undetached rabbit parts exist:
prima facie, anything but the final Quinean proposal would lead to a universal error-theory.11
And one can imagine other metaphysical positions that would select among the various options
we consider. Clearly a review of how the Quinean programme works out with respect to all
these different metaphysical settings is beyond the scope of our present discussion.
What we have seen is that there is a world-view—that of the Siderian/Lewisian four-dimensionalist—
that encompasses all the rabbit worms, stages and undetached parts one could wish for. I shall
presuppose it in what follows for three reasons: (1) I am personally inclined to look favourably
on this picture; (2) it seems to be Quine’s own favoured view; (3) it allows us to develop the
options and give the Quinean division-inscrutability argument its best chance of success. We
should not forget, however, that an independently motivated metaphysics that undermine as-
pects of the 4D setting, might yet impact on division-inscrutability.
10See Parsons (2000) on the compatibility of endurantism with the four-dimensionalist’s framework assump-
tions.
11van Inwagen (1990) and Dorr and Rosen (2002) recommend an analysis of ordinary talk as involving plural
reference to simples. The analysis faces some worries (for example, in how it will treat ordinary plural talk!) and
so nihilists should be interested in the Quinean alterative to be constructed below.
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4.3 Quine’s arguments for division inscrutability
Quine’s argument
Quine’s methodology is to challenge his opponent to point to some piece of linguistic behaviour
that discriminates between the translation-schemes he describes. To begin with, we have the use
of the general term ‘Gavagai!’ as an occasion sentence: used to register the presence of a rabbit.
In our own case, we might take such rabbit-registering uses of ‘Rabbit!’ as short for ‘There’s a
rabbit!’. On each of the proposals, we can find such glosses. For the three that concern us here,
these are:
Candidate rabbit-registering interpretation
Rabbit worm there is a rabbit-worm partially present
Rabbit stage there is a rabbit-stage present
URPs there is an undetached part of a rabbit present
As Quine is well aware, there is a more general challenge: to explain linguistic behaviour
where ‘Gavagai’ is embedded in more complex contexts. For example, we have synchronic and
diachronic identity statements: it is not immediately obvious how the stage and URP proposals
can deal with the analogues of ‘this is the same Gavagai again’. For it is not the case that we
find the same stage at two temporally separate occasions: the rabbit-stage in the hutch today is
distinct from the one that was there yesterday. In the URP case, even synchronic identity poses
problems: if (intuitively) a rabbit is partially hidden behind a post, then we can point to its nose
and tail and truly say ‘this is the same Rabbit as that’, but we are pointing to distinct URPs.
Quine notes that to put these forward as objections to the alternative reference-divisions, a
particular interpretation/translation of object-language talk of ‘sameness’ is being presupposed.
If by analytical hypothesis we take ‘are the same’ as translation of some construc-
tion in the jungle language, we may proceed on that basis to question our informant
about sameness of gavagais from occasion to occasion and so conclude gavagais
are rabbits and not stages. But if instead we take ‘are stages of the same animal’ as
translation of the jungle construction, we will conclude from the same subsequent
questioning of our informant that gavagais are rabbit stages. Both analytical hy-
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potheses may be presumed possible.
Quine (1960, p.72)
Quine’s general point here, mapped into our setting, is that if we vary our interpretations of
the ‘apparatus of individuation’—in particular, identity symbols—then we can finesse apparent
counterexamples to our alternative schemes of divided reference. The general point is good:
twists in one place can be ‘cancelled out’ by compensating twists elsewhere.
Clearly, though, the challenge is more general: the Quinean inscrutability argument requires
that we have no good grounds for discriminating between the options, no matter which sentence
we choose. Quine never attempts a general result along these lines.12 This incompleteness in
the Quinean case is exploited by the two authors we now discuss.
Internal problems for the argument for division inscrutability
Gareth Evans’ paper ‘Identity and Predication’ (1975) includes a subtle examination of Quine’s
arguments. Evans makes several different kinds of points against the inscrutability arguments
Quine offers. Some, for example, involve clever ad hominem attacks on Quine.13 Others in-
volve disputing the Quinean methodology for detecting predication and divided reference in a
language.14 But the ones of most interest to us simply point to sentences that it is not clear
that the Quinean can handle. We shall concentrate on Evans’ discussion of the Quinean case
for division inscrutability.15 As Evans concedes in the final paragraph of the paper, he does not
12Field (1974), discussing how to accommodate Quinean division inscrutability within a systematic semantic
theory, also concentrates on identity statements (his purpose, however, is not to defend division inscrutability, but
to show that even granted division inscrutability, a systematic semantics is possible).
13See the discussion of the identity of indiscernibles at Evans (1975, p.113?) (page references are to the version
in McDowell (1985)).
14The basic contention seems to be (1) that Quine misses the constraint of simplicity on semantic theory. (2) That
predicates should divide their reference over objects to whose spatial and temporal boundaries we are sensitive.
Evans seems to regard (1) as the more fundamental principle, and (2) as resulting from an application of this
principle. I do not see how the connection is to be established. We discuss simplicity constraints in Chapter 8.
15Evans’ arguments against differing analyses of predication seem to me unconvincing: he assumes the Quinean
interpretation of ‘White Rabbit’ would be White instance of Rabbithood, whereas I would render it Instance of
Rabbithood and of Whiteness (this is plausible at least for adjectives that are in the category Kamp (1975) calls
‘predicative’). I take it that Evans’ considerations have no force against this proposal. His objection to the rabbit-
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offer an assurance that no semantic proposal will vindicate Quine. His methodology is rather to
‘try out’ some plausible candidates and show that they break down. Since I will be developing a
detailed proposal in an attempt to vindicate Quine (or at least put his case in its strongest form)
it would be pointless to examine in detail the views that Evans tries out. What we can hope to
usefully extract from the considerations of Evans and others is a sense of the kind of problems
that a semantic theory must meet, and a range of test cases for a potential analysis.
The first set of Evansian objections concern the proposal whereby ‘Rabbit’ divides its ref-
erence over all and only undetached rabbit parts. Evans asks about the objects that supposedly
fall under adjectives such as ‘white’. He offers a trilemma:
• If all and only white things fall under ‘white’, then a brown rabbit with a white foot will
satisfy “white rabbit”.
• If all and only things which are parts of a white rabbit fall under ‘white’, then the con-
ditions of “white rabbit” will be fine, but the truth-conditions of “white house” will be
wrong.
• If all and only things which are parts of a white thing fall under ‘white’, we get white
rabbits and houses: but we overgenerate. A white rabbit foot is part of a white thing: on
the current proposal, we would have ‘white rabbit’ satisfied in the presence of a brown
rabbit with a white foot.
The Evansian question for any attempt to vindicate Quinean division-inscrutability is the
following:
(A) Show how the semantics allegedly supporting the division of ‘rabbit’ over URPs can cope
with the interaction of adjectives and general terms.
Fodor (1993), inspired by Evans, provides another challenge for the URP proposal. Rather
than looking to adjectives, he focuses on cases where we have predicates both for a thing and for
some distinctive part of that thing. The case he chooses is a language containing both ‘rabbit’
and ‘ear’. There is nothing that is both an ear and a rabbit, but any undetached part of a rabbit’s
ear (say, the ear itself) will be an undetached part both of a rabbit, and of an ear. Therefore, on
a systematic Quinean proposal, it looks as if the following will be true:
fusion proposal is that I mentioned above: that any part of a rabbit will count as a rabbit. As flagged earlier, I think
this shows that such a proposed analysis of predication will stand or fall with the claim that it is permissible to take
‘rabbit’ to divide its reference over URPs.
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there is something that is both a rabbit and an ear.16
The strength of Fodor’s objection is that there seems no way that we can assign to ‘ear’ an
extension that does not include some rabbit parts: but any such overlap will render true the
strange generalization given above. Thus, we have a second challenge:
(B) Show how the semantics allegedly supporting alternative divisions does not generate false
positives in the context of a pair of general terms, one of which (intuitively) applies to a
part of the other.
In considering the rabbit-stage proposal, Evans focuses on tense. He maintains that either
one will end up with a situation where if there is any stage of the rabbit which satisfies ‘F’,
any stage of the rabbit at any time will satisfy ‘F’; or one will be able to render true ‘a rabbit
was running’ where the rabbit no longer exists. Here I am convinced by the rebuttals of Evans’
specific arguments in Wright (1997) and Richard (1997). The general challenge is well taken
however: a systematic development of the stage proposal will have to show how it is compatible
with tensed ascriptions.
(C) Show how the semantics allegedly supporting alternative divisions can cope with tensed
predications.
Having noted these concerns, I think that the best tactic to meet these concerns is to develop
a systematic semantic proposal for each candidate ‘division’ of reference. We can then evaluate
whether the challenges (A-C) that we have extracted from Evans and Fodor cause problems.
This is the burden of the second part of this chapter.
16Fodor’s concern is actually with the conjunctions “A is an ear and A is a rabbit” and “A is an ear and a rabbit”.
I think the existential generalization presents the harder case for the division inscrutabilist.
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4.4 Worms, stages, and undetached parts
I now spell out three candidate semantic theories for (a fragment of) English. In the first, ‘rabbit’
divides its reference over four-dimensional rabbit-worms; in the second, it divides its reference
over three-dimensional (instantaneous) rabbit-stages. In the third, it divides its reference over
one-dimensional undetached rabbit parts or ‘dots’.17
The task is made infinitely easier by the development, in the literature on theories of persis-
tence, of semantic theories that suit our purposes exactly. In particular, I will appeal to the basic
semantic framework of the perdurance theory of persistence—“worm theory”, and the semantic
framework of what Haslanger (2003) calls the exdurance theory of persistence—the “stage the-
ory” advocated by Sider (1996a, 2001) and Hawley (2001). For terminological convenience, I
use ‘perdurance’ and ‘exdurance’ for the metaphysical theories of what it takes for an ordinary
object to persist through time; I will use ‘worm theory’ and ‘stage theory’ to refer to associated
semantic views.
Some inscrutability arguments are based on formal results proving that candidate semantic
theories are ‘sententially equivalent’—assign the same semantic values to sentences. I do not
believe this to be possible here.18 My methodology, rather, is one of providing a semantics
for a fragment of a language: albeit a rather rich one. In each case, it will be a first-order
intensional language with time and world indices, allowing modal and temporal operators to be
defined. A full defense would require extensions to a setting adequate for natural languages as
a whole, such as is arguably provided by the ‘general semantics’ discussed in the next chapter.
However, the present fragments provide more than enough material for the key issues over
division inscrutability—including those due to Evans and Fodor—to be formulated.
17I do not think that there would be any objection to extending the account respectively to non-atomic rabbit
parts, or to more-than-instantaneous stages, but I shall not discuss this here.
18Wolfgang Schwarz (2005a) makes this claim for versions of the stage and dot theories below; but his versions
have richer semantic structure, and it is not clear that they can be described as involving predicates whose reference
is divided over undetached rabbit parts/stages rather than sets of such parts/stages. See also the discussion archived
at Schwarz (2005b).
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Worm theory
The perdurance theorists of persistence have two central theses—first, that ordinary objects like
candles and rabbits are perduring space-time worms; secondly, such things undergo alteration
in virtue of their stages successively possessing different properties. Haslanger outlines the
view:
On the perdurantist’s conception of persistence, an object persists through time in
a way analogous to how an object is extended through space. The candle is spa-
tially extended through its 7-inch length . . . by having parts at the different regions.
Likewise, according to the perdurantist, the candle is extended through time. . . by
having parts or stages at different times. . . . The notion of perdurance provides
the resources for a relatively straightforward account of alteration: . . . the persist-
ing candle is composed of temporal parts or stages that only briefly exist; distinct
candle-stages are the proper subjects of incompatible properties, being straight and
being bent, and the temporal composite which consists of the stages is the subject
of persistence. . . . On this account, persisting things are temporally extended com-
posites, also known as . . . space-time worms
(Haslanger, 2003, p.318)
A semantic theory that accords with the perdurantist theory of persistence, then, would be
one where ‘rabbit’ divided its reference over rabbit-worms. Obtaining such a semantic theory
is not without its difficulties. In particular, it looks as if we have to discern two forms of pred-
ication, depending on whether the predicate at hand applies to a thing throughout its existence
(arguably including: rabbit, chair, person); or can apply to a thing at some times and not at
others (paradigmatic examples include ‘runs’, ‘is green’, ‘wobbles’, etc).
Following Parsons (2005a), let us divide predicates into two sorts: s-predicates (e.g. ‘is
a rabbit’, ‘is a chair’, ‘is a person’, etc) and c-predicates (e.g. ‘is running’, ‘is green’ etc).19
19The terminology here is intended to recall the distinction between ‘substance sortals’ and ‘characterizing
predicates’ of Wiggins (1980): but neither Parsons nor I wish to be committed to the Wigginsean understanding
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Parsons presents his theory taking the notion of s- and c-predicates as primitive, and deals only
with the monadic case. To generalize to the polyadic case, we shall take predicates to be given
with an assignment of sorts (s and c) to their name-places. An s-predicate is then a monadic
predicate whose name-place is of sort s, and a c-predicate one whose name-place is of sort c;
but more generally, an n-place relation might have k places of sort s, and n− k places of sort c.
I will present the worm theory together with a counterpart theoretic treatment of modal
operators. There is no reason why the world-shifting operators should not be treated in other
ways, but I include it here because the stage and dot theories to be discussed later contain
formally similar apparatus.
A commitment of all the theories that follow will be the possibility of analyzing tenses into
a tenseless language—tense operators such as ‘was’ and ‘will be’ in terms of generalizations
over operators such as ‘at t’. For example “Was: φ” is true relative to 〈t,w〉 on I iff for some
time t ′ prior to the time of utterance, “At t ′: φ” is true at 〈t,w〉 on I. “It has always been that
φ” is true relative to 〈t,w〉 on I iff for every time t ′ prior to the time of utterance, “At t ′: φ” is
true at 〈t,w〉 on I.20 Assuming this has been accomplished, the challenge for our theories is to
provide a semantics for the ‘at t’ operator. Analogous remarks apply to modal operators such
as ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’, which are to be defined in terms of an ‘at w’ operator; and (in
the case of dot theory), to location operators.
In what follows, we write |e|I for the semantic value of the expression e. A semantic theory
that allowed for indexical phenomena would give a story about how |e|I is determined by the
context in which e is uttered—we should therefore regard I as the assignment of content to
expressions in a given context. The modal operators are to be defined using a primitive symbol
of the frameworkCm, which may itself be indexical.21
of the distinction. Some features carry over: for example, an s-predicate F , will be something such that in order
to cease to be F , one must cease to be—a Wigginsean result. But, for example, no kind-essentialism need follow
from this. See Parsons (op cit) for further discussion.
20See Parsons (op cit, appendix) for a sample translation of some temporal vocabulary into a tenseless language.
However see Dowty (1979, ch.3) for an argument that, to handle tense and aspect in English, we need not only
relativization to instants, but relativization to intervals of time. This is briefly discussed below.
21Notice also that I use the quasi-substitutional way of handling quantifiers found in BensonMates. In an already
complex presentation, this allows us to drop at least one of the respects in which truth is relativized.
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• “φ∧ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I and “ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “¬φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ” is not true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “∃xφx” is true at 〈w, t〉 iff
“φ(c)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∪{c} where |c|I∗ exists
at 〈w, t〉.22
• “At w′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w′, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} whereCm(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w′, t〉.
• “At t ′, φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff “φ” is true relative to 〈w, t ′〉.
• “n is F” is true relative to 〈w, t〉 on I iff either:
(1) F is a s-predicate and |“n”|I is a member of |“is F”|I; or
(2) F is a c-predicate and some t-stage of |“n”|I is a member of |“is F”|I .23
Worm theory reflects the perdurance view. Perdurance says that ordinary objects—things
like rabbits—are space time worms. Correspondingly, it is this kind of object that ‘rabbit’ or
‘gavagai’ divides its reference over.24 Perdurance theories say that a thing alters by having
successive temporal parts that instantiate different properties—and this is reflected in worm
22The quantifier is ‘ontologically loaded’ in the sense that it only ranges over objects at one time. I see no
reason why there should not be tenseless and ‘possibilist’ quantification where this restriction is lifted (it is easy
to see how the clauses would be altered). Likewise, one can imagine intensional operators which do not invoke
relations. We may be using such devices when we say “there is some German composer who is now famous”. (For
an alternative strategy, see (Cresswell, 2004)).
23More generally, if we have a polyadic predicate R, with k s-places and l c-places then “Rn1, . . .nk,m1 . . .ml”
is true relative to 〈w, t〉 on I iff 〈n1, . . . ,nk,m′1, . . . ,m′l〉 is a member of |“is F”|I , where m′i is some t-stage of mi, for
each i.
Note that we will now have a variety of relations with claim to be the identity relation a = b, according to
whether a and b are regarded as of sort s or sort c. This leads to real differences in the context of counting.
24Or at least, it will do so so long as we regard ‘gavagai’ as what Wiggins would call a ‘pure sortal’, and not, for
example, a phase of the underlying sortal ‘organism’. In the former case, ‘gavagai’ will be a s-predicate, holding
of all rabbit-worms; in the latter case, ‘gavagai’ will be divide its reference over rabbit-stages. See Parsons (op cit)
and the references therein.
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theory by the account of c-predication, whereby a thing satisfies ‘is running’ at t, and fails to
satisfy it at t ′, by having temporal parts at those times that respectively do and do not fall under
the extension of ‘is running’.
Stage theory
Stage theoretic semantics reflects the exdurance theory of persistence advocated by Sider (1996a,
2001) and Hawley (2001).
According to the [exdurance] theory, ordinary persisting objects are stages that per-
sist . . . by having distinct stage counterparts at other times. [Exdurance] says that
in the afternoon when I find my bent candle on the shelf, the candle is the bent-
stage coexisting with me then, but that stage persisted from before (in the relevant
sense) by virtue of having a (straight) counterpart stage on the shelf in the morn-
ing. . . . Although on this view ordinary objects are stages and so (strictly speaking)
only exist momentarily, they can nonetheless persist by virtue of having counterpart
antecedent and/or successor stages.
(Haslanger, 2003, p.318)25
The key features of the exdurance theory are that ordinary objects are strictly speaking
momentary stages, persisting vicariously through their counterparts located elsewhere in time;
and that things change their properties through having counterpart-stages at successive times
instantiating different properties.
To set up stage theoretic semantics to reflect the exdurance theory of persistence and alter-
ation, we need an additional primitive: the two-place relation Ct (“is a temporal counterpart
of”). This holds between temporal slices. Intuitively, Ct(x,y) will hold if x and y are stages of
the same persisting object—in the case at hand, if they are stages of the same rabbit.
25Haslanger (2003) uses ‘exdurance’ and ‘stage theory’ interchangeably. I find it useful to regiment the termi-
nology to distinguish metaphysical from semantic theories, and have altered the above quote accordingly.
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• “φ∧ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff “φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I and “ψ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “¬φ” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff “φ” is not true at 〈w, t〉 on I.
• “∃xφx” is true at 〈w, t〉 iff
“φ(c)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∪{c} where |c|I∗ exists
at 〈w, t〉.
• “At w′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w′, t〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} whereCm(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w′, t〉.
• “At t ′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w, t ′〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} andCt(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at〈w, t ′〉.
• “c is F” is true relative to 〈w, t〉 on I iff
|“c”|I ∈ |“F”|I .26
This stage theory reflects the exdurance view. Exdurance says that ordinary objects—things
like rabbits—are momentary stages. Correspondingly, ‘rabbit’ or ‘gavagai’ divides its reference
over this kind of object. Exdurance theories say that a thing alters in virtue of distinct coun-
terparts having distinct properties —and indeed, we find that “a rabbit was running and is now
26The generalization to polyadic predicates is not immediate. In particular, we would like to be able to handle
crosstemporal relations—for example “William I was the ancestor of Elizabeth II”. The problem is that there may
be no single instant where both relata have counterparts.
Nothing in the above requires that the objects in the extension of a predicate at t need themselves to exist at
t. Indeed, there are good reasons for resisting this principle. Consider, for example, the predicate “is famous”.
It is natural to think that Beethoven satisfies “is famous” relative to the present time (and fails to satisfy it, for
example, relative to a post-nuclear world where classical music has been forgotten). But Beethoven does not exist
at the present time. (This example is from Cresswell (2004) who takes it to motivate the construction of ersatz
counterparts for individuals in worlds and times where they do not exist. The above seems to me a more attractive
handling of the case.)
If we adopt this setup, then there is no immediate objection to having 〈William,Elizabeth〉 within the extension
of ‘is an ancestor of’ relative to the present moment.
An alternative treatment would appeal to relativization to intervals, and say that pair is in the extension of ‘is an
ancestor’ relative to the 2nd millennium. See p. 4.5.1 below.
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sitting still” will be true iff some present rabbit-stage that falls under “sitting still” has a past
temporal counterpart that falls under “is running”.
Dot theory
When it comes to undetached rabbit parts, there is no corresponding theory in the literature to
draw on. One can see what such a theory would look like, however: it would be a theory of
extension through space that paralleled the exdurance theory of persistence through time. On
such a view, a rabbit that is partially at a position p would extend through space, not by having
parts located at other places, but through having counterparts at those positions.
We can modify the stage theoretic ideas to get a corresponding semantic theory, which I
shall call ‘dot theory’.27 As before, we have primitive counterpart relations Cm, Ct , and in
addition a relation Cp relating one object to another at a single time. In the case at hand, the
intended relation will hold of the pair x,y if they are parts of the same rabbit (stage).
• “φ∧ψ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff “φ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I and “ψ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on
I.
• “¬φ” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff “φ” is not true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I.
• “∃xφx” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 iff
“φ(c)” is true on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∪ {c} on which |c|I∗ exists at
〈w, t, p〉.
• “At w′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w′, t, p〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} such thatCm(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w′, t〉.
27Wolfgang Schwarz (2005a), discusses an ‘atomistic’ theory he calls ‘general counterpart theory’. The version
presented derives from an early version of Schwarz’s paper though with some variations to parallel more exactly
the counterpart theoretic paraphrases of Lewis (1968). Schwarz has subsequently reformulated his theory in ways
that are less congenial to my present purpose.
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• “At t ′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w, t ′, p〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =
L∪{c∗1, . . . ,c∗n} whereCt(|ci|I ,|c∗i |I
∗
) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at 〈w, t ′〉.
• “At p′, φ(c1, . . . ,cn)” is true at 〈w, t, p〉 on I iff
“φ(c∗1, . . . ,c
∗
n)” is true relative to 〈w, t, p′〉 on some extension I∗ of I to the language L∗ =




) and |c∗i |I
∗
exists at p′.
• “ c is F” is true relative to 〈w, t, p〉 iff
|“c”|I ∈ |“F”|I28
We can now let the extension of “Rabbit” or “Gavagai” be all and only mereologically
atomic undetached parts of a rabbit.29 An atomic part falling under ‘gavagai’ will extend in
space vicariously through having p-counterparts in other places. It will change its properties
through space through (for example) having white counterparts in one place; and counterparts
in another place that are black.30
The primitives
One of the most striking things about the move from worm to stage to dot semantics is the need
to appeal to additional primitives in each case. For worm theory, we appealed to the counter-
part relation Cm (and recall, this was inessential—we could have used some other treatment of
modality if preferred.). For stage theory we have in addition the temporal counterpart relation
Ct , and for dot theory, we also have the positional-counterpart relation Cp.
The modal counterpart relation as Lewis understands it, is a contextually inconstant relation,
so that statements about necessary properties (and de re modal predication in general) become
highly sensitive to peculiarities of conversational context.31 Lewis thinks of the counterpart
28To deal with cross-temporal and spatial relations, similar moves to that used in stage theoretic setup will be
needed.
29To get arbitrary undetached parts within the extension of ‘gavagai’, as on Quine’s original proposal, we would
need to combine elements of the dot theory with elements of the worm theory. I will not give details here.
30For purposes of exposition, we indulge in the fiction that mereological atoms are intrinsically coloured.
31Lewis (1968), Lewis (1986c, §4.5)
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relation as being fixed by facts about the similarity of objects to others. Although facts about
similarity are not treated as in any way subjective by Lewis, which respects of similarity are
called upon in a given case will depend on the demands of the conversation.32
The formal appeal to ‘counterpart’ relations does not commit us to anything substantive
about the nature of that relation. For example, it as yet says nothing about whether we can
further analyze it (as Lewis analyzes modal counterparthood in terms of similarity); or whether
we should treat it as primitive. Even in the modal case, compatibly with all that has been said,
which objects are the modal counterpart of one another might depend on their instantiating
special ‘haecceities’ (individual essences). This could lead to a treatment of modal predication
very different from Lewis’, though sharing the same formal setting.
Appreciating the distinction between the flexibility of the formal apparatus of counterpart
theory and the particular doctrines endorsed by its inventor is important when thinking of the
stage and dot theoretic versions. It may help to think of the stage-theorist’s “temporal coun-
terpart relation” as a relation of temporal unity. Every participant in the current debate owes a
story about how stages hang together to form continuing objects, even if this only amounts to
taking the notion of a ‘natural united’ object as primitive. This ‘hanging together’ is exactly
whatCt expresses (cf Hawley, 2001, ch.3).33
We can categorize accounts of the counterpart relations in numerous cross-cutting ways:
(1) It could be taken as primitive, or an analysis could be offered. (2) It could be constant—a
single relation-in-extension no matter what the context is; or inconstant—which relation-in-
extension is picked out by Ct might vary.34 (3) Further, grades of inconstancy might arise.
One might hold that there are only two temporal counterpart relations; say counterpart-qua-
body and counterpart-qua-person.35 Or, like Lewis, one might think of endless counterpart
32Lewis (1983a). Perhaps the most extreme example of Lewis endorsing context-sensitivity is to be found in
“Things qua truthmakers” (2003).
33On a role for similarity in uniting successive stages, see Lewis (1976). It is clear that similarity will not find
much use in an account of the p-counterpart relation involved in dot theories.
34As Parsons (2005a) notes (in a slightly different context), the kind of views on diachronic identity espoused
by Ayers (1974) and Armstrong (1980) may lead to a constant temporal unity relation.
35A picture that suits this case is one where we appeal to a small number of temporal unity relations, each paired
with a specific natural kind. Hawley (2001, ch.3, esp. p.70).
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relations, whose selection is highly dependent on context. (4) On an inconstant view, one might
hold that distinct counterpart relations are associated with each sortal predicate (so that sortal
predicates ‘carry with them’ criteria of diachronic persistence)36; or one might not endorse such
a connection. (5) One might think of the counterpart relations as subjectively constituted—for
example, in terms of the classificatory dispositions of agents; or objectively constituted—for
example, in terms of objective similarity (in the modal case)37 or constitutive causal relations
(in the temporal case)38. Of course, the modal, temporal and part counterpart relations may
require analysis in different ways.
My concern here has been solely to set up the formal framework, and I intend to have
presented it in a way that is compatible with any of these positions. In assessing whether the
various proposals can be cashed out in a way that meets the minimal constraint of fit with the
patterns of assent and dissent that form the interpretationist’s data, we shall occasionally fill out
the proposal in one direction or another, but in the present context, neutrality is a virtue, and
one that I shall seek to preserve as far as possible.
36See Hawley (2001, §5.5)
37See Lewis (1986c, p.254)
38See Armstrong (1980)
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4.5 Objections
In the next few sections, we consider objections to the argument for division inscrutability based
on the three semantic frameworks just sketched. These are based on the concerns of Evans and
Fodor, reviewed earlier (we also discuss briefly a common objection to stage theory—that it has
problems with counting statements). We first cover Evans’ concerns about how stage-division
handles tense ((C) on 115, above). Our formulation of the Quinean proposal in terms of stage
theory now comes into its own: stage theory includes (or can be straightforwardly extended to
include) the temporal operators needed to make sense of the semantics of tense and aspect. We
then move to investigate the predication-based objections to URP-division ((A) and (B) on 114,
above). I shall present a general feature of the use of counterpart theory—the phenomenon of
‘inconstant’ predication, and point to potential instances in both worm theory (potential modally
inconstant predication) and stage theory (potentially temporally inconstant predication). I then
show how the Evans and Fodor objections to URP-division surface, within the dot theory, as
instances of this general phenomenon.
4.5.1 Tense and aspect within stage theory
Worm, stage and dot theory each include temporal operators in terms of which tenses can be
defined. Evans’ concerns about the ability of the stage-view to deal with tensed attributions can
thus be answered in the most satisfying way: by appealing to a general treatment of tense.39
The more general concern, however, may still be a good one. Evans highlights the need
for a systematic account of tenses in English. Though tenses (strictly construed) can be han-
dled, it is not so clear that other forms of temporal relativization will be. It is not clear at first
glance whether the stage view can handle temporal aspect.40 More particularly, as currently
formulated, stage theory allows relativization to instants in time only. However, this may be
39Essentially, the flaw in Evans’ original argument lies in failing to distinguish what Sider (1996a) calls de re
and de dicto temporal predications: ∃xWASFx vs. WAS∃xFx. This is effectively the objection to Evans offered in
Wright (1997) and Richard (1997).
40Josh Parsons mentioned this puzzle to me as a known problem for the Sider/Hawley stage theory of persistence.
However, I have not been able to locate a reference within the literature on stage theory.
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inadequate to provide semantics for natural language. Dowty (1979, ch.4.) claims that to han-
dle, for example, the English progressive (‘John was crossing the road’) we need to appeal to
relativization to intervals.41
In fact, we can make a case for relativization to intervals more directly. Consider ‘John read
War and Peace yesterday’ (McCawley, 1980, p.345). For this to be true, it is not enough that
there be a time instant yesterday at which John was reading the book (for that is compatible
with him not finishing it), nor that be a time instant yesterday at which John finished reading
the book (since that would be consistent with his having only read the final page yesterday).
Various more complex analyses might be tried, but, having considered several such analyses,
McCawley writes:
I would like to propose that not only points in time but also intervals figure in the
logical structures of sentences and that examples such as [those above] all involve
time intervals. [‘John readWar and Peace yesterday’] will then not say that there is
a past time at which John read War and Peace but that there is a past time interval
such that he read it on that interval.
(McCawley, 1980, p.345)42
Let us suppose that the analysis of tense and aspect involves irreducible interval-relativization,
as McCawley and Dowty urge. Still, division over rabbit stages seems in good order, since we
can simply re-interpret the stage semantics of p.120 above, so that the temporal indices range
over intervals rather than instants. Formally, everything else remains the same—for example,
the extension assigned to a predicate at an interval will be a set of instantaneous temporal parts.
Relative to the interval during which John read War and Peace (say, 1am to 11pm) each John-
stage within the interval will fall under “readsWar and Peace”, whereas relative to a time when
he only got through half of it, no John-stage will fall under that predicate.43
41. The basic idea is that ‘John is crossing the road’ is true relative to a time T if there is a interval T ′ including
T relative to which ‘John crossed the road’ holds. This needs modification, though, to deal with the so-called
‘imperfective paradox’: ‘John was crossing the road’ can be true in situations where he never finished crossing
(e.g. because he was run over). See Dowty (op cit) for discussion.
42See also Dowty (1979, ch.3.).
43Related predicates, such as the progressive ‘is reading War and Peace’ will hold of John-stages at instants
during that day, given an appropriate treatment of the progressive (Dowty, 1979, ch.4.).
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Digression: counting rabbits
One common objection to stage theory is that it delivers the wrong results for counting state-
ments.44 The intuitive objection is that, since the reference of ‘rabbit’ is divided over infinitely
many instantaneous rabbit stages, it will say that there are infinitely many rabbits in the hutch
during a period in which common sense tells us that there is only one.
A standard Quinean response to such moves would be to re-interpret the ‘apparatus of indi-
viduation’: to declare that under the stage-hypothesis, we do not count by identity but by some
ersatz relation.45 That is, instead of characterizing the extension of ‘is identical to’ through
numerical identity, we characterize it using the counterpart-hood relation. Writing ‘I’ for short,
we let ‘xIy’ be true relative 〈w,T 〉 iff Ct(x,y) holds. Under this interpretation, we will not get
errors of counting, since if (intuitively) Mopsy alone is in the hutch during Tuesday, all the
rabbits in the hutch during that period are I-related.
Sider (1996a) declares it a virtue of stage theory that one does not have to do this, but can
stick with the interpretation of identity as =. However, he does think that re-interpretation is
needed to get sensible results when, for example, counting the number of rabbits in a hutch over
an extended period of time.46
For the Quinean, however, counting by I seems entirely unproblematic. Moreover, it is not
obvious that we are re-interpreting identity using I. After all, I only relates things that are, will
be or were numerically identical.47 I conclude that the Quinean, at least, has no worries about
44See in particular Sider (1996a), who despite defending stage theory is particularly concerned about this point.
45See Field (1974) for an example of this Quinean approach. Sider (1996a) endorses re-interpretation of identity
for particular ‘counting’ contexts.
46It is not obvious that counting by = itself will straightforwardly deliver bad results, once we factor in the
tense and aspect within counting statements. However, I do think that, particularly taking into account the interval
quantification just mentioned, it faces severe problems. In particular, we need to check that a proposal handles
the following case correctly: Flopsy is in a hutch during the early part of Tuesday; then taken out and destroyed.
Mopsy is created, occupies the hutch during the late part of Tuesday, and then is destroyed. On Wednesday, there
should be a reading of ‘there were two rabbits in the hutch during Tuesday’ which is true. The challenge for one
who wishes to ‘count by =’ is to show how the formulation of counting that handles this case correctly can also
deliver the intuitively correct results when the reference of ‘rabbit’ is divided over stages.
47In particular, this is not the ‘counting by rabbit-worms’ that Sider (1996a) appeals to. In the famous case, ‘the
Statue=the Clay’ will be true, for example, in virtue of their present stages being identical (and so counterparts),
whereas they may well be distinct worms. A better description would be ‘counting by ersatz identity’, since we
can regard counterpart-hood as the stage theorist’s substitute for diachronic identity.
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counting.
(This analysis also deliver interesting results in so-called ‘fission’ cases (Sider, 1996b;
Lewis, 1976). If Mopsy undergoes fission, splitting amoeba-like to becomeMopsy1 andMopsy2,
then Mopsy1 and Mopsy2 will witness the truth of ‘there are at least two rabbits in the hutch
during Tuesday’ (there are two rabbits—a Mopsy-1-stage and a Mopsy-2-stage who are not
I-related). The interesting result, however, is that we may get ‘there is exactly one rabbit in the
hutch during Tuesday’ coming out true as well. The point is that there is a rabbit within that
hour (a pre-fission stage of Mopsy) which is I-related to every rabbit in the hutch within the
day. There are two familiar ways of handling ‘there is exactly one F’ within first-order logic:
there is at least one F and it is not the case that there are at least two Fs
there is at least one F and every other F is identical to it
On the former reading the Mopsy-fission scenario will not make-true ‘there is exactly one rabbit
in the hutch’. But on the latter reading, the Mopsy-fission will make-true both ‘there is exactly
one rabbit in the hutch’ and ‘there are exactly two rabbits in the hutch’. I find this result quite
appealing—an apt reflection of the confusing nature of counting in fission cases.48)
4.5.2 Predication and compounding
We now turn to the Evans and Fodor objections (A) and (B) (given on page 114ff above.). The
natural proposal is to let anything which is (intuitively) an atomic part of an F fall under ‘F’
on the dot-semantics. As anticipated, prima facie problems with compounding arise: we will
indeed have objects that fall under ‘Rabbit’ and ‘White’ and ‘Ear’ in the presence of a rabbit
with a white ear—just take any simple part of the ear.
48The proof that the two readings of ‘there is exactly one F’ are equivalent relies on the Euclidean property of
the identity relation: and it is exactly this that fails when numerical identity is replaced by the ersatz identity I.
Thanks to Andy McGonigal for this point.
A similar treatment of fission cases will arise within worm theory, if the name-positions flanking the identity
sign are treated as c-predicates (cf. p.117, above.). Thanks to Wolfgang Schwarz for suggesting this.
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Rather than tackle the problem directly, I want to outline a range of parallel cases within the
worm and stage frameworks, and describe how advocates of those positions are likely to react
to the challenges. I will then look at how the analogous responses would work within the dot
semantics.
Inconstancy within stage and worm theory
Consider stage theory, as developed by Sider (1996a). The proposal is to let any stage of
something that is intuitively an F fall under the extension of ‘F’. The temporal counterpart
relation is something that unites person-stages of a single person: Sider takes it to be a matter of
psychological connectedness. In the case of other kinds of objects, different kinds of temporal
‘unity’ relations would be needed. Our worries will arise when two objects which share a stage
nevertheless call for extensionally distinct counterpart relations.
Let us illustrate this with a famous case. Consider a lump of clay that has existed for millions
of years, and which was formed into a statue 35 years ago. Many wish to maintain that the statue
came into existence when the clay was formed into the shape of a statue—it is an object in its
own right, not merely a temporary property of the lump of clay.
From the stage theorist’s perspective, this presents a dilemma. Does the temporal coun-
terpart relation relate the present statue/clay stage to a stage of the piece of clay before it was
formed into a statue? Suppose it does: then the statue pre-existed its sculpting, in virtue of
having a temporal counterpart before that event. Suppose it does not: then the piece of clay has
no counterparts before the sculpting, so came into existence at that point also.
Sider’s analysis of the statue/clay case is to admit two temporal counterpart relations: statue-
counterparthood and lump-of-clay-counterparthood. The latter relates the statue/clay stage to
entities pre-existing the sculpting event; the former does not. Which relation is designated by
our relation Ct is a matter for context to decide. When we ask about the creation of the statue,
the former is invoked; when we ask about the pre-existence of the clay, the latter is invoked.
What we have described thus far is sufficient to deal with questions phrased in terms of
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quantification (existence) and temporal operators. Using such devices we can ask about whether
the statue existed 36 years ago, and get one answer; and we can ask about whether the clay
existed 36 years ago and get a different answer. This is compatible with maintaining that the
statue and the clay are identical.
What I now want to highlight is that this does not solve all the problems that we need to
ask. For there are predicates that depend on the distribution of properties over the course of an
object’s history. Such ‘historical’ predicates include, paradigmatically ‘is exactly 35 years old’
and ‘is millions of years old’. Again, a dilemma emerges: is it true to say “there is a million
year old statue present”? Presumably not, given that the lump of clay was formed into a statue
only 35 years ago. Nevertheless, since the lump of clay stage is identical to the statue stage, if
one is within the extension of “millions of years old” the other must be too. We do want “there
is a lump of clay present that is millions of years old” to come out as true: so we are pressured
towards admitting the former sentence as true. Given that exactly similar remarks could be
made in favour of placing the stage inside the extension of “is exactly 35 years old” we are in
danger of declaring true “there is something that is both exactly 35 years old and is millions of
years old”.
One option here is to appeal to paraphrase so as to reduce the problem to one already solved.
The basic idea is to map
n is (at least) 35 years old
to
Throughout the past 35 years, n has existed.
As before, inconstancy of the counterpart relation directly impacts here, given the way that
temporal operators are defined.
The fundamental objection in the context of finding a possible semantic analysis of our lan-
guage, is that the free use of paraphrase to turn predicates into operators looks illegitimate. If
we are asking for a semantics for a language with a fixed syntax, we need some other device:
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for we want an interpretation of the predicate ‘is 35 years old’. Pointing to an operator that
systematically corresponds to it is not to deliver this.49 The resolution is close to hand, how-
ever. What we must maintain is that not only the counterpart relation, but a range of related
predicates are inconstant or indexical. ‘Historical’ predicates such as ‘is exactly 35 years old’
are paradigmatic examples of this class. Indeed, the two indexicals are related in a natural way:
‘is exactly 35 years old’ will hold of a stage at t iff the sum of the temporal counterparts of that
stage existing earlier than t measures 35 years. Notice that we use the counterpart relation in
specifying the property. Hence any indexicality characteristic of the counterpart relation will
infect the extension of the predicate.50 We get:
The statue is the clay
The statue is exactly 35 years old
The clay is millions of years old.
To explain the difference, we point to changes in context: the latter two invoke different coun-
terpart relations (statue-counterparthood and clay counterparthood respectively) which in turn
changes the extension of the relevant predicates.
The residual question
Our resolution of the puzzles over inconstant predication make heavy use of contextually vary-
ing counterpart relations. This leaves a residual worry. For simplicity, I set up the semantics
within a single context, and assumed that this context would determine a unique counterpart
relation. It is natural to think, however, that different counterpart relations can be invoked by
different parts of the same sentence. Thus (naming the statue ‘Goliath’ and the clay ‘Lump’) it
49What we would need to make a principled case is some independently motivated transformation or generative
component in the semantics that would derive the surface predicate from underlying operators. Cf. Lewis (1970a)
and Dowty (1979, ch.1.).
50Compare the ‘indexical’ response to Evans suggested by Wright (1997, p.410).
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is natural to think that
Goliath is exactly 35-years old and Lump is millions of years old (*)
should come out true. For this to be the case, we need to allow different counterpart relations
to operate in the two conjuncts. Two worries then emerge: How are we to think of this case?
What prevents us from existentially generalizing to get the problems back once again?
On the first point, we should first note that we have independent reason to think that context-
change within a sentence can take place. Consider the utterance “Now is not. . . now” Since the
second utterance of ‘now’ takes place at a later time than the first, there is a natural reading of
the sentence on which it expresses a truth. On the other hand, relative to any single context, it
expresses a contradiction. I suggest the following view of how token utterances get assigned
truth-conditions by a semantics. First, each expression in the utterance has its own context.
The first component to semantic theory (what Kaplan (1989b) calls ‘character’) will assign to
each component a content, depending on its own unique context. Indexical terms such as ‘I’
and ‘now’ are assigned a referent, indexical predicates are assigned an extension, and so on.
Once this is fixed, the second component of semantic theory kicks in. This tells us how the
referents and extensions assigned to the various expressions combine to determine the overall
truth-conditions for the sentence. The various semantic theories that we give above are each
candidates for this second component. Which extension the predicates have, or what precise
relation the primitive terms of the theory express, may indeed vary depending on the context at
hand, even within the same sentence.51
The second worry seems to me the most serious challenge. What prevents the worrying
existential generalization:
51For more examples of how context change within a sentence can be significant, see Lewis (1979c). The ac-
count of belief reports in Stalnaker (1999a) also requires context change. It seems to me that the need to distinguish
contextual determination of content, involving a variety of contexts, from the calculation of truth-conditions of a
given utterance, once content of its parts have been fixed, undermines Lewis (1980)’s suggestion that we could do
semantics entirely in terms of a single binary functions from index and context to truth-values. It gives a principled
reason for discerning a significant level of ‘content’ within the overall ‘semantic value’.
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There is something that is both exactly 35 years old and is millions of years old?
We have been given no reason to think that context cannot change in ways that render true
an utterance of such a sentence. The case is particularly pressing given our verdict that the
witnessing statement (∗), above, is unproblematic.
There are two responses. The way of resistance is to find some principled constraint on
change of context which prevents the generalization from coming out true. It is hard to see
a non ad hoc route for this. Better, then, is the way of concession. This is to accept that
there is no principled reason that a context cannot be found with respect to which the existential
generalization is true; but to insist that such contexts do not normally arise, so that standardly the
existentially generalized sentence expresses something false. One would then hope to explain
away intuitions that the statement is false, on the grounds of its typical (though not inevitable)
falsity.
I advise the stage theorist to take the way of concession. One should try to explain intuitive
resistance to the bare existential by noting that for it to be true, context would need to invoke
statue-counterparthood for the first part of the sentence, and clay-counterparthood in the second.
However, there are no prompts for such change in the sentence. If we do add such prompts, we
get something that sounds (to my ears at least) acceptable:
there is something that is exactly 35 years old (qua statue) and millions of years old
(qua lump of clay).
Analogues in the worm case
I have just explored the way that Sider handles statue/clay cases within stage theory. The key
was to diagnose inconstancy in the counterpart relation, and to extend this to relevant ‘incon-
stant’ predication. I now want to briefly sketch the analogous case within worm theory, before
turning to the Evans/Fodor objections to Quinean inscrutability.
Worm theory, as we have set it up, puts fusions of temporal stages of Fs into the extension
of ‘F’, when F is a s-predicate, and puts G-ing stages into the extension of ‘G’, when G is a
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c-predicate. It straightforwardly handles the whole variety of cases we have hitherto consid-
ered.52 Nevertheless, analogous phenomena do arise, given modal counterpart theory. It is not
unreasonable to hold that the statue is essentially a statue.53 Equally, it is not unreasonable to
hold that the lump of clay is essentially made of clay, but might never have been made into a
statue.54 On the other hand, if the statue and the clay were created and destroyed at the same
time (unlike Goliath and Lump) the statue and the clay will be the same space-time worm.
Lewis (1986c, §4.5) explicitly admits this kind of case, by making allowance for inconstant
modal counterpart relations (indeed, his is the model that Sider follows in developing the stage
view). Lewis’ thought is that on some standards of similarity, the statue/clay worm can be
similar enough to the statue to count as its counterpart in another possible situation; but on
other standards of similarity no non-clay can be a case in point, but statue-hood is irrelevant.
We can retrace the steps described earlier for the clay case: pointing to possible paraphrase in
terms of modal operators to which the modal counterpart relations are directly relevant (e.g.
‘Necessarily, it is a statue’); and then looking at an interpretation of the predicate ‘is essentially
a statue’ specified in terms of counterpart relations, so that it would inherit the indexicality of
the latter.
Again, there would be problematic existential generalizations:
there is something that is both essentially a statue; and is essentially made of clay,
but might never have been a statue
Again, we try to allay worries by noting how odd the context-change involved would have to
be to render this true; and also, perhaps, the acceptability of versions where contextual prompts
such as qua statue are introduced.
52This has the rather disarming implication that, strictly speaking, nothing is both white and a rabbit. Of course,
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The Evans and Fodor cases revisited
What now of the dot-semantics, and the Evans and Fodor objections? I want to urge that we see
the Evans/Fodor objections as the surfacing of the phenomenon of inconstancy found above.
Consider first Evans’ challenge: of what objects does ‘white’ hold? The underlying problem
here is that whether or not a rabbit is white depends on the overall distribution of whiteness
in its fur. Like the historical predicates that were problematic for stage theory, ‘spatialized’
predicates will pose challenges for dot theory.
The solution is to characterize the extension of predicates informally via the contextually
salient counterpart relation:
‘is white’ applies to a iff the fusion of a and its p-counterparts have a white outer
surface.
When ‘rabbit-counterparthood’ is salient, all atomic parts of a single rabbit are counterparts
of each other. In the presence of a white rabbit, the condition will be met by any part of a white
rabbit. It is not met by any part of a black rabbit with a white ear. It is not met even if there
is an atomic part A (part of the ear of the rabbit) which falls under ‘rabbit’ and which is itself
intrinsically white in colour.
Each such sortal will have to deliver its own counterpart relation. For example, there will be
ear-counterparthood, under which x and ywill be counterparts iff they are both parts of the same
rabbit ear. In the scenario sketched above, the same object A which did not fall under ‘white’
under the rabbit-counterparthood relation, will fall under ‘white’ under ear-counterparthood.
I hope it is clear that the above is just the analogue of the treatment of inconstant predicates
in the modal and stage settings: though now almost every predicate is inconstant. We can
expect an analogue of the odd existential generalizations found earlier. In the current setting
these generalizations are something like:
There is something that is both white all over and mostly black
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For A, above, is white all over qua part of a white-all-over ear; and mostly black, qua part of
a mostly black rabbit. Again, our initial discomfort might be explicable given the changes of
context that must occur to render the odd-sounding sentence true; and might be disarmed if we
find the ‘qua’ glosses moderately acceptable.
More disturbing is the Fodorian challenge:
There is something that is both a rabbit and an ear
Prima facie, we have here a choice between two uncomfortable options. The first is to regard
‘rabbit’ and ‘ear’ as constant predicates, applying invariantly to atomic undetached rabbit parts
and atomic undetached ear parts. That involves regarding the above as on all fours with state-
ments in the stage/modal cases such as ‘there is something that is both a statue and a lump of
clay’. Such statements were unproblematic in those contexts: but the Fodorian analogue is far
less comfortable.
The other approach is to say that sortal predicates, as well as adjectives such as ‘white’, are
inconstant: we would then give characterizations of the extension of sortals such as:
‘x is a rabbit’ is satisfied by A iff the fusion of A and its counterparts makes up a
rabbit.
Under the ear-counterpart relation, the extension of this predicate will be empty; under the
rabbit-counterpart relation, all the atomic undetached rabbit parts will fall within it. Of course,
this doesn’t mean that there are any ordinary contexts in which ‘there are no rabbits’ would be
true: for such sentences ipso facto make salient rabbit-counterparthood. The view does allow
us to regard the Fodorian sentence above as the direct analogue of the cases familiar from stage
and worm views: just as in those cases, the diagnosis will be that the sentence can only express
a truth if there is a context-change occurring in the middle of it. At first glance, this hardly looks
to be an improvement on the previous option. Since the predicates involved are exactly the ones
that generate the counterpart relations, it is hard to see why the sentence would be unacceptable.
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What one would need to resist Fodor’s objection, then, is either a complex story about how
the context-change needed to render true the relevant generalization is for some reason not
available; or else a healthy propensity to bite bullets. Suppose we tug on a rabbit’s ear, and say:
“this is a white ear; but it is also a mostly black rabbit”. In context, the statement seems fine.
We would probably regard it as a pun55—but for the dot theorist, it would express the sober
truth.
Some philosophers describe the part-whole relation as partial identity: the part being par-
tially identical to the whole. The dot theorist takes this in the most literal way: the part (the ear)
is identical with the whole (the rabbit). We can of course introduce non-standard interpretation
of ‘identity’ (e.g. ‘whole identity’56) such that the ear and the rabbit would not be wholly identi-
cal. However, this will not finesse the Fodorian problem we have just seen, for the problematic
sentences make no use of identity, but only quantification and predication. However, it will give
us the terminology with which to make some sort of sense of the result.
The Fodorian existential generalization seems a serious problem for the dot-inscrutabilist—
it certainly seems unfaithful to ordinary patterns of assent and dissent. Progress has nevertheless
been made: we have seen how Evans’ worries can be dealt with in ways exactly analogous
to corresponding problems for stage and worm theories. We have also seen exactly why the
Fodorian generalizations arise: cases where one sortal applies to parts of things falling under
another will generate parallel existential generalizations and identities on all three accounts.
Only in the dot case do they seem intuitively repugnant. What I take this to show is that the
Fodorian phenomena are not symptoms of a wider malaise for dot-theory—they are the most
problematic features of a generally successful account. Perhaps more importantly, we have
seen that we will not be able to find corresponding problems with the stage view: the analogous
55That is, one would assume that the anaphoric reference cannot be taken seriously—we would ordinarily as-
sume that we need ‘this’ and ‘it’ referring to different entities for the sentence to come out true.
56E.g. we say that a is wholly identical to b iff every counterpart of a is identical to some counterpart of b, and
vice versa.
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sentences (e.g. ‘there is something that is both a lump of clay and a statue’) are unproblematic.
Even if the Fodor objections disrupts the ‘undetached rabbit part’ version of putative division
inscrutability, stage/worm inscrutability is still live.
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4.6 Conclusion
Quine’s “argument from below” falls into two halves: inscrutability of logical form; and divi-
sion inscrutability. Quine proposes three alternatives in the latter case, which we have cashed
out systematically in worm theory, stage theory and dot theory. Dot theory is clearly of a more
dubious standing than the other two: Fodor’s examples, at least, threaten to illustrate seriously
counterintuitive results. Even this is not decisive, especially once we realize that Fodor-style
examples are localized phenomenon.
Let us focus, however, on the most plausible case for division inscrutability: stage and worm
semantics—regarding ‘rabbit’ as dividing its reference over perduring objects, or alternatively
over instantaneous stages that persist vicariously through temporal counterparts at other times.
I have argued that, for the fragment of language we have been considering, each does as well
as the other in matching patterns of assent and dissent—the kind of data that interpretationism
takes to settle semantic facts.
In later chapters, we will be looking at additional constraints that the interpretationist may
make on the evaluation of semantic theories. The most important such constraint is simplicity.
It is worth considering, therefore, whether considerations of simplicity could resolve putative
division inscrutability.57
It is notable that stage theory features an extra primitive, by comparison to worm theory—
the temporal counterpart relation. One might think, on those grounds, that it should be counted a
more complex semantic theory. However, this would be to ignore the corresponding complexity
of the objects over which worm theory divides reference, by comparison to stage theory. It is
a familiar theme that one can give the appearance of simplicity to a semantic theory simply by
building relevant information into the domain over which one quantifies: one can, for example,
get the power of an intensional setting in a purely extensional way, roughly by quantifying over
57In other settings, causal considerations are centre-stage. As noted by Field (1974); McGee (2005a) and others,
finding causal relations that would discriminate between rabbit worms, rabbit stages and rabbit parts is no easy
task. (It is instructive to compare the issue to that of the ‘qua’ problems for causal theories of reference. Sterelny
(cf. 1990, ch.6.))
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‘intensional objects’.58 Everyone owes an account of what makes an ordinary object ‘hang
together’ over time—even if it just taking the notion of a ‘naturally unified’ object as primitive.
This information is encoded within the objects that worm theory quantifies over; it is explicit in
the temporal unity relation of stage theory. On grounds of simplicity, there is little to choose.
Nor, I think, is there any sense in which one choice is ‘the natural’ one. This is obscured
when we described the options as dividing over rabbits; or over rabbit-stages. This makes it
sound like the former is the natural choice. However, when we give a metaphysical explanation
of what we take these ‘rabbits’ to be (certain four dimensional solids, only partially present at
a time) it becomes a real issue which, if any, of these candidates are ‘truly’ rabbits. If what
we are interested in is interpretation rather than translation—a pairing of words with parts
of the world—then there will be a point at which intuitions fall silent. We seem to know a
lot, introspectively, about the subject-matter of our thoughts and talk. However, we do not
introspectively access the physical nature of the things we talk about; and neither should we
be thought to have introspective access to the metaphysical nature of such things. The point of
view I am urging sees our intuitions as silent—or equally bemused—by all the various options
we have considered.59
Perhaps, once we see the options, there are advantages in choosing one rather than another as
a way of regimenting our talk of ordinary objects such as rabbits. (The considerations adduced
in Sider (1996a) seem to me to be mostly of this nature: Sider even calls them ‘philosophers
reasons’ for preferring a stage theory over a worm theory.) While there may be normative
reasons for choosing one or the other conception of rabbits, there seems nothing descriptive in
ordinary conception to resolve the division question.
It seems to me that there is no reason not to accept division inscrutability, granted a suc-
cessful resolution of ‘technical’ objections. Neither considerations of simplicity, nor causal
58See Lewis (1974b)
59It should not be thought that endurantism is a more intuitively appealing doctrine either: as spelled out within
the eternalist framework we are considering, it is equally, if not more, intuitively bizarre than the options just
considered. See Parsons (2000). One might take the moral to be that it is the eternalist framework that is at fault:
evaluating such a claim would take us far beyond the current discussion.
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constraints, promise a resolution of the issue. Equally, for the reasons just given, I think that di-
vision inscrutability is not all that counterintuitive—at least if we adopt a certain modesty about
how much is revealed in introspection about the metaphysical nature of the subject-matter of
our thought and speech. Since different primitive semantic machinery is being used in the var-
ious cases, one might even suggest that it is a kind of ‘framework’ inscrutability mentioned at
the end of Chapter §3.5; a less trivial example than the choice of analysis of relations in set-
theoretic terms, perhaps, but still a matter of how we package the same ontology, ideology and
meaning-facts. Appropriate objections to division inscrutability are the technical ones we have
been exploring; philosophically, the case seems innocuous.
Chapter 5
Arguments for radical inscrutability
I take positive inscrutability arguments to have the following form:
1. SENTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS: The criterion of success for a semantic theory is that it
assign the right semantic value to sentences
2. OVERGENERATION: Multiple assignments of subsentential reference generate the same
sentential semantic values
3. therefore: INSCRUTABILITY: There is no fact of the matter about what subsentential
expressions refer to.
Given the versions of interpretationism currently in view, SENTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS will
be sustained. This is the upshot of two theses:
1. SENTENTIAL DATA: The data-set constraining the selection of semantic theory concerns
the semantic values of sentences—e.g. a set of T-sentences, or a pairing of sentences with
propositions.
2. BEST=FIT: The sole criterion of success for a semantic theory is fitting this data.
We can see the Quinean ‘Gavagai’ arguments considered in Chapter 4 as fitting into this scheme.
In the Gavagai case, I have suggested, the best course may be to accept the claim of division-
inscrutability. There may be other settings—the ‘innocuous’ and ‘illuminating’ inscrutability
of §3.5—where we would not wish to insist on scrutable reference in any case.
When we turn to radical inscrutability of reference, the claim would be that there is no fact
of the matter whatever about which objects our words pick out: so that Paris and Sydney have
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as much claim as London to be the referent of “London”. This is too much for most to accept.
In future parts of this thesis: (1) I will be looking at whether there are good theoretical grounds
for wanting to resist radical inscrutability (Chapters 6,7) (2) I will be looking for principled
substitute for BEST=FIT that would block the move from overgeneration results to inscrutability
(Chapter 8).
The aim of this chapter is to provide a battery of arguments for radical inscrutability, via
outlining formal arguments for radical overgeneration. We will gain a sense of their robust-
ness and power, and I will outline a philosophically significant (though easy) extension of the
arguments. We will also see some limitations to the arguments: in particular, I describe two
semantic frameworks where the arguments do not go through.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section details the permutation arguments
for radical overgeneration popularized by Putnam (1981). The arguments are extremely simple,
but powerful. I first run through the intuitive ideas, then sketch their application to (a slight
generalization of) first-order predicate logic.
If we are to make a case that a natural language such as English is inscrutable, however, we
are likely to need results in much more powerful settings. The final result we prove below is as
powerful as one could reasonably wish: we work within a double-indexed general semantics of
the kind described in Lewis (1970a, 1980), and show that one can permute reference schemes
in arbitrary ways while leaving the pairing of sentences with semantic values (in this case, func-
tions from indices to truth-values) fixed. Since the general semantics is multiply intensional, and
contains the resources of a full type theory, this is an extremely powerful setting—corollaries
will be that indexical, modal, temporal and other intensional aspects of natural language will
not disrupt the permutation argument.1
1Putnam (op cit) gives the permutation argument for the special case of a modal logic. Hale andWright (1997b)
give these results and also extensions to a second-order setting. The result just described subsumes these theorems.
McGee (2005a) argues that the permutation arguments cannot be extended in full generality to quantification modal
logic. I explain at §5.1.2 and in Appendix C how my setup differs from that that McGee presupposes, in ways that
avoid his objections.
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The second (short) section describes a small extension of the argument for overgeneration.
Not only can we argue that arbitrary permuted reference schemes generate the appropriate truth-
conditions, but there are ‘sententially equivalent’ semantics that embed reference schemes that
change arbitrarily with context. Therefore, by the same arguments as previously, interpretation-
ism seems committed to indexical inscrutability: the claim that there is no fact of the matter,
from one moment to the next, whether a term has retained the same referent. This result will
play a central role in the discussions of Chapter 6.
The third section then looks at two settings where the permutation arguments break down.
These are semantic theories formulated in terms of structured propositions, of the kind de-
scribed by Soames (1989); and Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics, (Davidson, 1967; Lar-
son and Segal, 1995). (The latter result is perhaps surprising, since Davidson (1979) is one of
few to accept radical inscrutability.) I shall argue that this result may be significant: it shifts po-
tential resistance to inscrutability arguments from the relation between data and selected theory
(i.e. in modifying BEST=FIT), and focuses attention rather on the kind of data that the inter-
pretationist can provide. Only if the sentential data are ‘fine-grained’ (in a sense I shall spell
out) do we have a chance of avoiding inscrutability. However, the leading extant accounts of
such data (e.g. Lewis (1975, 1994b) Davidson (1973, 1980)) are ‘coarse-grained’. Unless we
provide some alternative way of identifying the data, it will be indeterminate which fine-grained
description of the data is appropriate; and radical inscrutability will be re-instituted. Though
the move to more fine-grained settings does point to a principled way of resisting inscrutability,
hard work would be required to get it to work.
The fourth and final section looks at an alternative way of arguing for radical inscrutability
of reference. Focusing in the first instance on an extensional setting, we can use the techniques
used by Henkin to prove model-existence theorems, to show that any consistent set of sentences
can be made-true by models embedding arbitrary reference-schemes. The strategic significance
of this form of argument is that, unlike the permutation arguments previously discussed, the
deviant models are not characterized derivatively from an ‘intended model’. This will be ex-
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ploited in Chapter 8 to cause problems for the Lewis (1984; 1983a) ‘eligibility’ response to
inscrutability. Here we describe the completeness/compactness argument, and an extension to
the intensional case. In Appendix B, we provide a standard presentation of the completeness
theorem for first-order predicate logic, and sketch the Henkin (1950) proof of completeness and
compactness for a type theory, using general (or ‘Henkin’) models.
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5.1 Permutation arguments
The key idea of permutation arguments is that twisted assignments of extensions (referents) to
constants are compensated by equally twisted assignments of extensions to predicates. Overall,
the twists ‘cancel out’ to deliver the usual result at the level of sentences.2 For a toy example
of this, let us use the phrase ‘the image of x’ to pick out x whenever x is anything other than
Billy or the Taj Mahal; to pick out Billy if x is the Taj Mahal; and to pick out the Taj Mahal
if x is Billy. We can describe our twisted reference scheme as follows: N twist-refers to x
iff N standardly-refers to y and x is the image of y. For the similarly twisted assignment of
extensions to predicates, take any atomic predicate P. Let P twist-apply to x iff P standardly
applies to some y, such that x is the image of y. The twists cancel out—the distribution of
truth-values to sentences is the same on both interpretations. For example, “Billy is running”
is true iff the referent of “Billy” falls under the extension of “runs”. Now, the twist-referent of
“Billy” is the Taj Mahal; but the twist-extension of “runs” includes all the images of running
things. Since Billy runs, and the Taj Mahal is the image of Billy, the Taj Mahal falls under
the twist-extension of “runs”. The sentence comes out true, just as it does under the standard
interpretation. The point of the permutation arguments we give below will be to generalize this
to arbitrary sentences in rich languages, and, where appropriate, to show that the permutations
can preserve semantic properties of sentences beyond simple truth-value.
2Versions of the permutation argument are given in Jeffrey (1964); Quine (1964); Field (1975); Wallace (1977);
Putnam (1978a); Davidson (1979); Putnam (1981). The most detailed presentation of the results that I know of is
in the appendix to Hale and Wright (1997b).
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5.1.1 Permutation arguments preserving truth-values.
The simplest form of permutation argument can be deployed against global descriptivism (cf.
§1.3), where the sole constraint on successful interpretation is that it render true a certain set
of sentences: “total theory”. What form an interpretation should take depends on the syntactic
complexity of the total theory. If the syntax is that of first-order logic, then a first-order model
theory will suffice. If it includes sentential operators (e.g., “necessarily”, “possibly”), then a
more sophisticated semantic theory may be needed.
To deal with natural language within a model-theoretic approach, the kind of interpreta-
tion offered may need to have the richness of the intensional frameworks of Montague (1970);
Lewis (1970a), discussed below. Nevertheless, in this section I will build up the permutation
argument for extensional fragments of language, in order to illustrate the general theme of later
constructions.
This section contains: first, a permutation argument for the quantifier-free fragment of first-
order predicate logic; and second, a permutation argument for a generalization of predicate
logic, where we can have ‘quantifiers’ other than the traditional first-order ∃ and ∀. This enables
us to illustrate moves that will be used later in the extension of the argument to a general
semantic setting.
Quantifier-free Predicate logic
The first framework to be considered is a language with propositional connectives, predicates
(of any finite adicity) and constants, but no quantificational expressions. Complex expressions
and well formed formulae are defined in the obvious way. This is the ‘predicate logic’ (PL) of
Davis and Gillon (2004, ch.3, §3.2.1). It will suit our purposes to set up the model theory in the
following ‘general’ way. A model will consist of the pair of a domainU and a lexical interpre-
tation function ||. A lexical interpretation function will be a function from atomic expressions
(predicates, constants and propositional connectives) to appropriate extensions. As before, the
appropriate extension for a constant will be an element ofU , and the appropriate extension for
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an n-adic predicate will be a function from the nth Cartesian product ofU to truth-values (i.e. a
function from n-tuples of elements ofU to truth-values). The appropriate extension for a n-ary
propositional connective will be a function from n-tuples of truth-values to truth-values.
For m a model with lexical interpretation function ||, we can then define the classical m-
valuation of the language in the following way:
1. For Π an n-adic predicate, and ci constants:
vm(Πc1 . . .cn) = T iff |Π|〈|c1|, . . . , |cn|〉= T .
2. For ∗ an n-ary connective, and αi formulae, we have:
vm(∗(α1, . . . ,αn)) = T iff | ∗ |(vm(α1), . . . ,vm(αn)) = T
Now, given a lexical interpretation function ||, and for any permutation φ ofU ,3 say that ||φ
is the φ-variant of || if it meets the following conditions:
• For Π an n-adic formula, we have:4
|Π|φ = |Π| ◦φ−1n
That is, if |Π| : 〈a1, . . .an〉 7→ T , then |Π|φ : 〈φ(a1), . . .φ(an)〉 7→ T
• For c a constant, |c|φ = φ(|c|).
• For ∗ a connective, | ∗ |φ = | ∗ |.
Let mφ be the model obtained from m by replacing its interpretation function by the φ-
variant. It is then an easy exercise to show that vm and vmφ assign the same truth-values to each
formula in the language. For whereas the reference-scheme (assignment of objects to constants)
has been permuted, the predicate-extensions have been permuted in compensating ways. The
‘twists’ of the reference scheme are ‘untwisted’ by the predicate extension scheme, and the
overall assignment of truth-values to sentences is invariant.
More formally, one first checks the base case—the assignment of truth-values to atomic
sentences. It suffices to note that:
3i.e. a bijection fromU toU .
4Here φ−1n is the obvious function from Un to Un induced by φ−1. I.e. χn : 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 7→ 〈a′1, . . . ,a′n〉 iff
χ : ai 7→ a′i for each i.
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vmφ(Πc1 . . .cm) = T ↔ |Π|φ : 〈|c1|φ, . . . , |cm|φ〉 7→ T (defn vx)
↔ |Π|φ : 〈φ|c1|, . . . ,φ|cm|〉 7→ T (defn ||φ)
↔ |Π|φ : φn〈|c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T (defn φn)
↔ |Π|φ ◦φn : 〈|c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T (maths)
↔ |Π| ◦φ−1n ◦φn : 〈|c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T (defn |Π|φ)
↔ |Π| : 〈|c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T (maths)
The last line here is just the condition for vm(Πc1 . . .cm) = T , so the equivalence for atomic
formulae has been established. Since the interpretation of the logical connectives is constant,
the induction steps will be trivial. This establishes the result that vm and vmφ assign the same
truth-value to every formula in the language.
Quantifiers
We now prove a permutation result for a quantified predicate logic (QPL). As mentioned, we
will not build special clauses for the quantifiers into the definition of truth-in-a-model. Instead,
we provide a general framework wherein the quantificational symbols themselves receive inter-
pretations.
The framework for QPL has propositional connectives, quantifiers, predicates (of any finite
adicity), constants and variables. Complex expressions and well formed formulas are defined
in the familiar way.
A model will consist of the pair of a domain U and a lexical interpretation function ||.
As before, this gives function from atomic expressions (predicates, constants, connectives and
quantifiers) to appropriate extensions. The appropriate extension for a constant will be an ele-
ment of U . The appropriate extension for an n-adic predicate will be a function from the nth
Cartesian product of U to truth-values (i.e. a function from n-tuples of elements of U to truth-
values). The treatment of appropriate extensions for connectives differs from that in (PL), and
quantifiers will find their place as a species of connective.
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To set up the semantics in this general setting, we shall use the kind of ‘cylindrical algebra’
described by Davis and Gillon (2004, ch.3). The semantic values of sentences will be sets of
variable assignments: functions from variables xi to elements of U . Call the set of all variable
assignments V . Intuitively, the set of variable assignments associated with an open sentence p
will be all those assignments to its free variables which render the sentence true. Intuitively,
a sentence will be true simpliciter if every variable assignment renders it true; that is, if its
semantic value is V .
The values of connectives and quantifiers reflect this. The value of ‘and’, for example, will
be intersection: for a variable assignment to render true the conjunction of two open sentences,
it must render true each of them. The appropriate extension for a two-place connective is a
function from (PV )2 to PV . Simple quantifiers such as ∀ and ∃ then become special one-place
connectives. For reference, the intended interpretations of the common logical connectives are
given below.5
|¬| : |α| 7→ (V −|α|)
|∧ | : |α|, |β| 7→ |α|∩ |β|
|∨ | : |α|, |β| 7→ |α|∪ |β|
| ⊃ | : |α|, |β| 7→ (V −|α|)∪ |β|
|∃xi| : |α| 7→ {g : for some h ∈ |α|,g∼xih}
|∀xi| : |α| 7→

|α| If whenever g ∈ |α| and h∼xig, we have h ∈ |α|.
ø otherwise
(When f , g are variable assignments, we write f ∼xi g iff f and g agree everywhere except
possibly on the values assigned to xi.)
As before, given a lexical interpretation function || within a model m, we move to define the
valuation vm.
5Compare Davis and Gillon (2004, ch 3, Def 27).
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1. For Π an (n+ k)-adic predicate, and x j variables and ci constants:6
vm(Πx1, . . . ,xk,c1 . . .cn) =def {g ∈V : 〈g(x1), . . . ,g(xk), |c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 ∈ |Π|}.
2. For ∗ an n-ary connective, and αi formulae, we have:
vm(∗(α1, . . . ,αn)) = X iff | ∗ |(vm(α1), . . . ,vm(αn)) = X
We call a formula α ‘true’ simpliciter when vm(α) =V .
Now we can define the φ-variant of || in the same way as before for predicates and constants.
We need to be careful with connectives. First, let the φ-variant gφ of a variable assignment g be
φ◦g: i.e the function that maps xi to φ(a) iff g maps xi to a. Then let the φ-variant Xφ of a set
of variable assignments X be {gφ p g ∈ X}. (Notice that V φ =V .) Now we can set the clause for
connectives. Where ∗ is an n-ary connective, let
| ∗ |φ : Xφ1 , . . . ,Xφn 7→ Y φ
iff
| ∗ | : X1, . . .Xn 7→ Y
(Notice that for ∗ one of the logical connectives or quantifiers, and || the intended interpretation,
|∗ |φ= |∗ | as before. Indeed, one proposal for characterizing logical connectives and quantifiers
is exactly this invariance under permutations.7)
We can now prove that for any formula (open or closed), |α|φ = Xφ iff |α| = X . This
will suffice to show that || and ||φ agree on the truth-values of all closed sentences. A closed
sentence can have only one of the two semantic values V (‘truth’) and ø (‘falsity’). Since, as
noted previously, V = V φ, and clearly ø = øφ, the result just stated will lead to invariance of
truth-value.
The base case is as follows:
vmφ(Πx1, . . .xk,c1 . . .cm) = X
φ
6Note that we may need to reorder to get to this case: allowing for this will be routine.
7The proposal is due to Tarksi. See MacFarlane (2000, ch 5.) for extensive and fascinating discussion.
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↔ Xφ = {gφ p |Π|φ : 〈gφ(x1), . . . ,gφ(xk), |c1|φ, . . . , |cm|φ〉 7→ T} (defn vx)
↔ Xφ = {gφ p |Π|φ : 〈φ[g(x1)], . . . ,φ[g(xk)],φ|c1|, . . . ,φ|cm|〉 7→ T} (defn gφ)
↔ Xφ = {gφ p |Π|φ : φn〈g(x1), . . . ,g(xk), |c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T} (defn φn)
↔ Xφ = {gφ p |Π|φ ◦φn : 〈g(x1), . . . ,g(xk), |c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T} (logic)
↔ Xφ = {gφ p |Π| ◦φ−1n ◦φn : 〈g(x1), . . . ,g(xk), |c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T} (defn ||φ)
↔ Xφ = {gφ p |Π| : 〈g(x1), . . . ,g(xk), |c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T} (defn logic)
↔ X = {g p |Π| : 〈g(x1), . . . ,g(xk), |c1|, . . . , |cm|〉 7→ T} (defn Xφ)
↔ vm(Πx1, . . .xk,c1 . . .cm) = X (defn vx)
This gives us the base case.
For the induction step, we need to ensure that
| ∗ |(|α1|, . . . , |αn|) = X ⇐⇒ |∗ |φ(|α1|φ, . . . , |αn|φ) = Xφ (†)
The induction hypothesis is:
|αi|= X ⇐⇒ |αi|φ = Xφ (††)
We also know, by construction of ||φ, that:
| ∗ |(X1, . . . ,Xn) = X ⇐⇒ |∗ |φ(Xφ1 , . . .Xφn ) = Xφ (‡)
by the induction hypothesis, ††, the right hand side of (†) may be rewritten | ∗ |φ(Xφ1 , . . . ,Xφn ) =
Xφ, where Xi = |αi|. This, in the presence of (‡), is equivalent to | ∗ |(X1, . . . ,Xn) = X ; and we
have our result.
Recapitulation
We have shown how the permutation arguments go through in a simple way for a quantifier-free
language; and how these arguments can be generalized to (an extension of) first order predicate
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logic. This gives us an argument for radical overgeneration, and thus for radical inscrutability
of reference, within the setting of global descriptivism (§1.3).
The settings so far covered are somewhat limited. Rather than develop analogous results for
higher order, modal, tense, and indexical logic, and combinations thereof, we shall deal with
them all at once. This will be achieved by proving a more general result, which shows that a
more general property of sentences can be held invariant under permutations of the reference
scheme. This general result will give a proof of radical overgeneration, not just for the global
descriptivist setting where invariance of truth-values of sentences suffices; but for the richer
interpretationist settings where we need to secure invariance of truth-conditions.
We shall ultimately provide a permutation result for a double-indexed general semantics.
This is a higher order, multiply intensional setting which is can represent the indexical char-
acter of a language. We shall see that a permutation of the reference (extension) of singular
terms (terms of category N) can leave invariant the intension assigned to sentences (symbols of
category S). To say that the intension of a (closed) sentence is invariant, is to say that it takes the
same truth-value relative to each index—a tuple of possible world, time, variable assignment
etc. A fortiori, it will take the same truth-value at the actual world, present time, given any
variable assignment. As a corollary, it leaves the truth-values invariant.
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5.1.2 Permutation arguments preserving truth-conditions
In some interpretationist settings, one’s data consist of a pairing of sentences with coarse-
grained propositions or intensions (cf. the Lewisian interpretationism described in §1.3). The
target is to preserve, not only the truth-values of certain sentences, but the truth-conditions of
sentences. In the current setting we shall think of truth-conditions as given by sets of possible
worlds, or characteristic functions of such sets: this tells us the worlds in which the sentence is
true. (In §5.3 we shall consider two more fine grained notions of ‘truth-conditions’ one might
use, which significantly alter the standing of the permutation argument).
We will show how arbitrary permutations of the extension of singular terms can be em-
bedded within an overall interpretation which leaves the truth-conditions assigned to sentences
invariant. In fact, the setting is more general. The semantics will assign to sentences functions
from indices to truth-values, where the indices specify not only a possible world, but also a
time, place, and other factors. As explained at §5.1.2, if we can show that the permuted variants
of an interpretation leave the semantic value of sentences invariant, we shall have what we need.
We first prove the result for the general semantic setting of Lewis (1970a) (what Cresswell
(1973) calls a ‘pure categorial language’).8 We first set out the framework itself, and then state
and prove a permutation theorem for the setting. We shall then describe how the framework is
altered to take into account indexicality, and extend the permutation argument to that ‘double-
indexed’ setting.
The framework (syntax): a pure categorial language
The framework in which we operate initially is a general semantics, in the sense of Lewis
(1970a). The atomic expressions of the language will be given by a lexicon, and there will
be phrase-structural rules saying how admissible compounds can be built up from elements of
the lexicon. The lexicon and the phrase-structural rules give the analogue of a definition of
well-formedness within a formal language.
8In Appendix C we extend this to a version of Cresswell’s λ-categorial languages.
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The framework that Lewis recommends is drawn from Ajdukiewicz’s (1935) categorial
grammar, and is what Cresswell (1973) calls a ‘pure categorial language’ (essentially, this is
a form of type theory, without any ‘syncategorematic’ terms such as λ-operators). In the lex-
icon, atomic expressions will be associated with categories, and then the well-formedness of
compounds will be determined by whether the categories of the components dovetail. For ex-
ample, the category of the lexical item “Susan” might be that of ‘names’ (N), and the category of
the lexical item “runs” might be ‘intransitive verb’ (S/N)—the notation reflecting the fact they
when combined with a category N expression it produces a category S expression (a sentence).
The categories themselves are characterized recursively. N and S are ‘basic categories’9
Given categories c,c1, . . . ,cn, we have a derived category c/c1, . . . ,cn. In the above, ‘runs’ is in
the derived category S/N. Writing “+” for concatenation, the general rule of well-formedness
is that for any expressions e,e1, . . .en, we have e+e1+ . . .+en well-formed iff e is of a derived
category C/C1, . . . ,Cn and each ei is of category Ci. “runs(Susan)” is well-formed because it is
of the form (S/N)+N, and so fits our template.10
Notice that the complexity of the category of an expression and its syntactic complexity
cross-cut. Basic lexical items—the atomic expressions—will typically have quite complex cat-
egories: for example, the atomic adverb ‘fast’ will have category (S/N)/(S/N) (it yields a verb
phrase when a verb phrase is input). Conversely, expressions of the basic category S (sentences)
will be syntactically complex.
The result of such concatenation won’t look much like English. A very basic example is
that ‘Jill loves Jane’ would be represented by the word-order ‘(loves(Jane))Jill’ within the sys-
tem just developed. Additional work is required to explain how such analyses relate to natural
language. What we need here is some kind of mapping from our ‘disambiguated’ formal lan-
guage to ordinary sentences of English. This ‘ambiguating relation’ may take one of a number
of forms, depending on what other resources from linguistics one wishes to bring to bear. Lewis
9In fact, it is controversial whether ordinary proper names are in category N.
10I keep the bracketing for notational convenience, though it plays no part of the official definition. It would be
a trivial matter to alter the definition of well-formedness to allow for parentheses, but it would be a distraction.
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(1970a, p.204) appeals to a “transformational component” of the grammar; Dowty (1979) sug-
gests various ways to integrate the setting with generative semantics.11
The framework (semantics): single-indexed general semantics
What we have so far seen is a treatment of the syntax of a formal language. We now describe
the Lewisian “general semantics” which will associate each well-formed expression with a se-
mantic value. The kind of semantic value for a given expression will be what Lewis calls an
“appropriate intension”—which intensions are appropriate being determined recursively by the
category of the given expression. The base cases are handled individually. For sentences (ex-
pressions of category S) an appropriate intension will be a function from indices to truth-values.
For expressions of category N, it will be a function from indices to objects.12 Appropriate
intensions of derived categories are then functions between intensions appropriate to the cate-
gories from which they are derived. For example, expressions in category S/N will be assigned
functions from intensions appropriate to category N expressions to intensions appropriate to
category S.
We can capture this by characterizing intensions in terms of their type. Let indices be of
type i, objects type o and truth-values type t.13 Let the type 〈a,b〉 include all functions from
elements of type b to elements of type a. We can then formulate the above by saying that an
appropriate intension for category S is a function of type 〈t, i〉; an appropriate intension for the
category N is of type 〈o, i〉; and in general the appropriate intension for category c/d, where c
11Montague used a richer set of rules within the general semantics itself to make the formal language closer to
English syntax. Cf. (cf. Partee, 1996, §3), Dowty (1979, ch.1) for discussion.
12Lewis (1970a) includes categoryC (common nouns) as another basic category, having as appropriate intension
a function from indices to sets of objects. For the sake of simplicity, I ignore this here.
13Note that there is a single ‘type’ containing all objects—when we define intensional operators over this frame-
work, we will end up with a ‘single domain’ semantics. Plausibly, we want to be able to say that there are things
which do exist, which might not exist had some other situation been actual. The solution is to pair each world-index
w with a partition of the type of objects into two: those that exist at w, and those that do not. We then interpret the
‘ordinary’ loaded existential quantifier relative to w be restricted to those objects that exist at w. Cf. §5.1.2, below.
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is of type α and d is of type β, will be of type 〈α,β〉.1415
A lexical interpretation || will be an assignment of semantic values to basic parts of the
language—the elements of the lexicon (e.g. names, adjectives, verbs, adverbs etc). We now
have the idea of a lexical interpretation function for a categorial language, and a characterization
of the type of semantic value appropriate to complex expressions. We need to ‘extend’ the
lexical interpretation function to give an overall assignment of semantic values to arbitrary
well-formed expressions in the language.
We let a model m for the language include a domain U , a set of indices I, and a lexical
interpretation function ||. Then one could let a model induce a valuation vm for arbitrary well
formed expressions:
1. For e in the lexicon, vm(e) = |e|
2. For e′ = e(e1, . . .en), vm(e′) = vm(e)[vm(e1), . . . ,vm(en)]
In what follows, I will choose a slightly different, though equivalent, setting. I will speak
of an arbitrary valuation || as any function taking expressions to intensions appropriate to their
category. Such valuations may very well be totally crazy: what we typically do is to restrict
attention to the well-behaved ones. I say that || embeds a lexical interpretation scheme if that
scheme coincides with the restriction of || to lexical elements. I call a valuation || compositional
if the following general relation holds:
|e(e1, . . . ,en)|= |e|[|e1|, . . . , |en|]
14This is formulated for derived categories with two elements only. For ‘binary branching’ languages we need
no more. For the more general case, we need some additional notation to mark functions from sequences of types
to types. (McCawley, 1980, ch.13)
15The compositional intensions which Lewis favours differ from the ‘Carnapian intensions’ that form the basic
framework for Montague (1970). To characterize a Carnapian intension, one first defines the notion of an appropri-
ate extension in a way paralleling the recursive formulation above. The extension for a name will be an individual
of type o; the extension for a sentence will be a truth-value of type t, and in general an appropriate extension for
an expression of category c/d will be of type 〈α,β〉, where α,β are the types appropriate to c,d respectively. An
appropriate Carnapian intension for an expression of category Q/R will be a function from indices to appropriate
extensions, i.e. of type 〈i,〈α,β〉〉 where 〈α,β〉 is the appropriate extension for category Q/R. The deficits of a
framework based on Carnapian intensions—centrally, its inability to deal with ‘intensional’ expressions such as
the predicate ‘is rising’—are discussed in Lewis (1970a) and are addressed by Montague by assigning certain
expressions semantic values which are not of the Carnapian kind. See Thomason (1974b).
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We then let models contain compositional valuations, rather than lexical interpretation schemes.16
This finishes the description of the syntax and semantics of our ‘single indexed pure cate-
gorial language’. To summarize:
1. Our language consists of infinitely many categories of expressions, described via a cate-
gorial grammar. S and N are basic categories. If C and C1, . . . ,Cn are categories (basic or
derived), letC/C1 . . .Cn be a derived category.
2. We have a set of indices, I and a domain of objects O, a set of truth-values {T,F}, and a
valuation ||.
3. The valuation || assigns intensions to each expression appropriate to its category. Appro-
priate intensions for each category are functions whose type reflects the build up of the
category, in the fashion described above.
4. Call a valuation compositional iff the semantic projection rule of function-application is
met. Suppose we have an expression e of category C/C1 . . .Cn, and expressions ei of
categories Ci (so that the complex expression e(e1 . . .en) will be of category C. Then it
must be that:
|e(e1 . . .en)|= |e|(|e1|, . . . , |en|)
The permutation argument within single-indexed general semantics
Let us introduce two further notions. First, call two compositional interpretations sententially
equivalent if they assign the same intensions to everything of category S. Second, say that a
valuation embeds the reference scheme r (relative to index i) iff whenever e is of category N,
|e|(i) = r(e). The aim now is to show that we can always construct sententially equivalent
compositional valuations which embed arbitrarily permuted reference schemes.
The theorem we will prove shows that any coherent17 assignment of semantic values (i.e.
appropriate intensions) to sentences can be made compatible with arbitrarily permuted refer-
ence schemes. We do this by defining the notion of a φ-variant of a valuation, where φ is
16The two settings are equivalent. Given a model that supplies a lexical interpretation ||, the corresponding
compositional valuation is the valuation vm determined by ||. Given a model that supplies a compositional valu-
ation, the restriction of that valuation to atomic expressions is the corresponding lexical interpretation. A minor
advantage of this setting is that even semantic projection rules are no longer required within the semantic theory,
minimizing ‘syncategorematic’ elements that are unmotivated in a metasemantic setting.
17Call an assignment of semantic values to sentences coherent if there is at least one compositional valuation
that embeds that assignment.
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a permutation of the domain of objects. If || is a valuation embedding at index i the refer-
ence scheme r that, e.g. assigns Susan to “Susan”; then the φ-variant ||φ of || will embed at
c a reference-scheme rφ that assigns φ(Susan) to “Susan”. Rather than setting up a permuted
lexical interpretation scheme and proving by induction that the valuations determined by the
original and φ-variants appropriately match, I shall define directly the φ-variant valuations, in a
way that makes obvious the fact that they are sententially equivalent to the valuation from which
one starts, and that they embed an appropriate permuted reference scheme. The challenge will
then be to show that the definition is legitimate: i.e. that the permuted valuation, so-defined, is
compositional. We must show that the semantic values that it assigns to complex expressions
arise in the appropriate way from the semantic values it assigns to the lexical basis.
The construction of the φ-variant valuations is as follows:
• Let φ be an arbitrary permutation of O. Define recursively the φ-image of an intension as
follows:18
– If f is an appropriate intension for S, then f φ = f
– If f is an appropriate intension for N, then f φ = φ◦ f
– If f is an appropriate intension forC/C1 . . .Cn,
then f φ : rφ 7→ gφ iff f : r 7→ s.
• Given a valuation ||, let the φ-permuted valuation ||φ assign to e its φ-image; i.e. for each
e, |e|φ := f φ where f = |e|.
Notice that, by construction, a φ-variant of a valuation v will embed a reference scheme that
is permuted by φ. Moreover, a valuation and its φ-variant will be sententially equivalent, again
by construction. What remains to be shown is that the φ-variant is a legitimate valuation of the
language—that is, that it is compositional in the sense delimited above. That isn’t hard:
Theorem 1. For any permutation φ, ||φ is compositional if || is.
Proof. Suppose || is compositional. Take an expression e of category C/C1 . . .Cn, and expres-
sions e1 . . .en of categoriesC1 . . .Cn respectively. The complex expression e(e1 . . .en) will be of
18If, following Lewis (1970a), we included an extra basic category C (“common nouns”) mapping indices to
sets of objects, then the permuted variant of |e| for e in categoryC should be |e| ◦ f 1.
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categoryC). By compositionality of ||, we have:
|e(e1 . . .en)|= |e|(|e1|, . . . , |en|)
We need to show that:
|e(e1 . . .en)|φ = |e|φ(|e1|φ, . . . , |en|φ)
We show this for the case n = 1, the other cases being trivial extensions. Write e1 = d. From
the compositionality of || we have: |e(d)| = |e|(|d|); i.e. |e| : |d| 7→ |e(d)| By the definition of
the φ-image this gives us: |e|φ : |d|φ 7→ |e(d)|φ. Given the way that ||φ is defined, we can rewrite
this as: |e|φ : |d|φ 7→ |e(d)|φ, i.e.:
|e(d)|φ = |e|φ(|d|φ)
so compositionality is secured.
The permutation argument within double-indexed general semantics
Indexical expressions are commonly thought to require the semantic values we have been dis-
cussing to be changeable: an expression may express different such values when uttered in
different contexts. One option within a general semantics is to include context (represented as
a ‘centred world’) as one index within the above account.19 Within that setting, our proof runs
just as before.
Alternatively, one can separate world, time, delineations etc. from context, to “double in-
dex” the general semantics.20 Syntactically, everything is unchanged. Within the semantics,
however, expressions are assigned characters rather than intensions, where a character is a
function that maps contexts to Lewisian compositional intensions. We need the notion of an
19See Lewis (1970a, appendix).
20Consider, for example, what happens if context changes through the utterance of a sentence say (cf. Lewis,
1979c, p.241). So long as we can assume that there’s a unique context associated with each lexical element, context
will determine an intension for each such element, which then collectively determine an intension for the whole.
The story would be far more complex if we proceed in terms of functions from context-index pairs to truth-values.
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‘appropriate’ character for a given category of expression. Therefore, say that a character is of
type τ iff it maps contexts to intensions of type τ; and wherever the appropriate intension for
category c was type τ, appropriate characters will be those of the same type.
Formally, characters resemble ‘Carnapian intensions’ rather than the ‘compositional inten-
sions’ of Lewis’ general semantics. Consider, for example, an intransitive verb (category S/N).
In Lewis’ general semantics, its semantic value was the function from semantic values of type
N to semantic values of type S. On the double-indexed proposal, by contrast, its semantic value
is a function from contexts to intensions; i.e. the context index is treated in a ‘Carnapian’ way.21
The upshot of this is that the semantic projection rule cannot simply be function-application,
as within the original Lewis treatment. We can still have a single rule appropriate to arbitrary
concatenations, however. Consider an expression a(b), where b is of category c1 and a is of
category c2/c1. If a has character A and b has character B, then the character of a(b) maps
context α to the intension that results from “compositionally” applying A(α) to B(α).
We need to spell out what the permuted interpretation function is for this new setting. This
is defined in the obvious way. If |e| is σ, where σ : c 7→ g, then |e|φ is σφ, where σφ : c 7→ gφ,
where gφ is the φ-image of the intension g. Notice that since gφ = g when e is a sentence we
have that |e|φ = |e| for e a sentence. The permuted interpretation not only holds the intensions
of sentences invariant, it holds the characters invariant also.
Derivative invariance results
We have seen that we can leave the semantic values of sentences invariant under permutations
of the reference-scheme in a rich class of settings. The ultimate aim of such results is to argue
for radical inscrutability, by saying that all such ‘sententially equivalent’ semantic theories are
equally good at fitting the data which the interpretationist provides. Such data may not take
the form of a pairing of sentences with something as rich as the compositional intensions or
characters that we have just been looking. It might rather involve a pairing between a sentences
21Cf. Appendix C
CHAPTER 5. ARGUMENTS FOR RADICAL INSCRUTABILITY 163
and propositions—the set of circumstances in which the sentence is to be true.
In such a setting, what we need for our purpose is that semantic theories that differ by con-
taining permuted reference-schemes can assign to sentences the same truth-conditions (function
from possible worlds to truth-values). This follows immediately from the above result once we
note that the truth-conditions of a sentence are determined by the semantic value of that sen-
tence in the rich settings just canvassed. If semantic theories are sententially equivalent, then
they will assign to sentences the same truth-conditions.
To illustrate this, let us show how to construct two senses of ‘truth-conditions’ for a sentence
S. These are what are known within ‘two-dimensional modal logic’ as the C-intension and the
A-intension of a sentence.22
For w a centred world (i.e. a context), define the matching-relation m(x,y) to hold between
world w and string of indices i iff the world, time etc. components of i match those given by
w. First, we will define the C-intension of a sentence s at a context c. This is a set of centred
worlds given by:
w ∈C(s)⇐⇒∀i(m(w, i)→ (|s|(c) : i 7→ T ))
Second, we will define the A-intension of a sentence. This is the set of centred worlds given by:
w ∈ A(s)⇐⇒∀i(m(w, i)→ (|s|(w) : i 7→ T ))
To see the difference between these two constructs, consider the sentence “he is Beckham”,
uttered while pointing at the famous footballer. The C-intension is the set of worlds where the
person indicated (i.e. Beckham himself) is identical to Beckham. On standard assumptions,
then, this is the necessary proposition—the set of all possible worlds.23 The A-intension is the
set of worlds where the person indicated by the pointing is Beckham. It is false, therefore, with
22For the terminology, see Jackson (1998). For alternative labels (‘secondary intension’ and ‘primary inten-
sion’ respectively), see Chalmers (1996). The C-intensions also correspond to what Stalnaker (1978) calls the
‘horizontal proposition’ associated with a sentence. Note that A-intensions/primary-intensions are not the diagonal
propositions of Stalnaker (1978). Stalnaker’s diagonal propositions are not semantic constructs, but are defined
pragmatically in terms of agents’ common knowledge of the semantic content of their words.
23I set aside concerns about worlds where the individual does not exist.
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respect to possible worlds where Beckham stayed at home and sent out his double to make the
public appearance. Notice that the A-intension is contingent where theC-intension is necessary.
It is arguable, in the light of these distinctions, that the data for a semantic theory might be given
in the form of a pairing of sentences with A-intensions.24 It is reassuring for the inscrutabilist,
then, that all these sentential constructions are invariant under the permuted valuations. This
can be easily checked by noting that the only appeal to the valuation || in the above definitions
is in application to sentences, where, as we have seen, || and ||φ coincide.
Inscrutability of existence.
I note one last inscrutability result. We have set up our general semantics in terms of a sin-
gle domain of objects (i.e. those entities of type o) from which we draw the semantic values.
However, objects go in and out of existence over time; some may not exist in other possible
situations, while other ‘mere possibilia’ do not exist in the actual world. This suggests that rel-
ative to each possible world, time, etc. we identify a subdomain of the entities of type o—those
that exist in that world or time. ‘Ontologically loaded’ quantification would be quantification
indexically restricted to those objects existing at the world, time etc. of the context.
I see no reason to suppose that we can only refer to what exists at the present time and the
actual world. ‘Beethoven’ refers to the composer, I take it, even though he is no longer around.
Salmon (1998, p.286-7) has suggested that we can construct uniquely identifying descriptions
of mere possibilia and that by exploiting these we can directly refer to such objects. Similarly,
objects can fall under predicates relative to times (and perhaps worlds) where they do not exit.
Beethoven currently satisfies ‘is famous’ (Cresswell, 2004). More controversially, we might
think that any object whatever satisfies ‘is self-identical’ relative to any world or time, whether
or not it exists there.25
24See Rayo (2004) for discussion.
25Any intuitive resistance to these claims comes, I think, from doubts about whether such entities really exist to
be referred to. However, if we are using a possible world semantics, such entities are already within the intensions
that we assign to the expressions in our language—hence we are already committed to their being able to stand in
relevantly similar semantic relations. Why should being in the transitive closure of the intension of an expression
be less ontologically worrying than being in the transitive closure of its extension? The appropriate response in
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Now the permutation arguments given above are indifferent to whether the image of an entity
under a permutation exists in the same times and worlds as the original. One might, for example,
choose a permutation that maps all objects existing in the actual world at the present time, to
mere possibilia. Our result goes through just the same. ‘Ontologically loaded’ quantification
will now range over the φ-images of currently existing objects; and under this interpretation, all
our singular terms refer to objects not in the present time, or in the actual world. One upshot of
the inscrutability arguments, therefore, is that it is inscrutable whether or not we are referring
to present or even to actual objects.26
5.1.3 Conclusion
As promised, we have seen how to embed arbitrarily permuted reference schemes within sen-
tentially equivalent general semantic accounts of language.27 This not only gives the overgen-
eration result for those interpretationisms whose data consist of a pairing of sentences with
propositions, it also discharges the obligation incurred in the set-of-sentences setting, to show
how permuted reference schemes can engender equivalent distributions of truth-values of sen-
tences in expressively powerful languages. As well as the semantic values of permuted valua-
tions matching, various other derivative sentential semantic properties match. Within the kind
of framework we have been considering, the case for radical overgeneration, and so for radical
inscrutability within an interpretationism that accepts BEST=FIT looks watertight.
each case is to give a satisfying story about possibilia talk (cf. p.20, above).
26I was led to thinking about this result by reading McGee (2005a). McGee imposes the restriction that relative
to w, terms can only refer to entities in w; and uses this as an objection to permutation arguments. As noted above,
I find the restriction unmotivated within a setting which allows the permutation arguments to get started.
27We have formulated the argument in terms of permuted reference schemes—i.e. the objects denoted, in a
context, by expressions of category N. Within the general semantic framework, it is arguable that there are no
natural language expressions of category N. Names, with noun-phrases in general, would fall within the derived
category S/(S/N) (Cf. McCawley, 1980, ch.13) Our results can be re-stated to finesse such issues. Each name
n has a semantic value that we can think of, intuitively, as ‘being one of the properties of n’. The effect of the
permuted valuation schemes will be to assign it instead ‘being one of the properties of φ(n)’. The systematic
correspondence between such values and the objects n, φ(n) respectively allows us to reconstruct the notion of
‘name-reference’, in terms of which the inscrutability of reference can be formulated. Compare the treatment of
extensional transitive verbs in McCawley (1980, ch.13).
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5.2 Indexical-inscrutability: a cut-and-shunt argument
We have examined arguments focused on what might loosely by termed “synchronic” inscrutabil-
ity of reference.28 We now prove a “diachronic” version. An expression such as “London” will,
on the standard interpretation, designate London no matter what the context is.29 Likewise,
the deviant interpretations assign to that term a single object—Sydney, say—at all contexts.
Because the reference of a term is at all times the image under the permutation of its original
reference, the pattern of indexical dependence of reference will be the same on each of the
permuted interpretation schemes.
We now have the resources to extend the arguments so that they imply a kind of ‘indexical
inscrutability’. The radical indexical inscrutability thesis is that, if c and c′ are distinct contexts,
then there is no fact of the matter whether e designates the same object at c as at c′. To get
this result, we ‘cut-and-shunt’ some of the permuted interpretations constructed above. The
intuitive case is straightforward. By the results of §5.1, we have two valuations that always
agree with each other on the content assigned to whole sentences, no matter what context is
chosen. If we construct a third valuation, which matches valuation-1 at some contexts, and
valuation-2 at the remainder, it will also have this property—all three will agree on the content
of sentences at each context. Our first valuation might have it that ‘London’ denotes London
at all contexts, whereas our second valuation has it that it denotes Paris at all contexts. The
constructed valuation will agree with the first on some contexts, with the second on others—so
it depicts ‘London’ as indexical. Yet it is sententially equivalent to the originals, and so under
the current assumptions, the interpretationist has no grounds for ruling it out. What we do below
is sketch how this intuitive idea could be formalized within the double-indexed semantic setting
given above.
Take the candidate double-indexed valuation, ||2. Relative to a given context c, the desig-
28The terminology would be strictly appropriate if the only variable aspect of context were temporal. Clearly
there are many non-temporal ways in which contexts can vary.
29This follows from the orthodox treatment of terms as having ‘constant character’, following Kaplan (1989b).
Some, such as Jackson (1998), claim that the names are indexical. They maintain that, at the least, they can vary
depending on what world they are uttered in.
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nated valuation determines what would be a valuation within the single-indexed semantics, i.e.
an assignment of compositional intensions to expressions:
|e|〈1,c〉 := |e|2(c)
We have seen how to construct sententially equivalent φ-variant interpretations ||φ of a arbitrary
single-indexed valuation || in the proof of the permutation result for the single-indexed case,
and we can apply these techniques here, yielding the φ-variants ||〈1,c〉φ .
Now assign permutations φi to contexts via a function P. Relative to P, we construct a new
double-indexed valuation, which we call the P-variant of ||2 and denote ||2P.
Given an expression e and a context c, we let ||2P assign to an expression e the intension
given by ||〈1,c〉φ at e, where φ= P(c), i.e.:
|e|2P(c) = f ⇐⇒ |e|〈1,c〉P(c) = f
We now argue that ||2P is sententially equivalent to ||2. At any given context c, the intension
assigned to a term is that assigned to it on some ||〈1,c〉φ . However, the intension assigned by ||〈1,c〉φ
to a sentence is exactly that assigned to it by ||〈1,c〉, by our previous results. By construction
||〈1,c〉 = ||2(c), so for all contexts c, ||2(c) = ||2P(c). QED.
By choosing P appropriately, we get radical indexical overgeneration. Consider “Lon-
don”, which we shall suppose to be of category N. Given contexts c and c′ pick P where
P(c)(London)=London and P(c′)(London)=Paris. Then on the P-variant interpretation, “Lon-
don” will pick out London as uttered at c and Paris as uttered at c′. Since the variant in-
terpretation is sententially equivalent to the original interpretation, given BEST=FIT, it is not
determinately incorrect.
Equally, by choosing the contexts and permutations carefully, we could take an indexical
expression and give it a constant reference. One could choose P so that the permutation φ
appropriate to a given context c maps the speaker of that context to London. Relative to that
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valuation, ‘I’ is a non-indexical expression referring to London irrespective of context. Again,
by the argument above, such interpretations are not determinately excluded.
Indexical inscrutability, though a straightforward extension of the basic permutation argu-
ment for radical inscrutability, may be thought much more problematic: I spell this out in
Chapter 7.30
30This argument will generalize to any setting where semantic values take a “Carnapian” form (i.e. they are
functions from indices to some compositional value). One would take ||2 as a valuation appropriate to a Carnapian
intensional type theory, and ||1 as an assignment of appropriate extensions to expressions, and appealing to a
permutation result for the extensional setting (which can be taken to be a limiting case of the permutation result
for the single-indexed general semantics above, where the set of indices is null). The above would give us a ‘cut-
and-shunt’ argument for radical intentional inscrutability: we can embed an arbitrary assignment of intensions to
singular terms. This is because we could choose different permuted assignments of extensions at different worlds.
Within our setting, where we have compositional rather than Carnapian intensions, radical intentional inscrutability
cannot be established by these techniques. See Appendix C for discussion.
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5.3 Two settings where the argument breaks down
In the preceding sections, we have seen arguments for radical inscrutability within interpre-
tationisms based on model theoretic semantics, whether based on a pairing of sentences with
truth-values or with truth-conditions. We now turn to two settings less congenial to the ar-
guments. These are, first, a semantics framed in terms of structured propositions; second,
Davidson-style truth-theoretic semantics. In each case, we will find that though the arguments
for overgeneration break down, the problems are relocated to a previous stage in the interpreta-
tionist project; so that the threat of inscrutability is not avoided.
5.3.1 Structured propositions
One might think that the propositions expressed by sentences must be more fine-grained than
those that the general semantics just described provides for. Soames (1989) develops an account
of semantic content in terms of structured propositions. Structured propositions, in the relevant
sense, are set-theoretic constructs, language-like in structure, containing objects and properties
as constituents.
The framework: structured propositions as truth-bearers
The semantic account is two-fold. First, one recursively specifies which structured propositions
are associated with which sentences, by appeal to the semantic values of the atomic parts of the
sentence and their mode of composition. Then, one defines what it is for a proposition to be
true, and to have certain truth-conditions.
These semantic values may be appropriate ‘compositional’ intensions of the form just can-
vassed, or they could be something that determines these extensions. From a technical point of
view, we need the entities to carry enough information to be able to extract the kind of semantic
values we have been working with above.
For example, one could postulate sui generis abundant ‘properties’ as the semantic value of
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predicates, whose pattern of instantiation in possible worlds corresponds to a certain function
from worlds to sets of objects (what is sometimes known as a Carnapian intension for the
predicate). Given an account of cross-world identity (even a trivial one!) picking out an object
would determine a name-intension—selecting that object in each world where it exists. We
could then have the structured propositions contain these objects and properties, rather than
the set-theoretical semantic values we have been hitherto considering. We might call these
‘Russellian propositions’.
An alternative is just to put compositional intensions directly into structured propositions:
these would then become what Lewis (1970a) calls ‘structured intensions’.31 Various interme-
diate positions are of course possible. Without further constraints provided by metaphysics, or
by a theoretical role for propositions outside pure semantics, there seems little to choose be-
tween these formulations. I’ll address the Russellian version, but nothing should hang on this
choice.
The standing of permutation results and the additional premiss.
Reformulating the “semantic values” of sentences as Russellian propositions embedding the
objects referred to by the terms within that sentence has a dramatic effect on the permutation




for the property that applies to all those things that are φ-images of runners,
the Russellian proposition of the sentence on a φ-variant interpretation would be
31Structured intensions are really the same thing as the sentences of the ‘Lagadonian language’ of §2.4, above.
In neither case do we need to assume that the constructs are intrinsically representational; what we appeal to is a
rather convenient way of defining parochial semantic properties. Of course, if one takes propositions/Lagadonian
sentences to be the real truth bearers, one might object to the term ‘parochial’, thinking of these as the only
legitimate notions of ‘truth’ etc. If so, the metasemantic challenge for the semantic property of truth may be
easy; the difficult thing is the semantic property of expressing the proposition p. Given a general semantics for
a language, and so an assignment of semantic values to the atomic parts of language, it is easy enough to define
this relation, so our interpretationist project can be adapted to this reformulation of the problem of intensionality
anyway.
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〈φ(Susan), (running)φ−1〉
Clearly, the proposition paired with the sentence has altered: within the framework of structured
propositions, the permuted reference schemes do impact on the semantic values of sentences.
One might wish to dispute this point. One might claim that we can make the valuation ||
and its permuted variant ||φ deliver the same result, by putting appropriate twists into the clauses
that say how the structured propositions are determined by the semantic values of the parts of a
sentence. For example, we have been assuming:
If |c|= x, and |Π|= P, then |Πc|= 〈x,P〉
Why must this hold? Why isn’t an alternative the following:
If |c|= x, and |Π|= P, then |Πc|= 〈φ−1(x),(P)φ〉
If we can include the clauses of the former kind along with the initial valuation, and clauses
of the latter kind with its φ-variant, then the structured propositions associated with sentences
match.
This argument strikes me as a cheat. In the case at hand, we seem free to stipulate the form
that the compositional clauses are to take—they are part of the semantic framework, the terms
in which we formulate an interpretation, rather than being a part of the interpretation itself.32
Have we found the key flaw in arguments for radical inscrutability? Is avoiding such ar-
guments as easy as choosing a structured-propositions semantic setting rather than the general
semantics previously discussed? It must be admitted that there is a programme of interpreta-
tionism whereby this could be exploited. The crucial move would be to argue that, on an ap-
32Not all clauses that are part of the theory rather than settled by the interpretation function could be defended
in this way: often one finds specific axioms governing the behaviour of compounds such as A∧B, rather than this
being determined by what the interpretation function assigns to ∧. In such cases, we are entitled to extend the
interpretation function in order to eliminate such parochial axioms. The process has to end somewhere and there
is no motive in the case at hand for allowing re-interpretation.
Where to stop is a matter of controversy: consider second order logics where much turns on whether the con-
catenation of a second order variable with a term Xt is part of the general framework (and thus not susceptible to
re-interpretation) or should be analyzed as an implicit predication relation p(t,X).
See also the discussion in §3.5 of ‘innocuous’ inscrutability.
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propriately non-semantic basis, one could extract a pairing of sentences with Russellian propo-
sitions that will constrain re-interpretation in just the way envisaged. Herein lies the catch:
the structured-proposition framework can resist permutation moves just because it postulates
a far richer data-set than that appealed to by its rivals. In principle, such a theorist could ap-
peal to Lewis’ convention-based account: an appeals to a convention to utter “Susan runs” iff
one believes the structured content 〈Susan, running〉. In order for this to fit into an overall
reductive account of intentionality, however, one would have to say what it is for someone to
believe structured propositions. “Head-first” theorists such as Lewis and Stalnaker typically
assign mental content in a less finely grained way—the kind of counterfactual and decision-
theoretic resources they appeal to will not discriminate between attitudes towards necessarily
equivalent propositions.33 The focus on coarse-grained propositions is not accidental then: it is
a byproduct of the kind of reductive story of mental content that is offered.
The point is that one must be sensitive to the strategic demands of an overall account of
intentionality. Appealing to finely discriminated intentional states may well remove the threat
of semantic inscrutability, but the problem is relocated to the foundational account of the repre-
sentational content of mental states.
One might think, for independent reasons (perhaps due to the problems of ‘logical omni-
science’) that belief contents should be represented by structured propositions rather than the
course-grained ones favoured by Lewis and Stalnaker. In that case, we can state our problem
in one of two ways. (1) We might say that, from a foundational perspective, the kind of ‘head-
first’ stories offered by Lewis and Stalnaker do not deliver genuine belief contents, but only
‘proto-belief content’, which has less structure. The Lewis-style interpretationist hopes that this
proto-content may be enough to found a story of the semantic properties of language; where-
upon one might be able to use linguistic behaviour (or the semantic properties of a language of
thought) to found true belief content. (2) Alternatively, we might say that the ‘head-first’ stories
do not determine the content of belief precisely; that such an account makes it indeterminate
33See Stalnaker (1984), passim. Jeffrey (1965).
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which of a variety of necessarily equivalent belief contents an agent has. This indeterminacy
in mental content then bleeds to an indeterminacy in the data to which the interpretationist ap-
peals: for example, it will be indeterminate whether the convention is to utter “Susan runs” only
if one believes the content 〈Susan, running〉; or whether it is to utter that sentence only if one
believes (the necessarily equivalent) 〈φ(Susan), (running)φ〉. Indeterminacy in the data will lead
to indeterminacy in best semantic theory once again.
I have argued that the problem of inscrutability is relocated by the move just considered,
rather than eliminated; and I have sketched why one kind of supplementary story about mental
content (the broadly decision theoretic machinery used by Lewis and Stalnaker) does not give
the resources to assign the kind of fine-grained mental content needed to allay our concerns.
Nevertheless, relocation may be effective if the problem is more tractable in the new setting. If
one had some other head-first account of mental content, or some alternative to the Lewisian
convention based pairing of sentences with propositions, then one might be able to resolve the
difficulties exactly by providing suitably fine-grained data. Let me sketch one kind of view that,
if it could be appropriately filled out, would sustain this case. Suppose that one thought that
the data-set for interpretationism should be a pairing of Armstrongian states of affairs34 with
sentences. The pairing would be determined by causal connections between states of affairs
and utterances of observation sentences such as ‘that’s a ball!’. Crucially, if a’s being F is a
state of affairs with a and F as constituents, metaphysics provides no ‘permuted variant’ of
the state of affairs (states of affairs are not ‘abundant’ in that way). Such a causal story about
the interpretationist’s primitive data, together with an appropriately sparse ontology,35 seems a
34cf. Armstrong (1978b).
35The details of the metaphysically underpinning will be crucial. For example, a bundle theory of objects (say,
objects as bundles of tropes) will not obviously allow the same kind of resolution. Moreover, even on Armstrong’s
favoured account, macroscopic properties such as ‘being a ball’ are not universals, and so are not constituents in
states of affairs.
In a more general setting, there will be an issue within a causal theory about how to extract objects and properties
from the relata of macroscopic causation. If the relata are events, we need to know what privileges the event
described as a’s being F over φ(a’s) being (F)φ. See Kim (1974), Lewis (1986d). This is particularly pressing on
reductive accounts of causation, such as Lewis’ counterfactual theories (Lewis, 1973a, 2004), where prima facie
necessarily co-instantiated events would stand in the same causal relations. One prima facie attractive approach
on such reductive views is to think that the description of causal relata as involving one object rather than another,
should be dealt within a theory of causal explanation, rather than causation proper: if so, an account of such
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promising line of attack on the problems we face. Notice the obvious restriction however: it
applies in the first instance to medium sized dry goods, and we would owe some other account
of the content of other parts of language, such as theoretical and mathematical vocabulary.36
Review
A respectable form of attack on inscrutability, consistent with interpretationism, is to relocate
the problem to the data, either by postulating structured mental content, or by some more direct
means. Distinguish such relocated attacks from the straight responses, which will not appeal to
structured data, but either accept inscrutability or try to deal with it within the story about how
coarse-grained data determines theory. The structured-propositions proposal, and its apparent
immunity from permutation arguments, may be a contribution to the first project, but it makes
no progress on the second.
5.3.2 T-sentences
The framework: Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics
In the foregoing, we have been concentrating on model-theoretic approaches to semantic theory,
which provide valuation functions assigning to expressions in the language a semantic value.
The Davidsonian setting is somewhat different. The style of semantic theory advocated in
Davidson (1967) focuses not on valuations and other model theoretic techniques, but on an
axiomatic theory from which semantic statements are syntactically derivable. The theorems
that associate sentences with truth-conditions are roughly of the form:
“Londres est jolie” is true iff London is pretty
The data-set that the interpretationist must provide should take the form of a list of such T -
sentences. The semantic theory itself then gives axioms concerning the reference of terms and
distinctions may well presuppose mental or semantic content rather than explicating it. (This kind of idea is close
to that raised and mocked by Fodor (1987, p.126-7) as “alleged interest-relativity of explanation”.)
36Compare Fodor (1993, ch 4.). A strategy for ascribing structured mental content is proposed by Dretske
(1981): close attention should be paid to the assumptions needed to get the fine structure of content determinate.
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the satisfaction-conditions of predicates.37 In a popular formulation, the theorems of the theory
will be those that are canonically derivable from the axioms38, where canonical derivability
is more restricted than logical derivability. In this framework, the T-sentence above will be a
theorem of the theory, but the logically equivalent:
“Londres est jolie” is true iff London is pretty and everything is self-identical
will not be. By the restriction to canonical derivations, so called ‘Foster problems’ (Foster,
1976) are avoided.
Davidson (1979) is one of the few explicitly to accept permutation arguments for radical
inscrutability, in the form given by Wallace (1977). It is somewhat surprising, then, to note that
the argument is problematic within the semantic framework that Davidson favours, in just the
same way as it is within the Soamesian structured-propositions framework sketched above.
The obvious adaption of the permutation argument to the present case is to adopt permuted
axioms of the following form:
‘Londres’ refers to φ(London)
‘x est jolie’ is satisfied by a iff φ−1(a) is pretty
On this basis we will be able to give a canonical derivation of the following:
“Londres est jolie’ is true iff φ−1(φ(Londres)) is pretty
Of course, it is a mathematically trivial move to cancel the permutation and its inverse to obtain
the T-sentence originally cited. The restriction to canonical derivations, however, prevents us
appealing to just such trivial steps. The T-sentence is not a theorem of the permuted Davidso-
nian semantic theory, since though mathematically equivalent to such a theorem, it is not itself
canonically derivable.39
37There will be similar axioms for other categories of expression: see Larson and Segal (1995)
38See, for example, Davies (1981); Larson and Segal (1995); Ko¨lbel (2001)
39The restriction to canonical derivations is obviously central here, but almost all users of Davidsonian semantic
theories wish to avoid “Foster problems” whereby arbitrary tautologies may be added to the clauses governing
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Review
Pace Davidson (1979), the Davidsonian truth-theoretic setting makes permutation arguments
highly problematic. As in that case, this formal point should not give one a false sense of
security. For, here as before, even if appropriate data sufficiently constrain theory-choice to
avoid permutation problems, the problem is pushed back to the selection of the data. Indeed,
when Davidson (1980) comes to work out his own views in most detail, settling the content
of the language and thought simultaneously, the decision-theoretic framework used builds in
exactly the same kind of ‘logical omniscience’ assumptions that lead to this coarse-grainedness
in Lewis’ account.40 Prima facie, then, the basis on which the data for interpretationism is
constructed is insensitive to exactly the kind of distinctions needed to determine data that would
finesse Foster and permutation problems. To avoid the threat, we need further substantive work,
whether within or without Davidsonian radical interpretation.41.
the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Plausibly, such Foster-problems and the permutation argument stand and
fall together, so it is hard to make sense of the position of those (such as Davidson himself) who think that the
former but not the latter can be avoided. I do not think that any generality is lost by considering explicitly the
canonical-derivability case.
40Given the modified Ramsey-Jeffrey setting to which Davidson (1980) appeals, data about ordinal preferences-
true fix assignments of cardinal degrees of belief-true and preference-true. Logically equivalent sentences such
as “Londres est jolie” and “Londres est jolie ∧∀x(x = x)” will be assigned the same degree of belief-true and
preference-true.
41On the latter point, see Lepore and Ludwig (2005, chs. 8, 15.).
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5.4 Model-existence arguments for inscrutability
The permutation arguments for radical inscrutability are highly general. They do have one
characteristic vulnerability, however, which will be exploited later (§8.4): the deviant models
they construct are characteristically parasitic on an ‘intended interpretation’. I here develop an
alternative argument for radical overgeneration, and hence radical inscrutability, which does not
have this vulnerability. As we shall see, however, it is harder to argue for the generality that is
the principle virtue of permutation arguments.
The theorem and Henkin’s proof (details delayed)
Model-existence theorems are well-known metalogical results, the basis of famous complete-
ness and compactness proofs. They state that if a theory is consistent (/finitely satisfiable) we
can build a model for it—an interpretation which renders it true. The Henkin way of proving
this result for a first-order theory is to construct an explicit model for the theory. By a vari-
ety of sophisticated moves, it extends the theory into one where every existential statement is
‘witnessed’ by some constant, and which is ‘negation complete’: containing either S or ¬S, for
each sentence S. By assigning objects to the constants42, and including an object within the ex-
tension of a predicate only when forced to do so by some atomic sentence within the extended
theory, one arrives at an interpretation of the language that (cut down) will serve as a model for
the original theory. The Henkin procedure is indifferent to what objects are initially assigned
to the constants—hence, by making appropriate choices at the initial stage, we can find models
embedding arbitrary reference-schemes.
It is clear how to use this as an argument for overgeneration, and thus radical inscrutability,
within the context of a ‘global descriptivist’ interpretationism that formulates data in terms of a
set of first-order sentences.43 So long as this ‘total theory’ is not inconsistent, we will be able to
build a canonical model by the Henkin methods, embedding arbitrary reference schemes. This
42The assignment is constrained only to assign the same object to any two constants c and c′ such that ‘c = c′’
features in the extended theory.
43Quine in several places, and Putnam (1980) suggest essentially this idea.
CHAPTER 5. ARGUMENTS FOR RADICAL INSCRUTABILITY 178
is sufficient for radical overgeneration in the context of a standard first order quantificational
predicate logic.
To illustrate the general idea, let us consider a toy theory. Consider a constant-free language




The theory is compatible with there being infinitely many things—but also compatible with
there being just two things in existence. I will show how to find the two element model for this,
by means of the Henkin construction.
The first thing to do is to extend the theory T to T ′, by adding “∀x,y,z(x= y∨y= z∨x= z)”.
Any model of T ′ will be a finite model of T . Now we run the general Henkin procedure to find a
model of T ′. Extending the language, we can introduce witnessing constants for the existentials,





∀x,y,z(x= y∨ y= z∨ x= z)
It is then clear that we will be able to extend this to a consistent theory T ∗, meeting two condi-
tions:
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Maximality for every sentence φ in the language containing the two new constants, T ∗ contains
either φ or ¬φ;
Fully witnessed for each existential ∃xφx is in T ∗, there is a constant c such that φc is in T ∗.
Consider the class of all equivalence classes of names, under the equivalence relation “c =
c′∈ T ∗”.44 In the case at hand, we can see that ‘Fido’ and ‘Betsy’ will be representatives for the
two equivalence classes f and b that will result.
The Henkin interpretation of T ∗ asks us consider the set of equivalence classes of constants
as the domain of interpretation—{ f ,b}. It then lets each constant refer to its equivalence class—
so that “Fido” refers to f and “Betsy” refers to b. Extensions are assigned to predicates in the
obvious way: x will be put in the extension of F iff Fc is in T ∗ for some c ∈ x. In this case,
“Dog” will be assigned { f}. This suffices for a model of T ∗, and hence, cut back to the original
language, will be a model for the original theory.
To embed another reference scheme, we simply start with some other set in place of { f ,b},
but otherwise parallel the construction.45
What is significant, of course, is not that the preceding theory has the model we have just
constructed (which we could have found by ad hoc means in a much simpler way!), but that the
general technique generalizes to far more complicated theories. The details are involved (par-
ticularly in constructing the analogue of T ∗ meeting conditions (1) and (2)), but the underlying
idea is the same. Since this is a standard result, I put the proof in Appendix B.
Higher-order languages
In the context of permutation arguments, we proved the result in a generalized setting. Notori-
ously, model-existence results (and hence the ensuing completeness and compactness results) of
the kind just considered are sensitive to how the system is set up. Second order logic, with stan-
44This will be an equivalence relation thanks to the maximality and consistency of T ∗.
45Starting with {0,1} gives a ‘pythagorean’ ontology of numbers of the kind Quine (1964)) considers.
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dard semantics, is non-compact, and so we cannot expect to extend the overgeneration argument
to that setting.
At first glance, this looks bad for the prospects of arguing for radical inscrutability. For
much natural language semantics proceeds on the assumption that higher-order resources are
available.46 One might think, therefore, that this form of argument for radical inscrutability of
a natural language is vitiated.
Before moving to a substantive response, two points should be noted. First, there are those
who think that semantics can be given in an entirely first-order way. If such a proposal were
effective, then overgeneration might be sustained on a set-of-sentences version of interpreta-
tionism using just the result cited above. Second, even if overgeneration cannot be proved for
the language as a whole, one might still be interested in arguments for radical inscrutability
for speakers who restrict themselves to fragments of the language. Radical inscrutability looks
hardly more plausible for those speaking a more primitive ‘first-order’ fragment of English.
Still, a less concessive response is available. Though higher order logic with standard se-
mantics is not compact, higher order logic with Henkin semantics has this property (Henkin,
1950). The difference is this. Standard semantics insists that the domain of second order quan-
tifiers is the full classical powerset of the first order domain. Henkin semantics, by contrast,
allows one to restrict this second-order domain of quantification in various ways. A Henkin
interpretation allows one to regard quantificational expressions in a language as restricted in
range to, say, the constructible subsets of the first-order range.
Now, it may well be that the Henkin interpretations are ‘unintended’. However, from a
foundational perspective, the appeal to what is ‘intended’ cuts no ice: prima facie the extent of
domains of quantification for any category of expression are up for grabs along with everything
else. Hence the liberalism of Henkin models seems quite appropriate to the current setting.47
The Henkin proofs of model-existence for first order logic and a simple type theory are standard
46See Partee (1996) for discussion of the liberation effected when Montague introduced higher-order resources
into semantic theory.
47Requiring that the range of the second order quantifiers be ‘full’ seems analogous to requiring that the first
order quantifiers be ‘unrestricted’—an assumption usually not built into first-order semantics.
CHAPTER 5. ARGUMENTS FOR RADICAL INSCRUTABILITY 181
pieces of meta-theory: for reference, they are provided in Appendix B.
Matching truth-conditions.
A simple type theory is still extensional. Famously, lots of natural language expressions are not:
attitude reports, modal vocabulary, and items such as ‘seeks’, ‘is rising’, ‘allegedly’, and ‘fake’
seem to demand treatment in a richer setting. Two points made above bear repeating: there
are some who try to handle such apparently intensional locutions within a purely extensional
semantic framework; and there is interest in seeing whether radical inscrutability works within
the extensional fragment of a natural language.48 Clearly it would be nicer if there were a
generalization of compactness arguments to an intensional setting. The point is particularly
important if the data for interpretationism is formulated in intensional terms—in terms of a
pairing of sentences with truth-conditions, rather than with truth-values.
Now, completeness and compactness are concerned with the truth-values of sets of sen-
tences, rather than the truth-conditions of such. At first it looks like the technique is simply
inapplicable to such cases. However, there are ways of constructing deviant interpretations that
match truth-conditions from the completeness/compactness techniques.49 Our aim initially will
be to associate each expression with an appropriate Carnapian intension: a function from in-
dices to compositional extensions appropriate to the category of the expression. We discuss this
choice of framework below.
Take a set of sentences that are paired with intensions (functions from indices to truth-
values). Now take an arbitrary index i. Look at the set of sentences whose intensions map i to
the true. Call this the induced theory at i (or, for short, the i-set of sentences). Now, we can
apply the completeness/compactness results for a type theory to each i-set, getting in each case
a model which will assign to each expression an extension at i. Hence we have described an
appropriate Carnapian intension for each expression. By construction, the Carnapian intension
48How far this extends is a matter for detailed semantic investigation. See Dowty (1979, ch.4) for an account
that treats the progressive ‘tense’ in English (e.g. ‘he is reading a book’) as implicitly modal.
49Compare Putnam’s appendix to Reason, Truth and History (1981).
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assigned to a sentence will be exactly the intension paired with it initially. There are then
canonical ways to extract appropriate the compositional intensions that Lewis favours from such
Carnapian intensions (leaving the intension of basic categories, and in particular, of sentences,
unchanged).50 We can therefore find a single-indexed general semantics for the set of sentences
that matches the pairing of intensions to sentences.
One might have pause at this point. Although every predicate that can be analyzed as hav-
ing a Carnapian intension might equally be analyzed as having a compositional intension, the
reverse is not the case in general. Essentially ‘intensional’ vocabulary such as ‘is rising’ and
so forth are supposed not to be handleable in the Carnapian way. How have we managed to
produce an argument that treats them in this fashion? In fact, the impression that we have given
an argument that covers such cases is illusory. Our technique requires us to have a consistent
theory with respect to each possible situation. However, consider the following triad:
• the temperature is rising
• the temperature is ninety
• it is not the case that ninety is rising
These are simply contradictory if ‘is rising’ is interpreted extensionally in a straightforward
way. Here we have a limitation of this technique: it cannot be applied to languages containing
such predicates.51
We have, therefore, a way of building up a ‘Carnapian’ general semantics that matches the
truth-conditions assigned to sentences. As before, the generalization to indexical inscrutability
is equally secured.52
50See Lewis (1970a) (pp.196-199 of the version collected in Lewis (1983b)).
51At this point it is important to note that it is controversial whether there are genuine examples of such phe-
nomena in English. (cf. Dowty, 1979, ch.1). Intensional operators such as ‘necessity’ ‘always’ and so forth will
be fine.
52In fact, what we have done is really to replay the simple ‘limiting case’ of the argument for indexical in-
scrutability described at §5.2, above, where ||1 is taken to give an assignment of extensions.
Since we are working with Carnapian intensions throughout, we secure the analogue of indexical inscrutability
for indices other than context. By choosing different reference-schemes at different worlds, we can get a great
array of possible-world intensions assigned to terms in category N. In particular, factors such as the rigidity or
non-rigidity of a term will become inscrutable.
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5.5 Concluding remarks
As promised, we have developed two distinct kinds of argument for radical overgeneration, in
very general settings. We have also developed extensions of those results (most importantly for
what follows, to indexical inscrutability) and seen semantic frameworks in which the overgen-
eration arguments do not go through.
What are we to make of these results? In the Gavagai case, we ended up proposing to think
of the case as one of a kind of framework inscrutability: as innocuous as the choice of set-
theoretic representation of the semantic values of relational predicates. Radical inscrutability
of reference is an entirely more shocking proposition. Nevertheless, there have been those
that do adopt something like a ‘framework inscrutability’ attitude to it. Something like this
appears to be Davidson’s attitude when accepting radical inscrutability. He compares a choice
of reference-scheme with a choice of measurement-scale for temperatures:
To someone who objects [to the inscrutability of reference]. . . the right answer is:
individual words don’t have meanings. . . . Just as we must indicate whether the
numbers we are using to measure temperature place the temperature on the Fahren-
heit or the centigrade scale, so we must indicate which method of interpretation we
are using.
(Davidson, 1997, p.80?)53
Which scale one chooses when giving information is an artifact of presentation, rather than
forming part of the information presented. What most would say about the choice e.g. of
Wiener vs. Kuratowski set theoretic representations of relations, Davidson appears here to be
saying about reference in general. Certainly, he regards the inscrutability results as innocuous
ones, rather than potential paradoxes to be defused.
Our question in the next few chapters will be: is something like Davidson’s attitude sustain-
able? Is living with radical inscrutability a serious possibility? And if not, what can be done to
escape the arguments we have just seen?




Introduction to Part III
Interpretationism promises a reductive account of semantic properties. Given BEST=FIT, the
key notions involved can be spelled out in a clean way. As we have seen, this leads to radical
inscrutability of reference: there is no fact of the matter about whether “Londres” refers to
London or to Sydney.
There is much to gain if we could bite the bullet and accept that reference is inscrutable.
Indeed, this is the very attitude that Davidson (1977, 1979) recommends. The purpose of the
following two chapters, and this extended introduction, is to examine whether this is a tenable
proposal. We shall be looking at the costs of radical inscrutability of reference.
It is not my aim here to show where the argument for inscrutability goes wrong, if it does:
it is to determine whether or not we are obliged to find some flaw in it. To this end, we shall
outline five objections to accepting radical inscrutability: the incredulous stare; the alleged
self-undermining nature of the arguments; interaction with vagueness; the standing of lexical
semantic beliefs; and impact on token inference. We shall briefly discuss these five below. In
the two chapters within this part, we develop the final two in more detail: sketching reasons
for wanting to attribute beliefs about reference to language users; and arguing for a treatment of
token validity that is incompatible with the kind of inscrutability of reference considered earlier.
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Five objections to radical inscrutability
The incredulous stare
The thesis under consideration is quite extraordinary. Hold up a red ball in front of your face.
Say aloud “that red ball is shiny”. Accompany the words by jabbing your fingers into the ball to
remove any reasonable way of mistaking your intent. What is being claimed is that nevertheless,
the words “that red ball” might just as well refer to the Taj Mahal as to the red, shiny ball in
front of you. Isn’t that just unbelievable? Moreover, the claims denied seem obvious truisms:
‘disquotational’ reference principles such as ‘ “London” refers to London”.
For languages in general, and in particular for the reference of one’s own language, in-
scrutability arguments seem to try to deny the non-negotiable. Lewis (1983a, p.46) describes
the principle that “Our language does have a fairly determinate interpretation” as “a Moorean
fact”—one which we have more reason to believe, than we have justification for believing any
premisses that might undermine it.
From time to time, philosophers advocate positions that generate ‘incredulous stares’. Lewis
himself believed that for each metaphysical possibility, there was an existing concrete cosmos
equally as real, and of the same nature as the one we inhabit. Some philosophers (‘mereological
nihilists’) believe that, strictly and literally speaking, there are no tables and chairs, since the
simplest particles do not ‘compose’ any further object.1 Williamson (1994) argues that there
is a fact of the matter about the exact extension of a vague predicate—the number of hairs that
it takes to render a man non-bald, for example. In running flat against common sense, radical
inscrutability of reference is in the same boat as these doctrines.
One kind of response to such concerns is to argue that the intuitions can be accounted for
within the theory in question. There are many ways in which this tactic could be pursued. I
briefly sketch two here: appeal to a substitute notion of ‘aboutness’; and appeal to ‘disquota-
tional’ proposities of truth and reference.
1See van Inwagen (1990); Dorr (2002); Dorr and Rosen (2002) for arguments for this thesis.
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(1) Radical inscrutability of reference need not undermine the notion of a (coarse-grained)
proposition’s being ‘about’ an object. Since the propositions assigned to sentences are invariant
under the kind of radical inscrutability we have been considering, this may give a derivative
sense in which a sentence can be (determinately) about an object, even if there is no fact of the
matter at all about what its constituent terms refer to.
According to orthodoxy, John must exist in all worlds where the proposition expressed by
‘John runs’ is true. As a first approximation, then, we say that a proposition p is ABOUT an
object o iff (p holds at w, t ⇒ o exists at w, t).2 (So-defined, the set that is John’s singleton,
and its singleton, and so forth, also stand this relationship whenever John does. Moreover, as
currently defined, any proposition will be ABOUT every necessary existent, contradictions will
be about everything whatsoever, and necessary truths about all and only necessary existents.
These are undoubtedly problems for the notion just outlined, but should not obscure the fact that
for a wide range of cases it gives plausible results: in particular, for contingent characterizations
of contingent existents. For the moment, we could either accept these as features of the account,
or rule them out on a case by case basis.3)
Suppose ‘Fa’ expresses the proposition p. We should not in general assume that p is ABOUT
the referent of ‘a’, even on the standard interpretation. ‘Beethoven is famous’ may well be
true relative to the present moment; but Beethoven himself does not exist now. Therefore the
proposition expressed is not ABOUT Beethoven (at least in the strong sense). Moreover, let us
introduce the monadic predicate ‘is a johero’—a person satisfies this iff he or she is one of Jo’s
heros. The proposition expressed by ‘Beethoven is a johero’ is then ABOUT Jo, rather than
Beethoven.4
2We can get alternative notions of ‘aboutness’ by requiring only that the relevant objects exist at the worlds at
which the proposition is true, but more ‘necessary connections’ such as those about to be mentioned would then
cause concern—e.g. those arising from putative essentiality of origin.
3I hope that the notion could be refined in a principled way to avoid such problems; but there are difficulties,
particularly in allowing relational predication ‘John is a member of singleton-John’ to be ABOUT both John and
singleton-John.
4Notice that wide-scope tense and modal operators will ‘screen off’ aboutness. For example, ‘it was the case
that John ran’ is not ABOUT John, since he need not exist for it to be true. But ‘John is such that he was running’
will be ABOUT John. Similar remarks go for de dicto and de re modalizing.
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Since deviant reinterpretations keep propositions expressed by sentences invariant, the propo-
sition expressed by ‘John runs’ is ABOUT John even if ‘John’ refers to Jane. The proposition is
not ABOUT Jane; since, as discussed in §5.1.2 above, there will be worlds where the proposition
is true but Jane does not exist (a world where John runs but Jane is never born). Absent radical
inscrutability, if ‘Fa’ expresses p, then often but not inevitably the referent of a and the object
that p is ABOUT will be one and the same. Radical inscrutability preserves the ABOUTNESS
facts, by renders indeterminate all connections between aboutness and reference.
The inscrutabilist may appeal to ABOUTNESS in attempt to alleviate some of the incredulity
that attaches to radical inscrutability claims. They should point out that they are not denying
that there is a good sense in which the proposition expressed by “London is pretty” is about
the city London, and not Paris, even if there is no fact of the matter to which city “London”
refers. The inscrutabilist might claim that the initial repugnance of radical inscrutability lies
in an illegitimate slide from radical inscrutability of the semantic property of reference, to the
(false) conclusion that it will somehow be indeterminate what our beliefs and assertions are
about.5
(2) A different way of addressing the incredulous stare is to claim that one can agree with
the intuitions, as expressed in ordinary contexts. This kind of response would focus on ordinary
statements about reference. Within the interpretationist framework, one interprets another’s
words to make them, as far as possible, turn out correct. Since speakers often assert instances
of the disquotational scheme, the onus is on the interpreters to find a way of interpreting the
words so they are satisfied. The point is that compatibly with the heavyweight representational
notion of REFERENCE suffering from radical inscrutability, there may be a way of understanding
all the object language vocabulary (in particular, the object-language ‘reference’) in ways that
vindicate ordinary thought and talk. After all, all that is needed is a suitable pairing of objects
and words to be assigned as extension to the relevant relational symbol in the target language.
It is important to get in focus exactly what is being proposed. It is being claimed that,
5This response, however, will be available only to interpretationisms that guarantee invariance of truth-
conditions. Global descriptivism, for example, does not take this form.
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as things turn out, words like the French “se re´fe`re” do not pick up on the representational
notion that has been our concern throughout this thesis. Rather, ordinary thought and talk
latches onto some other notion that is better equipped to render true apparent platitudes. We
might, for example treat such vocabulary as expressing a relation that is stipulated to satisfy
the disquotational schema.6 What the radical inscrutability arguments then show us, we might
think, is that such a term cannot express REFERS.
We initiates, then, will be able to diagnose an ambiguity: there is the ordinary lightweight
sense of ‘refers’, in which it sustains the truth of the disquotational principles; and there is the
heavyweight sense in which ‘refers’ expresses REFERS, and which is relevant to the philosoph-
ical problem of intentionality.
I think the point is well taken. There is no reason to insist that everyday talk about reference
must track the relation that philosophers, for whatever reason, find interesting. As contemporary
deflationists about truth urge, the work that can be done with disquotational reference is not to
be sneezed at.
We should not overplay the significance of either move for the inscrutabilist. At best, what
has been shown is that there is a way to ‘explain away’ certain intuitions, concerning the no-
tion of ‘aboutness’ and in favour of disquotational principles. There are situations, however,
in which it would be extremely uncharitable to think that people’s intuitions against radical in-
scrutability are directed towards a thin notion: intuitions against radical inscrutability survive
transition into the philosophy classroom.
The parallel to other instances of ‘incredulous stares’ is instructive. Mereological nihilism
is not made less counterintuitive if we adjoin to it an explanation of how common-sensical
claims such as “there is a table in front of me” come out true. What is found incredible is
6Compare McGee and McLaughlin (1994), McGee (2005b) on an ‘ambiguity’ view whereby the notion of
‘truth’ falls apart into two notions, both in good order and with theoretical work to do: heavyweight truth and
disquotational truth.
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the philosophical claim that, strictly and literally speaking, they are false.7 Nor does Lewis’
hyper-realism about the existence of concrete worlds avoid its inherent implausibility when
its advocate points out that ordinary statements such as “there are no actual talking donkeys”
or “there are no existing round squares” come out true on his favoured semantics. In each
case, the intuitions against the doctrine are not just semantic intuitions that such-and-such a
sentence in ordinary English should come out true. They are focused on the implausibility of
the philosophical doctrines themselves.
Nevertheless, the incredulous stare has no decisive impact on the question of whether a
philosopher should accept radical inscrutability of reference, if she can bring herself to counte-
nance it. It is a ‘cost’, but if the theoretical benefits delivered are sufficient, it can be outweighed.
Ineffability
Several philosophers have thought that radical inscrutability renders its own thesis ineffable.
In part, this is based on the kind of considerations just raised—that the ordinary notion of
‘reference’ is used in ways that favour readings on which REFERS is not what is expressed.
Even if common-or-garden use of “refers” doesn’t pick out the philosophically heavyweight
relation, further argument would be needed to show that that relation cannot be expressed.
Other ineffibility worries may be given, however. If the theorist’s language is itself in-
scrutable in reference, it may be thought mysterious how we conceive of and discriminate be-
tween various rival interpretations of our language. In particular, are we not supposing that there
is an ‘intended’ interpretation of the language, from which our ‘deviant’ interpretations are par-
asitically constructed? If so, doesn’t the conclusion of the inscrutability argument undermine
the argument given for it?
I think this kind of dialectical concern is a good one. In fact, for other indeterminacy argu-
ments, I think a strong case can be made for the underminingness of the conclusion advocated.
7Dorr (2002) suggests that the semantic content of such a claim may turn out to be “According to the mereo-
logical fiction, there’s a table in front of me”, or “If there were composite objects, there would be a table in front
of me”. If so, then semantic content of ordinary existential claims is true, but not ontologically committing. We
need a special operator ‘strictly and literally speaking’ to express our nihilistic philosophical views.
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Notice that the state in which it would leave us is peculiar. From the scrutabilist’s point of view,
we have no reason to deny that we can discriminate between the rival interpretations. Hence
the scrutabilist allows the resources required to make out the argument for inscrutability. Prima
facie, therefore, we could run the argument to reduce the scrutabilist’s position to absurdity. On
the other hand, if we maintain that the argument relies on resources that are unintelligible if
reference is radically inscrutable, then one who accepts radical inscrutability cannot regard the
argument as cogent. We seem to be left with a situation whereby one could be led to adopting
an inscrutability thesis, on the basis of an argument that, having accepted its conclusion, one
regards as unintelligible.
Such puzzling situations may arise for some kinds of inscrutability arguments,8 but I do not
think that ‘undermining’ occurs in the case at hand.
The best way of relieving suspicion is to put forward a positive account of how inscrutabil-
ity theses can be expressed and argued over. In chapter 3 we outlined two ways in which in-
scrutability of reference for a language can be expressed within an object-language itself—even
one innocent of semantic notions such as ‘reference’—by exploiting the notion ‘Definitely’.
Even if radical inscrutability is not ‘ineffable’, one might worry that the argument cannot be
made sense of. Given radical inscrutability, how do we discriminatingly pick out the different
‘valuations’ in terms of which our discussion proceeded? The appropriate response to this
worry differs depending on which style of argument for radical inscrutability is in focus. A
compactness-based argument makes no appeal to an ‘intended’ interpretation of the language,
hence is not parasitic in any sense. It does construct a specific ‘deviant’ interpretation, but
unless there is some independent argument that radical inscrutability debars us from performing
8Consider, for example, Williamson’s (2003) considerations for regarding denying unrestricted quantification
as self-refuting—since they must allow quantification in a less restricted sense in order to specify the restriction.
Arguments for inscrutability of quantification based on Skolem-style considerations look to be in danger of un-
dermining themselves in this way. The point is that this seem to presuppose we can in the metalanguage quantify
over elements not covered by the ‘unrestricted’ object-language quantifier—which seems only to show that it is
not unrestricted.
To emphasize, this shows at most that accepting inscrutability results is unsustainable—it does not relieve us of
the burden of saying where the argument goes wrong, or even tell us straightforwardly that it is wrong (why should
the truth be something that we can have reason to believe?).
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mathematical constructions, there seems little reason for concern on this point.
Prima facie, permutation arguments for inscrutability do start with an ‘intended’ interpreta-
tion and derivatively specify deviant interpretations. This is, however, entirely inessential. We
should simply note that we never need to pick out individual valuations or interpretations—not
even an ‘intended one’. Rather, we just argue for the conditional claim that, for all x, if x is
an interpretation-function which renders true a set of sentences T , then the permuted variant
of x also renders this true. (Talking of different ‘interpretation functions’ is, of course, just to
talk about certain mathematical objects, function from words to objects). This suffices to make
the point, for then we need only the principle that there is some interpretation which renders
the data-set true, to conclude to radical inscrutability. Discussion can thus proceed entirely in
quantificational terms, without ever mentioning the ‘intended’ interpretation.9
Interaction with vagueness
A more theoretical reason for suspicion of radical inscrutability occurs if we think that the phe-
nomena of vague and indeterminate language are instances of the inscrutability of reference—
its being inscrutable which precise extension ‘red’ is associated with, for example.10
The problem, alluded to earlier (p.98), is that radical inscrutability may undermine various
principles used in explaining the phenomena of vagueness. For example, consider the following
principles:
There is someone who is definitely bald
There is no-one who is definitely not bald, such that a man with one hair less would
be definitely bald
The truth of these kind of principles (de re quantification into definitely contexts) has gained
currency as a relatively theory-neutral way of explaining how a non-revisionary logic can be
9Compare Hale and Wright (1997b).
10See Rayo (2004) and Eklund (2005).
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adopted, and still leave room for an account of the seductiveness of sorites reasoning.11 The
idea is that, even though the non-revisionist is committed to the truth of “there is some sharp
cut-off point between bald and non-bald men”, we can explain the intuitive repugnance of the
thesis by supposing that some pragmatic mechanism leads to our hearing such an assertion as
“there is some sharp cut-off point between definitely bald and definitely non-bald men”.
The problem is that if vagueness and inscrutability are the same phenomena, principles such
as
There is someone who is definitely bald
will be false. For (a) something falls under ‘definitely bald’ iff it falls under ‘bald’ on all
admissible interpretations; and (b) something which falls under extension of ‘bald’ on a given
admissible interpretation will always fail to fall under the extension of the term on some other
admissible assignment, given radical inscrutability.12
Inference
I contend that token inferences of a logical kind are in good-standing only if the inferrer can
legitimately suppose that there is no change in reference during the period in which the inference
takes place. To get an intuitive feel for the kind of problems that might arise, consider inferences
involving indexical expressions. Reiteration (from S infer S) is about as straightforward a rule
of inference as you can find; but it will clearly go wrong in such applications as:
The time now is 12 o’clock precisely
(pause)
The time now is 12 o’clock precisely
11See, for example, Fine (1975); Edgington (1997); Keefe (2000); Greenough (2003); Weatherson (2002).
12This holds for any predicate P which is not ‘universal’—i.e. has at least one object o that does not fall under it
in a given admissible interpretation. For then, given an object o′ which falls under P on assignment o, consider the
permutation that switches o′ and o and leaves everything else invariant. By the permutation arguments of Chapter
5, this results in another admissible interpretation, where o′ does not fall under P.
Consideration of the ‘problem of the many’ (Unger, 1980) poses problems for the use of such principles inde-
pendently of radical inscrutability. In such a case there is available a treatment which will resolve the issue: Lewis’
“many” solution (Lewis, 1993). I discuss this case in Williams (2006a).
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By the time the conclusion is uttered, the time has moved on, and so the reasoning can
clearly take us from truth to falsity.
Validity of sentence-type, then, does not secure the good-standing of tokens of that type. In
Chapter 7, I will argue that to retrieve a notion of token validity we need to add the presumption
that no change in context has occurred that might shift the reference of parts of the sentence.
Only with an awareness of type-validity combined with knowledge that no relevant change of
context has occurred, do we get any kind of logical ‘license’ for our inference.
We have seen in §5.2 that from BEST=FIT we can argue for an extended indexical form
of radical inscrutability of reference, with the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter
over whether a given expression retains the same reference over time. If so, then the supple-
mentary condition on the good-standing of token inference is never determinately met; so no
token inference is determinately in good-standing. If the arguments for radical inscrutability are
sound, then they generalize to this kind of case. Generalized radical inscrutability (‘indexical
inscrutability’) threatens epistemological disaster, as logical license for inference is debarred.13
Semantic beliefs
A traditional view in philosophy is that competence with a sentence can be identified with a cog-
nitive attitude towards the meaning of sentences: perhaps understanding consists in knowledge
of meaning (Dummett, 1976); or perhaps it consists in beliefs about meaning (Heck, 2005a);
or some other kind of attitude (Garcia-Carpintero, 2000; Stanley, 2002). Call these cognitive
approaches to understanding. I will explore whether the cognitive approach would be compro-
mised by radical inscrutability of reference.
Suppose we had an argument to show that understanding a language, under the cognitive
conception, required that agents had beliefs about the lexical meaning of words. Then we would
13Of course, that we are ‘logically licensed’ to infer something given what we already believe, doesn’t mean we
should so infer. For what we arrive at may be a contradiction—in which case the thing that rationality recommends
is to drop one of the previous beliefs (or at least lower our credence in them appropriately). If by “belief in Γ
licenses the belief φ”, all we mean is that we should not endorse all of Γ and deny or suspend judgement on φ,
then this kind of case will not be problematic—it is a matter for separate argument whether on a given occasion
we should revise beliefs by modus tollens or modus ponens.
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have the prima facie case that the cognitive account is in tension with radical inscrutability. For
on this model, to understand words we must believe something of the form:
N refers to o
or perhaps:
N refers to the thing which is F
Radical inscrutability says that there is never any fact of the matter about whether such claims
hold good. Prima facie, the upshot will be that one’s understanding will consist in beliefs that
are indeterminate in status. The prima facie case requires the move from ‘there’s no fact of the
matter as to whether p’ to ‘If x believes p, then there’s no fact of the matter whether x’s belief
is true’. I question this move below. For now, I label it the infection principle, and will be
assuming it for the time being.
Taking for granted that the infection principle holds, and that the cognitive account iden-
tifies linguistic competence with a suitable range of lexical semantic beliefs, what problems
arise? Clearly, if the beliefs have to be knowledgable then we are in trouble. For under this
assumption, by the factivity of knowledge, it can be at best indeterminate whether we know the
relevant claims, and hence at best indeterminate whether we have what it takes to understand
our words.14 This is surely unacceptable.
However, there are independent reasons for questioning the identification of understanding
with knowledge of meaning (Pettit, 2002). There is still discomfort with the idea that the atti-
tudes wherein our linguistic competence consists systematically fail to be fully correct, but the
primary tension here takes another form.
The basic tension that I diagnose lies in the rationalizing role for the semantic beliefs that
imperil understanding. As I shall outline in Chapter 7, there are grounds for holding that the
14Many have assumed that indeterminacy of what is believed is incompatible with the beliefs being knowl-
edgable, but Dorr (2003) puts forward an attractive case for the ‘more optimistic’ view for indeterminate knowledge
where it is indeterminate whether the factivity condition is met.
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semantic beliefs that constitute understanding are among one’s reasons for performing linguistic
acts: of uttering S when one wishes to say that p, for example (Heck, 2005a).
For the third person case, where we can assume that agents are ignorant of radical in-
scrutability, this role for semantic beliefs does not pose any new questions: prima facie false or
indeterminate beliefs can rationalize action just as well as true beliefs. The first person case is
much more disturbing. Any linguistic action, it seems, will commit us to the Moorean paradox:
p, and there’s no fact of the matter whether p
Believing the first conjunct is constitutive of understanding words; but, having come to ac-
cept radical inscrutability on philosophical grounds, we are explicitly committed to the second
conjunct. One’s linguistic actions, it seems, would all have to be undertaken in bad faith.
There may be other roles for semantic beliefs involved in understanding beyond this ratio-
nalizing role. They may have an epistemic role, for example, in virtue of playing a part in an
inferential model of the epistemology of testimony. Here again, we find potential trouble. I will
briefly sketch how this trouble might arise.
Plausibly, the semantic beliefs involved in an epistemology of testimony will not be the lex-
ical semantic beliefs whose content radical inscrutability renders indeterminate; but rather the
sentential semantic beliefs which are in good order. However, on this model of understanding, it
is plausible that beliefs about sentential meaning will derive from premisses about lexical mean-
ing. (This is, after all, part of the original attraction of looking to semantic theory: to utilize
a finite basis of lexical semantic beliefs to explain our competence with potentially infinitely
many sentences.)
If sentential semantic beliefs derive from lexical ones, their epistemic standing is imperilled
because the beliefs are based on a derivation from premisses that are themselves only indeter-
minate. Therefore, even though there is no argument against our reaching fully correct beliefs
about the truth-conditions of sentences on the basis of our indeterminate lexical beliefs, the sta-
tus of such beliefs as knowledgable is questionable, since their epistemic heritage is suspect. If
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the epistemology of testimony appeals to semantic beliefs, and if such beliefs are derived from
lexical semantic beliefs that (because of radical inscrutability) are in bad order; then radical
inscrutability threatens our ability to gain knowledge through testimony.
I conclude that, if lexical semantic beliefs are involved in a cognitive account of compe-
tence, and if the infection principle holds, then radical inscrutability will get us into serious
trouble. Under those two assumptions, we will therefore have reason to find flaw with radical
inscrutability. Chapter 6 examines the case for these two principles.
Incredulous stares can be faced down; and I have argued that arguments for radical in-
scrutability are not self-undermining and do not render their conclusion ineffable. Interaction
with vagueness is a matter of concern, but it depends crucially on a controversial take on the na-
ture of vague language, and also on the role of ‘Definitely’ in accounting for vagueness, which
I will not defend here. The final pair of problems for radical inscrutability will receive exten-
sive discussion, however. Chapter 6 will look at the compatibility of radical inscrutability with
accounting for semantic competence or understanding. In Chapter 7, I will discharge the re-
maining premiss of the argument that indexical inscrutability (and hence by association, radical
inscrutability) vitiates the epistemology of inference.
Chapter 6
Lexical semantic beliefs
It is unquestionable that we do have some lexical semantic beliefs: beliefs about what words
refer to. It is because we do believe that “Londres” refers to London that we are prompted
to stare incredulously at claims that reference is inscrutable. If there is no theoretical role for
such beliefs, however, then one may bite the bullet or attempt to ‘explain away’ such intuitions.
Davidson, one of the few to endorse radical inscrutability, explicitly denies that reference has
any functional role outside compositional semantics. Reference is:
a theoretical construct, whose function is exhausted in stating the truth-conditions
for sentences
(Davidson, 1977, p.223)1
However, if lexical semantic beliefs have serious theoretical work to perform, then holding
that such beliefs are universally incorrect will cause trouble.
The claim to be investigated here is that such lexical beliefs are not idle: rather, they are
part of what it is to understand language. As outlined in the Introduction to Part III, if this
is sustained, the costs of accepting radical inscrutability threaten to become overwhelming:
our linguistic competence will be constituted by a range of beliefs that are not fully correct;
1Page references are to the version collected in Davidson (1984).
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philosophically reflective speakers will be put into Moorean-paradoxical situations; and the
epistemology of testimony may be threatened.
I will presuppose a certain view of understanding—the cognitive account. This has it that
understanding is a matter of having certain semantic beliefs: it is what lies behind the slogan
‘to understand something is to know what it means’. We shall not presuppose that the cognitive
conception is to be cashed out in terms of knowledge, but we will assume that some consciously
accessible cognitive attitude such as belief or presupposition is involved. For definiteness, I
shall talk in terms of belief.2
The plan for this chapter is as follows. The first section elaborates the cognitive conception,
dealing with in-principle objections, making out an intuitive case for a role for lexical semantic
beliefs within the account. I outline a line of resistance: the weak cognitive account (suggested
by Wright (1987)) whereby only sentential semantic beliefs are consciously accessible, and
lexical semantic beliefs are merely ‘tacit’ or subpersonal states.
The second section develops one line of argument for the cognitive conception, giving us a
handle on circumstances in which we need to regard semantic beliefs as consciously accessible.
This is based on the Davidsonian model of rational language use developed in Heck (2005a).
However, Heck’s motivating examples do not require more than sentential semantic beliefs, so
weak cognitivism still seems a stable position.
The third section gives examples where the Heck-style motivation for consciously accessi-
ble semantic beliefs transfers applies directly to lexical semantic beliefs. This turns on issues
to do with the proper analysis of fragmentary speech acts, which are briefly discussed. The
conclusion is that weak cognitivism is unstable; and a proper cognitivism about understanding
should attribute consciously accessible lexical semantic beliefs.
As mentioned above, this will be in tension with radical inscrutability only if what we called
the infection principle holds: if there is no fact of the matter about what N refers to, then there
2See Pettit (2002) for some intriguing Gettier-based arguments against the identification of understanding with
knowledge of meaning. I do not find his arguments against identifying understanding with (appropriate) beliefs
about meaning so persuasive.
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is no fact of the matter about whether a belief that N refers to o is correct. Such a principle
is critical in determining the status of any lexical semantic beliefs: if it fails to hold, the case
for tensions between radical inscrutability and the cognitive conception of understanding will
lapse. As flagged in the Introduction to Part III, the infection principle is not platitudinous: I
shall be questioning it in the final section of this chapter.
6.1 The cognitive account of understanding
The cognitive account of understanding, broadly characterized, says that linguistic competence
is constituted by cognitive attitudes (say, belief) concerning the semantic properties of language.
One way of motivating it, to be explored below, is in the role that beliefs about the meaning of
words play in a rationalizing linguistic action.3
A more traditional motivation for ascribing ‘tacit knowledge’ of a semantic theory to speak-
ers is to explain how finite beings are able to attain competence with potentially infinitely many
sentences.4 Since semantic theory displays how one may derive infinitely many ‘theorems’
about the meanings of sentences on the basis of a finite number of lexical atoms about the
meanings of words, it is attractive to say that speakers somehow implement the semantic theory
within their cognitive architecture. The natural model is that beliefs about sentence-meaning
are derived inferentially from beliefs about word-meaning.
Some object that the claim that speakers have a grip on such a complex theory incredible.
One move in reaction would be to downgrade the status of the beliefs attributed: to say that
the beliefs are ‘merely tacit’—subpersonal processing states, rather than consciously accessible
person-level beliefs.5 Such a move, if universalized, would be in tension with the first moti-
vation mentioned above: the idea that semantic beliefs had a role in rationalizing behaviour.
For beliefs that give a rational explanation of action need to be person-level. All that the ‘tacit’
3See, in particular, Rumfitt (1995, §XI).
4A locus classicus is Davidson (1965).
5This is the analogue of a move that Chomsky makes in the context of syntactic beliefs. Dummett (1976) thinks
of ascriptions of such beliefs as a ‘theoretical representation of a practical ability’—hence mere implicit. Evans
(1981) introduces the notion of tacit knowledge as an explicitly subpersonal level of representation.
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semantic beliefs could offer would be causal explanations of linguistic action—not what we
were after.
There is still general philosophical and psychological interest in the ‘downgraded’ cognitive
conception of understanding. However, for my purposes it is the stronger versions, where at
least some semantic beliefs are person-level and consciously accessible, that is of interest.
We can then distinguish two versions of a more ambitious view. The strong cognitive con-
ception has it that both lexical semantic beliefs and sentential semantic beliefs are consciously
accessible.6 The weak cognitive conception has it that only sentential semantic beliefs are con-
sciously accessible.7 It is the strong cognitive conception that threatens to be in tension with
radical inscrutability of reference—for merely subpersonal states would not generate the wor-
ries over Moorean paradoxical situations, or the epistemic heritage of testimony, in which the
tension could arise. I shall argue in the next section that considerations of the rationality of lin-
guistic acts will favour the strong cognitive conception. For the remainder of this section I shall
discuss some initial worries about formulation and plausibility of the cognitive conception.
The regression objection
There is an in-principle objection to the cognitive account that I want to dispense with im-
mediately. This is that such an account will inevitably be regressive. For in accounting for
understanding, we are appealing to semantic beliefs; but what account is to be given as to how
we grasp the content of those beliefs—isn’t this itself a mode of understanding? At least in this
case, understanding cannot be knowledge of meaning, on pain of regress.
The way to resist such an objection is to reject that idea that we need any special explana-
tion of ‘grasping the content of a belief’ beyond mere having of that belief. No correlate of
‘understanding’ needs to be made out for the semantic belief itself.
Suppose, for example, that our account of belief content is prior to our account of sentence
6Note this is not to buy into an ultra-strong conception, whereby even compositional axioms would be con-
sciously accessible—I take it that really would be phenomenologically implausible.
7Note that this is still more ambitious than the ultra-weak or ‘downgraded’ version mentioned above.
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content. Then we must explain directly what it is for someone to have a belief with a certain
content—there is no need for a separate account of ‘grasping that content’.
On the other hand, suppose that our account of linguistic content is prior to our account of
mental content, and assume further that we explicate this along the lines suggested by Fodor
and Field. Then thinking is a certain sort of language-use: tokening sentences of ‘mentalese’ in
various cognitive boxes. Believing that ‘Londres’ refers to London is just to token “ ‘Londres’
refers to London” in mentalese.
Even though this account has us using a language of thought, it needs further argument that
we need an account of understanding for the language of thought. Our use of mentalese might
be construed purely mechanistically, with no reflexive awareness at all.8 To anticipate later
discussion: it seems clear that use of natural language is intentional under verbal descriptions—
there are practical reasoning explanations for why we say what we say using the words that we
do. This motivates appeal to beliefs about the meaning or truth-conditions of sentences, that
can play a role within the practical reasoning explanations of linguistic action.
By contrast, use of the ‘language of thought’ does not exhibit the same features. Fodor holds
that, faced with a red wall, say, the thought ‘that is red’ simply happens to us—the mentalese
sentence pops into our awareness box (Fodor, 1993). There is little reason to say that our
tokening of mentalese ‘sentences’ is rational under verbal descriptions—this is just one way in
which a so-called ‘language of thought’ would be unlike a natural language. Whereas we owe
an account of natural language understanding—and it looks as though this should proceed in
terms of semantic beliefs—there is no corresponding demand for an account of understanding
sentences in the ‘language’ of thought. As in the case of ‘head-first’ theorists, we simply explain
what it is for beliefs to have content directly—there is no residual question over ‘grasp’ of the
belief.
8Conscious thinking may be another matter; but then we are not committed to analyzing understanding in terms
of conscious beliefs.
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The cognitive conception elaborated
We now put forward an intuitive case for the strong cognitive conception of meaning. On a
possible-worlds approach ‘London is pretty’ and ‘London is pretty and arithmetic is incomplete’
have the same semantic content. Intuitively, though, they are distinct in meaning, so we can
expect trouble if we identify understanding of S with knowing that S has semantic content p,
within this framework. Intuitively one can know that a sentence S has semantic content London
is pretty without understanding S—for example, if S is the conjunction of those words with a
complex mathematical truth.9
This pushes us to focus on the subsentential level. The strong cognitive conception seems a
natural next move: we would say that understanding S is to have appropriate beliefs about the
content of each expression which forms part of S. What distinguishes ‘London is pretty’ from
‘London is pretty and arithmetic is incomplete’, after all, is intuitively that the understanding
of the former provides only part of what one needs to understand the latter. This is not a phe-
nomenon restricted to compound sentences. Consider an invented predicate modifier ‘pooky’
(of the same syntactic type as ‘very’). Contrast the following two sentences:
London is pooky pretty
London is pretty
Now, I can stipulate that ‘pooky’ is to be a redundant predicate modifier—to satisfy ‘pooky
F’ is just to satisfy ‘F’. Given this, the two sentences above will have the same possible-worlds
intension. I claim that you don’t understand the first sentence just by knowing that it expresses
the same possible-worlds intension as the second.
This might be questioned: can we not ‘triangulate’ from our knowledge of the equivalence
between the sentences, to determine the interpretation of ‘pooky’? Consider a variant where
we introduce a pair of modifiers ‘smooky’ and ‘pooky’, and tell someone that the sentence
9See Soames (1989). Contrast Stalnaker (1984) on the ‘problem of deduction’.
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‘London is smooky pooky pretty’ is equivalent to ‘London is pretty’. There are many pairs
of assignments to ‘smooky’ and ‘pooky’ that might have the effect of ‘cancelling each other
out’, so there’s no hope of triangulating to the meaning of either. Nevertheless, we are free to
stipulate that, as a matter of fact, they are both redundant modifiers.
The obvious way to deal with this, absent worries about inscrutability, is to say that our
understanding of ‘London is pretty’ is comprised, not only of our knowledge that ‘London is
pretty’ expresses the proposition that London is pretty (=the proposition that London is pretty
and arithmetic is incomplete=the proposition that London is smooky pooky pretty); but also of
our awareness of syntactical structure of the sentence, and our knowledge of the content of its
parts: that “London” refers to London, “pretty” applies to pretty things, and so forth. What
blocks our understanding “London is pooky pretty” is that we do not know what the meaning
of “pooky” is. This seems intuitively satisfying.10
10Soames (1989) argues that the best case for a theory of competence would identify understanding with knowl-
edge of the structured proposition expressed by a sentence. As noted at §5.3, within this framework radical in-




An analogue of the infection principle could be formulated for this case, and I think that the dialectic would
not much change. (We do not have total inscrutability of the pairing of sentences with propositions, but still
enough to undermine the natural thought of identifying understanding with belief that “Londres est jolie” expresses
〈London, being pretty〉). Soames’ suggestion would therefore simply short-circuit the discussion by allowing us to
discern tension between radical inscrutability and the cognitive conception at the level of sentences.
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6.2 Rational language use
Given the infection principles, if understanding is to be compatible with radical inscrutability,
we have to give up on the idea that it is wholly a matter of consciously accessible semantic
beliefs. That is, we have to give up on the strong cognitive conception of understanding.
We shall now explore whether one can avoid the tension by adopting the weak cognitive
conception. As flagged in our introductory sections, the issue turns on what we need to do to
discharge one motivation for adopting a cognitive conception: to account for what Heck (2005a)
calls the ‘verbal rationality’ of speech. (I shall not be discussing accounts of understanding
that do not take this issue on—including the ultra-weak ‘downgraded’ cognitive conception, as
well as non-cognitive accounts of understanding. The arguments below may be regarded as a
prima facie challenge to those traditions, and so as an argument for a (non-ultra-weak) cognitive
conception of understanding.11)
Let us examine the case for this. Suppose I utter the words “Jill is wearing red”. My action is
an intentional one, not something that just ‘happens to me’. Characteristically, then, we should
expect practical reasoning explanations to be available, showing how my beliefs and desires
interact so as to make the action ‘the thing to do’.
I shall be assuming that the relevant practical reasoning explanations take a familiar David-
sonian form, e.g.:
1. (desire) To make you form the belief that Jill is wearing red
2. (belief) If I say that Jill is wearing red, then you will form the belief that Jill is wearing
red.
This belief-desire pair instantiate the classic pattern for rationalizing an action. The assump-
tion is that the beliefs and desires involved have to be consciously accessible if this is to be a
good explanation.12 However, the above practical-reasoning explanation shows only that my
11The most promising approach for such theorists looks to be to challenge the Davidsonian model of rationaliz-
ing action presupposed below. This is the line taken by Hornsby (2005) in defence of a non-cognitive conception.
Another option would be a Gricean account of non-natural meaning, perhaps as developed in Schiffer (1972).
12Davidson (1974) admits no other kinds of belief.
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utterance is rational under the description saying that Jill is wearing red (under what Heck calls
‘propositional descriptions’). It does not show that it is rational under the description uttering
the words “Jill is wearing red”.
Suppose that the utterance is rational under verbal descriptions. What kind of practical
reasoning explanation should we then give? Plausibly, the following:
1. (desire) To make you form the belief that Jill is wearing red
2. (belief) If I say something that means that Jill is wearing red, then you will form the belief
that Jill is wearing red.
3. (belief) “Jill is wearing red” means that Jill is wearing red
With this in place, we can secure the verbal rationality of speech.13
We now have a distinction between the propositional rationality and verbal rationality of
a linguistic action: the first being the rationality of a speech act under the description (say)
saying that Jill is wearing red; and the second being the rationality of the same action under the
description uttering the words “Jill is wearing red”. The second, notice, requires the attribution
of semantic beliefs.
The intuitive case for our language-use being verbally rational, in addition to its being
propositionally rational, is quite strong. Moreover, a more detailed consideration argues in
favour of it, drawn from Heck (2005a). Sometimes we utter sentences that betray misunder-
standings of the meanings of words. Our utterances in such cases can still be rational. If I
say, for example, “Billy was livid”, intending to communicate that Billy was flushed, then there
need be no rational criticism of me. Given that “Billy was livid” means Billy was pale rather
than Billy was flushed, there is no obvious way of making sense of the speech act from the point
of view of propositional rationality. For the propositional story rationalizes an action of saying
that Billy was flushed, and no such action took place.14 Not only does a rejection of the verbal
rationality of language seem false to the facts, it also deprives us of the resources to make ra-
tional sense of perfectly ordinary speech behaviour. If we make the plausible identification that
13Hornsby (2005) suggests that the relevant practical reasoning explanations involve different ingredients.
14Heck notes that similar points can be made in the context of ambiguous speech, misheard speech and the like.
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which makes language-use rational=that which constitutes understanding, then we can use this
as an argument for the cognitive conception—and indeed, for more than an ultra-weak version
of this doctrine, since merely tacit semantic beliefs will not play the required rationalizing role.
We have formulated this as an argument for semantic beliefs in a rich sense—for belief
in ‘x means that p’. Perhaps, so presented, it overplays its hand. Consider, for example, a
reformulation in terms of a common belief concerning the truth-conditions, or coarse grained
proposition expressed by the utterance :
1. (desire) To make you form the belief that Jill is wearing red
2. (belief) If I utter u, and it is common ground between us that u expresses the proposition
that Jill is wearing red, then you will form the belief that Jill is wearing red.
3. (belief) it is common ground that “Jill is wearing red” expresses the proposition that Jill
is wearing red
This seems equally to underpin verbal rationality—but now we need appeal to nothing be-
yond beliefs about the (coarse-grained) truth-conditions of the utterance. Plausibly, this is the
most that the argument as currently formulated can legitimate.
Lexical semantic beliefs
We have seen an argument for the following: beliefs about the truth-conditions of sentences
must be of the kind that can subserve practical reasoning explanations. If so, then we cannot
think of them as merely ‘tacit’: they must be the kinds of beliefs that we have conscious access
to. However, the argument is prima facie particular to the case of sentences. It is enough to
secure the rationality of uttering “Billy was livid” when wanting to say that Billy was pale that
one (mis)believes that “Billy was livid” means Billy was pale; there is no obvious need to go
further and appeal to a mistaken belief that “livid” means pale.
Is there a need for lexical semantic beliefs? Well, certainly it is natural to diagnose mistaken
beliefs about the meaning of sentences as underpinned by a mistaken belief about the meaning
of a word. In the situation above, presumably you would also be inclined to utter “Tony Blair
was livid”, “my granny was livid” and so forth, in appropriate circumstances where those people
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were flushed. Within a given agent, sentential semantic beliefs systematically vary—which cries
out for an underlying error that unifies and explains each of these.15
Let us grant that the systematicity of errors requires explanation. Still, we have as yet no
reason to think that the underlying explanation is a mistaken belief, rather than some subper-
sonal state that is causally responsible for the production of semantic beliefs about sentences—a
point forcefully pressed by Wright (1987).16 In the sentential case, the role of semantic belief
within practical reasoning explanations debarred us from treating it as a merely subconscious
or tacit state; and it is this that lapses in the current case.
Even if we gave up on consciously accessible lexical meaning beliefs, it is not as though
we would be committed to treating sentences as unarticulated ‘monoliths’.17 We can credit
speakers with knowledge of syntactical structure; and even knowledge that these syntactical
parts are relevant to the determination of the meaning of the whole. None of this commits us to
lexical semantic beliefs, and none of it is inconsistent with inscrutability.
The Wrightian “weak cognitive conception” thus looks prima facie stable. It involves the
following claims:
1. We know that S expresses the proposition p
2. This knowledge is consciously accessible, as is an appreciation of the syntactic structure
of S and an appreciation that its parts are semantically significant
3. There are no consciously accessible lexical semantic beliefs—rather, there is some sub-
personal structure that produces semantic beliefs at the level of sentences as required.
Part of understanding would be the holding of consciously accessible semantic beliefs (i.e.
knowledge of the truth-conditions of sentences); partly also a matter of general syntactico-
semantical knowledge. But partly it would be a matter of having for each word appropri-
ate neuro-physiological states that, in combination, reliably deliver knowledge of the truth-
conditions of sentences. To be sure, we have plenty of conscious beliefs about what words
15See Evans (1981).
16See also Wright (1981); Evans (1981); Davies (1981) and Miller (1997).
17Pace Heck (cite).
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mean; but these are now to be regarded as post hoc generalizations, and no part of the ontogen-
esis of linguistic action.
Verbal rationality and lexical semantic beliefs
The weak cognitive conception of understanding is not without its costs. First, it makes certain
connections that one might have thought were rationally sustained into merely nomological
issues. For example, consider the misunderstanding previously mentioned—manifested in ut-
tering ‘Billy was livid’ when I wanted to say that Billy was flushed. As previously mentioned,
sentential semantic beliefs will tend to covary—when I come to realize that ‘Billy was livid’
means Billy was pale, then I will simultaneously realize that ‘granny was livid’ means granny
was pale. The view just described represented these patterns as arising from subdoxastic mech-
anisms that causally influence the sentential beliefs. Now consider someone who continued to
hold that ‘George Bush was livid’ meant George Bush was flushed, despite changing all her
other sentential beliefs so that in other cases ‘N was livid’ means N was pale. By the lights of
the present view, this is a mere processing error: there can be no rational criticism of the agent.
In point of rationality, her beliefs cohere perfectly. This seems odd.
Second, independently of the issues just mentioned, one might think that a right understand-
ing of ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ should provide the resources to justify the right understanding of
‘Brutus killed Brutus’. However, on the present view, there is no legitimate post hoc reasoning
to this effect from the semantic knowledge implicit in understanding.
Third, conscious management of one’s lexical beliefs, by looking them up in the dictionary
and the like, will become a dubious enterprise. We might think of it as post hoc management
of one’s sentential semantic beliefs via principles that are indeterminate in status—an activity
that looks irrational once we become aware of radical inscrutability. Perhaps all that can be
said is that by using the dictionary one puts oneself in a situation where one will be caused to
have correct sentential semantic beliefs (perhaps in the spirit of Pascal’s recommendation that
we choose religious friends to improve our chances of acquiring beneficial beliefs.)
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Fourth, second-language competence, if not first, seems inextricably bound up with lexical
semantic beliefs: to decide that I should utter “Londres est jolie” in a French oral examination,
I explicitly recall the individual meanings of “Londres” and “jolie”. Even if I avoid irrationality
and epistemic trouble in using English, the worries recur when I speak French or Welsh.
I shall not press these points here, since I think a direct case can be made for lexical seman-
tic beliefs within rational use of our native language. The argument directly parallels Heck’s
arguments from verbal rationality to the need for consciously accessible sentential semantic
beliefs. If successful, they will show that the weak cognitive conception of understanding is
unstable—either Heck’s considerations should not persuade us to admit consciously accessible
semantic beliefs in the first place, or we need such beliefs at the lexical level too.
One often hears it said that ‘only a sentence can make a move in the language game’. What
is intended, I suppose, is that the typical speech acts have a sentential component. Typically,
one asserts by uttering a sentence with assertoric force, one commands by uttering a sentence
with imperatival force, and so forth. The hackneyed maxim looks false, though. Much of
speech consists in ‘fragments’. Suppose Billy asks Jean where she will be that summer, and she
answers ‘In France’. Prima facie, she has just performed a speech act whose linguistic vehicle
is a subsentential expression.
Stainton (1998) gives the following example. We are at a round-table meeting, and I am
describing seating arrangements. I do so by pointing at various chairs, while uttering, succes-
sively, “the boss”, “anyone who needs to go early”, “a representative from the faculty board”,
“Billy”. You form appropriate beliefs, respectively that the fourth seat is reserved for the head
of department, the second seat is for anyone who needs to go early, and that the first seat is for
a representative from the faculty board. Clearly I have managed to communicate propositional
contents, but I have done so by uttering fragments of sentences.
If this is right, then we can run the same kind of considerations as before. This sort of
language use looks verbally rational. To secure verbal rationality, we need semantic beliefs to
play a role in the practical reasoning explanation of the speech act. The semantic beliefs that
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seem to be required are subsentential: principles such as:
‘Billy’ refers to Billy.
Suppose that I wrongly believe that the chairperson is called ‘Billy’. My pointing to the chair
and uttering “Billy” is a rational act, with a practical reasoning explanation routing through the
(mistaken) belief that:
‘Billy’ refers to the Chairperson.
Again, absent such beliefs, it is hard to see wherein the rationality of the action consists. By the
identification of understanding with that which rationalizes linguistic action, we therefore have
an argument that lexical semantic beliefs form part of our understanding of language. This is
an argument against the weak cognitive conception.
The argument turns crucially on the principle that my utterances are truly subsentential
speech acts. There is an alternative diagnosis: even though a fragment is all that is phonetically
realized, it may be that a sentence is uttered. The parallel is to utterances such as:
Billy was walking and Jean was too.
Here, the second conjunct is elliptical: there is a phonetically unrealized component. Writing
the unrealized component in brackets, we can represent the speech act more fully as:
Billy was walking and Jean was [walking] too.
In the case at hand, what Stainton (1998) calls ‘the ellipsis hypothesis’ is that fragments in
the kind of speech acts we have been considering are elliptical for full sentences. The sugges-
tion is that phonetic fragments cited above are syntactically sentential. For example, the full
description of my making the noise “Billy” would be that I utter (something like):
‘Billy [sits here]’
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If the ellipsis hypothesis is sustained, we can give a practical reasoning explanation for phonet-
ically fragmentary utterance that routes through sentential semantic beliefs rather than lexical
ones, and the weak cognitive conception would remain an option.
Stainton argues that the ellipsis hypothesis is false,18 preferring the view that semantic infor-
mation received from the linguistic fragment is processed pragmatically to determine a proposi-
tional content for the speech act as a whole. One reason that he gives is that paradigm examples
of ellipsis do not occur in discourse-initial position. The following exchange makes clear sense
A: “Mary is at the door”;
B: “Billy too”
Here the second sentence is elliptical for “Billy [is at the door] too”. Stainton holds that the
ellipsis in B’s utterance works because the linguistic cue “is at the door” is available in the
context in which the phonetic fragment is uttered. Stainton generalizes this to a general account
of how a hearer ‘fills in’ a phonetic fragment to get a full sentence: the hearer must rely on
the presence of cues in the prior linguistic context. Discourse-initial utterances, of course,
will not have any prior cues. Given Stainton’s general hypothesis about how ellipsis functions,
discourse-initial ellipsis will never be appropriate.
Assuming Stainton’s general account of the functioning of ellipsis stands up to scrutiny, it
offers a test for putative ellipsis. If the phrase is appropriate in discourse-initial position, it
cannot involve ellipsis. Crucially, there are many phonetically fragmentary utterances that can
occur in discourse-initial position. (Stainton gives the example of going up to a market trader
and saying, apropos of nothing, “five red apples, please”.) For such examples, Stainton’s test
rules out the ellipsis hypothesis, and so the argument for a rationalizing role for lexical semantic
beliefs goes through.
Stainton takes care to emphasize the provisional nature of the evidence he cites. He main-
tains, however, that a compelling case can be made for syntactically fragmentary utterances
when one considers the evidence as a whole. The issue is a live one within linguistics.19 The
18“it doesn’t quack like ellipsis, it doesn’t walk like ellipsis, so it isn’t ellipsis” (1998, p.854).
19See, for example, Merchant (2005) and the references therein.
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controversy over this point should not bring comfort to the inscrutabilist: for dialectically it is
she who will have to adopt controversial positions within linguistics in order to stabilize her
position, if she is to resist her opponent’s arguments via the ellipsis hypothesis.20
The weak cognitive conception of understanding is unstable, therefore. We reject the ultra-
weak cognitive conception, and accept consciously accessible sentential semantic beliefs, be-
cause of their rationalizing role. But the same consideration can be replayed to move us to
the strong cognitive conception: there is a rationalizing role for consciously accessible lexical
semantic beliefs.
The argument with which this chapter is concerned takes the following form:
1. Given radical inscrutability of reference, beliefs about lexical meaning are never determi-
nately true.
2. Ordinary linguistic understanding in part consists of lexical semantic beliefs
3. Therefore: Ordinary linguistic understanding consists in part of beliefs in things that are
not determinately true.
From this conclusion, we can construct the uncomfortable Moore-paradoxical situations and
the epistemological concerns described in the Introduction to Part III.
The focus of this chapter has been on defending (2). Support comes from two directions.
First, it is a natural way to work out a cognitive conception of understanding, when one notices
that beliefs about ‘coarse-grained’ truth-conditions of sentences are not plausible sufficient con-
ditions on understanding. Second, principled arguments for adopting a cognitive conception in
the first place, on the basis of what is required for speech to be verbally rational, plausibly
require not only consciously accessible sentential semantic beliefs, but consciously accessible
lexical semantic beliefs. To deny the latter extension, which takes us from a weak to a strong
20Moreover, even the fact that such evidence can be brought to bear on the case, and that the evidence just
cited appears to tell against the ellipsis hypothesis, should be deeply embarrassing for one who wants to stake the
tenability of a philosophical hypothesis on the ellipsis hypothesis. We have in prospect an a priori argument on
an empirically substantive point. The tenability of a position such as radical inscrutability of reference should be
independent of such empirical matters.
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cognitive conception, one would have to adopt tendentious views on the linguistic analysis of
fragmentary utterances.
The case for lexical semantic beliefs will only be in tension with radical inscrutability if (1)
is sustained. This is supported by the ‘infection principle’ which tell us that, if there is no fact
of the matter about semantic claim p, then the belief that p is at best indeterminate in status. We
finish, therefore, with a brief discussion of whether this can plausibly be denied.
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6.3 Pseudo-semantic beliefs
The principle at issue holds that radical inscrutability entails that beliefs about lexical reference
are never determinately true. The basic idea is simple: if there is no fact of the matter what n
refers to, then we cannot be totally correct in believing that n refers to o.21
This line of thought, however, presupposes something substantive. The general point, devel-
oped in detail below, can be expressed as follows: If the medium of thought is itself subject to
radical inscrutability, then it may be that the indeterminacy in thought and the indeterminacy in
language are so aligned, that we can have determinately true thoughts about reference, despite
there being no fact of the matter what either terms of language or the concepts of thought pick
out.22
Let us pro tem suppose that to have beliefs is to token mentalese sentences in one’s ‘belief
box’.23 A lexical semantic belief about the French “Londres” would be:
“Londres” refers to London
(Here the underlining highlights the fact that mentalese expressions are here used.) The
question of whether the infection principle holds reduces to the question of whether something
like the above mentalese sentence can be true.
Just as the natural language ‘Londres’ is radically inscrutable in reference, it is natural to
think that the mentalese term ‘London’ will be too. There will be no fact of the matter about
what either refers to.
Nevertheless, in principle, there may be a fact of the matter about whether or not they
co-refer. Consider the two names of the famous Roman orator ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’. For the
inscrutabilist, the reference of such names will each be radically inscrutable. If sentences such
as “Cicero=Tully” are to be true, they will need to be correlatively indeterminate—co-referring
21Rumfitt appeals to beliefs about reference, via their role in rationalizing linguistic action, in objecting to
Davidson’s view of reference (Rumfitt, 1995, §XI).
22The following discussion draws on Weatherson (2003).
23See, for example, Fodor (1987, passim).
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on any optimal semantic theory.24 Usually we think of such cases as taking place within a
single language, but Weatherson (2003) has argued persuasively that we do better to allow
correlative indeterminacy across different languages—and in particular, to allow correlations
between natural language and mentalese.
Whether or not the mentalese sentence about reference is determinately true depends on
how the semantics of the mentalese symbol ‘refers’ is handled. There is at least one paradigm
in the literature—the ‘penumbral’ treatment of reference of Fine (1975)—which can render it
true.25 One must assume that on a given sharpening, the pairing of a word w with w’s referent
on that sharpening will be within the extension of ‘refers’. Given this, we have our result: for
within the extension of refers will be 〈“Londres”,o〉, where o is the object (on that sharpening)
that is assigned to “Londres”. Equally, o is assigned to ‘London’ by the sharpening.
One might worry that the term ‘reference’ so construed, does not express the robust reference-
property in terms of which the inscrutability result is formulated. It is hard to know how to
resolve such claims. If we formulate inscrutability in the supervaluational way of §3.1, then
the heavyweight notion REFERS simply fails to have application. In this setting, the penumbral
handling of ‘refers’ looks entirely inappropriate. However, if we formulate inscrutability in the
purely theory-shadowing way described in §3.2, we get no such quick argument: in the sense
there defined there is no fact of the matter about the application of REFERENCE. Perhaps there is
room for regarding the penumbral handling as appropriate. We need to find a way of reflecting
the ‘unsettledness’ of ‘refers’ in our candidate semantics. An appropriate way of achieving this,
one might think, is to let the extension assigned to ‘refers’, on an interpretation, exactly reflect
what that interpretation assigns to the first-level terms. After all, were that the right valuation,
that would be the correct extension for ‘refers’. Since admissible interpretations disagree on
what extension should be assigned to ‘refers’, it will end up being unsettled what its extension
is, exactly as required.
24For discussion of other examples of correlative indeterminacy see Field (1974) and Fine (1975).
25See also Field (1998, §I), where in the same way ‘correlative indeterminacy’ is invoked in giving a semantics
for ‘refers’ and ‘is true’.
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I think that we can avoid taking a position on this dispute. Suppose we had to give up on the
claim that the mentalese ‘refers’ that plays a role in rationalizing linguistic action are genuine
beliefs about semantic properties of sentences—one might label them instead pseudo-semantic
beliefs. Whatever status they have, the relevant question is whether they can play the right sort
of role in rationalizing linguistic action. And it does seem that beliefs configuring ‘refers’ can
do the job. For example, it is perfectly clear that one could have a mistaken belief about lexical
meaning, by, for example, tokening the following sentence in one’s belief-box:
“Londres” refers to Paris.
The suggestion on behalf of the inscrutabilist is setting aside the issue of whether (gen-
uinely) semantic beliefs that are part of the ontogenesis of linguistic action; we have pseudo-
semantic devices (Fine’s penumbral reference) that exploit correlative indeterminacy of thought
and language that match the inscrutability of natural language. Lexical pseudo-semantic beliefs
can be granted compatibly with radical inscrutability.
This response to the worry just posed is far from uncontroversial. It requires we take se-
riously mentalese (already too much for some), take mentalese expressions to have semantic
properties of just the same kind as natural language (again, controversial)26 and then buy into
the kind of correlative inter-linguistic indeterminacy of Weatherson (2003). Nevertheless, it
does give the inscrutabilist a loophole out of the tension argued for above.
26Notice that some interpretationisms—for example, Lewis’ convention-based approach—cannot naturally be
applied to mentalese. There is something ugly about different interpretationist proposals holding good in the
mentalese and the natural language case. If parity is enforced, then not all interpretationisms can avail themselves
of the suggested defence.
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6.4 Conclusion
We started with five arguments against radical inscrutability. One concerned the role of se-
mantic beliefs within an account of linguistic competence. We set out a number of costs that
would be incurred if those beliefs which are constitutive of understanding turn out to be merely
indeterminate, rather than fully true.
To make the case against radical inscrutability, two claims need to be established: (1) The
claim that understanding in part consist of a certain range of lexical semantic beliefs; and (2)
The claim that radical inscrutability of reference will imply that such beliefs are untrue.
It is in the second case that we find a loophole: something very like lexical semantic beliefs
might be in good-standing despite radical inscrutability, so long as the content of thought and
of language in the relevant places are indeterminate in correlative ways. Since, on reflection,
it is unclear why the considerations in favour of (1) cannot equally be discharged by appeal to
these ‘pseudo-semantic’ beliefs; the case against inscrutability is not decisive.
Chapter 7
Good inference and context
In this chapter, I shall argue that the goodstanding of a token inference depends on our be-
ing entitled to suppose that reference is stable through the contexts in which we perform the
inference.
This ‘stability principle’ is based on the following line of thought. Treatments of validity
for indexical languages typically suffer from a certain sort of incompleteness. The standard Ka-
planian treatment of validity in indexical languages requires only that the truth of the premisses
secures the truth of the conclusion within a single context. This threatens to make mysterious
what relevance the validity of an argument has to practical concerns of safely inferring one thing
from another: for token arguments will typically involve change of context over the course of
the inference. In this chapter I outline a modest way of resolving the problem: I hold that partic-
ular token inferences are in goodstanding when (1) they instantiate a valid argument-type, and
(2) we can legitimately presuppose that no change of reference has occurred during the course
of the inference. I answer objections to this proposal. In particular, I consider and reject two
rival treatments due to Timothy Williamson and John Campbell.
If we endorse arguments for radical inscrutability then we are in no position to resist argu-
ments for indexical inscrutability, which tells us precisely that it is indeterminate whether or
not the reference of expressions alter across a given change of context (§5.2). Granted the suc-
cess of permutation arguments for radical inscrutability of reference, the argument for indexical
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inscrutability is quite simple: we simply ‘string together’ different deviant interpretations of
the language. Since all the deviant interpretations coincide at the level of the truth-conditions
of sentences, a ‘cut-and-shunt’ interpretation will have the same truth-conditions also. As far
as generating the right truth-conditions are concerned, the deviant indexical interpretation is as
good as any. If radical inscrutability is acceptable on the basis of such arguments, then, it had
better be that indexical inscrutability is likewise acceptable. The treatment of inference argued
for in this chapter shows that this is not the case.
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7.1 Deductive good-standing
The theme for this chapter is the relationship between what one might call ‘speech act’ or ‘token
validity’ on the one hand; and ‘formal’ or ‘type validity’ on the other. The former concerns the
conditions under which the inference from premisses P to conclusion Q is properly made. The
latter the study of what follows from what, the implication relationships between the sentences.
One might expect the two to be related. Type-validity of the argument from Γ to φ guarantees
truth-preservation in its instances: if the premisses of an argument instantiating the type are
true, then the conclusion must be true too. Hence (one would think), in deducing an instance of
φ from instances of Γ, the validity of the argument-form ensures you won’t ‘start to go wrong’.
Clearly, however, the study of good inference and the study of what follows from what are
distinct. The former is an essentially epistemological inquiry. It asks: what are the conditions
for a certain kind of epistemically virtuous action? Simple-minded attempts to connect this with
formal validity are bound to fail. For example, it will not do to say that, if one believes-true
S1,. . . Sn, and the argument-form from those sentences to S′ is valid, then one should believe-true
S′. For the appropriate response to noting that S′ follows from what was previously believed
might be to revisit and revise one’s previous beliefs. Further, there are many styles of proper
inference that do not seem easily to pair up with logical consequence: inductive inference is a
case in point.
To think there is no connection between facts about implication and facts about how one
should revise one’s beliefs would be an implausibly strong claim. It does seem that valid pat-
terns of inference should be epistemologically relevant. The trick is to spell out the relationship.
Here is one view of the relationship that I find attractive. It draws on an analogy with
another abstract property/speech act pair: the relationship between truth and proper assertion.
Many hold that truth is a (perhaps the) norm of assertion. This issues in a connection of the
form:
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One must: (assert that p only if p is true).1
Similarly, it seems to me that type-validity can be presented as a norm of deductive infer-
ence:
One must: deductively infer φ from Γ only if φ is a consequence of Γ
Some of the questions one wants to put to this kind of claim have direct parallels in the
truth-norm case. For example, note the ‘only if’ in each formulation: we are not committed to
the absurdity that one is obligated to assert every truth of which one is aware, or derive every
consequence.2 Some subsidiary constraints on assertion might be derived from the rule above:
perhaps, that one should assert p only if one believes that the conditions demanded by the
fundamental norm are met—i.e one believes that p.3 Likewise, perhaps one should deductively
infer φ from Γ only if one believes φ to follow from Γ. The way in which such ‘derivative
norms’ flow from ‘fundamental norms’ helps to explain why people may blamelessly assert
the false, if under a misapprehension as to what is the case; or blamelessly make a fallacious
inference, if under a misapprehension as to what follows from what.
The putative normative relation between inference and implication sketched above is not the
only possible model for the relationship between these two notions. The details do not matter,
for present purposes, for my main purpose here is to consider a worry which, if sustained, would
undermine any connection. The attack is a very simple one, arising from standard treatments
of (type-)validity for indexical languages. What is interesting is that what seems like a very
modest resolution of the problem illustrates the need for a particular kind of stability of content
across contexts. It provides grounds for upholding John Campbell’s claim (made in a somewhat
different context):
1See Williamson (2000, ch.7.) on Assertion for the kind of constitutivef norm here being appealed to.
2One can expect many other rules: ranging from constraints of etiquette to the more systematic constraints
of Grice (1975). (Note that the above rule is intimately related to Grice’s maxim of quality for assertion (do
not assert what one believes to be false). There are reasons to assign quality maxim a special role: in particular
because, contra Grice on ‘conversational implicatures’, putative quality-implicatures are not cancellable: attempts
at cancellation take the form of a ‘Moorean paradox’: “p and I don’t believe p.”)
3cf. Wedgewood (2002), Williamson (2000, ch.7).
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In our reasoning we depend on the stability of language, the fact that its signs do
not arbitrarily change in meaning from moment to moment.
(Campbell, 1994, p.82)
As already flagged, indexical inscrutability undermines such a stability principle: so if the
best account of inferential practice makes use of it, we have grounds for looking askance at such
inscrutability.
7.2 Validity for indexical languages
My concern here is with semantic or model theoretic validity. At a first approximation, some-
thing is semantically valid if no matter what the subject matter of the premisses and conclu-
sion might be, the inference is truth preserving. For example, the argument ‘Billy is running;
therefore something is running’ will count as valid in the intended sense, since no matter what
“Billy” refers to, or what “is running” means, the truth of the premiss will secure the truth of
the conclusion.
This basic idea is cashed out more formally as follows: an argument p1, . . . , pi, . . ., therefore
q is semantically valid if, on every admissible interpretation of the language, either one of the
pi is false or the conclusion is true.4 Grades of semantic validity will emerge, depending on
what we count as an admissible interpretation. If the sole constraint on admissibility is that the
interpretation of logical connectives be held constant, as in the “Billy” example above, then we
get a notion of formal or logical consequence. More severe constraints on admissibility lead
to different consequence relations. The semantic treatment of consequence does not enforce
any particular choice of admissibility constraints: what choice is appropriate can be left for
independent argument to determine.5
4The notion extends to arbitrary sets of formulae taken as premisses.
5Note that in some presentations, the admissibility constraints are obscured, since the semantic theory contains
explicit axioms fixing the interpretation of certain expressions. In many presentations of the model theory of first
order or modal logic, the semantics of logical connectives is handled by including explicit axioms governing these
expressions within the model theory. In a ‘general semantic’ framework (cf. Lewis, 1970a) logical constants are
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So long as we can classify sentences as true or false simpliciter, the above definition of
semantic validity makes straightforward sense. It is a familiar fact about natural languages that
(unambiguous) sentence types can change their truth-value on different occasions of use. We
cannot assign a truth-value directly to the sentence “I am George Bush”: for it is true when
uttered by Bush, and false when uttered by me. Similarly for temporally indexical sentences “it
is now 5 o’clock”: true as uttered at 5pm, false as uttered an hour later.
Accordingly, even the most obviously ‘valid’ inference-patterns will on occasion fail to
preserve truth, in an indexical language. The rule of reiteration from S, infer S is obviously
valid for non-indexical languages; but if we instantiate the pattern with “it is now 5 o’clock”,
and allowing the two tokens of S to take place an hour apart, it will clearly fail to preserve truth.
There are two immediate challenges that arise when we consider such phenomena. The first
is to characterize a non-trivial notion of semantic validity for argument types, for an indexical
language. The second is to explain how the notion of validity so-characterized is relevant to the
kind of inferences we actually make—token inferences involving potentially distinct contexts.
Kaplanian validity
Kaplan’s paper “Demonstratives”6 tackles the first question. The first step towards systematiz-
ing validity for indexical languages is to characterize sentences, not in the first instance as plain
true but rather as true in the context c.7 For example, “it is now 5 o’clock” is true in the context
c1 (where the time of c1 is 5pm) but false in the context c2 (where the time of c2 is 6pm). We
can describe an utterance of the type S as plainly true if the sentence is true in the context c,
where c corresponds to the setting in which this token of S is uttered.8
The basic characterization of semantic validity does not have direct application to languages
containing a parameterized truth predicate “true-in-c”. At the time at which Kaplan’s work was
assigned particular semantic values, and the need for explicit decisions over what should count as an admissible
re-interpretation of the language is more evident.
6Published as Kaplan (1989b), but in circulation in manuscript form since the 1970’s.
7For present purposes, I ignore other options, such as taking dated utterances to be truth-bearers.
8One might try to distinguish the context of utterance and context of interpretation. See below.
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written, there were extant techniques for extending the semantic characterization to parame-
terized truth-predicates.9 If we are interested in the truth-conditions of sentences—their truth-
values in different possible situations—then ‘possible world semantics’ involves a relativized
notion of truth. According to possible world semantics, a sentence such as ‘Billy is sitting’ is
not in the first instance true or false simpliciter, it is true or false at possible world w. (Again,
we can derivatively assign truth values to token sentences—as uttered in a concrete situation, S
will be plain true if it is true at the actual world.)10
As in the case of indexical languages, the resulting parameterized truth-predicate blocks the
straightforward transfer of the characterization of validity in terms of unrelativized notion of
truth-preservation. In the intensional case, the answer was familiar by the time that Kaplan was
writing “Demonstratives”: we characterize validity in terms of truth-at-w preservation, at all
points w, under any admissible interpretation.11 That is, we first say what it is for an argument
to be true-preserving at all points: for every point w, either one of the premisses is false-at-w,
or the conclusion is true-at-w. As a second step, we generalize over interpretations in the way
characteristic of semantic definitions of validity.12
Kaplan’s “Demonstratives” suggested that we apply the same trick to indexical languages.
Again, we find a parameterized truth predicate, truth-at-context-c.13 To define validity, we
must first ‘generalize away’ this parameter. First, we say what it is for an argument to be truth
9The following few paragraphs summarizes some of the setup described in more detail in chapter §3.1 and
Appendix A.
10As noted previously (Chapter 3), relativization to possible worlds is only one of the ways in which truth-
predicates can usefully be parameterized. Others we have mentioned include relativization to variable assignments
and delineations (Chapter 3); to times and locations (Chapter 4). See Lewis (1970a, 1980) for general discussion.
11It is tempting to gloss this as ‘necessary truth preservation’ under any admissible re-interpretation. This is
misleading, as the usual characterization allows arbitrary frames (i.e. re-interpretation of the ‘worlds’ component
of the designated semantics.)
12Strictly speaking, we should generalize over models, not just interpretations, where a model is a tuple that
specifies, in addition to the interpretation, a ‘frame’ for the interpretation: sets of points playing the role of context,
etc. and any needed accessibility relation on this space. See Chapter 3 and Appendix C.
This way of characterizing validity is ‘local’ in character, in the sense of Williamson (1994) discussed in Chapter
3 and Appendix C. An alternative to the above would be the ‘global’ style there characterized, whereby each model
for the language contains additional structure corresponding to ‘privileged points’: which in the designated model
correspond to the actual world (for the modal case), the context of utterance (for the indexical case), etc.
13I take a context to be a centred world, in the way suggested by Chalmers (1996). See Lewis (1980) for
discussion of the utility of centred worlds within a (generalized form of) Kaplanian indexical semantics.
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preserving at all contexts: every context c such that the premisses are true-at-c must be such
that the conclusion is true-at-c. Then, as a second step, we generalize over interpretations in the
way characteristic of semantic definitions of validity. The result is that an argument is valid if it
is truth preserving at all contexts, under any admissible interpretation.14
Kaplan’s treatment gives us a definition of semantic validity for indexical languages. Signif-
icantly, it shows how such a notion can be non-trivial. For an argument to be valid, it is required
only that it be truth-preserving at each particular context. It does not require that it be truth
preserving when the premisses and conclusion occur in different contexts. Hence, reiteration
can be a valid rule, and we are allowed to dismiss as irrelevant ‘counter-examples’ to its validity
involving change of contexts.
Problems
I will assume that the Kaplanian treatment of indexical languages is the correct way to answer
the first challenge: to characterize a non-trivial notion of valid argument type for indexical
languages. Defining validity in this Kaplanian way leads to an immediate puzzle about the
relevance of the validity of an argument type, so-characterized, to the practice of inferring one
thing from another.
In the basic case of a non-indexical, extensional language there is no gap between validity
of patterns of inference (inference-types) and the goodstanding of concrete exemplifications of
that type. Since validity guarantees that the inference in question preserves truth simpliciter, the
information that inference-pattern I is of a valid type assures us that in any token of type I, the
truth of all the premisses ensures the truth of the conclusion.
We find a similar situation for the intensional case. If I is type-valid, then we know that the
inference is truth preserving in every possible situation. Obviously, any token of that type with
14This treatment of validity I regard as the basic idea of the logic of demonstratives. The distinctive theses
associated with that work—i.e. that ‘I am here now’ is a logical truth, and that the necessitation rule fails for logical
validity, arise from other features. The first of these is the way that Kaplan restricts admissible interpretations to
those that hold fixed the ‘character’ of expressions (he does this implicitly, by using specific axioms to fix the
reference of basic indexical expressions). The second special feature is the way that Kaplan combines indexical
and intentional logics to define LD-validity. Neither of these special features will be presupposed here.
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which we would be concerned, would take place within a single possible world, so as a special
case we have it that such tokens of that type will preserve truth.
In the case of indexical languages matters are not so straightforward. If the whole of a
token inference occurred in some particular context c, then since a valid inference-type is truth-
preserving in every context, it is truth preserving in the one in question. The situation would
be exactly analogous to the intensional case above. However, token inferences—strings of
utterances or inscriptions15— prima facie involve a series of distinct contexts. It takes time to
utter or inscribe successively the premisses and conclusion of a token inference. If the premisses
and conclusions occur in distinct contexts, there is no guarantee that the token inference will
preserve truth, even if it is of a valid type.
Again, we can illustrate this with the reiteration rule. Consider the inference from “Jim
walks” (uttered at c1) to “Jim walks (uttered at c2). The inference-type here instantiated is
clearly valid, on Kaplan’s characterization. At any single context, under any re-interpretation,
it will preserve truth. However, we can find an interpretation of the vocabulary that will make
the premiss true-at-c1 and the conclusion false-at-c2. (Example: Consider the re-interpretation
according to which “walks” is an indexical predicate designating walking at c1 and skydiving
at c2.) We have an interpretation which makes this combination of inference-type and change
of context non-truth preserving. Absent further information, one can conclude nothing about
the truth-preservingness of the actual inference one makes, from the fact that the inference-type
tokened is semantically valid in Kaplan’s sense.
7.3 The modest proposal
The threat is radical. The validity or otherwise of inference-types threatens to become irrelevant
for the practical purposes of reasoning. Prima facie, all reasoning involves changes of context—
and any such change would seem to render the Kaplanian treatment of validity irrelevant. Our
15On a language-of-thought model of reasoning, movements in thought from one set of judgements to another
fall within this compass.
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challenge is to explain the relevance of information about validity of inference-types to the
rightness or wrongness of specific inferential practice.
One reaction is to conclude that we should be interested in some non-semantic notion of
valid inference-type. I think that this would be overhasty. There is a modest solution at hand,
that shows how the semantic validity of inference-patterns can still have practical significance.
The modest idea is the following. Call a token inference good if (1) it instantiates a valid
pattern in Kaplan’s sense (2) no relevant change of context occurs during the course of the
inference. The contention is that the information that a token inference’s good-standing, in the
above sense, guarantees that it preserves truth, and hence will justify inferential practice. Since
part of the characterization of goodstanding is the validity of the argument type, we explain why
information about validity is relevant to correct inferential practice.
Note that the characterization of goodstanding allows irrelevant changes of context to take
place over the course of an inference. Suppose we make an arithmetical inference. Then,
intuitively, no change of context will be relevant to this argument token. Whatever change of
context occurs, the argument will be good.
Stability and Constancy
Which token inferences are classified as good will depend on how we cash out the notion of
‘relevant change of context’. The basic idea here is that a change of context will only be relevant
if it changes the intension of some expression occurring somewhere in the inference. Note that
though condition (1) is, by its nature, appreciable independently of what the particular mean-
ings of the words are, appreciation that (2) obtains will essentially depend on what indexical
character the words have.
Let C˜ be the set of all contexts involved at some stage of a token inference i. If i is of
a valid type, then so long as no relevant change of context occurs, we can be sure that we
will not be led from true premises to a false conclusion. For we know, by condition (1), that
within a single context this can never happen. Now consider the correct interpretation of the
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premisses; this will be some c ∈ C˜. Hence we know that the conclusion is true as uttered in
c. However, any legitimate reading of the conclusion will be assessed relative to some context
c′ ∈ C˜. By condition (2), we know that c and c′ assign the same referents to the expressions
that feature in the inference (for otherwise, a relevant change of context would have occurred).
By compositionality, an assignment of intensions to the primitive parts of a sentence will fix
the intension of the sentence as a whole. Hence we know that the conclusion has the same
intension when assessed relative to c and c′. Sentences with the same intension are true in
exactly the same situations. Since the conclusion is true in c, it is true in c′ also.16
The basic idea that a change of context will only be relevant if it changes the reference
of some expression occurring somewhere in the inference needs more exact formulation. I
provide two alternative ways of precisifying this notion, formulated for the general case of an
intensional, indexical language.
STABILITY.
Call a set of contexts C˜ stable with respect to a set of expressions E, if the character of
the expressions in E assign to each term the same intension at every context inC.17
CONSTANCY.
Call a set of contexts C˜ constant with respect to a set of expressions E, if any aspect of
context that is used to fix the intension of a term in E is common to every context in C˜.
Either stability or constancy could be used as an explication of condition (2); for definiteness,
let us require constancy.
Review
The central idea here is to limit the range of relevant changes of context that we need to worry
about when evaluating a certain inference. If we can legitimately presuppose that context does
16As presented, the argument assumes that all the premisses are uttered in a single context. Clearly the argument
will generalize to situations where the premisses are to be evaluated with respect to distinct contexts within a stable
set. Similar considerations will also cover cases where different parts of a single sentence are to be evaluated with
respect to distinct contexts.
17Here, of course, ‘each term’ takes wide scope over ‘same intension’—i.e. each term keeps its intension stable.
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not change in any of those ways, then the fact that the inference is a token of a valid type will
guarantee that truth will be preserved through the inference. An attractive feature is that the
only knowledge that we need, in principle, in order to work out what kind of context changes
are relevant, will be basic linguistic knowledge about the meaning of the expressions used in
the inference.
7.4 Objections and responses
Objection 1.
Constancy is too demanding to play the role envisaged above. For context is constantly
changing: utterances of premisses and conclusions are never totally simultaneous, for ex-
ample. No inference involving any temporal indexical will ever correspond to a constant
set of contexts.
Reply 1.
There are several responses available, getting progressively less concessive.
(a) The most concessive response is to grant that no inference involving (for example)
temporal indexicals will ever be in goodstanding, as characterized above. For recall that
the aim was never to extend greatly the range of arguments we could legitimately declare
valid. Rather, its goal is to save what we already think we have: to explain how the notion
of semantic validity can have practical significance in application to uncontroversially
valid patterns of inferences carried out in apparently unobjectionable settings.
For example, correct inference probably plays a central role in the epistemology of math-
ematics. Mathematical English is, however, just an indexical-free fragment of a broader
indexical language (“2+2 = 4 and I am here” is intuitively well formed). As part of an
indexical language, mathematical English, though it contains no indexicals, is subject to
re-interpretations wherein its terms are treated as indexicals. Token mathematical infer-
ences are therefore under threat. However, constancy, and hence stability, are trivially
CHAPTER 7. GOOD INFERENCE AND CONTEXT 231
secured for tenseless, indexical-free fragments of language, such as the language of pure
mathematics: this captures the sense in which consideration of indexical re-interpretations
of the words seems so irrelevant to the good-standing of mathematical inferences.
Beyond this, we are used to the idea that we might need to substantially reformulate
arguments in order for them to meet the strictest standards of validity—and reformulation
in tenseless language might be one of these cases.
(b) A less concessive response is to preserve the potential goodstanding of token infer-
ences involving temporal indexicals by characterizing the notion of goodstanding in terms
of stability rather than constancy. The temporal indexical used in inferring “Today is
Tuesday” (at 13.01 hours) from “Today is Tuesday” (at 13.00 hours) does not render the
relevant set of contexts unstable, though it arguably renders them inconstant.
(c) Less concessively still, one can question whether the context change involved in the
above inference does render the set of contexts inconstant. On one view, contexts com-
prise a string of factors: the time, place, agent, world, etc. at which the utterance takes
place. On this picture, the character of the indexical “Today” would be something like
“the day containing the temporal component of context c”. There is then a relevant differ-
ence in context during the above inference; and hence the set of contexts associated with
the inference would be inconstant. The current objection tacitly presupposes this kind of
setup.
An alternative is to represent contexts as centred worlds, and appeal to auxiliary functions
that pick out aspects of those worlds. For example, the interpretation of ‘today’ would be
given by ‘ DAY(c)’. The ‘aspect’ of the context that is required to be invariant in the case
of the “Today” inference, would be DAY(x) for x ∈ C˜. This kind of setup is attractive, if
only because it seems hopeless to list once-and-for-all all the possible aspects of context
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that could be relevant to determining the reference of an indexical expression.18
If this is the case, then one can analyze goodness in terms of constancy, while still classing
the ‘Today’ inference as good.
Objection 2.
The account fails to capture the interesting logical or conceptual connections between
indexical utterances uttered in different contexts. From ‘it is the case that F’ we can
legitimately infer, at a later point, ‘it was the case that F’. This inference is not valid in
Kaplan’s sense, and so the token will not be in goodstanding, in the current sense.
Reply 2.
It is not my intention to say anything novel about such questions at this stage. As out-
lined in the response (a), above, the radical threat in view is that the Kaplanian notion of
validity turns out to be irrelevant to actual inferential practice. Indexicality threatens the
application of the concept of validity to all token inferences. Faced with this threat, the
first job is to secure the goodstanding of the boring, run of the mill token inferences that
we all take for granted.
This is not to deny the interest of more ambitious projects that try to explain the distinc-
tive character of inferences involving indexicals that do not obviously instantiate a valid
inference type—and indeed, ones whose ‘validity’, if such it is, depends on a change of
context. I contend (but will not defend here) that an account of such ‘dynamic inferences’
can be made out that dovetails with the present account: we can outline a chain of good
inferences in the sense of this chapter, that take us from “Here, it is raining” to “There, it
is raining” as one drives out of and away from a thunderstorm while keeping track of its
location; We can exploit similar stories to account for good and bad cases of basing one’s
utterance “it was raining” on an earlier utterance of “it is raining”.19
18Lewis (1980) adopts something like this view, based on, among other things, the consideration just canvassed.
19The basic ingredients for this story are the account of inference involving demonstratives outlined in Campbell
(1994), and its generalization to a wider class of indexical expressions by Prosser (2005). To convert the ‘Fregean’
setting to one amenable to Kaplanian treatment, we can appeal to an account of ‘dynamic words’ based on the
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The account given here is not committed to the success of these more ambitious projects.
Nevertheless, the availability of an extension of the approach to these more controversial
cases guards against accusations that we are attempting to theorize about good inference
using the wrong tools (e.g. materials from the theory of reference, rather than the theory
of sense).
Objection 3.
The account fails to cover some obviously valid patterns of inference. For example,
consider the inference from ‘it is now 13.46.24 precisely’ to ‘everything is self identical’.
The argument is clearly a good one, in virtue of the consequent being a logical truth, but
since the temporal component involved in the antecedent will alter through the course of
the inference, it will not be ‘good’ in the sense sketched above.
Reply 3.
To begin with, the now familiar point about the aim of the project being to save the
applicability of uncontroversially valid inference types, rather than to give a sense in
which more controversial types are valid, is again relevant. Let us set this aside for the
moment, however.
In the particular case cited, we might be able to modify the definitions of stability or con-
stancy to get the result the objector wants. We could, for example, demand constancy
only of aspects of context that are appealed to more than once in the course of an infer-
ence. However, new examples would be constructed making the same point: consider ‘it
is now 13.46.24 precisely’ to ‘everything is self identical or it is now 13.46.24 precisely’.
Clearly, more and more fine grained notions of constancy could be developed, seeking to
capture the idea that there should be no change in aspects of context which are essential to
the validity of the inference. This looks like a project that will have diminishing returns.
Better to bite some bullets. Let us accept pro tem that the inference is not good, in the
treatment of proper names in Kaplan (1990).
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relevant sense. What bad results follow? Notice that we can characterize a derivative
sense in which the inference is well-made. For example, the inference from the null set
of premisses to ‘everything is self identical’ is valid. If we know this, and also know
that (quite generally) a token argument will never take us from truth to falsity if it is
a weakening of one that is in goodstanding, then we know enough to explain how we
appreciate the truth-preservingness of the original argument. I anticipate telling similar
stories, on a case-by-case basis, for other examples adduced.
Objection 4.
You haven’t given what you promised! The notion of semantic validity still has no appli-
cation to token inferences.
Reply 4.
I have chosen to introduce the neutral notion of the goodstanding of a token inference,
rather than to describe this status as validity. This is because I do not wish to be involved
in disputes that seem to me to obscure the central point at issue.
One might think that in cases where a token inference is performed where there is change
in an aspect of context that affects the reference of one of the terms involved, it would
be a category mistake to apply the notion of ‘validity’ to the inferences in question—
evaluation of an argument as valid or invalid occurs only after we have ensured against
‘ambiguity’-like phenomena in the expressions used. Alternatively, one might want to
characterize an inference from “it is now 5pm” (uttered at 5) to “it is now 5pm” (uttered
an hour later) as invalid.
I take no stance on the issue, which strikes me as essentially terminological. Depending
on which approach one favours, one can construct the relevant notions out of the mate-
rials provided–in particular, the neutral notion of a good inference. The key feature is
to explain how appreciation of the semantic validity of arguments could be practically
relevant; and this has been explained, if it is granted that the good-standing itself is prac-
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tically relevant.
Objection 5.
We need not think of token inferences as involving change of context at all. The modest
proposal is therefore unnecessary: semantic validity will suffice.
Reply 5.
This is a view suggested by Williamson (1997). After describing the Kaplanian treatment
of validity for indexical languages, Williamson notes the challenge:
There is a problem. On this account, the validity of an argument tells us noth-
ing about truth-preservation when the premises and conclusion are instantiated
in different contexts. However, inference takes time: we judge the premises
and conclusion successively. Thus the account of validity looks irrelevant to
the inferences we actually make. (Williamson, 1997, p.652)
Williamson holds that the problem only arises if we focus on the relations between oc-
current judgements. Plausibly, it takes time to move from judging (or supposing) that
premises hold, to judging that the conclusion follows. However, Williamson contends
that we should properly be focusing on belief states, which can be retained over time.
These simultaneous belief states can be considered as instantiating, or failing to instan-
tiate, a valid pattern of inference; and no concern about the involvement of different
contexts emerge.
I think two points show Williamson’s approach does not get the heart of the issue. Let us
suppose pro tem that his suggestion handles cross-temporal context change. Nevertheless,
there are other aspects of context that may still vary between premises and conclusion of
an inference. We can bring this out with a simple, though admittedly artificial, indexical
expression. Let me introduce the indexical ‘blig’, which will refer to the primary connec-
tive of any sentence or sentence-like structure in which it figures, and to the Taj Mahal
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otherwise. ‘Blig is the Taj Mahal’ is true; but ‘Blig is the Taj Mahal and Blig is the Taj
Mahal’ is false.
The point is the placement of the indexical itself is potentially an aspect of the context
with respect to which the indexical is assigned a referent. Though the example is artificial,
it would be most uncomfortable to exclude expressions with this feature a priori. Indeed,
more standard philosophical examples might well be analyzed as involving expressions of
this type: e.g. self-referential sentences or thoughts such as “this very sentence is short”,
which presumably rely on aspects of context such as the demonstrated sentence. A related
point is that context can change within a sentence, as Lewis (1979c, p.241) emphasizes. If
the above proposals are accepted, we look in danger of developing a notion of context and
inference that is unable to discharge its other theoretical roles. We need to accommodate
such context change, not eliminate it.
Further, the account stands in need of an extension to handle ascriptions of validity to
sequences of occurrent judgements, written and spoken inferences, and the like. We do
evaluate such sequences of events as valid or invalid, and we need a reconstruction of this
practice. Since the issue of cross-context inferences has not been taken head-on by the
Williamson proposal, we have no ready-made proposal for such cases. Presumably, such
ascriptions of validity must be handled derivatively from the primary notion of a valid
inference involving belief states—but we have been given little indication how this is to
be effected.
Objection 6.
There is an obvious response that the current discussion misses. We should distinguish
the context in which a judgement (or utterance) is made from the context with respect to
which a judgement (or utterance) should be assessed. Accordingly, we should think of
a token inference as assessed at for a single context—though it is indeterminate which
one this should be. Since semantic validity guarantees truth-preservation in all contexts,
it guarantees truth-preservation no matter which of these contexts we take to be the actual
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one.
Reply 6.
This strategy is canvassed by both Campbell (1997) and Williamson (op cit). However, it
is easy to find examples where it delivers inappropriate results. Consider an argument of
the following form:
This very second is an even number of seconds after t
This very second is an even number of seconds after t
Now, if some time has elapsed between the judgement that the premiss holds and the
drawing of the conclusion, it is clear that the ‘argument’ by reiteration should not be
taken to be in good standing. However, every choice of context will declare it valid, since
a choice of context will determinate a time which will be the referent of ‘now’ in each
case. Assessing the token argument with respect to a single context delivers exactly the
wrong result: this is an instantiation of a valid argument type that we want to come out
invalid.
The point becomes more dramatic if we use the indexical ‘blig’, introduced above. Con-
sider the following argument:
Blig is the Taj Mahal
so:
Blig is the Taj Mahal and Blig is the Taj Mahal
The premise is unambiguously true (in a sentence with no main connective, ‘blig’ will
designate the Taj Mahal); the conclusion is unambiguously false (in a conjunctive sen-
tence, ‘blig’ will designate Conjunction). With respect to any single choice of context,
‘blig’ will have to designate a single object; and hence the argument will come out as
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truth preserving. Again, the argument-type is truth preserving, but no argument token
should be described as in goodstanding.
The point is that the separate elements of the token argument—the token premiss and
conclusion—call for distinct contexts. We cannot force them into a single context without
clear distortion of the intended use of the expressions. There just is no admissible single
context for the token inference.
I have drawn attention to an incompleteness in treatments of validity for indexical languages.
The standard way to secure a non-trivial classification of indexical inferences as valid or invalid
threatens to make a mystery of the relevance of formal validity of inferences to practical con-
cerns of safely inferring one thing from another. The danger has been noticed and addressed
before (by Williamson and Campbell) but not satisfactorily.
My proposal is a modest one: it holds that particular token inferences are safe (in goodstand-
ing) when we can legitimately presuppose that no change of reference has occurred during the
course of the inference.
Nevertheless, if this account is right, something significant has been secured: an explanatory
role for stability of subsentential meaning—the reference of individual names and predicates—
within an account of inference. With this in place, radical indexical inscrutability as formulated




Introduction to Part IV
In the final chapter of this thesis, I will consider in detail what I take to be the most promising
general approach to avoiding inscrutability. In this introduction, I shall locate it within a space
of possible approaches to avoiding radical inscrutability of reference.
Suppose we adopt the general interpretationist thought that semantic facts are whatever best
semantic theory says they are. Given this, in the Introduction to Part III of this thesis I suggested
that canonical inscrutability arguments can be seen as having the following form:
SENTENTIAL DATA
The selection of semantic theory is based on data about the semantic values of sentences.
BEST=FIT
The sole criterion of goodness of a semantic theory is fitting this data.
OVERGENERATION




There is no fact of the matter about which objects terms refer to.




Deny that all data is sentential One holds that one can non-circularly identify data constrain-
ing the selection of theory other than that pertaining to the semantic values of whole
sentences.
Deny Best=Fit One holds that the selection of a ‘best’ semantic theory isn’t simply a matter of
fitting that data (i.e. generating in the appropriate way theorems matching the data, and
not generating anything inconsistent with it).
Deny overgeneration One holds that, properly regarded, the data about the sentential meaning
is ‘rich enough’ to avoid overgeneration.
The first and last approaches tackle the problem at the level of the data available to the inter-
pretationist. They do so in different ways: the former concentrates on the form of the data; what
sort of output of the theory it constrains (one might look to inferential patterns, or classificatory
behaviour for raw materials here). The latter concentrates on possible structure in that data. The
key obligation of such an account would be to make the case that one could identify in a non-
circular way appropriately rich data, which could be fed into one of the ‘fine-grained’ semantic
theories mentioned in §5.3 (Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics, and Soamesian structured
propositions). There are several possible directions here—perhaps structure is present in the
raw materials themselves;1 or perhaps there are theoretical constraints operative in extracting
data from the distribution of non-semantic facts, which disqualify ‘permuted’ presentations of
the data.2
What form and structure the data have will vary depending on the details of the implemen-
tation of interpretationism. It is unlikely that we will be able to say anything general about
the prospects of success. As already noted, the particular implementations canvassed in §1.3—
global descriptivism, Lewis’ convention-based approach, and Davidson’s ‘unified theory’—
look distinctly unpromising on this front. The attraction of addressing radical inscrutability
1In causal relations between language-users and relatively sparse structured states of affairs, for example
2Within a Davidsonian setting, the T-sentence data plays a double role: providing the constraints on seman-
tic theorizing, but also in converting information about sentences held-true to information about belief content.
Constraints on belief attribution might therefore impose constraints on suitable data.
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through denying BEST=FIT is that such modifications impact on all forms of interpretationism.
If successful, we would avoid radical inscrutability without committing ourselves to anything
substantive on the particular implementation of interpretationism at issue. In Chapter 8, I look
in detail at one particular way of denying BEST=FIT: David Lewis’ work on eligibility.
Chapter 8
Eligibility
To make the case for radical inscrutability, we built into interpretationism the assumption that
the meaning-fixing theory is required only to fit the data we provide. We now question this
assumption.1
Interpretationism holds that the selected semantic theory is the best theory of a certain range
of data. Quite generally, fit with data is only one among many theoretical virtues, others might
include: predictive power, simplicity, explanatoriness, and so forth. It looks as if we have a
rich set of resources to play with in selecting the theory which fixes the semantic facts, while
remaining faithful to the interpretationist’s slogan.
There are theoretical pressures which make the ‘null’ hypothesis BEST=FIT attractive. If we
want a reductive account of semantic properties, we should be wary of appeal to properties of
theories that are themselves to be cashed out in intentional terms. Whatever we appeal to we
must subject to careful scrutiny to make sure it does not undermine our purpose.
The focus of this chapter is on the theoretical virtue of simplicity. Quite independently of
his metasemantic views, David Lewis has offered an objective analysis of at least one dimen-
sion of simplicity (what is sometimes known as theoretical ‘elegance’). Furthermore, when we
plug this account of simplicity/elegance into an interpretationism, we derive Lewis’ response to
arguments for radical inscrutability—his notion of a semantic theory’s ‘eligibility’ emerges as
1This chapter is based on material drawn from Williams (2006b)
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a derivative theoretical virtue.
Famously, the eligibility response is not a metaphysically ‘neutral’ account—it requires
that we buy into one or another version of what Hirsch (1993) calls ‘inegalitarianism’ about
properties. I shall argue in the second half of this chapter that its metaphysical commitments
need to be far stronger. In particular, when combined with the kind of ‘ultra-sparse’ conception
of properties that Lewis favours (a form of microphysicalism), the eligibility response engenders
problems worse even than radical inscrutability. Therefore, the eligibility response requires a
more commital conception of property ontology, perhaps involving emergent universals.
To begin with, however, I shall discuss a more general question: why be interested in specif-
ically interpretationist solutions to radical inscrutability in the first place?
8.1 Side constraints.
In §2.3, I argued that interpretationist’s slogan—the semantic facts are those that follow from
best semantic theory—can be made precise in terms of a theory shadowing paraphrase. Not all
theory-shadowing paraphrases of semantic discourse are interpretationisms, however.
A fairly common suggestion is that, within a generally intepretationist setup, causal side-
constraints should be added to a theory of reference.2 For a semantic theory to be successful,
the thought goes, one must not only match data about utterance-conditions of sentences, but
one must also assign to basic terms (e.g. demonstratives and proper names) referents to which
usage of those terms is appropriately causally sensitive.
I take it that there is no prospect of fitting this account of the selection of the meaning-
fixing theory into a broader account of what makes one theory better than another in general.
In the case of theory choice in science, there seems no way even to formulate an analogous
constraint. What is being proposed, to put it bluntly, is an entirely ad hoc way of selecting
the ‘meaning-fixing’ theory.3 Nevertheless, if the required causal relations can be specified in
2For an example of one theorist endorsing this view, see Hirsch (1993, pp.108-9).
3There may be other ways of getting such causality involved: for example, one might hold that suitable causal
relations between terms and objects are a way of providing data (pairing singular terms and objects) that constrain
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an acceptable way, then we could write down a paraphrase of the general form given in §2.3
that would impose such causal connections. Moreover, such an interaction between causal and
interpretationist elements would have its advantages: the causal side-constraints would (in a
large range of cases) eliminate radical inscrutability; and the interpretationist setting would
address problems of generality that face the causal account4 as well as more specific technical
problems that afflict causal theories of reference.5
The mixed account just considered does not count as an interpretationism: we can’t rea-
sonably describe it as a view whereby the best semantic theory of a certain range of data fixes
the semantic facts. This raises the question: Why care about the slogan? I will not offer any
knock down objections to this approach, but I am deeply uneasy about it, essentially because it
strikes me as objectionably ad hoc. In the remainder of this section, I shall put forward some
considerations against imposing such side-constraints, which will in turn motivate an interest in
interpretationisms as such.
theory. This is to deny SENTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS. Another, previously canvassed, is to appeal to causal con-
nections between utterances and structured states of affairs as an attempt to get structured sentential data to feed
into interpretationism. This may lead to a denial of OVERGENERATION. Such ideas should be distinguished to the
suggestion that causal considerations be built into a replacement for BEST=FIT, which is our topic here.
4Causal accounts seem to face problems when departing from the paradigmatic cases of words referring or
applying to medium sized dry goods: discourse about the abstract, theoretical terms for the very small and very
large; and of the semantic properties of connectives (‘and’) and other elements of language (e.g. ‘very’). See
the remarks in the appendix to Field (1972) for discussion of the case of connectives; and the worries in Fodor
(1993) about non-paradigmatic cases. Accounting for the semantic significance of concatenation, fixed by the
compositional axioms of a semantic theory, is another challenge for the causal account (cf. the footnote on p.33,
above).
One option, not involving causal ‘side-constraints’, would be to have an independent causal theory of singular
term reference, and combine this with an interpretationism about semantic values for other expressions. This might
be attractive to one in favour of a fully-fledged “identity theory” for objects for which we have demonstrative
contact; but who is worried by the generality problems above. I do not regard this “two-step” proposal as ad hoc
in the way that the mixed theory is.
5The mixed view would resolve so-called ‘qua’ problems that face pure causal theories: for even if the required
causal connections hold between our utterances of ‘horse’ and horse surfaces as much as between those utter-
ances and horses themselves, appeal to the constraint to render true “internal organs are parts of horses” plausibly
would eliminate one candidate (though we would need to take care to see if Gavagai-style re-interpretations were
possible). See Sterelny (1990, ch 6.) for an overview of the qua problem.
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Basic explanations
Given a putative constraint on correct semantic theory, one can ask: in virtue of what is that
constraint in force? Consider the constraint of fit with the data, in the case of interpretationism.
There one can say: semantic properties are just reflections of best theory of the appropriate data;
and fitting relevant data is one way in which a theory can be good. If one appealed to simplicity
to rule out deviant interpretations, the same story can be given. The explanation consists in two
moves: (1) a general characterization of the nature of semantic facts; (2) the observation that
the constraint flows from that characterization.
Now, metaphysical explanations have to come to an end somewhere: call these basic expla-
nations. In the case just mentioned, it seems we can legitimately reject a follow-up question:
Why is it best semantic theory that fixes the semantic facts? We respond that semantic properties
just are fixed by best semantic theory.
However, putative explanations that are formulated in gerrymandered terms do not seem
acceptable as basic. A general feature of explanation, inside or outside philosophy, is that we
should explain away such complexity. However, the mixed account of theory selection would
leave us appealing to an apparently gerrymandered concept ‘best-theory-that-in-addition-meets-
causal-constraints’. I diagnose the discomfort with the mixed approach, therefore, as resulting,
not from any technical inadequacy, but from the contravention of principles constraining meta-
physical explanation. With such a proposal, we cannot evade the question: In virtue of what are
those the features that give the meaning-fixing theory?
One could resist directly by citing some unifying feature. This is less easy to do here than in
general. In the general case, one always has the option of adopting a ‘projective’ explanation:
we say that F’s just are the things which meet conditions C1,C2 . . ., because that’s the way we
use to the term ‘F’, or how we apply the concept of F-ness. This sort of unifying explanation
appeals to our classificatory practices: the F’s just are the things we call ‘F’. The analogous
move in the current context would be to appeal to the way that people use the word ‘refer-
ence’, or more generally to the intentions of speakers to use semantic terminology in a causally
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constrained way.
At least if one adopts a word-first strategy, appeal to linguistic intensions and desires in a
unifying explanation will not work. We can semantically ascend, including “N refers to x iff
N and x stand in relation C” within the data constraining the selection of the meaning-fixing
theory, but to appeal to the content of referential intentions or stipulations is illegitimate. This
seems to me an acceptable version of Putnam’s notorious assertion that causal constraints are
‘just more theory’ (Putnam, 1980)—the causal constraints on reference cannot be more than
additional data, if there is no non-circular way of explaining how such causal factors could con-
strain theory selection.6 It must be an independent metaphysics of representational properties,
rather than a matter of our intentional attitudes, that provides an unifying explanation of why
the constraints are in force.7
Those in favour of the mixed theory have several lines of resistance to the above. They may
reject the principle about metaphysical explanation I appeal to; they may argue that an inten-
tional ‘unifying explanation’ is acceptable so long as we adopt a head-first account to the reduc-
tion of intentionality, so that by the time we come to give a theory of linguistic content, we can
legitimately appeal to mental content. However, interpretationist forms of theory-shadowing
paraphrases allow us avoid worries about gerrymandering entirely. They do this by giving a
principled characterization of acceptable constraints on the selection of a meaning-fixing the-
ory: any constraint must be, or be derived from, general theoretical virtues.
6I emphasize that a ‘pure’ causal theory of reference is not susceptible to this criticism: since it identifies the
reference relation with such-and-such a causal relation, the theorist can legitimately say “reference just is causal
relation C”, without the appearance of gerrymandering. It is interesting to note that Putnam’s (1980) criticism of
Field (1972) focuses, not on the notorious ‘just more theory’ gambit, but on the putative need for an explanation
of such identities. See also Field (1975) and Putnam (1978b) for further discussion.
7Compare Lewis (1984).
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8.2 Simplicity and eligibility
David Lewis is committed both to interpretationism (1974a; 1975), and to rejecting radical
inscrutability of lexical meaning (1984). Therefore, he must find a flaw in the arguments for
radical inscrutability. Lewis’ response is to say that ceteris paribus, selected semantic theories
must be more ‘eligible’ than their rivals, where for one theory to be more eligible than another
is for it to configure more ‘natural’ vocabulary.8 The thought is that the ‘twisted’ reference
schemes used to argue for radical inscrutability will typically be very much less eligible than
the ‘standard’ ones. The property (running)φ—holding of all φ-images of runners—picks out a
class of items less naturally unified than the running itself. Eligibility constraints thus favour
standard valuations over their permuted variants.
What is to favour this kind of move over the imposition of causal constraints? One might
argue over the details, for example citing the potential applicability of the eligibility response to
cases of abstract reference. However, the deeper worry is that it is a fundamentally ad hoc ma-
neuver. Assuming that this is intended to be a version of interpretationism, then we must answer
the question why eligibility should be a constraint on selecting the meaning-fixing theory.
We can find in other areas of Lewis’ philosophy the resources for arguing that the eligibility
constraint can be derived from better known theoretical virtues, and so finesse the charge of
ad-hocery. For Lewis, I argue, eligibility is implicit in the theoretical virtue of simplicity.9
In this half of the chapter I argue that the Lewisian response to inscrutability arguments is
composed of three moves. Firstly, correct semantic theory is the best one that accounts for the
relevant data (interpretationism). Secondly, fitting with the data is but one kind of theoretical
virtue a theory can have; other virtues, such as simplicity, can make one theory better than
another (the denial of BEST=FIT). And thirdly, one aspect of simplicity is to be analyzed by
8i.e. for its primitive vocabulary to pick out more ‘natural’ facts.
9We could alternatively defend eligibility across the board as an independently motivated theoretical virtue.
This would involve separating eligibility from those other elements that I regard as involved in the overall account
of simplicity, and reserve the term ‘simplicity’ only for the latter. If one preferred this route, then one could use the
considerations below to argue for the need for the theoretical virtue of simplicity to be supplemented by eligibility,
and hence defend eligibility as a non-derivative theoretical virtue. I regard dispute on this point as essentially
terminological.
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appeal to objectively natural (‘elite’ or ‘sparse’) properties. We shall see that when we put these
together, Lewis’ eligibility response follows.
I begin by setting out the second and third components, as they emerge in Lewis’ discussion
of laws of nature.10
Additional junk and scientific laws
Consider the ultimate theory T of microphysics, one which gives accurate predictions of the
behaviour of all subatomic particles. Contrast T with the theory T ′, which is just like T except
for the addition of a ‘redundant’ natural law: one which generates no new predictions about par-
ticular matters of fact. (Suppose that it governs the behaviour of particles under nomologically
impossible circumstances: what an atom would do if it travelled faster than light, for example.
Since no actual particles meet the conditions (we will suppose), both the putative law and its
negation are consistent with all the local matters of fact that the world supplies.)
If there were basic facts about the world that did not concern local matters about the dis-
tribution of fundamental properties in space and time—for example, if there were robust ‘law-
making facts’ of the kind that Armstrong (1983) postulates—then whether T or T ′ is the correct
theory of the world would be settled by correspondence to reality.
Some theorists do not wish to postulate law-making exotica, however. For these theorists,
the truth-makers for scientific theories must be found in the arrangement of matters of particular
fact, rather than in abstruse ontology. Call this view Humeanism.
As we have already indicated, T and T ′ fit the matters of particular fact exactly as well as
one another. If in order for a scientific theory to be true, given Humeanism, it has just to fit
with matters of particular fact, then there is no distinguishing T and T ′. Call this the argument
from additional junk: it threatens to show that Humeanism about laws of nature will make it
indeterminate whether or not the redundant law included in T ′ holds.
10Lewis himself notes the analogy between his treatment of laws of nature and his eligibility response to in-
scrutability arguments in (Lewis, 1983a), but this is not pursued in much detail.
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The response of the Humeans is that there is more to being a good theory of some range of
data, than simply being consistent with that data. Fitting with the appropriate range of data is a
virtue of a theory, but there are other considerations besides. Among the additional virtues, for
example, are simplicity (how economical and parsimonious the theory is); and strength (how
many claims the theory commits itself to, and how much of the data it predicts). For Humeans
such as Lewis (1986d, pp.xi-xii), to be the correct scientific theory of a range of data, is to be
the best theory of that data, where the best theory is one that has the optimal combination of
simplicity, strength, and fit.
With the generalized notion of ‘best theory’ in place, we have a recipe for resolving the puz-
zle over T and T ′. Since T ′ is just T plus additional junk, it is less simple than T . Moreover, this
loss of simplicity is not compensated by any gain in predicative power (strength) or descriptive
adequacy (fit). T is the better theory, hence (if these are the only candidates we are to consider)
it is the correct theory. The threat of indeterminacy from ‘additional junk’ vanishes.
Simplicity and Naturalness
What makes for simplicity? As noted earlier, some regard simplicity as fundamentally a projec-
tive of our subjective appraisal of a theory. In the current setting, however, this would amount
to adding a subjective component to the account of what fixes the laws of nature. Surely this
would undermine the objectivity of scientific laws. In response to this worry, Lewis (partially)
analyzes the notion of theoretical simplicity in terms of objective features of the theory.
The first thing that strikes one about the ‘junky’ theory T ′ is simply that it contains an extra
axiom. That is, the theory is syntactically more complex. To address this, count a theory as
simpler if it has fewer, and syntactically less complex, axioms.
This alone cannot resolve our puzzle. Consider, for example, the single property: being
such that T ′ holds. Let the predicate ‘P’ denote this property. Now consider the theory T ′′,
which consists of the single axiom, ∃xPx. In syntactic terms, it is clearly simpler than T , and
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arguably matches it for strength and fit.11 Obviously we do not want it to be the best overall
scientific theory, or the whole enterprise will be trivialized.
We can distinguish between relatively natural properties: having spin 1/2; being green;
being an animal etc.; from relatively unnatural properties: being thought of by somebody,
being grue (being green prior to t, blue after t); being the mereological sum of the left half
of a human and the right half of a donkey; being such that T ′ is true. At the limit, we can
distinguish the perfectly natural or fundamental properties from all the rest. Lewis insists that,
in evaluating a scientific theory for simplicity, the primitives of a scientific theory must pick
out these fundamental properties—the basic furniture of the world.12 Once this is done, we can
fairly compare theories according to their syntactic complexity.
In order for this to contribute to an objective (partial) analysis of simplicity in terms of
syntactic complexity, we need to postulate an objective distinction between elite properties and
abundant rubbish (I discuss this below).13 If the metaphysics stands up, we can cash out at
least some of our claims about one theory’s being simpler than another in non-subjectivist, non-
relativist terms. All else equal, one theory will be simpler than another if the first is syntactically
less complex than the second, when each is spelled out in fundamental microphysical terms. In
particular, then, we can make the case that T ′ is less simple than T .
Naturalness and eligibility
Now let us turn back to the case of semantic facts. The situation is analogous to the one facing
the Humean about natural laws. Various theories were available, all of which fit the relevant
11See Lewis (1983a). The case is not decisive. For although the single axiom ∃xPx entails T ′, it has little deduc-
tive power. What we say about it will depend, therefore, on whether we characterize ‘power’ of a theory through
its logical consequences, or through its entailments. This should not affect the point about interpretationism being
made below, though.
12I take it that for Lewis this includes basic metaphysical notions like mereological and logical notions (or
constitution relations, if one’s metaphysics includes such things) as well as the basic notions of microphysics.
13A classic defense of the need for an objective distinction, and advocacy of one particular form that such a
distinction might take, is Armstrong (1978a,b). Lewis (1983a, 1986c, §1.5) argues for the utility of the distinc-
tion, and canvasses several forms that it might take, without endorsing any particular account. Armstrong (1989)
is a more recent survey and evaluation of the options. van Fraassen (1989a) disputes the entire framework of
inegalitarianism concerning properties.
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range of basic facts; and an unacceptable indeterminacy threatens. It is attractive to respond just
as we did in the case of scientific theories—we hold that fit is but one among several theoretical
virtues. To be the best account of sentential data, a theory needs also to optimize the other
theoretical virtues: in particular, simplicity.
Now recall Lewis’ objectivistic (partial) analysis of the simplicity of a theory. Strictly, we
look at how syntactically complex the theory is when spelled out in primitive terms, where these
are constrained to refer to perfectly natural properties. Usually, we would formulate a semantic
theory by including axioms such as:
‘is an atom’ applies to something if and only if it is an atom.
To evaluate the simplicity of a theory in Lewis’ style, we have to replace the term ‘atom’ as it
is used by the theory (i.e. on the right hand side of the above biconditional) by a definition of
this property in terms of the fundamental properties of physical science. This must be done, not
only for scientific discourse, but also for the general run of natural language expressions: “is
red”, “is a human”, “is running”, etc.14
Equivalently, though, we might assign a ‘degree of eligibility’ to each property—a measure
that reflects how long a definition of that property would be, if spelt out in primitive terms.
The degree of eligibility of a property gives a measure of how much complexity is added to the
overall theory by an axiom that uses that property. This means that the syntactic complexity of
the original theory, plus the degrees of eligibility of the properties it uses, together will sum to
the syntactic complexity of the theory when spelled out in primitive terms.
We can then restate the result as follows: a semantic theory will be simpler to the extent that
it assigns more eligible extensions to the primitive predicates of the object-language.
What we have reached is exactly Lewis’ ‘eligibility’ response to the inscrutability argu-
ments.15 First, we have the view of interpretationism as ‘best’ (i.e. highest-scoring) theory,
14How could this possibly be done? See the following section for discussion.
15Lewis states that he owes the idea to Merrill (1980).
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where eligibility is one of the factors relevant to gaining a high score:
Only if we have an independent, objective distinction among properties, and we
impose the presumption in favour of eligible content a priori as a constitutive con-
straint, does the problem of interpretation have any solution at all. . . . [C]ontenthood
just consists in getting assigned by a high-scoring interpretation, so it’s inevitable
that contents tend to have what it takes to make for high scores. . . . I’ve suggested
that part of what it takes is naturalness of the properties involved.
(Lewis, 1983a, pp.54-55)16
Second, we have the view of eligibility as determined by the syntactic complexity of definitions
of a property in perfectly natural terms:
Physics discovers which things and classes are the most elite of all; but others
are elite also, though to a lesser degree. The less elite are so because they are
connected to the most elite by chains of definability. Long chains, by the time we
reach the moderately elite classes of cats and pencils and puddles; but the chains
required to reach the utterly ineligible would be far longer still.
(Lewis, 1984, p.66)17
If I am right in this interpretation, then Lewis has the resources to answer the general chal-
lenge of ad hoc-ery in his appeal to eligibility.
In the remainder of this section I will consider a number of worries. The first three are
exegetical, questioning the plausibility of my interpretation of Lewis. I maintain that the deriva-
tion of the eligibility response just sketched is of interest independently of any relation to the
views of Lewis or anyone else, for it shows how the eligibility response flows from the core
interpretationist proposal, rather than being tagged on as an ad hoc side constraint. However, I
am also prepared to argue the exegetical case, and do so below. After dealing with these issues,
I turn to more substantive worries.
16Page references are to the version collected in Lewis (1999).
17Page references are to the version collected in Lewis (1999).
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Three exegetical worries.
Worry 1: primitive naturalness as a rival account
I claim that Lewis identifies the simplicity of a theory with its syntactical complexity,
when spelled out in primitive terms. The passages above appear to support this (e.g. “The
less elite are so because they are connected to the most elite by chains of definability”).
However, in general Lewis is fairly non-specific about exactly what makes for eligibility.
One might think that there are other options that are more plausible.
Here is an instance. Lewis considers taking as a metaphysical primitive the notion of
the ‘relative naturalness’ of one property over another. And indeed, when discussing the
eligibility response in his (1983a), he says that it is in connection to language that we
‘most need’ such a gradable notion of naturalness (p.48)18. Perhaps, then, eligibility of
a theory is not a matter of its syntactic complexity when expressed in perfectly natural
terms; it is rather a matter of the relative naturalness of the terms in which a theory is
formulated.
I think that this is a dubious view, however. To begin with, eligibility is a relation between
theories, not among properties directly. What is being contemplated is using the relative
naturalness of properties, in effect, to induce an ordering of naturalness among the sets of
properties that feature in the theory. This puts substantial pressure on the kind of primitive
naturalness required. For example, a mere ordering of properties as more or less natural
does not look a promising basis for an adequate ordering of sets of properties—what we
need to get a grip on the relative naturalness of two sets of properties is a measure of the
naturalness of the properties.
Not all the ways of analyzing natural properties that Lewis (1983a) considers can support
such rich materials. Indeed, ontological inegalitarianism, appealing to a theory of sparse
universals or tropes, looks able to sustain only the idea of a distinction between perfectly
natural properties (those corresponding to universals) and the rest. Though this is suf-
18Page references are to the version collected in Lewis (1999).
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ficient to ground the kind of analysis of eligibility I suggested, it would not ground the
highly complex metric seemingly needed for the rival view. Since Lewis is officially neu-
tral between these rival analyses of naturalness, I find the suggestion that his treatment of
semantic theories is straightforwardly incompatible with the ontological inegalitarianism
just mentioned exegetically implausible.
Indeed, the only view Lewis mentions that does seem compatible with having grades of
naturalness—taking the second order relational property being natural to degree n as a
metaphysical primitive ideology—is independently objectionable within a Lewisian treat-
ment of abundant properties.19 Lewis treats such properties and relations as set-theoretic
constructs.20 There are however, multiple equally good ways of reducing ordered sets to
unordered sets;21 and so it seems that there will be an irreducible element of arbitrariness
as to which sets of sets will represent relations such as is the father of. However, if some
non-symmetric relation is perfectly natural, to what entity does the primitive second order
property ‘perfectly natural’ or ‘natural to degree d’ attach—the Weiner set theoretic con-
struction or the Kuratowski one? Neither option seems motivated, and no other suggests
itself .22
Worry 2: new vocabulary
The second worry is that semantic theory is not comparable to case of laws of nature. In
that paradigm case, all the terms of theory are constrained to pick out perfectly natural
properties, and the theory must be true, so interpreted. However, in the case at hand, there
is an element of the theory—the semantic notions—that are not interpreted. Unlike in the
paradigm case we are not picking a ‘best formulation’ amongst a variety of true theories.
19The following objection is due to Armstrong (1986) and Forrest (1986). For extensive and persuasive discus-
sion of the concern, see Sider (1996b).
20Lewis (1986c, pt.1)
21The famous reductions are by Wiener (1914) and Kuratowski (1921). See §3.5 for a brief discussion.
22Taking relations as sui generis primitive ontology is one option, if not an attractive one. One would then have
to face the concerns outlined in Dorr (2004). On the other hand, if one follows Dorr’s recommendations, and
avoids non-symmetric relations in ones fundamental ontology and ideology, then naturalness-Primitivism may be
an option once more. By this stage, though, ambitions of using it to define ‘degrees of naturalness’ have been
dashed.
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The appropriate response here, exegetically, is to point to Lewis’ fullest best-system anal-
ysis of laws of nature—one accommodating chancy laws (Lewis, 1994a). Lewis thought
positing primitive ‘chance’ facts was objectionable. However, he had no wish to exclude
primitive chance talk in formulating laws of nature, in the light of its use within physical
science, and in particular within quantum mechanics. His solution was to hold a compe-
tition between partially interpreted theories featuring an uninterpreted notion of chance.
Just as with semantic theory, the constraint could not be that the theories as a whole match
the microphysical facts, since there are no chance-facts to match. Instead, Lewis uses an
appropriate notion of ‘fit’ with the facts (together with other theoretical virtues) to pick
the successful theory.23 This treatment of ‘new properties’ is analogous to the reduction
of semantic properties in the case of the designated semantic theory. I contend that it
shows that there is no problem of principle in regarding interpretationism as a ‘Humean’
theory of semantic facts, in the Lewisian sense.
Worry 3: Humeanism
I am suggesting, in effect, that Lewis’ attitude to semantic facts is a straightforward ex-
tension of his Humean account of laws of nature. Lewis himself, though, did not extend a
Humean account to any arena other than fundamental physics (Nolan, 2005, pp.10,86-7).
Isn’t it implausible that he did so in this case?
The point that Lewis is concerned primarily with a Humean account of fundamental laws
of nature is well taken: the question is whether there is any obstacle in principle to ex-
tending this to the special sciences. Indeed, the factor just mentioned, the introduction
of novel vocabulary—marks a major difference between Humean accounts of laws as
they were formulated in Lewis (1986d), around the time when Lewis was setting out his
metasemantic views. As just discussed, given the later development of Lewis (1994a),
this no longer marks a departure.
23cf. Elga (2004) for discussion. I regard Lewis’ story as giving a quasi-fictionalist reduction of chance talk to
the non-chancy ‘Humean mosaic’.
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More substantively I do not see why his account should be in tension with the broader
project of Humean accounts of the laws of special science more generally, given by the
best theory (possibly involving new properties) of a range of independently legitimated
data. In particular, an account of the laws of special science could be fed into Lewis’
theory of counterfactuals (Lewis, 1973b) to deal with ‘counter-legal’ conditionals that are
otherwise highly problematic.24
Indeed, Humeanism might be seen as more attractive in the context of the laws of special
sciences, than in the context of the fundamental laws of nature. Armstrong (1983) favours
robust law-making facts in microphysics, but equally he adopts a sparse conception of
facts, and is not friendly to the idea of emergent facts special to psychology, economics
or semantics that would be needed to generalize the law-makers account of laws to special
sciences. Equally the Armstrongian objections to Humeanism seem less pressing in these
contexts.
24The problem is that Lewis cashes out counterfactuals in terms of similarity between situations, and similarity
partially in terms of laws. If the only laws around, then, are laws of microphysics, it will be difficult to account
for such true counterlegals such as ‘If cows were as small as atoms, we wouldn’t be able to see them’. However, if
we have an account of the laws of biology, we can stick with Lewis’ original law-based analysis of similarity, and
handle such phenomena. (There are, of course, more recalcitrant counterlegals, such as “were gravity to obey an
inverse-fourth law. . . ”. A partial account of counterlegals is far better than no account at all).
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8.3 Six objections to Lewis’ eligibility response.
In this section, I shall describe and briefly respond to six objections to the eligibility response to
inscrutability. Not all of these have satisfactory answers. We shall, in the next section, develop
in more detail a worry which gives a more precise focus to the most serious of these concerns,
and suggest a alternation of Lewis’ framework that will allow the difficulty to be resolved—at
a cost.
Objection 1: Inegalitarianism Lewis’ response presupposes an ontology of ‘perfectly natural
properties’. This ‘inegalitarianism’ is unacceptable. (van Fraassen, 1989a, 1997).
Reply 1: To undermine Lewis’ eligibility response, one would have to argue either that there
is no division between more or less natural properties (what Hirsch (1993) calls property
‘egalitarianism’), or to say that such a division is mind- or language-dependent, so that
invoking it would vitiate the reductive metasemantic ambitions. (One could also object to
the idea of perfectly natural terms—see the next objection).
Beyond these minimal conditions, the eligibility response can be neutral on the kind of
property inegalitarianism being invoked. It might be unpacked ontologically—in terms
of sparse universals or tropes; or in terms of additional ideology—primitive naturalness
of properties, or primitive contrastive resemblance between individuals.
Lewis himself cites all the above treatments. However, if our interest is solely on the
eligibility response, we can be neutral in several areas where Lewis is committal. We can
hold that the natural properties have their nomic or causal roles essentially for example,
instead of holding Lewis’ view whereby it is possible for any property to play any role
Lewis (forthcoming). We can hold that sparse property ontology consists of world-bound
entities, rather than trans-world individuals.25
25For discussion of Lewis’ views on properties, and alternatives, see Lewis (1986c), Lewis (typescript) and
Schaffer (2005)
If our concern is with linguistic content alone, in the context of a head-first theory, then we could even appeal
to attitudinal states in characterizing natural properties without immediately introducing circularity. However,
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Objection 2: The onion objection Even given a distinction between more or less natural prop-
erties, are we entitled to the assumption that there are perfectly natural properties?
Reply 2: Consider the following scenario, derived from Armstrong (1978b, ch.15). It is fa-
miliar that atomic nuclei are composed of protons and neutrons, and these in their turn
are composed of quarks. What if this process of decomposition went on for ever? What
if every property P were decomposable into more basic properties Q,Q′ in the way that
being a hydrogen atom is decomposable into properties such as being a proton and being
a neutron? Call such a scenario an onion world.
Would there be perfectly natural properties in an onion world? One line of thought would
have it that there each layer of microstructure is more natural than the one above it. If
this is the case, then there would indeed by no ‘most natural’ properties.
This description of the case is not mandatory, however. Suppose we think of the case as
one where every universal is structural, composed in the relevant way from universals at
the level below. Each universal is then ‘infinitely structural’ (compare Lewis, 1986a). Al-
ternatively we could have each ‘level’ featuring emergent universals—simple universals
that perhaps nomologically covary with those at ‘lower levels’. It seems quite moti-
vated, when we come to read off property naturalness from the ontology of universals,
that we count all properties that are ‘united’ by a universal (whether simple, complex or
structural) as perfectly natural in the relevant sense. If so, onion worlds have a relative
abundance of perfectly natural properties, rather than none at all.
Objection 3: Can we give an adequate explication of the notion of syntactic complexity?
Reply 3: The natural first move would be to count the number of connectives involved in the
theory, axiomatized as a single sentence (this will have application, therefore, only to
Lewis (1983a, 1994b) also wishes to appeal to eligibility within an account of mental content, which would end up
blatantly circular. (For an alternative take on mental content, in terms sympathetic to Lewis, see Stalnaker (1984).)
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finitary theories).26 Sider (1995) objects (1) that disjunctions should count for more com-
plexity than conjunctions (2) that there may be no way of singling out the privileged class
of connectives allowed in the definitions. The latter point does not seem over worrying.
Two-place connectives and the array of logical quantifiers (perhaps of higher orders) seem
perfectly adequate to the task at hand.
The former point seems to presuppose that the assessment of a theory as more or less
eligible should track the intuitive idea of a class of properties as overall more or less nat-
ural. I think, however, that we should divorce eligibility from naturalness. The eligibility
of a property is a measure, not of its naturalness, but exactly of the complexity it adds
to a theory. The case for counting disjunctions as detracting from eligibility more than
conjunctions relies on the conflation of these two issues.27
Objection 4: Optimality A general worry about Humean accounts is that they appeal, not only
to individual virtues like simplicity, strength and fit, but also to a notion of an ‘optimal
combination’ of those to arrive at the overall ‘goodness’ of a theory. What is this addi-
tional ‘optimizing’ primitive and how is it justified?
Reply 4: The general worry affects all Humean accounts of laws.28 One concessive move here
is to relativize the sense of ‘best’ involved. We would be unable to say that a given theory
was best simpliciter, but only that it was best relative to a particular way w of balancing
virtues. Likewise, we would have a plentitude of possible paraphrases, playing on the
various relativized notions of ‘best’: and the utility of the paraphrases is then a matter of
26Notice also that we should not allow arbitrary n-adic connectives in formulating the theory, else we could
reduce complexity simply by using single rich connectives. The solution within the spirit of the eligibility response
is to postulate ‘sparse’ universals for logical connectives as well as for non-logical properties, and demand the
theory be formulated entirely in ontologically privileged terms. Thanks to Kit Fine for pressing me on this point.
27A conflation, it has to be said, that Lewis does much to encourage. Nevertheless, I maintain that the best
reading of Lewis’ work separates these two notions—see the exegetical comments above.
28The introduction to Lewis (1986d) considers this worry and declares it an unattractive feature of Humeanism
about laws. One idea there seems to be to treat optimality as fixed by our dispositions to treat something as
optimal. If so, then mental content (specifically, regarding combinations of virtues as optimal) are presupposed in
any broadly Humean account of laws. This may be a worry for interpretationism, though once again a head-first
theory may help out. It is a hugely more difficult challenge within the overall Lewisian programme of ‘Humean
Supervenience’ (Lewis, 1986d, introduction), since mental content is not supposed to be involved in picking out
laws of nature (and so the counterfactuals and related notions that are supposedly used to fix mental content).
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which discharges the appropriate theoretical function. One would then hope that much
the same facts would be vindicated on all but crazy ways of balancing the virtues, so that
particular choices wouldn’t matter much.
The ‘realist’ alternative is to treat ‘best theory’ as a basic kind of ‘structured’ virtue, with
simplicity, power, fit etc. as its structural parts. After all, there are many cases where
a ‘compound’ virtue intuitively arises from the balancing of component virtues (e.g. on
the weighting of considerations on an objective list account of morality) and it seems a
major step to declare every such case infected with subjectivity. This realism allows us to
formulate Humeanism, explain the relevance of eligibility and the other theoretical virtues
to the determination of best theory, and avoid accusations of subjectivity or circularity.
The realism comes in reductive or non-reductive versions. A non-reductive version would
hold that there is no informative description of the way in which the structural parts
are balanced to determine the overall virtue. The overall virtue is therefore sui generis:
a strictly additional metaphysical commitment. A reductive version would attempt an
informative characterization, perhaps drawing on related work within the philosophy of
science in relating simplicity and fit in the evaluation of curve-fitting.
Objection 5: Vagueness Vagueness pervades natural language. Absent ontic vagueness (in
disrepute through much of the philosophical community) how can a basis of precise per-
fectly natural properties allow one to define the extension of a vague predicate?29
Reply 5: There are two worries that can be extracted from the above question. The first ques-
tions whether we have any hope of combining the eligibility response with a treatment of
vague language. The second grants that there are treatments of vague language consis-
tent with the eligibility response, but holds that the eligibility response pushes us towards
unattractive treatments.
The first objection presupposes that the perfectly natural properties are precise. If the
29Thanks here to Elizabeth Barnes for pressing this point.
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perfectly natural properties are, as Lewis holds, found at the level of microphysics, this
is plausible.30 However, if the distribution of universals is more liberal—if there are
universals at a macro-level, for example—then the situation is less clear. I shall not press
this point, however, as it is somewhat unclear what a semantics for a language involving
reference to vague properties would look like.31
On an epistemicist approach to vagueness, such as that advocated Williamson (1994),
there is similarly no problem of mismatch between the range of basic properties and a
vague language. For the epistemicist, a vague language can have an absolutely precise
semantics. Another option is to analyze vagueness as a kind of inscrutability. In that
case, all the semantic theories will be perfectly precise, and the vagueness will consist in
indecision over which is selected. Some cases of ‘vague language’, broadly construed,
are easily handled within this setting (e.g. the “mass” case of Field (1973)) but more
paradigmatically vague terms (degree vague examples such as ‘red’, ‘bald’ and ‘heap’)
are more difficult. For progress towards a metasemantic treatment of such terms, see
Rayo (2004).32 The final response would be to develop a special semantic treatment of
vague language, perhaps in the sophisticated supervaluational setting of Fine (1975) or
Kamp (1975). In the present context, these would need to be formulated ultimately in
perfectly precise terms.33
There are, therefore, extant approaches to vague language compatible with the framework
of the eligibility response. The most that the present setup could be accused of is com-
mitting itself to one or another of a variety of ambitious positions in the philosophy of
vagueness.
30Though see Barnes (2005).
31Two thoughts: first, one might appeal to (metaphysically) vague sets. Or, one could formulate semantics
in terms of precise sets, and pick out certain extensions as ‘basic’ if they ‘precisify’ the metaphysically vague
property, and then run the eligibility story with ‘basic’ in place of ‘perfectly natural’.
32Lewis (1969) takes a ‘metasemantic’ approach (see the discussion in the appendix to Lewis (1970a)). Burns
(1991) tries to defend this approach, and is criticized in Keefe (2000, ch.6.). Eklund (2005) compares semantic
and metasemantic treatments of vagueness, and Rayo (2004) develops a metasemantic proposal explicitly aimed
at underpinning vague language, using Lewisian notion of degrees of conventionality.
33For opposition to this, see Keefe (2000, ch.8); for a defence see ?, p.123-5.
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The second line of objection is interesting. A sophisticated supervaluational semantics for
a vague language is going to involve much greater complexity than the straightforward
classical semantic theories that correspond to its ‘sharpenings’. Given this, it looks as if
on grounds of eligibility, classical semantic theories will always do better than their more
sophisticated rivals.34
The natural thought is to look to other factors that counterbalance the difference in eli-
gibility. For example, if supervaluational proposals are better than classical theories in
predicative power or fit with the data, then the question of which is to be preferred is
open. To evaluate the claim, we would need both a more developed account of the theo-
retical virtue of fit/predicative power,35 and a way of reading off what the predications of
classical theories/supervaluational theories are when filtered through an appropriate the-
ory of competence and pragmatics. It is obvious, then, that the eligibility response offers
no easy arguments for favouring classical over supervaluational semantic treatments of
vague languages. However, if we worked through the details, and found that one over-
all package worked better than the other, I would not be unhappy to take that as a good
reason for favouring the victor as the appropriate semantic treatment of vague language.
Objection 6: Reductive Presuppositions The eligibility response supposes that there are ‘long
chains of definition’ for each property. Unless these definitional chains are finite, we will
not have finitary theories to compare for syntactic complexity. The claim that in general
such ‘reductive’ definitions are available seems extremely ambitious.36
Reply 6: Some of the hardest challenges here are really part of the problem of vagueness men-
tioned above. Finite definability of ‘red’ in terms of perfectly natural properties seems
34Notice that the ‘vagueness-related’ supervaluationism should be distinguished from the ‘inscrutability-related’
supervaluationism of §3.1: these are two different deployments of the same theory. Essentially, the kind of super-
valuationism we are here considering is one where the supervaluational theory is put forward as a competitor in the
race for best theory. The supervaluational setting was used to ‘encapsulate’ all the successful (classical) candidate
semantic theories to form a single overall meaning-fixing theory.
35Rothschild and Leuenberger (cite) suggest that the degree of fit of an interpretationist theory with its data
might be based on a general account of ‘truthlikeness’ of theories.
36Sider (1995) raises this concern.
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hard; finite definability of ‘having surface spectral reflectance profile P’ (which we may
suppose to be a candidate for red-ness) is less so. We need only provide finite reductions
for the salient candidate properties.
What is being presupposed is the disjunction: reductionism-or-emergentism. Wherever
there are no finite chains of definability linking basic microphysics with a given property
(‘life’ as it may be), we will need other perfectly natural properties that do allow for fi-
nite definability. In the context of an Armstrongian theory of universals, this amounts to
‘emergent’ sparse universals, of the kind that Armstrong allows for, but dislikes (Arm-
strong, 1978b, pp.69-71). What is ruled out is an attitude where properties ‘merely super-
vene’ on others, without being reducible in some stronger sense37 In such scenarios, we
would need to postulate emergent perfectly natural properties, or admit defeat.
The issues here are deep. ‘Merely supervening’ properties are something with which ev-
eryone should be uncomfortable: unexplained supervenience seems a metaphysical mys-
tery. Without addressing this general question, there are cases which pose more direct
difficulties. I have argued that one can give reductive paraphrases without being com-
mitted to reductive identifications or definitions. Theory shadowing paraphrases, such as
that for ‘reference’ itself are a case in point. Such paraphrases were supposed to render
supervenience on the properties involved in the base language unmysterious; but it is far
from clear that they allow the possibility of finitary definition.
Of our six objections, the first three (inegalitarianism, the onion objection, and syntactic
complexity) can be finessed without great cost. The latter three pose a more substantial chal-
lenge. In the case of optimality, one might adopt either a reductive or non-reductive realism;
the core point being to resist subjectivism (resolving the problem, moreover, is something that
is required by Humeanism about natural laws in any case). In the case of vagueness, there is at
least a programmatic response.
37Chalmers (1996) endorses such notions as a kind of reductivism.
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The biggest worry by far is over the plausibility of finite definability. However, even this
case is not clear-cut.
The situation is dissatisfying. The presumption built into Lewis’ eligibility response that
every property (or property-candidate) we refer to admits of finite reductive definition seems
wildly overambitious. However, it is not clear how to turn this strong feeling into a focused
objection to the proposal. In second half of this chapter, I will develop a more detailed objection
to the eligibility response, based on inadequacy to its basic task: eliminating the threat posed
by inscrutability arguments.
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8.4 Eligibility and emergence
I want to outline a prima facie case that the eligibility response to inscrutability arguments is
unsustainable unless a substantial metaphysical constraint is met. We already know that it is
committed to property inegalitarianism. I shall argue that unless there are ‘perfectly natural’
properties at a relatively macroscopic level, then there are possible worlds macroscopically
indistinguishable from our own, where an ‘arithmetical’ interpretation (where all singular terms
denote numbers) is determinately better than the ‘intended’ interpretation (call such a situation
‘Pythagorean’). Further, for all we know, our actual world could be Pythagorean—so we lose
our claim to semantic knowledge.
I shall first briefly discuss the way of marking the divide between natural and non-natural
properties in terms of which the discussion will be framed. I shall then point to a gap in
the case against inscrutability: as direct rebuttal, the eligibility response is dialectically effec-
tive only against ‘parasitic’ arguments for radical inscrutability, and not against the complete-
ness/compactness style arguments described in §5.4. Turning then to the global descriptivist
form of interpretationism, I describe how to construct a finitary ‘arithmetical interpretation’ of
the language, and use this to argue for the existence of Pythagorean worlds mentioned above. I
finish by outlining the impact of this result, and the way that appeal to emergent universals (or
equivalent machinery within other forms of property inegalitarianism) can resolve matters.
I frame this discussion in terms of a particular way of spelling out property inegalitarianism—
a theory of sparse universals—although I think that the discussion can be reconstructed in the
other frameworks also.
Universals
Armstrong (1978b, 1989) gives a vivid characterization of a certain kind of property ontology,
that of Universals. These are to be objective existants, multiply located through space and
time, incapable of existing uninstantiated, and wholly present at the location where they are
instantiated. Such ontological characterizations as yet say nothing about the distribution of
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universals. A central part of Armstrong’s view is that universals are relatively scarce. There
may be a universal being a Chimpanzee, but there will be no universal not being a Chimpanzee;
nor will there be a universal being a Chimpanzee or being a Gorilla.
Call a theory of universals sparse if by its lights there are no disjunctive universals, no
negative universals and the like. A sparse theory then allows us to draw a distinction between
the ‘merely abundant’ properties and the ‘natural’ ones, the latter being those holding of all and
only the instantiators of some universal. All the theories of universals discussed here will be
sparse in this sense.
Call a theory of universals ultra-sparse if the only universals that exist are those correspond-
ing to the basic notions of microphysics: SPIN UP, CHARGE -1, and the rest.
Following Armstrong (1978b, pp. 69-71 ), I will call a universal emergent if it is a simple
universal at a relatively high level: corresponding to the framework notions of chemistry, bi-
ology, psychology, for example. Emergent universals are to be distinguished, therefore, from
structural universals, which within the Armstrongian theory, hold of relatively complex entities
through (somehow) being ‘composed of’ more basic universals instantiated by the parts of the
complex. being H20 might be a structural universal; whereas if there is a universal being an
animal, then it is likely to be an emergent.
A theory that incorporates emergent universals will be sparse, but not ultra-sparse. It may
for example admit simple universals for chemical, biological and psychological kinds. Emer-
gentism, for the purposes of this paper, is the thesis that there are universals for scientific kinds
outwith microphysics. As such, it is rejected by both Armstrong (1978b) and by Lewis (1983a).
It seems quite generally inconsistent with the position known as microphysicalism.
I want to emphasize three things about the framework here being used:
1. Emergence, as here used, is an entirely ontological matter. Often emergent properties are
characterized epistemologically, in terms of their predictability from a ‘lower-level’ basis.
That is not the case here.
2. I am neutral on the connections between arrangements of higher and lower level uni-
versals. There may be supervenience relationships between the distributions—and these
might hold with metaphysical necessity, or the weaker nomic necessity.
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3. I am neutral about some aspects of the nature of universals: whether or not they are
‘cross-world’ or rather ‘world-bound’ entities (Lewis, 1986c); and whether or not they
have their nomic or causal roles essentially.
There are various reasons why one might wish to buy into emergent universals. One line
of argument would focus on ‘old work’ for a theory of universals: their use in accounting for
objective resemblance between things, in giving a framework for singular causation, and in pro-
viding a Realist account of laws of nature, and so forth (cf. Armstrong, 1978b, 1983, passim).
If one wishes to make room for genuine macroscopic similarity, macroscopic causation, macro-
scopic laws and the like, under the universals-based analysis of these notions, it seems unlikely
one will be able to do without emergent universals. Schaffer (2004) argues for emergence on
exactly these grounds.
On the other hand, many find putative covariation of wholly distinct and metaphysical basic
entities deeply mysterious. It is also hard to see how to avoid metaphysical vagueness, unless we
restrict universals to the most fundamental microphysical kinds (cf. Barnes, 2005). As already
noted, emergence contravenes the systematic reductive microphysicalism favoured by some.
As we shall see, the tenability of the eligibility response to inscrutability turns on this highly
controversial metaphysical issue.38
A revenge problem for global descriptivism
Recall the way that eligibility allowed us to respond to permutation arguments for radical in-
scrutability. The appeal to eligibility relied on the parasitic nature of the permuted interpreta-
tions: for all we have said, it looks like the logical distance of being the φ-image of something
that is running from the fundamental set of properties is greater than the logical distance of
being a runner from that set. Our only grip on the twisted properties in terms of which the
38Though I shall present my discussion in terms of Universals, the distinctions just drawn, and the discus-
sion below, can be replayed in terms of other ways of drawing the natural/non-natural distinction: trope theory,
resemblance nominalism, or primitive naturalness, for example. As illustration, an ultra-sparse version of resem-
blance nominalism would have objective resemblance relations holding only between basic microphysical entities.
Emergent Universals correspond to primitive relations of resemblance holding between relatively complex objects,
allowing the picking out of natural properties at a relatively macroscopic level.
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new interpretation is formulated, is derivative from the untwisted ones. We therefore have no
reason to think that there is any way, in general, of characterizing these properties so as to match
the most economical characterization of the original property in fundamental terms. There is a
prima facie case that each twisted interpretation is less eligible than the standard interpretation.
Dialectically, the argument for radical inscrutability fails.
Notice that there is no safety result: no guarantee that every permutation is such that on
average the twisted properties are less eligible than the original. This is brought home by par-
ticular cases where permutation-style arguments plausibly succeed in the teeth of eligibility.
Two cases where this can be argued are automorphic mathematical structures such as the com-
plex numbers; and worlds containing structural symmetries (perhaps rotational or periodic).39
Such limited gaps may not worry the friend of the eligibility response. Limited inscrutability of
reference in these, very specialized, cases, would be far less shocking than radical inscrutability.
However, the situation changes if we use arguments for radical inscrutability that do not have
the parasitic character of the permutation arguments. In particular, the completeness/compactness
argument gives a direct construction of an interpretation matching the intended one at the level
of truth-values or truth-conditions. Thus we have two interpretations, one built up out of a do-
main of arbitrary elements (we might as well take them to be numbers), and we have no grip on
how the syntactic complexities of the two compare.
This should itself disturb the interpretationist. For the inscrutability argument at this point
threatens to issue in stand-off—though the inscrutabilist has as yet no grounds for claiming her
twisted theories match the intended theory on grounds of eligibility, neither does her opponent
have any grounds for denying they do so. The stand-off is unhappy for the interpretationist, for
the aim was to secure scrutable reference, not leave the matter undecided.
In fact, if we turn to the global descriptivist version of interpretationism, we can make the
worry sharp.
39Brandom (1996) and Strawson (1959) respectively, give versions of such arguments.
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The arithmetical interpretation
Suppose we adopt a global descriptivist form of interpretationism. The data constraining se-
mantic theory in this case is a pairing of sentences with truth-values—or equivalently, a “total
theory” that the semantics must render true. “Total theory” recall, was the sum total of all the
platitudes gathered from every walk of life—all the sentences that are too obvious to question.
If total theory is consistent, we know from elementary metalogic that we can find models for
that discourse. Indeed, we have seen in detail in §5.4 how the completeness and compactness
theorems of elementary metalogic give us recipes for constructing models in a systematic way,
even where the language contains higher-order and intentional resources. For simplicity, how-
ever, let us suppose for the time being that total theory can be formulated in first order terms.
We shall now use these resources to develop an argument for what I earlier called Pythagorean
worlds.
We will be considering a case where this “total theory” is consistent with there being only
finitely many things. For example, the total theory cannot commit itself to a plenitude of ab-
stracta, or to infinitely divisible regions of substantival space or time. (If one holds that our folk
theory of the world contains such commitments, consider a more cautious community who are
at best agnostic about such matters). Take the consistent theory that results from adding “there
are exactly n things” for an appropriate n, to total theory.
We can now appeal to our earlier discussion of the completeness based arguments to find
a model whose domain consists of the numbers less than n. Call this the arithmetical model
of total theory. Given this, it will be possible to write down long sentences listing element
by element the objects assigned to a given predicate P. By brute force, then, we arrive at a
description of the model. We can treat this as a semantic theory, whose clauses for predicates
take an inelegant enumerative form.
What we now have available, in principle, is a semantics for total theory, which can be
characterized in perfectly natural terms in some finitary ‘enumerative’ way. Since it is finite,
we can simply read off the syntactical complexity of this theory. Say the syntactical complexity
CHAPTER 8. ELIGIBILITY 271
of the arithmetical interpretation is m.
Now we are in a position to see the danger for the global descriptivist. We have constructed
an interpretation of the language whose elegance (when expressed in perfectly natural terms) is
pegged at a particular natural number m. Moreover, we appealed to nothing about the world in
constructing the model, beyond the fact that the particular total theory T was extracted. Hence,
the same construction will be available in any world where T is total theory.
If the ‘intended’ interpretation for the language in question has greater complexity than m,
when cashed out in perfectly natural terms, we’re done—for both interpretations model global
folk theory (i.e. fit the data) and in the scenario just mentioned, the intended interpretation will
be less eligible than its rival, hence determinately unsuccessful. We may call worlds where the
arithmetical interpretation beats the ‘intended’ interpretation in this way Pythagorean worlds.40
The existence of Pythagorean worlds
I shall now argue that, given the eligibility response to inscrutability and an ultra-sparse theory
of universals of the kind that Lewis favours, there will be Pythagorean worlds.
In our world, let us suppose, atomic nuclei are made out of protons and neutrons, which are
in turn made out of quarks. Only this bottom layer is a repository for universals, on the ultra-
sparse conception. Presumably, that the microstructure of the world takes this shape is meta-
physically contingent. Consider therefore a possible world that replicates ours from the ‘quarks
up’, but in which the quark-counterparts are composed from yet more basic particles, the sub-
quarks. The ultra-sparse conception now places the universals below the quark-counterparts.
We can iterate this procedure, each time adding underlying ‘layers’ to reality. On the ultra-
sparse conception of universals, such underlayering pushes the domain of perfectly natural
properties further and further away from the macroscopic. Moreover, each such iteration de-
creases the eligibility of properties such as being Human, since the long chains of definition
down to the perfectly natural now need extra clauses added.
40Compare Quine (1964).
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Notice, however, that this process allows us to decrease the eligibility of all of the properties
which feature in the ‘intended interpretation’ without limit. For any number N, we can find a
world like ours from the ‘quarks up’ with sufficient micro-structure that the syntactic complexity
of the analogue of the intended interpretation, presented in fundamental terms, is more than N.
In particular, we can choose a world of sufficient micro-structure that the syntactic complexity
of the “intended” interpretation there exceeds the syntactic complexity m of the arithmetical
interpretation. All the worlds we are discussing are like ours from the quarks up, so the same
“total theory” will feature in each. Hence, such worlds will be Pythagorean.
(Note that even if we relax the restriction of the vocabulary of total theory, our case goes
through. First, if we allow higher-order resources, the type theoretic constructions of Henkin
(1950) (described in Appendix B) will allow us to make exactly the same case. If there are
intentional resources present, we need to strengthen our assumption about total theory: we need
to take a case where it is agnostic about whether there is an upper limit on the number of things
that there could possibly be. In such settings, all possibility and tensed claims, etc, should be
able to be rendered true while still allowing the kind of brute enumerative specification of a
model that allowed us to argue for Pythagorean worlds.)
Three problems arising
The result is clearly disturbing. I see at least three direct problems.
First, and most obviously, we have a violation of an extremely intuitive principle that (some)
semantic facts supervene on the macroscopic structure of the world. Worlds that are structurally
like ours, but have different microphysical constituents might well engender twin-earth style
differences in representational content, but there is no precedent for the kind of content change
here envisaged. In particular, A-intensions or linguistic meaning of linguistic items (if one be-
lieves in such things) should supervene on macroscopic structure. In the Pythagorean world,
A-intensions as well as ‘horizontal content’ (C-intensions) are abandoned in favour of exten-
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sions drawn from the natural numbers.41 Here we have a people behaving just as we do, within
a world that is ‘well-behaved’ and just like ours in every detail from the quarks up; yet they
refer to numbers where we refer to the objects around us. The case beggars belief.
Second, the actual world may itself be Pythagorean. The complexity of the arithmetical
interpretation is enormous—but so are the lengths of definitions that would relate macroscopic
structures to fundamental microphysics. I see no grounds for thinking that the first of these
large numbers turns out, in the actual case, to be greater than the second.
Third, even if the actual world turns out to be non-Pythagorean, its being Pythagorean is
a non-sceptical epistemic possibility. One route to this conclusion is just by noting the obser-
vation made above: that we have ourselves have no grounds for confidence that the intended
interpretation will beat the arithmetical interpretation.42
This last conclusion is extremely disturbing. Part of our reason for rejecting radical in-
scrutability in the first place was to preserve epistemic access to semantic facts. We have just
seen considerations to the conclusion that, even if semantic facts do happen to obtain, we have
no reason to think that they do, and consequently no knowledge of any such facts.
Emergence
Notice the crucial role that the ultra-sparse conception of Universals played in the above argu-
ment. Suppose we abandon the ultra-sparse conception in favour of an ‘emergentist’ picture in-
cluding macroscopic universals. On this picture, whatever chemical, biological, and psycholog-
ical emergent universals we have are equally as ‘fundamental’ as microphysical kinds. Hence,
the semantic theories that are compared with each other on grounds of syntactic complexity can
be formulated in relatively macroscopic terms. The logical distance between the properties of
41The point here is that the whole semantic theory—including the functions from contexts to horizontal
content—is to be determined by best fit with appropriate data. In Pythagorean worlds, arithmetical extensions
beat all such theories. Thanks to Bob Stalnaker for pressing me on this point.
42A more powerful, though more controversial route to this conclusion would be via the considerations some
offer for holding that we have no justification for thinking that the actual world ‘stops’ at the level that current
physics has detected (Schaffer, 2003). If this is right, the whole chain of worlds of increasing macro-complexities
that we used to argue for the existence of Pythagorean worlds, are all epistemic possibilities.
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which we speak and these properties is of course much smaller than that to the microphysical:
correspondingly, there is little return in pressing worries that the distance might turn out to be
greater than the astronomical complexity of the arithmetical interpretation. Moreover, since the
elegance of the theories is now pinned relatively directly to macroscopic properties, one could
not detract from the elegance of the theories by adding ‘extra layers’ to the base of reality.
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8.5 Conclusion
The eligibility response to inscrutability response is a sound strategic line for an interpretationist
to take. It is non ad hoc, given that it flows from a general analysis of theoretical elegance. It is
dialectically effective against permutation arguments, even if there is no safety result.
A more general setting exposes serious limitations. Quite generally, when we consider
arguments for radical inscrutability that are based on completeness and compactness, there are
no longer direct grounds for disputing the inscrutabilist’s argument. And, depending on how we
cash out interpretationism, we may be able to argue directly for the existence of ‘Pythagorean’
worlds. I have argued that admitting the existence of such worlds is no better than admitting
radical inscrutability.
We have a remedy, but it comes at a severe cost: the cost being what looks like an ontolog-
ically extravagant appeal to emergent property ontology (or its analogue within an ideological
handling of the natural/non-natural distinction). The appeal would, of course, be less extrav-
agant if one were independently committed to emergent universals and the like—perhaps in
order to secure an analysis of macroscopic similarity, causation and laws. However, it is embar-
rassing, to say the least, that what looks to be a local problem for the metaphysics of meaning
should require such substantial commitment.
We can expect a familiar dialectic to ensue. A prima facie case has been made for the need
for a certain kind of ontology. One now looks around for something that can do the same work,
at a cheaper philosophical cost.
One last direction for progress would be to revisit the way that Lewis handles theoretical
elegance. What is needed to do the work is some objective way of picking out an appropriate
vocabulary, using which we can compare theories with each other. Focusing on perfectly natural
properties is a natural place to look. There may be other ways. For example, one might constrain
the theories to be formulated in terms of intrinsic properties—and hope that this will rule out
gerrymandered properties such as ‘being such that T is true’. I will not speculate here on
the prospects for this and related proposals that would attempt to pick out ‘special’ high-level
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properties without appeal to metaphysically primitive ontology or ideology.
What is clear is that some such underpinning is needed. Unless we patch the eligibility
response in one of these ways, Lewis’ remedy for inscrutability threatens to be worse than the
disease.
Recapitulation and concluding remarks
Recapitulation
In the first part of this thesis, The Framework, I set out the basic challenges for a metasemantic
theory. It is part of a more general project of giving a metaphysical account of representation
properties: focused, in the present case, on the representational properties of language that are
set out by semantic theories.
I proposed to investigate one particular strategy for addressing the metasemantic challenge.
In interpretationism, unlike in causal theories, there is no suggestion of identifying semantic
relations such as REFERENCE with relations that are in independent good-standing. Rather, (as
described in Chapter 2) the “facts underlying” semantic statements are to be found in patterns
of assent and dissent to sentences. §2.3 argued that this ‘interpretationist’ proposal is intimately
related to fictionalisms, though it is to be divorced from any claim about the semantic analysis
of the discourse in question. The key claim was that we can describe the facts underlying se-
mantic talk by giving a ‘theory-shadowing paraphrase’, in terms of what follows from a selected
semantic theory. The “real content” (in Yablo’s sense) of semantic claims are those expressed
by the fictionalist paraphrase.
Different implementations of this ‘interpretationist’ idea give different stories about how
exactly these patterns should be described: for instance, Lewis identifies them with conventions
of truthfulness and trust in uttering a sentence. Interpretationisms can differ also in how they
take the data to constrain a ‘selected’ semantic theory. A common thread is that the meaning-
fixing theory must be the best account of the relevant data—though here too, there is room for
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variation in what we take to be the theoretical virtues relevant to picking the ‘best’ theory.
In this setting, the possibility ofmultiple theories being selected became a worry. I presented
two ways of handling such a situation: either construct an ‘overall’ meaning-fixing theory that
embeds each of the others; or quantify over all the selected theories. In the latter case, any
disagreement between the theories becomes a special case of the general puzzle of ‘incomplete
fictions’. I introduced the machinery in §2.2 for handling that puzzle; and in Chapter 3 com-
pared it to the most promising “overall” account: the supervaluational framework. I concluded
that there was not much to choose between these two options.
In general, where optimal semantic theories disagree with each other as to what it is that
words (or other expressions) refer to, we get inscrutability. Some instances are innocuous: what
I called ‘framework’ inscrutability, paradigmatically the choice of set-theoretic representation
of relations. Other instances of inscrutability may illuminate puzzling features of language. Two
potential examples are the case of theory-change described by Field (1973), and the problem of
the many (Unger, 1980). It might be that vague language in general is a case of ‘illuminating
inscrutability’ in this sense. Our focus then turned to two cases which are, at least at first glance,
much more disturbing.
I argued in Chapter 4 that in the first of these cases—Quinean ‘division’ inscrutability—the
initial appearance is misleading. First, we assessed the argument it was indeterminate whether
‘gavagai’ (or ‘rabbit’) divided its reference over rabbits (i.e. rabbit-worms), rabbit-stages or
undetached rabbit-parts. There are challenging technical issues facing the Quinean case for this
division-inscrutability. I suggested that the best rejoinder to technical worries was to lay out
a semantic treatment of fragments of language, to enable a direct comparison of the results of
‘dividing’ reference in different ways. I concluded that, at least in the stage/worm case there is
a strong argument for division inscrutability. Once we looked in detail at the candidate semantic
theories, the appearance that we were setting bizarre re-interpretations against a common-sense
view was shaken. Once described fairly, they all appeared equally bizarre—or better, all equally
committal on matters where common sense had nothing to say. Moreover, none of the options
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had an obvious advantage on grounds of simplicity: they simply involve various divisions of
labour between additional complexity in the form of extra primitives of the semantic theory (in
particular, the counterpart relations invoked) vs. additional complexity encoded in the objects
over which the quantifiers range and over which reference is divided.
The remaining case I consider is that of arguments for radical inscrutability. I developed
permutation arguments for radical inscrutability in a highly general setting, which allowed us
to see the potential power of the arguments. We also saw settings in which the arguments
break down—though I maintained that if nothing further is said, radical inscrutability can still
be argued for, since the underdetermination of selected theory by data is simply pushed back
to indeterminacy in the data itself. We also found various generalizations of the inscrutability
results: importantly, we have radical indexical inscrutability, which contends that there is no
fact of the matter concerning whether a given term retains its reference from one moment to
the next. This result was taken up in Chapter 7. An alternative ‘direct’ argument for radical
inscrutability on the basis of Henkin’s completeness/compactness proofs was described (§5.4),
giving rise to the problems later discussed in §8.4.
Davidson thinks radical inscrutability of reference is innocuous, perhaps seeing it as a kind
of ‘framework’ inscrutability of a kind with those described earlier. Rather than simply rely
on incredulity at Davidson’s position, I suggested we look for direct arguments against it. In
the third part of the thesis, I investigate the theoretical basis of accepting radical inscrutability.
I began by outlining a number of possible objections, but focused on two: potential tension
between radical inscrutability and cognitive accounts of meaning; and potential tension between
indexical inscrutability and inferential practice.
It is natural to think that inscrutability would ‘infect’ semantic beliefs—rendering beliefs
about reference universally indeterminate. In Chapter 6, I argued that while the cognitive con-
ception of reference is committed to lexical semantic beliefs (or something very like them),
the infection principle itself is resistable given an appropriate account of the relationship be-
tween the content of language and the content of thought. We found no decisive case against
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inscrutability here.
In the case of inference, I gave considerations in support of Campbell’s contention that “In
our reasoning we depend on the stability of language, the fact that its signs do not arbitrarily
change in meaning from moment to moment.” (Campbell, 1994, p.82) I think that this principle
is vital if we are to understand how facts about what follows from what can be relevant to token
inferential moves. However, the indexical inscrutability result of §5.2 contradicts Campbell’s
principle. Here, I claim, is a real problem for the inscrutabilist.
The final part, and chapter, of my thesis focused on a way of avoiding inscrutability. I argued
that we needed to look for a principled way of placing additional constraints on the selection of
semantic theory—one that could be seen as deriving from theoretical virtues in general. Lewis’
eligibility move, as I presented it, takes exactly this form. However, there is a revenge problem
for the account: it relies on the parasitic nature of the permutation arguments, but has nothing
dialectically effective to say about direct (compactness/completeness) arguments for radical
inscrutability. In the case of global descriptivism, I showed how this led to the existence of
‘Pythagorean worlds’—worlds where our terms (or their counterparts) denote abstract entities,
though the world is macroscopically just like ours.
Their are patches available, but they come at a high cost: to directly patch Lewis’ eligibility
response we would need to endorse emergent universals at a macro-level. Perhaps the same job
could be done at a lower cost: but that is a project we must leave for future work.
Concluding Remarks
Radical inscrutability arguments initially seemed to me to be a straightforward reductio of a
simple-minded approach to what fixes meaning, easily avoided by more sophisticated accounts.
My opinions have now changed, as the result of three factors. First, I am now more impressed
with the difficulty facing other foundational theories of meaning. In particular, it is very diffi-
cult to see how metasemantics can deal with expressions other than paradigmatic terms for, and
predicates applying to, medium-sized dry goods. Perhaps logical connectives and theoretical
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terms may be handled in a principled way: but what of ‘very’, ‘of’, ‘the’ and other ingredients
of speech? What of the semantic significance of concatenation itself, reflecting in the composi-
tional axioms of a semantic theory? Some sort of interpretationism seems to me, on reflection,
highly attractive.
Second, when concentrating on a reductive account of the semantic, serious constraints are
in force. The most straight-forward interpretationism gives a clear account of the way that
patterns of assent and dissent determine a meaning-fixing theory: a theory is selected iff it fits
the data. When we appeal to richer theoretical virtues, the account becomes much harder to
formulate, particularly if we are concerned to avoid appealing to intentional resources. It is to
Lewis’ credit that he gives a picture of how this might work: but as detailed above, I think his
account is highly problematic.
Third, I am impressed with how difficult it is to make a compelling case for the problem
with radical inscrutability. I considered a number of potential objections, but we needed to
make serious commitments (concerning the nature of linguistic competence and the connection
between inference and implication) before we had even a prima facie case. Even then, it was
not clear that the inscrutabilist’s resources are exhausted, as illustrated by the ‘pseudo-semantic
beliefs’ offered to the inscrutabilist in §6.3.
I regard the theory of inference as posing the strongest objection to the inscrutabilist. If
this could be finessed, the acceptance of radical inscrutability starts to look like a principled
position. Part III of the thesis identified a number of resources, or ‘substitutes’ for the supposed
explanatory role of scrutable reference.43 The inscrutabilist should point out that he is not
denying that there is a sense in which “Billy runs” is about Billy, rather than Jane (see §III
and the introduction to part III); he merely insists that reference does not capture the sense
of ‘aboutness’ in question. She might wish to avail herself of the pseudo-semantic beliefs of
43In the postscript to his (1978), Field suggests that non-semantic ‘indication relations’ may discharge some
of the theoretic role of robust truth-conditional properties of sentences, leaving us free to deploy a disquotational
treatment of semantic properties to discharge the residual theoretical role. Something like this is being suggested
in the two cases below.
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§6.3.44 We can view such debate as investigating whether a key Davidsonian claim about the
functional role of reference is correct; whether reference is:
a theoretical construct, whose function is exhausted in stating the truth-conditions
for sentences
(Davidson, 1977, p.223)45
If inscrutability is accepted, reference-schemes would be presented as mere artifacts of system-
atizing data about truth-conditions, just as Davidson always insisted.
If the interpretationist is to accept inscrutability, however, she must be wary of deviant
interpretations that have not been discussed here. A central worry will be the ‘Kripkenstein’
rule-following arguments (Kripke, 1980): a finite range of sentential data will always let us
assign truth-conditions that are deviant, so long as the sentences involved are not within the
data-set. Such radical inscrutability of (certain) truth-conditions even less tenable than radical
inscrutability of reference. Moreover, in the specific setting of global descriptivism, the original
‘Putnam’s paradox’—that whatever our (consistent) total theory is, our selected interpretation
will render true—threatens the anti-realist result that total scientific theory is infallible.
Such puzzles may admit of independent resolution. Attention should turn to the form in
which the sentential data is given. For example, if we appeal to dispositions to assent and
dissent, rather than actualized patterns of such, we may be able to undermine the Kripkenstein
considerations. Here is not the place to open up rule-following controversies, however.
Both for one concerned to resist inscrutability while avoiding complicating the meaning-
fixing-theory/data relation, and one who wishes to defend radical inscrutability without falling
victim to Kripkenstein and Putnamian worries, a focus on the data of interpretationism becomes
important. Here we can no longer remain non-committal on details of how interpretationism
44Recall, also, that we did not close off the possibility that “pseudo-semantic beliefs” really do have a semantic
subject-matter. We just noted that this would be a matter of controversy, and that there was no reason to require
this in order for them to discharge the appropriate theoretical role.
45Page references are to the version collected in Davidson (1984).
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is implemented: we must consider, in a case-by-case way, the virtues and vices of particular
interpretationist proposals.
In my future work on this topic, the study of the form which the interpretationist data takes
will be a principle focus. There are many different directions possible here: from appeal to
fine-grained mental content, to causal connections, to structured states of affairs, to data con-
straining referential relations directly. On a ‘head-first’ approach, this will require attention to
broader aspects of the problem of intentionality: particularly on the kind of structure we might
be able to discern in perceptual and attitudinal content. An attraction of such approaches is that,
like Lewis’ eligibility response, they preserve the principled character of the interpretationist
account of semantic facts.
In addition to this broad direction for tackling inscrutability, the work here presented has
thrown up a number of challenging issues that would benefit from further work. I list some of
the matters arising, chapter by chapter:
Chapter 1 As mentioned above, new and detailed forms of interpretationism may be needed in
order to avoid inscrutability, incorporating new sorts of data, or more structured data of
the traditional sentential kind. These may be based on one of the three models outlined
in §1.3, or may take a different form. I am particularly keen to develop the deployment
of decision theory sketched by Davidson (1980), and generally to examine how an in-
terpretationist metasemantics fares in the language of thought setting described by Fodor
(1987).
Chapter 2 One way of arriving at principled constraints on new interpretationist theories, is to
think about the role of underlying facts. In Yablo’s terms (Yablo, 2001), the real content
of semantic statements can be formulated in terms of the patterns of assent and dissent.
General reflection on the role of ‘real content’ of a discourse may therefore give us insight
as to the acceptability, of, for example, causal word-object relations forming part of the
interpretationist’s data.
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Chapter 3 A key question arising in Chapter 3 (also raised in §8.3), concerns the relationship
between vagueness and inscrutability. If vagueness is to be understood as broadly a lin-
guistic or representational phenomenon, rather than ontic or epistemic in character, then
its relation to inscrutability becomes pressing. Is vagueness a form of inscrutability? Or
do vague terms rather have special ‘first-order’ semantic properties, entirely distinct from
vagueness? Even if vagueness is sometimes an ontic matter, how can a semantics be de-
veloped that reflects this? How can metasemantics cope with ‘degree-vague’ expressions
such as ‘red’? Similar questions can be asked about other forms of broadly indeterminate
content, such as that generated by the problem of the many. The cases need to be handled
with care, since the interaction between various views can be damaging.46
Chapter 4 A general project would look at the potential applications for dot theory: perhaps
as a semantics compatible with mereological nihilism. In such cases, we might be willing
to accept some of the quirks which make problems for division inscrutability.
Chapter 5 The extension of the permutation arguments in Appendix C to λ-categorial lan-
guages, while adequate for our purposes, would be more elegant if we had either a reduc-
tion of λ-categorial languages to pure categorial languages, or a fully general treatment
of λ-terms.47
Chapter 7 As a self-standing treatment of the relation between logical consequence and good
inference for an indexical language, one would hope to be able to be able to theorise about
apparently good inferences that exploit context change: for example, the move from “A
is F” uttered at one time, to “A was F” uttered at a later time. As noted on p.232, I do
not think that it is mandatory to think of these as inferences supported by logically valid
argument. Nevertheless, I think a setting can be developed where these inferences can
be underpinned by a chain of valid arguments, within a purely model-theoretic setting.
46See my Williams (2006a).
47As noted in Appendix C, the result there given is restricted to λ-operators applied to sentences (expressions of
type S). The λ-terms of Cresswell (1973) had no such restriction.
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The key will be to transfer the ideas of Campbell (1994) and Prosser (2005) to the model-
theoretic setting, and here I think the metaphysics of words developed in Kaplan (1990),
(and endorsed by Prosser (op cit)) hold the key. I hope to develop this further in future
work.
Chapter 8 In discussing Lewis’ eligibility response made a prima facie case for the need for
emergent universals to avoid the threat of Pythagoreanism. I continue to think that Lewis’
approach is the best motivated response to inscrutability considerations that focuses on es-
olving directly the underdetermination of semantic theory by the interpretationist’s data.
A general programme making the case for emergent universals, comparable to that of-
fered in favour of property inegalitarianism in Lewis (1983a) would be one way of blunt-
ing the cost of the patch I offer the eligibility response. One approach would be to look at
whether the original motivations for property inegalitarianism in Armstrong (1978b) and
Lewis (1983a) require emergent properties; a step in this direction is made by Schaffer
(2004). Alternatively, there is the programme of identifying ‘special’ higher-level prop-
erties without supposing robust property ontology that I mentioned at the end of chapter
8. We should not rule out, either, a quite different handling of the theoretical virtue of
simplicity better able to discriminate between the complexity of the subject-matter of the
theory and the lack of simplicity of the theory itself.
This thesis has not developed a metasemantic framework immune from inscrutability wor-
ries; neither has it brought comfort to those wishing to adopt a laissez-faire attitude to radical
inscrutability. We have concentrated on diagnosing the source of inscrutability, understanding
its nature and the nature of the framework that gives rise to it, mapping the space for responses to
it, and examining the challenges faced in giving a principled response. The effect has been not





Is supervaluational consequence revisionary?
In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability or
otherwise of its alleged logical revisionism. Timothy Williamson claims that supervaluationism
gives rise to:
. . . breakdowns of the classical rules of contraposition, conditional proof, argument
by cases and reductio ad adsurdum in the supervaluationist logic of ‘definitely’.
Williamson (1994, pp.151-152)
Williamson is clearly unhappy with such revisionism:
Conditional proof, argument by cases and reductio ad absurdum play a vital role
in systems of natural deduction, the formal systems closest to our informal deduc-
tions.. . . Supervaluationists have naturally tried to use their semantic apparatus to
explain other locutions. If their attempts succeed, our language will be riddled with
counterexamples to the four rules.
(ibid)
Others, accepting the case for logical revisionism, have argued that the upshot is unobjection-
able. Thus Keefe:
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A number of commentators have emphasised how supervaluationist logic . . . fails to
preserve certain rules of inference or classical principles about logical consequence
. . .
How important is the failure. . . of certain classical principles governing logical con-
sequence? . . .My reply is that the described features of supervaluationism are ac-
ceptable. . .
Keefe (2000, pp.176-178)
As both these authors emphasize, the case for logical revisionism depends on the pres-
ence, in the language at hand, of the supervaluationist notion ‘Definitely’ (the ‘D’ operator).1
Roughly, ‘Definitely p’ says that, no matter how we sharpen the indeterminacy in our language,
p always holds. In this, it is an object-language reflection of the supervaluationist’s notion of
truth—‘supertruth’: the idea being that ‘p’ is supertrue if it is true no matter how we sharpen
our language. In a supervaluational language without the D-operator and its relatives, there is
no special threat to the classical modes of inference. Once it is added, it is alleged that the fol-
lowing results hold, providing counterexamples to the respective classical modes of inference.2
Contraposition
• p |=SV Dp
• ¬Dp 6|=SV ¬p
Conditional proof
• p |=SV Dp
• 6|=SV p⊃ Dp
Argument by cases
• p |=SV Dp∨D¬p
• ¬p |=SV Dp∨D¬p
• 6|=SV Dp∨D¬p
1Though related notions, ‘intentional’ with respect to the parameter of delineations, would also lead to com-
plaints.
2The following are taken from Williamson (op cit)
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Reductio
• p∧¬Dp |=SV ⊥
• 6|= ¬(p∧¬Dp)
Here, for example, is Keefe on contraposition:
in any specification-space where A is super-true, DA is also super-true since DA is
defined as true whenever A is true on all specifications. However, it is not typically
the case that ¬DA |=SV ¬A. . . in a specification space where A is true on some spec-
ifications and false in others, ¬DA is super-true while ¬A is not.
Keefe (2000, p.176)
Below, I argue that these results do not hold if the supervaluationist’s framework is properly
chosen. Moreover, even if they did hold, it is obscure in what sense they would count as a
‘revision’ of classical logic.
Responses
I distinguish two ways for the supervaluationist to respond to the arguments above. The first is
to claim contra Williamson and Keefe, that supervaluational consequence is thoroughgoingly
classical. The second is to accept that the examples arise and, with Keefe, to argue that the
revisionism induced is not objectionable. It is the first line of response that concerns me here.
I can think of three ways of making the case that supervaluationism involves no departure
from classical logic.
1. In order to deny that the examples arise, one might give a non-standard treatment of
the connectives involved, ⊃, ∨ and so forth. One would make a case that, properly
understood, |=SV p ⊃ Dp holds, so that the validity of p |=SV Dp does not lead to a
failure of conditional proof.
2. One might try to undermine the case by characterizing |=SV in such a way that results such
as p |=SV Dp does not hold, so that we can retain the standard treatment of connectives,
and still not fall into revisionism.
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3. One might make a case that the examples given above are not revisions of classical logic
at all, because classical logic fails to sustain the relevant inferences. This would involve
claiming that conditional proof, argument by cases and the rest are not universally valid,
even for the thoroughgoing classicist.
I will focus here on (2) and (3). I argue that the natural generalization of the classical char-
acterization of logical consequence will give a version of |=SV that does not lead to departures
from classical logic: indeed, I will argue that none of the cases that Williamson and Keefe cite
provide counterexamples to the rules they mention. Furthermore, I do this while accepting much
of Williamson’s setting: in particular, his rejection of ‘local’ characterizations of consequence
in favour of ‘global’ characterizations.3 In addition, I point to counterexamples to conditional
proof, contraposition and the rest within classical logic.
The setting
Let me begin by outlining the treatment of consequence I favour. With Williamson (op cit) I
characterize consequence model-theoretically. The first challenge is to say what a supervalua-
tionist model looks like.
A supervaluationist model structure for a language L will consist, at minimum, of a domain
of individuals D and a set of “delineations” ∆, and appropriate accessibility relations on that
domain. In addition, there will be an interpretation function f , which will assign to expressions
classical extensions relative to each delineation. Intuitively, at each delineation the function
will project each expression onto a perfectly sharp ‘meaning’. Formally, the model-structure so
characterized is exactly analogous to that appropriate to a possible-worlds treatment of a modal
language.
The crucial difference between my setting, and those of Williamson and Keefe, is that I
assume that within the model structure of the intended model there will be delineations that are
‘extreme’—relative to which a 6’8” man is short, for example. There are several reasons for
3Williamson gives arguments for the revisionary consequences. I do not dispute that the results follow from the
framework for supervaluationism that he sets up—I dispute one element of that framework on which the cogency
of his arguments turn.
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wanting to have such delineations within our model structure. Consider the following attractive
supervaluationist treatment of comparatives (cf. Lewis, 1970a; Kamp, 1975).
‘A is F-er than B’ is true iff the set of delineations where ‘A is F’ is true is a proper
superset of the set of delineations where ‘B is F’ is true.
This will be untenable unless we have available extreme delineations. For otherwise, the set of
delineations making-true ‘A is tall’ (where A is 6’8”) will be the same as that making-true ‘B is
tall’ (where B is 6’10”). On the treatment of comparatives given above, this will mean that ‘B
is taller than A’ will be declared false, which is absurd.4
Within the intended model, then, we will find extreme delineations. Nevertheless, we want
‘a 6’8” man is not short’ to be true, and ‘a 6’8” man is short’ to be false, on the intended model.
Due to the presence of extreme delineations, we cannot characterize supertruth in the simplest
way, i.e. saying that S is supertrue iff on every delineation d, S is true relative to d. Some extra
machinery is called for.
To finesse these issues, we first require models to pick out a subset of the delineations—a
subset we will call the sharpenings. S will be supertrue (on a model) if it is true relative to each
of the sharpenings of that model. A sentence will be supertrue simpliciter if it is supertrue at
the intended model.
Second, we introduce an accessibility relation, S-access, on the space of delineations of the
model structure, and let ‘Dp’ be true at a delineation d in a model if ‘p’ is true at all delineations
S-accessed by d. On the intended model, the set of sharpenings will S-access each other.5 Our
4Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000) cite such cases as objections to the treatment of comparatives, under
their assumption that all delineations are non-extreme.
A second example: my desk is definitely flat. But in some extreme sense, it is not flat—it is less flat that an oil
slick, for example. To give a treatment on which ‘this is definitely flat, but in some extreme sense, it is not flat’
will come out true, we need to appeal to extreme delineations ‘accessed’ by ‘in some extreme sense’.
Yet another reason for wanting such delineations is the need to treat higher-order vagueness within the superval-
uationist setting. See Williamson (1994, §5.7).
5Another constraint on S will be, presumably, that it is reflexive. More constraints will presumably flow from
an adequate account of higher-order vagueness.
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models will therefore take the form:
m= 〈Dm,∆m,Sm, fm,sm〉
where Dm is the domain, ∆m the set of all (extreme and non-extreme) delineations, Sm an acces-
sibility relation, and sm a subset of the delineations—the sharpenings of the model.
Given this setting, we can then distinguish two forms of consequence. The first is local
consequence:
Γ |=local φ iff
On all models m, and all d ∈ ∆m, fm makes Γ true relative to d only if fm makes φ
true relative to d
Williamson rejects this characterization, on behalf of supervaluationists. He takes it that conse-
quence should be characterized in terms of truth preservation under arbitrary re-interpretations.
For standard supervaluationists, then, it should be characterized in terms of supertruth-preservation.
Given this, local validity looks suspect:
The problem for supervaluationists is that supertruth plays no role in the definition
of local validity. Yet they identify truth with supertruth; since validity is neces-
sary preservation of truth, they should identify it with necessary preservation of
supertruth. That amounts to an alternative definition. . .
Williamson (1994, op cit)
This alternative is global consequence:6
Γ |=global φ iff
On all models m, Γ is supertrue-at-m only if φ is supertrue-at-m
6Williamson does not mention the relativization of truth to a model in the above. However, I take it that he will
wish to generalize over models in the final characterization, on pain of admitting water=H20 as a logical validity.
If we added into our models a set of possible worlds, and a specification of one among these as ‘actual’, then
generalizing over all models would amount to requiring necessary truth preservation, as Williamson requires.
Incidentally I am not personally committed to rejecting local characterizations of consequence, but shall not
argue the point with Williamson here. Since I have no objection to the global characterization, I am independently
interested in exploring its behaviour.
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The notion of supertruth—truth at all sharpenings—is the central notion used to define su-
pertruth on a model. Global consequence, as we have characterized it, meets Williamson’s
constraints. I shall assume in what follows that |=global is a proper explication of |=SV.
Revisionism?
Does |=global induce logical revisionism? I argue not. Consider, for example, the alleged result
that p |=SV Dp. When |=SV is read as |=global, then we can find counterinstances. Take a model
where the set of sharpenings contains a single delineation δ, relative to which p is true (thus
p is supertrue at that model). Assume further that the accessibility relation S relates δ to a
delineation δ′, and p is false relative to δ′. Then ‘Dp’ is not true at δ, and hence not supertrue-
at-m. Hence, we have a countermodel to the claim that Dp is a consequence of p. The upshot
is that this sequent cannot play a role in showing that contraposition, or conditional proof, fails.
Countermodels can be found to the other examples too. For example, consider the alleged
result that p∧¬Dp |=SV A∧¬A.7 The model above is a counterinstance to this also; for relative
to the model just described, the premiss is supertrue, but the conclusion superfalse. Indeed, all
the results cited fall to such considerations.
Notice that to find these countermodels, the S-accessiblity relation has to relate sharpenings
to delineations that are not themselves sharpenings. One might think this illegitimate: the
accessibility relation was introduced precisely to enable a definition of ‘D’ that reflected the set
of sharpenings.
I claim this misunderstands semantic consequence. The basic idea of that notion is that φ
will be a semantic consequence of Γ iff whenever the latter is true, the former will be true also
no matter what the expressions involved may mean. That the above model gives an unintended
interpretation of ‘Definitely’—i.e. so that it does not reflect supertruth—is no objection to our
citing it as a counterinstance to a claimed consequence relation. An unintended interpretation
7Williamson (1994, fn.5.19 p.297) cites this as a robust result, one from which counterexamples to the above
modes of inference all follow.
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is exactly what one should look for, in general, to find counterexamples to claims that one thing
is a semantic consequence of another.8
Now of course total re-interpretation of the particles of language won’t give us a classical
notion of consequence. For example, if we are allowed to re-interpret ‘and’ as meaning or,
then A∧B |= A will have counterinstances. Accordingly, the model-theoretic treatment allows
us to declare inadmissible certain models; paradigmatically, those where the interpretation of
logical constants deviates from that intended. In the case of modal logic, we standardly declare
models inadmissible when the accessibility relations do not obey certain formal features of the
accessibility relation we wish to preserve—which features these are depends on the modality
we are interested in.
One aiming to convict supervaluationism of revisionism may say that the models we cited
above are similarly inadmissible. But what could possibly be the motivation for this? Not
any analogy with precedent within classical modal logic: normally accessibility relations are
allowed to vary as they might, subject only to formal requirements (e.g. reflexivity, as it might
be). Not from any desire to preserve classical logic more generally, since ruling out such models
will mean giving up on conditional proof, contraposition and the rest. Not from a need to secure
other less controversial inferences: for example, to secure that p will be a consequence of Dp,
we need only insist that in every logically admissible model the S-access relation is reflexive—
exactly the kind of restrictions on admissible models familiar frommodal logics more generally.
The only way of arguing that our counterinstance should be ruled inadmissible, as far as
I can see, is a direct approach: one would claim that the connection between the accessibility
relation used to define D, and the set of sharpenings that a model provides, should be taken
as ‘logical’. Again, the question is: what is the argument for this?9 Certainly, the Tarskian
8Consider, for example, a counterinstance to a claim that ‘Hesperus=Phosphorus’ is semantically valid. This
will have to involve assigning to either ‘Hesperus’ or to ‘Phosphorus’ something that it does not designate—that
is, we appeal to an unintended interpretation of this bit of language.
9In conversation, Williamson has indicated that he does regard DEF as a logical constant in these circumstances:
and indeed, he would favour treating modal operators such as metaphysical necessity in parallel ways, rather than
following the standard treatment of modal consequence where domains and accessibility relations are allowed to
vary. Clearly, these are controversial issues; and substantial support for this approach would be needed if the view
is to be dialectically effective against the supervaluationist.
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characterization of logical constants, via permutations, is unlikely to deliver such a result.10
I conclude that we should let the S-access relation vary within logically admissible mod-
els independently of which delineations count as sharpenings in that model. Accordingly, the
argument that global definitions of consequence entail logical revisionism fails.
Counterexamples to the rules without delineations
We can find counterinstances to contraposition, conditional proof, argument by cases and re-
ductio within a purely classical setting. This is due to an orthodox treatment of variables, rather
than the novel treatment of delineations. Standard model-theory for a predicate logic works
with a notion of truth relative to a variable assignment. For example, ‘x is male’ will be true
relative to an assignment that pairs x with Tony Blair; and false with respect to an assignment
that pairs x with Margaret Thatcher. Standardly, we say that x is true (/false) on a model iff it
is true (/false) with respect to every variable assignment.11 Immediately, we find ‘failures of
bivalence’ involving open sentences. It follows directly from the definitions and observations
made above that, on the intended model, “x is male” is neither true nor false.
The considerations in favour of global consequence that Williamson offers transfer directly
to this case: consequence, as truth-preservation, should be defined in terms of truth-on-a-model.
Given this, it is simple to verify that we have the following counterexamples to “classical” rules:
Contraposition
• x is male |= ∀x(x is male)
• ¬∀x(x is male)6|= ¬(x is male)
Conditional proof
• x is male |= ∀x(x is male)
• 6|= x is male ⊃ ∀x(x is male)
10See MacFarlane (2000) on extending the Tarskian permutation criterion to the intensional case. He argues
that it is hard to see how such a categorization could justify restricting the accessibility relation in the formal ways
described above. If so, this makes our case even stronger.
11Lewis (1970a) suggests we take the analogy to its fullest extent and think of variable-assignments as indices,
alongside worlds, times, delineations etc. within a multiply intensional general semantics.
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Argument by cases
• x is male |= ∀x(x is male)∨∀x¬(x is male)
• ¬x is male |= ∀x(x is male)∨∀x¬(x is male)
• 6|= ∀x(x is male)∨∀x¬(x is male)
Reductio
• x is male ∧¬∀x(x is male) |=⊥
• 6|= ¬(x is male ∧¬∀x(x is male))
We have here a definition of truth-on-a-model, characterized by generalizing over all in-
dices of a certain kind—in this case variables. We also have a certain operator—universal
quantification—which reflects this definition of truth, and indeed, is constrained to do so on all
models. Williamson finds analogous behaviour within the setting he offers the supervaluationist
because supertruth and ‘definitely’ stand in an analogous relationship, for him. For Williamson,
a sentence is supertrue if true on all delineations; and ‘Dp’ is true on an arbitrary delineation
in the same circumstances. In the treatment of supervaluationism that I have been offering, this
connection between the definition of truth and the definition of an operator is broken; so the
phenomena do not arise.
If required, we could perform a similar trick with the above results. We could characterize
the universal quantifier in terms of an accessibility relation over the variable assignments, which
was then allowed to vary in unintended models.12 Two factors are missing that were present in
the supervaluational case: in that case we had motivation for formulating the ‘D’ operator in
terms of an accessibility relation, once we had (for independently motivated reasons) introduced
extreme delineations into our semantics. Second, there was no prima facie case for regarding
D as a logical operator, whereas there is such a case for the universal quantifier. The case for
“revisionism”, if such it is, is much stronger in the case of free variable formulas, than it is in
the case of ‘Definitely’.
12To get this to work, we may need to allow it to access individuals from outside the domain.
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Conclusion
One headache for supervaluationists in recent times has been the logical revisionism allegedly
implicated by their setup. I say that there is a natural framework for supervaluationism that
undermines the arguments for revisionism offered in the literature. Moreover, the setup—
involving extreme delineations—is one that supervaluationists have independent reasons to ac-
cept.
Perhaps the case for revisionism can be mended: one could try to argue that there are good
reasons for taking the link between ‘Definitely’ and the set of sharpenings to be ‘logical’ in
nature, contrary to what has been urged above. It is likely that such a case would involve
deep and controversial claims about the nature of logicality, particularly in relation to sentential
operators such as ‘definitely’, ‘necessarily’, ‘possibility’ and even quantifiers. The burden of
proof is certainly on the supervaluationist’s critic to make such a case.
Our final observation is that there are counterexamples to all the rules cited earlier within a
purely classical setting. This makes urgent the need for clarification, from the supervaluation-
ist’s critic, on what counts as an objectionable ‘logical revision’. We already have precedent for
the kind of breakdowns in contraposition, conditional proof and the rest that Williamson cites.
Further, reasoning with open sentences does take place—in mathematics at least. Again, the




The results and proofs below are based on those given in Zilber (2000), and the ideas derive
ultimately from Henkin (1949).
We first consider a first-order language, L, which is constructed in the usual way from
logical symbols (including identity, ‘ .=’) and a non-logical vocabulary of constants, function-
symbols and predicates. We will consider arbitrary such languages, imposing no limitations on
the cardinality of the language.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Any consistent set Σ of L-sentences is satisfiable. (In particular, it
is satisfied by a structure of cardinality no greater than that of the language.). Equivalently: if
a set of sentences is unsatisfiable (i.e. Γ ⊥) then it is inconsistent (i.e. Γ ` ⊥).
A corollary is:
Theorem 3 (Compactness). Any f.s. set Σ of L-sentences is satisfiable. (In particular, it is
satisfied by a structure of cardinality no greater than that of the language.)
This follows from the observation that a set is finitely satisfiable only if it is consistent.
Consider an inconsistent set Λ. There must be a finite derivation of an absurdity from this set—
the derivation will appeal to only finitely many elements of Λ. Conjoining, and appealing to
the deduction theorem, we have (λ1∧ . . .∧λn)→⊥ derivable from the null set. Since ⊥ is not
satisfiable, by the interpretation of→ every model must make one of λi false. Hence this finite
subset of Λ is not satisfiable.
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We shall prove the completeness theorem and allow compactness to fall out as a corollary.
The proof given could easily be modified to prove compactness directly, substituting ‘finite
satisfiability’ for ‘consistency’ throughout, and making the necessary small changes.
In the following, we will need the following notions. A set of L sentences Σ is maximal if,
for every L-sentence φ, either φ ∈ Σ or ¬φ ∈ Σ. It is full if whenever ∃xφ(x) ∈ Σ, there is some
constant c such that φ(c) ∈ Σ. It is finitely satisfiable if every finite subset Σ0 ⊆ Σ has a model.
It is deductively closed with respect to finite subsets if, whenever Γ is finite subset of Σ, and
Γ |= χ, then χ ∈ Σ. A canonical model for Σ is one in which every element of the domain is
denoted by a constant symbol in the language.
We now move to show that completeness holds for first order languages with arbitrary sets
of non-logical vocabulary.
Lemma 4. If Σ is maximal and consistent then it is deductively closed with respect to finite
subsets of formulae.
Proof. Suppose φ,ψ ∈ Σ and that φ,ψ ` χ (⇔{φ,ψ,¬χ} is inconsistent.) By maximality of Σ,
either χ or ¬χ ∈ Σ. If ¬χ were in Σ, then {φ,ψ,¬χ} would be a clearly inconsistent subset of
Σ. So χ ∈ Σ. This reasoning generalises to arbitrary finite cases.1

Proposition 5. For any full and deductively closed set Σ of L-sentences there is a canonical
model A of Σ. Further, this canonical model can be chosen to embed an arbitrary reference-
scheme σ, so long as this is consistent with the identities contained in Σ.
Proof. Note that it follows from the above that Σ is deductively closed wrt finite subsets.
Let Λ be the set of closed terms of L. For α,β ∈ Λ define an equivalence relation ∼ that
holds iff α .= β ∈ Σ. That this is an equivalence relation is established by the above remark and
the elementary properties of identity.
Let A be the set of equivalence classes of Λ under ∼. The domain of our canonical model
could be taken to be A. However, we can build a canonical model from any domain of objects
1NB: notice that parallel reasoning would show that maximal finitely satisfiable sets are deductively closed with
respect to finite sets.
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that is bijective with A. Suppose, in particular, that we wish to construct a canonical model
that matches some function σ from terms of L to objects drawn from O. Suppose also that
σ(α) = σ(β) whenever α∼ β.
Extend take any supersetM ofO, of cardinality equal to A, and pick some particular bijective
function φ : A≈M. Now write α˜ for the image under φ of the equivalence class of α under ∼.
We need now to assign an interpretation of constants, functions and relations of L relative
to M. This will proceed in the obvious way. Thus:
• cA = c˜
• f A(α˜1, . . . , α˜n) = ˜f (α1, . . . ,αn)
• 〈α˜1, . . . , α˜n〉 ∈ RA ←→ R(α1, . . . ,αn) ∈ Σ
It is easily checked that these definitions do not depend on the choice of representatives for
α˜. If αi and βi are different representatives of the same equivalence class, then we have
α1
.= β1, . . . ,αn
.= βn ∈ Σ. Note that: α1 .= β1, . . . ,αn .= βn,P(α1, . . . ,αn) |= P(β1, . . . ,βn). By
deductive closure of Σ, it follows that P(α1, . . . ,αn) ∈ Σ entails P(β1, . . . ,βn) ∈ Σ. Similar ar-
guments show the well-definedness of other clauses.
This completes the definition of the L-structure A which is to be the canonical model. We
may now show that it does indeed model Σ. It suffices that:
A |= φ(α˜1, . . . , α˜n)⇐⇒ φ(α1, . . . ,αn) ∈ Σ
We proceed by induction on the complexity of φ.
The base cases hold by construction. For propositional connectives, the deductive closure
of Σ gives our result. In the case of quantifiers, we need to use the fullness of Σ. Let us suppose
that ∃xφ(α1, . . . ,αn,x) ∈ Σ. Now by the definition of satisfaction, A |= ∃xφ(α˜1, . . . , α˜n,x) holds
if and only if there is some β˜ ∈ A such that A |= φ(α˜1, . . . , α˜n, β˜). By construction of A , this last
holds iff φ(α1, . . . ,αn,β) ∈ Σ. This is the case just when ∃xφ(α1, . . . ,αn,x) ∈ Σ (⇒ by deductive
closure, ⇐ by fullness of Σ). This gives our result, once we note that the domain of A must
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have cardinality ≤ |L|, by construction.

The above result gives rise to the following general strategy for constructing models for sets
of formulae:
Take a consistent set of L-sentences Σ and extend them to a set Σ† in a language L†
which is maximal consistent and full. By the first two conditions, it is deductively
complete, so we can use the above construction to build a canonical model. We can
then restrict the result to obtain an L-structure modelling Σ.
A first step is the following lemma.
Lemma 6 (Lindenbaum Theorem). Given a consistent set of L-sentences Σ, there is a maximal
consistent set of L-sentences Σ∗ extending Σ.
Proof. By the axiom of choice, the set of formulae of L can be well-ordered. Since the language
is set-sized, under this ordering it is order-isomorphic to some ordinal β. Index each formula
by ordinals ≤ β.




γ<λΣγ λ a limit ordinal
Σα+1 :=

Σα : if there is no φα in L
Σα ∪{φα} : if this is consistent
Σα ∪{¬φα} : otherwise
Set Σ∗ := Σβ (note that Σγ = Σβ for all γ> β)
Note that, so long as Σα is consistent, one of Σα ∪{φα} and Σα ∪{¬φα} must be consistent.
We can see this by reductio. If both were inconsistent then Σα ∪{φα} ` ⊥ and Σα ∪{¬φα} ` ⊥.
Appealing to the deduction theorem twice, Σα ` φα→⊥ and Σα ` ¬φα→⊥. Logic then gives
us that: Σα ` ¬¬φα and Σα ` ¬φα, and so Σα ` ¬¬φα∧¬φα. So Σα itself would be inconsistent.
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With this in place, it is easy to see that the construction preserves consistency. Given that
the initial Σ is consistent, Σ∗ will be a consistent set.
Σ∗ will also be complete. Take an L-sentence ψ. This has a place in the well-ordering
described above, so ψ= φα for some α< β, and so one of ψ, ¬ψ will be in Σα+1 ⊆ Σ∗.

Note that even without the axiom of choice, the above theorem would be available for lan-
guages with well-orderable sets of non-logical terminology. In particular, it would hold for
countable languages.
Theorem 7 (Completeness). Any consistent set Σ of L-sentences is satisfiable. (In particular, it
is satisfied by a structure of cardinality no greater than that of the language.)
Proof. Extend L to L+ by adding constant symbols cφ for each L-formula φ(x) with exactly
one free variable. Now form Σ+ by adding the L+-formulas of the form “∃xφ(x)→ φ(cφ)” to Σ.
Notice now that Σ+ is now full in L+.
It will be also be consistent if Σ is, for we would be able to replicate any proof of a contradic-
tion from Σ+ within the original setting, by appealing to existential elimination on appropriate
instances of ∃xφ(x).
We now take the full, consistent set Σ+ and use the Lindenbaum theorem to find a maximal
superset Σ+∗.











Σ+∗+∗ ⊆ ·· ·
The non-zero even elements of the chain are full, the odd elements are maximal, and all are
consistent. The union of the chain, Σ∞ will then be a maximal consistent and full set of sentences




.2 By an earlier result, we will be able to construct a canonical
2Consistency: any finite subset of Σ∞ will be also a finite subset of some Σn, which is consistent. Since a set is
consistent iff its finite subsets are consistent, this gives the result. Full: any ∃xφ(x) will be found in some Σn, and
hence a witnessing constant will be introduced in the next constructions. Completeness: Any formula φ of L∞ is a
formula of some L(+)n . By construction, either φ or ¬φ will be entailed by Σn+1, which is a subtheory of Σ∞.
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L∞-model A∞ for Σ∞. Note that none of the extensions of the language increase its cardinality,
and hence this model has cardinality ≤ |L|. By appropriate elimination of the interpretation of
new constant-symbols from this structure, we will obtain an L-structure which will model the
L-sentences within Σ∞, which is exactly Σ.

This proof depends on the axiom of choice insofar as it relies upon the Lindenbaum lemma.
We may note, therefore, that the result can be proved without use of the axiom of choice in the
case of well-orderable languages, and as a special case of this, for countable languages.
Given the proof just sketched (and in particular, the closely related version where ‘consis-
tency’ is replaced by ‘finite satisfiability’ throughout), it is easy to go on to prove a version of
the upward Loweinheim-Skolem theorem. Details can be found in Zilber (2000).
Extending the results to type theories
Completeness and compactness results can be proved for second order logics, and type theories,
provided that we allowmodels which are not ‘standard’. The ‘non-standardness’ of such models
is not worrying for our purposes: it simply means that we allow the domains of the various types
to vary in certain ways. From one perspective, this is a natural extension of the standard feature
of first-order logic: that the domain of the first-order quantifiers should be allowed to vary from
model to model. It may well be that the intended model of a second order or type theoretic
language has its domains related to each other in a tightly constrained way: but this can be
admitted while allowing admissible (unintended) models where this is not the case. The more
general kind of model are known as ‘general’ or ‘Henkin’ models, as opposed to ‘standard’ or
‘full’ models.
There are two ways of viewing the extension of compactness results to the higher order
cases. The first is to view a higher-order logic, say with ‘second-order’ (predicate-position)
quantifiers, as a multi-sorted first order language. Predication would be represented by a rela-
tion holding between terms of the first sort, and terms of the second sort. ‘Fx’ is represented
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p©(F,x) (for the full type theory, we extend this to include many more sorts). We then need only
generalize the above techniques to apply to relevant kinds of multi-sorted logics, and we can
derive our result. See Shapiro (1991, §§4.3) for a full proof of compactness for second-order
logic that takes this kind of line.
Henkin (1950) gives a proof of compactness for an extensional type theory that does not
require such re-interpretation. The basic idea is a generalization of that given above. Given a
consistent set Λ, one extends it via Lindenbaum-style techniques to a complete set Γ. (Within a
Church-style type theory setting, this will automatically be full, as the axioms governing the λ
and ι operators within the framework ensure that the maximal consistent set of sentences Γ will
contain a singular term ι(λxFx) witnessing Fx whenever ∃xFx is in Γ.)
Henkin then puts closed expressions of each type into equivalence classes relative to Γ.
Introducing the notion of identity ‘=’ between expressions of a given type via a version of
Leibniz’s law, he lets expressions Ac, Bc be equivalent iff Γ ` Ac = Bc.
With this in place, he begins to build the domains. As before, the ‘first order domain’ (i.e.
the domain of category N) will comprise equivalence classes of singular terms. The category
of S is given the domain {T,F}. In general, he argues that by suitably choosing the domains of
each derived category, one can set up a 1-1 function Φ from elements of the domain of category
Q to equivalence classes of expressions of that category. This clearly holds for the first two
cases. The equivalence classes of S are just two: those proved by Γ which we map by Φ to T ;
and the rest, which are mapped to F . The equivalence classes of N just are the elements of that
domain, so Φ can here be taken as identity.
For a derived category Q= R/T we set up an appropriate domain (by induction) as follows.
We suppose that we have extended Φ to expressions of category R and T . An element of the
domain will be a function, from elements of the domain of T to elements of the domain of R.
So take q of category Q, and an arbitrary element A in T . By our induction hypothesis, there is
some expression t of category T such that Φ maps the equivalence class of t to A; Φ([t]) = A.
Now consider q(t), which is an expression of category R. By induction again, there is a unique
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corresponding element of R, B, such that Φ([q(t)]) = B. Hence we set:
Φ([q]) : A 7→ B
It is easy to check that our construction depends at no point on the choices of representatives,
and that we have thereby proved our induction step.
Henkin then proves a lemma which shows that, if we let variable assignments range over
the frame of domains just characterized, we have a valuation of the language which matches Φ
on the value it assigns to closed formulae. We started out by ensuring that Φ paired elements
of Γ (and a fortiori, those of Λ) with T . Given this is indeed embedded within a valuation of
the language as a whole, there is a valuation which makes each element of Λ true. (Further-
more, because each of the (countably many) domains is in 1-1 correspondence with a set of
equivalence classes of expressions of the (countable) language, the overall domain is at most
countable.) This provides the desired completeness result: for every consistent set of closed
sentences, there is a valuation on which every member of the set is true.
Compactness is then a trivial corollary: established by linking finite satisfiability to prov-
ability as above.
Appendix C
Variables, abstraction and inscrutability
The pure categorial framework described in §5.1 has difficulties in giving an elegant treatment
of quantification for non-basic categories. Consider the following two expressions: “For every-
one, there’s someone who loves them” and “For everyone, there’s someone that they love”. The
most elegant approach would be to formalize these using λ-abstracts:
• Everyone λy(Someone(λx[x loves y]))
• Everyone λx(Someone(λy[x loves y]))
What Cresswell (1973) calls a ‘λ-categorial’ language treats λ as a new primitive—a syncate-
gorematic expression, whose interpretation is not allowed to vary across models.
In order to keep their categorial languages ‘pure’, Lewis (1970a) and Montague (1970) treat
λx for an appropriate variable x as a part of the lexicon. Lewis calls them ‘binders’. He considers
only the case where the variable is of category n, and treats λx itself as having category (S/N)/S.
The key here is that Lewis treats variable assignments themselves as an index within the general
semantics—this then allows intensions for the binders to be defined. The details can be found
in Lewis (1970a, p.210-212).1
1Here is a quick sketch. We want to assign an intension appropriate to the category (S/N)/S to λxn. This
will be a mapping from sentence intensions to (a function which maps name-intensions to sentence-intensions).
Suppose a sentence intension f is input. We now want to describe the behaviour of the output, g on an arbitrary
name-intension. Therefore let σ be a name intension (a function from indices to objects), and consider g(σ), which
must be a sentence intension (a function from indices to truth-values). Stipulate that g(σ) will take the value T
306
APPENDIX C. VARIABLES, ABSTRACTION AND INSCRUTABILITY 307
There is a serious limitation to Lewis’ approach, which he notes in the postscript to (1970a).
As Lewis sets it up, a variable assignment is a function from variable-numbers2 to extensions of
the appropriate type (in the case of category N variables, it is a function from variable-numbers
to objects). If semantic values for all expressions were ‘Carnapian’ in form—i.e. functions from
indices to extensions, we would have little problem in generalizing Lewis’ idea. A variable
assignment would simply map variables of category c to extensions of the type appropriate to c.
However, on Lewis’ treatment, the semantic values of derived categories are ‘compositional’
rather than ‘Carnapian’. The semantic value of an expression of category S/N, for example, will
be a function from intensions of type 〈i,e〉 to intensions of type 〈i, t〉. Therefore, in the general
case, there simply are no ‘extensions’ to range over. Moreover, we cannot generalize Lewis’
idea by taking variable assignments as mappings from variables to appropriate intensions. Con-
sidered set theoretically, the indices themselves (in particular, all variable assignments) are in
the transitive closure of any intension. If a variable assignment maps variables to intensions,
anything in the transitive closure of the intension is in the transitive closure of the variable as-
signment. In particular, a given variable assignment is in its own transitive closure—a violation
of the foundation axiom (cf. Lewis, 1970a, postscript).3
The plan for the remainder of this note is the following. First, we generalize general se-
mantics by making a distinction between compositional and Carnapian indices, and relate this
to the double-indexed semantics and the Carnapian type theory described in §§5.1 and 5.4 re-
spectively. We note that treating variable assignments as Carnapian indices resolves the worries
about Foundation, but does not allow an easy generalization of Lewis’ treatment of binders.
Setting the question of how variables are to be handled aside for the moment, we note that we
already have the resources for proving sentential invariance under permuted reference-schemes
at an index i iff f (i′) = T , where i′ is an index is like i except that the object it assigns the free variable matches
the object delivered by σ. (I.e. f (i′) = T ) where i′ is that index differs from i if at all only at the nth entry in the
variable-assignment co-ordinate of i; where it there coincides with σ(i).)
2I.e. if there are denumerably many variables of category N, v1, . . . ,vn . . . then a variable assignment is a
mapping from the natural numbers to objects.
3Montague’s framework in (1970), by contrast, is based on Carnapian intensions (albeit with departures), and
so Lewis’ problems with variable-assignments for derived types do not afflict him.
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in the general setting, and that Carnapian indices always allow the analogue of radical indexical
inscrutability. This runs against recent arguments by McGee (2005a), and so we take time to
explain how our setting—and in particular, the treatment of variable assignments as indices—
undermines McGee’s case. Finally, we turn back to the question of how λ-terms are to be han-
dled. I show how to extend the permutation argument to (a version of) Cresswell’s λ-categorial
framework.
Generalizing general semantics
Let us initially divide indices within an intensional type theory into two sorts: Carnapian indices
and compositional indices. Now define two sorts of intension for an expression. Appropriate α-
intensions will be characterized recursively as compositional intensions are in Lewis’ treatment,
and as appropriate extensions are in an extensional type theory. Having chosen α-intensions for
basic categories, we define appropriate α-intensions for derived categories in a way isomorphic
to the build up of the categories themselves. In particular, an expression of category S/N will be
assigned a function from name-α-intensions (functions from compositional indices to objects)
to sentence-α-intensions (functions from compositional indices to truth-vales).
Next, define appropriate β-intensions (which will play the role of semantic values) over
the α-intensions just constructed, paralleling the moves made in the Carnapian case. A β-
intension for a derived category will then be a function from Carnapian indices to appropriate
α-intensions. A name will therefore be assigned as semantic value a function from Carnapian
indices to name-α-intensions; i.e. a function from Carnapian indices to (a function from compo-
sitional indices to truth-values). S/N expressions will be assigned as semantic value a function
from Carnapian indices to (a mapping from name-α-intension to sentence α-intensions).
Various of the frameworks discussed in Chapter 5 can now be categorized. The Carnapian
intensional type theory (§5.4) is a case where all indices—variable assignments, possible worlds,
contexts etc—are all treated as Carnapian indices. The α intensions are just extensions, and the
β intensions are ‘Carnapian intensions’. The single-indexed Lewisian framework of composi-
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tional intensional type theory is a case where all these indices are compositional indices. The
α intensions are Lewis’ compositional intensions, and since there are no Carnapian indices we
can identify β-intensions with the α-intensions.
The double-indexed general semantics that I put forward for the purposes of the argument
for radical indexical inscrutability is of the mixed kind. All the indices bar that of context
are compositional, but the context index is Carnapian. In this framework, the α intensions
are Kaplanian ‘contents’ (handled compositionally) whereas the β intensions are Kaplanian
‘characters’: functions from contexts to contents.
How should we decide whether to treat an index as compositional or as Carnapian? Lewis’
argument in favour of compositional indices rests on what he calls ‘intensional predicates’ such
as (allegedly) “is rising” where whether the concatenation of the predicate with a name is true
at a world depends on the intension of a name, not just its extension. (Other phenomena calling
for such treatment include adjectives such as ‘good’, ‘fake’ etc.)
It seems we should treat possible worlds as a compositional index, if only as a matter of
prudence. In contrast, there seems no parallel argument against treating context in a Carnapian
way.
Suppose we treat variable assignments as Carnapian. Immediately, some of the problems
for Lewis’ picture are addressed. For we can now take variable assignments to map variables to
appropriate α intensions; but α-intensions do not include variable assignments in their transitive
closure, so there is no threat of violating Foundation. This is definite progress: we do indeed
have the basic framework for handling variables of all categories.
There is a bug. Lewis’ definition of binders treats them as functions of the β-intensions of
the sentences they attach to (given that variable assignments are now Carnapian). For what λx
does when attached to a sentence θ is to create a function f , such that the value of f (α) at a
Carnapian index is defined in terms of |θ| at some other Carnapian index (i.e. some other vari-
able assignment). Although we have no problems with Foundation, prima facie we still cannot
define binders, if we are to limit ourselves to the Lewisian functional-application treatment of
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the semantic significance of concatenation.4 I will shortly follow Lewis in moving to Cress-
well’s (1973) λ-categorial framework, and show that permutation arguments still go through in
that setting. Significantly for what follows, we can still treat variable assignments as Carnapian
indices in the way just sketched.
I will now discuss how this treatment of variables undermines some objections to permuta-
tion arguments due to Vann McGee.
The inscrutability results and variables
We should note that we already have the materials to prove radical interpretation results for the
‘mixed’ setting. The theorem of §5.1.2 showed that α-intensions were invariant under permuta-
tions, and in extending this result to a double-indexed semantics, we implicitly showed that this
holds also for β-intensions. Further, the cut-and-shunt argument of §5.1 for radical indexical
inscrutability relies only on the Carnapian character of the context index. For any Carnapian
index i, we can establish radical i-inscrutability by exactly the same procedure there used. In
particular, this holds for the limiting case, where all indices are Carnapian, as was noted in
passing in §5.4.
McGee (2005a) holds that variables are the Achilles heel of one version of permutation
arguments for radical inscrutability. The argument he considers is the one where different per-
mutations are applied to each world—effectively, this is the ‘cut-and-shunt’ technique, this time
for radical intensional inscrutability we discussed in §5.4.5 McGee’s first complaint is that if
different permutations are chosen in different worlds, then names will no longer be rigid des-
ignators. I am confused as to how this observation could undermine permutation arguments.
To note that radical intentional inscrutability will undermine the rigidity of proper names is no
more an objection to inscrutability arguments than it is to note that straightforward radical in-
4Achille Varzi, in personal communication, maintains that binders can be handled within a pure categorial
language. The outline of his treatment is in Varzi (2002). If Varzi is right, then the following extension to λ-
categorial language is unnecessary. I hope in future work to be in a position to evaluate Varzi’s contention, the
details of which are given in Varzi (1999).
5As there mentioned, this kind of ‘cut-and-shunt’ move is first made in the appendix to Putnam (1980).
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scrutability can associate names with objects with which tokenings of the name bear no causal
connection. What would be needed is some independent constraint on acceptable interpretation:
respectively, that proper names must be causally connected to their referents, or that they must
be rigid.6
A stronger argument that McGee offers is the following. Suppose that humans are essen-
tially animals. Then the following should be false: there is something which is a human, and
is such that it is possibly a chair. Given radical intensional inscrutability, we can let the per-
mutation chosen for the actual world be the identity mapping, and the permutation for some
non-actual world w be one that maps Tony Blair to his chair and vice versa. Given the way
that the deviant interpretation is constructed in w, Tony Blair will fall under ‘chair’ at w. On a
standard treatment of variable assignments, an assignment that maps x to Tony Blair will render
true the open sentence x is human and possibly, x is a chair. As McGee puts it, variables are
automatically rigid, so the permutation argument (in the current formulation) gives the wrong
results when we consider quantified modal formulae.
This generates a puzzle: I have claimed to prove that categorial languages, of a sort that
is able to handle all the quantification one could wish for, is sententially invariant under the
kind of permutations that McGee is considering.7 Yet McGee has produced an apparent coun-
terexample. The tension is defused, however, when we realize that our setting does not treat
variables assignments in the standard way. From the perspective of our system, variables are
simply a term of category N, not distinct, from a formal point of view, from an ordinary proper
name. Under the intended interpretation, the extension of this term depends solely on the vari-
able assignment, and is indifferent to what world-index is selected. This is not the case on the
permuted interpretation. Following through the way this was to be constructed, we see that any
6Even if we made the case that everything of type N has to be rigid (as for example, Evans (1982) tries to
do, based on a principle of simplicity in semantic theorizing), another premiss that would be required is that the
elements of English we ordinarily take to be names are indeed proper names. Ramsey famously worries about this,
holding that names might be re-construed as second-level predicates (i.e. of category (S/(S/N)). Indeed, Montague
handled proper names in exactly this way.
7Lewis’ treatment of objectual quantification in his pure categorial language would suffice to make this point,
given our results in Chapter 5, even if the extension to λ-categorial languages below was not successful.
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expression in category N at world w will refer to the φ-image of its intended referent. Thus
variables too will become non-rigid under radical intensional inscrutability.8 Hence our setting
is safe from McGee’s alleged counterexample.9
The permutation argument in a λ-categorial setting.
While keeping the treatment of variable assignments as Carnapian indices, let us move (as Lewis
(1970a) suggests) to a λ-categorial setting based on that described by Cresswell (1973). Here, λ
expressions are syncategorematic, and we need to lay down specific semantic axioms governing
them, as follows:
λ-axiom
Where x is in category σ and θ is of type t, |λxθ| is the function f of type 〈t,σ〉,
such that for any a ∈ σ, f (a)(i) = |θ|(i′), where i′ and i match everywhere except
possibly on the value assigned to x, where i′ assigns a. (We write this i′ = i(x/a))
The question now is whether our permutation results can be extended to this revised setting.
Now the proof as we have given in §5.1 still stands: it assigned a value to each expression
according to its category, and showed how these fit together to give an overall compositional
interpretation. Now, however, there is the worry that this interpretation will not verify the λ-
axiom we just laid down—that |λxθ|φ and to |θ|φ will not be connected in the way just specified.
In fact, this worry is well-placed. In order to get a permuted interpretation to work, we have to
include in our semantic theory a different axiom for λ, as follows:
φ-variant λ-axiom
Where x is in category σ and θ is of type t, |λxθ|φ is the function f of type 〈t,σ〉,
such that for any aφ ∈ σ, f (aφ)(i) = |θ|φ(i′), where i′ and i are Carnapian indices
that match everywhere except possibly on the value assigned to x, where i′ assigns
a (i.e. i′ = i(x/a)).
8Note that the value of a variable xn at variable-assignment v will no longer simply be the object to which the
variable-assignment maps the appropriate n.
9Note also that McGee’s claims are in tension with the proofs given in the appendix to Hale andWright (1997b).
The framework there used (deriving from Benson Mates) effectively treats variables as temporary names. Hence,
when the permutation argument is proved, variables are subject to the same ‘twisting’ as are names, and so, in the
case McGee considers, will no longer be rigid.
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We can now proceed to show that nothing goes wrong with the permutation result. We need
to show that our axiom is vindicated by the permuted-variant interpretation. The crucial clause
for our purposes is the following:
If f is an appropriate intension forC/C1 . . .Cn,
then f φ : rφ 7→ sφ iff f : r 7→ s.
Of course, we now modify this since we have Carnapian indices in place. What we need in
general is the following recursive clause:
If f is an appropriate β-intension for C/C1 . . .Cn, and i is a specification of the
Carnapian indices, then f φ(i) : rφ(i) 7→ sφ(i) iff f (i) : r(i) 7→ s(i) where rφ = g and
sφ = h
In the case at hand, the functions in question will be mapping intensions onto sentence inten-
sions. We already know that sentence intensions are invariant across the original and permuted
interpretation. What we need to show, therefore, is that |λxθ|(r)(i) = |λxθ|φ(rφ)(i). But this
follows immediately from the permuted λ-axiom:
|λxθ|(r)(i) = |θ|(i(x/r)). (†)
If we applied the old rule to the permuted interpretation, |λxθ|φ(rφ)(i) = |θ|φ(i(x/rφ)). But
since we are using the new φ-variant rule for λ, we have
|λxθ|φ(rφ)(i) = |θ|φ(i(x/r)). (‡)
|θ| and |θ|φ are identical (being of category t), so (‡) gives us |λxθ|φ(rφ)(i) = |θ|(i(x/r)). Since
this is identical to |λxθ|(r)(i) (by †), we have our result.10
.
10Strictly, we would induct on the number of occurrences of λ in θ.
To prove the result for the fully general λ-categorial language, where θ can be of any category, further work
would be needed. I assume that this will pose no new problems, and hope to give the fully general result in future
work.
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